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IMMEDIATELY after the fall of Khiva, ~ i l c l  before 
tlie Treaty of Peace hacl beell concluded, General 
Iiaufnalln under took a campaign against the 
Yomuil tribe of Turkomalls, who inhabited a por- 
tion of the I<liivan Oasis in the vicinity of Iliali. 
In justification of this expeclition, it was statecl 
tllat the Turlcol~~ai~ sul~jecls of the IChan of Klliva, 
Iluil llevcr proved to 1)e ol~eclient, ancl that ullless 
. . 
tJlcy ~verc illncle to feel the l~owcr of Russia it was 
11r01)al~le 151:~t as soon as the ni~ssiail t1.oops were 
~vitllilrnwn tllcy ~voulil recornmelice their acts of 
lx~vlcssness :~11(1 pill:~ge, and woulcl tlius, sooner or 
lntcr, necessilato tlic? dcsl~ntch of :L liussiau force l o  
ltecp t,l~c~rl in (:11~(:1;. 
l h t  tlic SC:LI c::\asc of this :~tl,ac,lr 011 llie Yolnucls 
J'ijl,, 11. I3 
2 TI-IE TURICOMANS OF I<I-IIVA I si3- 
is probably to be found in the failure of Kaufn~anu's 
columll to gain t l ~ e  first honours in the Kllivan 
campaign. When Illat caillpaig~i was first planned, 
it had been arranged that ICaufmann should leacl 
the main coln~nv from Turkestan, a secoildary 
force being sent oi11y from the Caspian to a,ssist in 
the uaclcrLaking, I t  was thus fuUy expected thnt 
Kauimann tvould gain the entire credit of the con- 
quest of Khiva ; and even when the original plans 
were modified, it was still believed that the Tur- 
Irestan troops would take the leading part in the 
operatioas. The result, however, coixpletely falsi- 
fied these anticipations, for while Xaufmann ancl 
his troops were still struggling across the desert 
from Kl~ala Ata to Uch-Uchak, Vereflrin, wit11 big 
Orenburg troops, was 1.apid1y approadling the 
I<hivan capital; and after the junction of the 
Or enburg a i d  Kinderly detachments the unitecl 
colulnns contillued their victorious advance and 
reached the capilal while Kaufmann was still 
many miles distant. The brunt of the fighting 
also had been borne by the Orellburg and Kiilderly 
columns, while Kaufinann's troops l ~ a d  scarcely 
seen the enemy; and, to crown all, Kaufinann's 
triumphant entry into Khiva had been marred by 
SkobelefT's successful assa~~l t  on tlie north gate of 
the city and advance through the town to the 
Khan's palace. There can be no doubt that Kauf- 
mann felt that his share in the campaign had been 
completely eclipsed by the more brilliant opera- 
tions of Verefkin's force, and he was t,hereforc not 
clispleasecl when an oppostnnity presented itself 
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-1876 CAUSE OF ATTACK ON THE YOMUDS 3 
whereby his Turkestan troops could obtain a share 
of the fighting, and thus participate in the rewards 
and decoratioiis which would be bestowed at tile 
end of tlie war. 
When, therefore, JhiIaliornmed Rallim Khan, for- 
getful of the valuable assistance t~l i ich the Turko- 
mans hail always given liiin in supplying the best 
Inen for the defence of the Khanate, deuoullced 
t,llein to I<anfmanii as robbers and outlaws, ad -  
vantage was taken of these complaints to obtain 
distinction for the Russiali troops by an attack 011 
these troublesome subjects of the Khivan ruler. 
The Khan, who was anxious to regain possession 
of 2lis artillery, stated that he could not keep the 
Yomuds in order uilless tlie guns which had bee11 
captured were given back to hiin; and wlien the 
question of tlie war indemnity was being discussed, 
he, apparently in the hope of having it reduced, 
declared that he could not be held answerable for 
its payment, as he could not compel tlie Turkomans 
to pay their sllare of the fine. Kaufmann, there- 
fore,returiled to the Khan some eighteen or nineteen 
of the pieces of artillery which had been captured, 
and decided to himself enforce payment by the 
Yornuds of their portion of the war indemnity. 
Tlie fact was ignored that, inmediately after 
tlle capture of Khiva, the Yoniuds had sent lheir 
elilers to tlie Bussian camp with oirers of submis- 
sion, and llacl then been informed that they mrould 
be uilt,ouclied so long as they lived quietly and 
abstitined from pillage and robbery. I t  was, more- 
ovelo, forgotten that when Colonel Gluk~ioRsky was 
a 0 
sent early in July with a force of cavalry to Lake 
Sari-Kamisl~ to examine the ancient bed of the 
Oxus, he ailcl liis officers had been treated wit11 
the greatest friendliness and liospitality by tlie 
Turkomans, ancl that siillilar satisfactory relations 
had been maintained when the Orenburg troops 
marched to Kone Urgenj and Khojaili. The Turlco- 
mans had, it is true, been tlie chief opponents to 
the Russian advance on Khiva; but when that 
city had been captured and i t  becanie evident that 
further resistance would be useless, the Yomuds 
had formally surrendered ; their submissioil was 
accepted by Kaufinann; and from thal; time they 
had, by no act of their own, given ally excuse for 
the unwarrantable ancl barbarous attack which 
was izlade against them. 
However, Kaufiiianii had determined to attack 
then1 to gain glory for himself and renown for his 
army, and he tl~erefore ordered twenty-five heacl- 
men of the tribe to attend on hiin a t  Khiva. 111 
compliance with this order, seventeen of the elders 
presented theinselves before the Russian General 
on July 17, and they were then inforined that their 
tribe would have to pay a fine of 300,000 roubles, 
one-third of which was to be paid by July 29, 
while the remaining 200,000 roubles had to be 
paid before August 3. 
To clearly understand thc full meaning of tllis 
order, it must be borne in inincl that the Yomud 
Tnrkomans then settled in Khiva had only 11,000 
kibitkas (felt tents), with a populatiorl of about 
55,000 souls, and t l~a t  this l i ~ ~ e  therefore meant 
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-1875 THE YO~IUDS ARE FINED 5 
that each family hacl to pay over twcnty-seven 
roubles ~vitliin two weelm. The sole wealth of 
these noinacls consisted in tlieir horses ancl flocks 
of sheep, ancl even had these beell accepted in 
payment of this contribution, their position would 
have been a snficiently harcl one. But, as if for 
the purpose of preventing any possilsility of corn- 
pIiance, it was st,atecI that the fine i n ~ ~ s t  be paid in 
money aiid not in kind, and, therefore, before the 
Russian terins could be conlplied wilh, it would 
have been necessary for the Yomucls to  lind pur- 
chasers for their live stock, m~hic11, of CoLwse, was 
c l~~ i t e  impossible. 
If any further proof of the injustice and i n -  
morality of this demand were required it is to be 
fo~~nc l  in the Treaty of Peace which Kaufinallll 
himself signed a mon t l~  later, and which, it musl; 
be  renq.emberecl, had been drafted and sent to 
St. Petersburg for the Czar's approval before these 
events took place. In  the last article of that 
Treaty it is stated that, 'as owing to the insufficiency 
of money, both in the country and in the hands of 
the Government, the ICllivan Government is unable 
to pay the above slum ' (2,200,000 roubles) 'within 
a short time, the ILhivail Goveri-lment shall, in 
consideratioil of this dffliculLy, have tlie right of 
~ a y i n f ;  the said fine by  iiistalments, with tlle 
addition of interest thereon at the rate of 5 per 
c,ent. per annuni, on coridition that during the 
first two years 100,000 roubles shall be anilually 
paid i n t , ~  the Russian excl~ecluer.' And thus, 
altl~ough on account of the poverty of llzc people 
TI-IE TURICORIANS O F  I<I-IIVA 
- 
it was not con~idered possilsle for the Kllan to 
collect more t l~an 100,000 roubles per annum, a 
srnall section of tlie population was nevertheless their 
called upon to pay three times the amount within A1 
a fortnight. were I 
This in itself should be sufficient t,o prove the of tll 
~itt,er extravagance of the Russian demands, nucl to tw elvl 
sl.101~ that Kaufinann inteilcled to render it impos- 
sible for the Yoin~~cls to comply. He, however, in res 
was not coiltent with levying this preposterously sentec 
heavy contribution, but; proceeded a t  the same vions 
hime to take steps which clearly shot~~ed that he breac 
did not believe in the possibility of compliance on cours 
the 1)art of the Yonzuds, and that he was bent on tlle Y 
attacking tlie~n ; for on the very next day (July 18) Ir 
he wrote a letter to General Golovatcheff, informing receil 
Iiim of the fine which had been inflicted, and Ialiv; 
ordering him to proceed at once with his detach- corn1 
ment to Hazavat, and if he saw that the Yomuds sacks 
were not collecting money to pay the contribution, rockc 
but were assembling for the purpose of attacking the e 
the Russian troops, or even for the purpose of cam1 
leaving the country, he (Golovatcheff) was -to im- Ihe : 
mediately march against their settlement and soon 
'give owem* the settlements of tlze Yomuds and their devo 
families to comnplete dest~uction, and their 1~e1-cls desei 
and pmlope~-ty to con.scation.' The Orenburg de- 
tachment was also ordered to move to Kizil-Talryr, 
under Coloilel Sarantschoff, who received similar 
instructions to attn.ck and slaughter the Turlro- 
These orders were contained in Letter No. 1167, dated Ehive, 
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mans in that neig11Isourllood in the event of their 
showiilg signs of opposition, or any desire t;o assist 
their Yomud kinsmen. 
At the same time five of the Yomnd elders 
wese sent back to their tribe to give i~~i 'ormat i~n 
of the fine wl~icll was inflicted; but tlie other 
twelve elders were detained by K au f inan11 as 
l~ostages. This cletelltion of Inen wllo had colne 
ill response to a frienclly invitation, and who repre- 
sented a people wliose subivission llacl been pre- 
.vionsly proffered and accepted, was a flagrant 
breach of faith, cluite in lreepil~g wit11 the general 
course pursued by Kaufillanll in his clealings with 
the Yomuds a t  this time. 
111 accordzn~ce vith the orders vbicll he had 
received, General Golovatcl~efl' marclied out of 
Khiva on July 19 ,  with a force composed of eight 
comp~nies of infantry and eigllt sotnias of Cos- 
sacks, with eighf; guns, two mitraillenses, and a 
rocket-battery. The Eazavat Canal was reached 
the same day, agd the force there remained en- 
camped tliroughout tlie next day. On tlie 21st 
the advallce was co~itiiluecl, and the coluinn was 
so011 passing through a fertile counl;ry whicli was 
devoid of inhabitailts ; for the Yomucis, having 
desertecl their honzes, were flying. for safety l;o the 
desert. Aizcl then began tlle wanton ancl. iiiclis- 
cril-ninate cles truction of the Turkoman homesteads, 
which MacGahan graphically describes in the fol- 
lowing words :-' I was still musing oil the cluiet- 
n.ess a i d  desolatioii of tile scene, when all at once 
I was star~led by a s l~arp  crackling soulid behind 
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me. , Looking round I beheld a long tongue 
flame darting upward froin the roof of the house 
into n7hicll I had just beell ~ee r i l y ,  and  allotller 
from the staclt of nicely-gathered unthreshed wheat 
near it. The dry straw-thatched roof flashed UP 
like ponder, and the ripe r n l l e a t - ~ t r a ~ ~  I-'urned 
allnost as readily. Huge voluines of dense blaclc 
smoke rose out of the trees in every direction, and 
rolled overhead in dark, ominous-looking clouds, 
coloured by the fiery glare froin the flames below. 
I spurred my horse to the top of a little eminence 
a i d  gazed about me. I t  was a strange, wild 
spectacle. I n  an incredibly short space of time 
flames and smoke had spread on either side to the 
horizon, and, sldvanciilg steadily lorward in the 
direction of our course, slowly enveloped every- 
thing. Tlirougli this scene movecl the  Cossacks 
like spectres. Torch in hand, they dashed swiftly 
across the country, leapiiig ditches and flying 
over walls like veTy demons, and leaving behiild 
them a trail of ilanle and smoke. Tliey rarely dis- 
mounted, but simply rocle up to the ho~zses, appliecl 
their blazing torches to the projecting eaves of 
thatch and the stacks of unthreshed grain, ancl 
then galloped on. Five iniilutes afterwards slleets 
of seething flame and darkling snzoke showed llow 
well they had done their work. The entire coulltry 
was on fire. 
' In half an liour the sun was hidden, tile slr;y 
grew dark ; for, as thougll the sudclen ligllt,ing o, 
SO inany fires had producecl soiile cha1lge in tile 
amtinosphere, a rain set in-a tiling almost; ull~llowll 
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in Ichiva, and which added one dismal feature 
inore to the already dismal scene. It was a slow? 
drizzling rain, not sufllcient to put out the fires, 
but only to beat off tlie ashes and make them burn 
brighter ; to chive dowil the smoke, ancl make it; 
hnng over the, trees in heavy, sullen masses, dark- 
ening the air a i d  forming a lowering backgrouucl 
to tlle blood-coloured flames. This was war such 
,zs I hacl never before seen, and such as is rarely 
seen in nzoclerll days. 
' I t  mas a sad, sad sight-a terrible spectacle of 
vrar at its clestructive work, strangely in keeping 
with this strange, wild land.' 
While tlie COSS-aclrs were thus wantoilly a id  
pitilessly devastating the country, the illfantry aid 
guns of the columil steadily aclvanced along the 
roads, a i d  a t  about lnidclay it  mas reported that 
the Tu~rlromsms were in sight. The mass of the 
fugitives - men, women, and cllildren-were hasten- 
ing tot~.arcls tjie clesert, where they hoped to find 
safety iiom their enemies ; but, as the Eussialls 
approached, a small body of horsemen halted and 
deinancled mrlly their country was being thus. 
iiivnded, allcl stated that they numbered many 
t.housands, and that if the Russians persisted in 
hunting tlleln down, they would fight, ancl severe 
~vould be the punisln~ient wliiclz they ~ o u l d  inflict 
on tlleir foes: Such parleying was, however, use- 
less, for tlie orile~s wllicll Golovatcheff hacl received 
mere precise, ancl he wa,s obligecl to prevent the 
very flight of tile Yomuds to the desert n~liich Was 
at that moiaent; taking place ; and, therefore, after 
some hesitation, wl~ich appears to have been due 
to his reluctance to cause unnecessary blooclshed, 
Ile issued orders for six sotnias of Cossacks to 
pursue ancl prevent the escape of the Turlromans. 
I t  was not long before the cavalry overtoolc 
the fugitives, who were llanlperecl in their fligl~t 
by their arbus (country carts), cattle, sheep, 
nnil families ; and then ensued a scene of the 
wildest confusioi~ ailcl pitiless destruction. The 
terror-stricken nonlacls abandoned everything in 
their efforts to escape from their relentless pur- 
suers, and for a brief space the advance of the 
Cossacks was checked by the carts mrllich con- 
t.ained the household goods of the fugitives, ancl 
by the cattle and sheep which were careering 
wilclly over the plain. BLI~ the rocket-batlery was 
tlieu brought up to complete the work of clestruc- 
tion, nncl while the shrieking missiles tore through 
the masses of tlie enemy, who were fast clisappea~- 
ing over a clistailt sandy ridge, the laggards and 
stragglers were put to death by the Cossacks. No 
cluarte~ was given to the men, whether armed or 
~marined, and numbers of women also were cut 
cloml ill the mdle'e. I11 this encounter many hun- 
clrecls of Turkomans were slaughtered, some 2,000 
cattle a id  sheep were captured, and tbe whole of 
tlieir worlclly goods were destroyed. 
It nlust be remembered that this massacre 
was perpetrated before the expiration of the time 
allowecl for payment of the first instalment of the 
fiue. I t  is true that the Yomuds could not possibly 
have paid, even if the full time hacl been granted ; 
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but I 'aulnann,  in his desire for military g l ~ r y - ~ r  
what he was pleased to co~isider as sucli-did not 
even give them a chance of paying ; and, following 
up his outrageous demands by still move outrageous 
actions, he ordered a savage and barbarous at,tack 
on these wretched nomads, for which no justifica- 
tion can be found. 
011 the next clay (July 22) Golovatcheff again 
moved forward, wlleil the same wllolesale system 
of destruction was continued, aid the couiltry was 
devastated for miles on both sides of the line of 
advance. He reported to Kaufmann that the 
Yomuds showed no signs of collectiilg inoney l o  
pay the fine, but, on the contrary, were assembling 
either for the purpose of leaving the country or 
for resisting tlie Russian advance ; ancl that lie 
had, therefore, in accordance with his instructioas, 
been obliged to attack them and lay waste the 
country. Xaufmann, therefore, iss~led another 
order, clated July 22, in wllicll he exl~ressecl his 
approval of Golovatcheff's actions, and went on to 
state that he had liberated the elclers who had 
been lrept as hostages, in order that they might 
influence their folIowers ; and he then adcled : ' If 
the Y ornuds Lecome submissive stop ravaging 
them, but keep watch of what is bei~lg done aillollg 
them ; and a t  the leust nttem2.1t to rnig~ate cawy out 
nzy orders for the Jilzal exte~nzi~zaiion f the disobedient 
t~ibe.' 
Only ten out o f  the twelve hostages were liberated, the othor 
two having been k i e a  ~vlile making an attempt to  escape. 
Letter No. 1217, dated of July 1873, from General Kauf- 
mann to Generd GoIov&tctcheff. 
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On July 33 the column reacl~ed the plain of 
Kizil-Talcyr, and on the 25 th encanlped withill about 
two nliles of Uiali, near some gardens on the edge 
of the desert. Here, at about noon, irregular 
masses of the enemy were observed advancing 
across the desert from the west, and two companies 
of infantry were sent forward to dispute their ad- 
vance, while the cavalry were ordered to prepare 
for action. Tlle Turkoinans, however, after arriv- 
ing within about half a mile of the camp, appeared 
to be disinclined to come to close quarters, and 
~rlerely contented tl~emselves with galloping back- 
wards and forwards in front of the line of Russian 
slrirmishers. 
While this demonstration from llle west was 
occupying the whole attention of the Russians, 
another large mass of Turkomans advanced from 
the clirection of Iliali, and succeeded in arriving 
within 200 yards of the camp before they were 
observed. But this body of Yomuds, instead of 
boldly attaclring the Russians, halted at the edge C- 
of the gardens, and began to drive off the camels 
and l~orses that mere grazing near the camp, thus 
betraying their position and giving the Russians 
Lime to change front to meet the new danger. 
They thus lost a chance of almost certain vici,ory ; 
for a few inoinents later the alarm was sounded, 
and the Russians, who were watcllillg the slrirmisll 
on the west of the camp, hurriedly formed in order 
of battle, and opened a heavy fire on the slill 
hesitating Turkomans. At the same time a par- 
tion of the skirmishing line was withdrawn from 
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the west of the camp, and doubled across to a 
position from whence they could bring a flanking 
lire to bear on the enemy, and after this detach- 
ment had poured in a succession of volleys the 
Yomuds turned and fled. 
The horsemen on the west rneanwllile con- 
tinued to hover about within a short distance of 
the camp, and caused consiclerable annoyance to 
the Russians, as they carefully abstained from 
coming to  close quarters, and, owing to ' the 
superior speed of their horses, coulcl not be over- 
taken by the Cossacks. But with the defeat of 
the main body of the enemy on the eastern side of 
the camp all danger was removed, and, after a 
little more skirmisl~ing, the last group of nonlads 
retired slowly into the desert, and the first serious 
encounter between the Russians and the outraged 
Yoinuds came to an end. 
In  this engagement the Russians lost an officer 
and five men killed, while the Turkoinans m ~ ~ s t  
have suffered heavilj, altl~ough they only left two 
of their dead on the lield. Many Yomuds were 
seen to fall; but their colllrades always carried 
them off, even when exposed to the heaviest fire. 
This battle clearly showed that the Yomucls 
had made np their minds to fight, and this deter- 
mination on their part cannot be wondered at, 
for Golovatche~s troops had throughout their 
advance continuously ravaged the whole of tlie 
country, and had slaughtered large numbers of tlie 
tribe, who, being unable to pay the fine imposed, 
were guilty of no greater offence tllan a desire lo 
I4 THE TURICOMANS OF I<I-IIVA 1873- 
migrate into tlle desert and so to escape from the 
punishment which mas threatened in the event of 
non-navment. Finding that escape was denied to 
C - d  U .L 
them, while their continued stay in the country 
merely meant massacre and the utter destruction 
of their homes and possessions, it mas only natural 
that the nonlacls should have eventuallv turned 
against their oppressors; and the fact that they 
(lid figl~t-and fight bravely-can in no way be 
held ally excuse for the relentless manner in 
which the Russiails hunted them down and en- 
cleavoured to exterininate them. 
1 After this repulse of the Turkomans Golovat- 
cheff's force remained in its camp near Iliali, while 
information was being collectecl as to wliere the 
main body of the enemy hacl taken refuge. I t  
having been ascertained that their camp was some 
five or six miles distant on the opposite side of 
Iliali, Golovatcheff on the night of July 26 gave 
orders ,for an advance to be made at one o'clock 
on the following morning, hol3ing to surprise thein 
by a night attack. During the night, however, 
several alarms were caused by Turkomans who 
were prowling round the camp, and who were 
from time to time fired on by the Russian picquets ; 
and, fi~lding that his movemeilts were being so 
closely watched, QolovatcheE a t  the last moment 
issued orders postpoaing the aclvance for a couple 
of hours. 
At three o'clock ,on the morning of the 27th, 
just as the force had fallen in ancl was awaiting 
orders to advanc,e, a series of wilcl, unearthly yells 
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suilile~~ly broke the stilllless of the night, and, be- 
fore any one had time to realise what was hap- 
pening, a Inass of Turkoman horsemeu burst into 
the camp and inade a furious onslaugl~t on the 
astonished Russians. Por some moments there 
was a confused hand-to-haail struggle ; the Cos- 
sacks, who had a few minutes before marched out 
of the camp, fell back in disorder, and the Turko- 
mans, pushing their caps over their eyes, penetrated 
the Bussian line in several places aild fought with 
fierce determination. 
Golovatcl~efT was wouiided by a sabre cut on 
the .arm, Colonel Friecle, the chief of the sta;ll; 
also received a bullet wound in the head, and a 
panic and massacre were immineilt; but the 
Russian infantry, encouraged by the cool bravery 
and presence of mind of their General, clisplayed 
the greatest steacliness, and, pouring in a succes- 
aion of well-directed volleys, soon checlred the 
aclvance .of the enemy ; and, after a desperate 
struggle, as daylight broke the Yomuds were, seen 
to be flying across th.e plain in full retreat. 111 
spiLe of the sudden~iess of the attack and the 
determinabion with mhich the Turltoinans came to 
close quarters, the Russians only lost; forty lrilled 
and wounded, vhile their opponents afterw,zr.cls 
sckllowledgecl a loss of about 500. 
As soon as the sun rose Golovatcheff, carrying 
out his original intention, marchecl towarcls t l ~ e  
north-west in search of the Turkoman camp. 
Passing Ilia'ti, the column advanced without seeing 
any signs of the enemy till about nine o'cloclr in 
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the  morning, when large bodies of llorsemen ap- 
peared in sight and hovered about on the flanks 
of the Russian column. They, however, kept at 
a respectful distance, and confined tl~emselves to  
attacks against advanced parties of the Cossacks, 
for whom they appeared to have the greatest con- 
tempt. Their object evidently was to delay the 
Russian advance in order to give time for their 
families to escape, and in this they were partly 
successful; for, on account of their demonstra- 
tions, the Russians could only advance slowly, and 
had frequently to drive back with inrantry ailcl 
artillery fire such bodies of the enemy as ventured 
to  approach too near to the colunin. 
The Yomud caillp was hidclen behind some low 
sand-hills, and, although Golovatcheff's force passed 
within two miles of it, it was not discovered, 
and tlle column, marching past it, encamped 
on  tlie banks of the Aila Murad Caaal, on the 
site of a1 old fortified calnp which had been 
prepared by Mahommed Rahinl Khan during one 
of his numerous wars with his Turkoman subjects. 
The Yomuds, finding that the Russians had marched 
past them, doubled back, and hastened in a soutli- 
easterly direction through the count~y which 
Golovatcheff had traversed during his advance. 
Rut, although tlrey thus gained several hours' start, 
the  Russians got on their trail during the next 
day, and, overtakiiig them on July 29, lrilled hun- 
dreds of lllelem, and succeeded in capturing 5,000 
head of cattle, 11 9 camels, a id  allout 3,000 arbas 
laden with various articles of property. 
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In  tlze iiiealzwhile Kaullnann, who had remained 
ill Iilli~7a, had received 130 news from G;oIova,tchefF 
for several clays, as all cominui~icatioll liad been 
cut OK by tlie Turlromans. He therefore left 
Khiva on July 27, and inarcl~ed to lliali, where 
he arrived and joined hands with Golovatcl~effs 
cletachinent and the Orenburg troops on tlie 31st. 
While there lie issuecl a proclanz,ztion, calling 
upon tlle other Turlcoman tribes to pay a fine of 
510,000 roubles within a week ; but, on tlle elders 
presenting tl~smselves before him declaring the 
utter impossibility of collecting such a large sum 
a t  so short a notice, he extended tlie period of 
payment to twelve days, and permitted lialf'the 
amount to be paid in,cainels. 
Fearing that they wonlcl suffer the same de- 
struction as hacl fallen upon their kinsmen, these 
sections of tlie tribe did their utmost to comply 
with the cruel cleizland ; but altllough they gave 
up their horses, camels, cattle, and household 
goorls, and even though the women strippecl off 
their trinkets and tawclry jewellery and gave then1 
over to tlze eneizly to save the lives of their hus- 
bancls, fathers, anci sons, yet when Kaufnlann lef~; 
Tliali on August 15 (the day after the expiration 
of tlie time granted for payment) one-thircl of the 
full amount of the fine had not been paid. He 
tl~erefore took ail11 llim twerity-seven of the elders 
as hostages, and con~meiiced his return march to .  
Khiva. Passing on his way through the lancls of 
tlze Yomud tribe of Bairam-Slzali, he imposecl on 
them a further fine of 108,000 roubles, and, taking 
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fourteell of their chiefs as hostages till the sulln 
should be paid, he reached I(1Gva on August 23. 
Tllus closed this first cainpaign agninst the 
TLlrkomans of Klliva, the chief result of which 
was that they became imbuecl with feelings of the 
oreatest hostility ancl bitterness against the Russians. h 
I t  was not probable that a warlike race of uncivil- 
ised l~o~nads  woulcl readily forget the slaughter 
and destruction wl~icb had been so suddenly and 
ul~provoIieclly inflicted upon them, and there is 
no doubt that the savagery and illhlunanity wl~icll 
markecl. the Russian operations against these 
miserable tribes left a lollg legtcy of hatred and 
rexrenge which has not even yet been forgotten. 
To satisfy the ambition of one Russia11 commander, 
and to compensate a bocly 01 Russian soldiers for 
their disappoiiltment in having failed to take a leacl- 
ing share in the conquest of Khiva, a wanton and 
unjustifiable attack was nlade on these people, who 
were slaughtered in a wholesale and pitiless manner, 
while their l~ornesteads and property mere, at the 
same time, destroyed with reckless barbarity. 
Truly, indeed, might MacGahan say that it was 
a war such as he had never before seen, ancl such 
as is rarely seen in mocleril clays ; for this attack 
on the Turkomans of Khiva was carried out in 
a manner which was a disgrace to the Russian 
nation, and which has le£t an illclelible stain 011 the 
'character of the Russian troops in Central Asia. 
The Treaty of Peace with Khiva having been 
signed on the day after Kaufinann's return to the 
cspihal from Iliali, there was no I~lrt~lier necessity 
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for cletainillg the Russian troops ill the Khanate, 
and they begail to re t~l ru  hon~ewards. The 
Orel~burg colul-t~n, wl~ ic l~ ,  at  Ibe close of the Turlr- 
oinan cainpaign hacl returnecl to Kizil-Talcyr , re-. 
maiilecl there till August 13, and then commenced 
its return illarc11 to the Fmba, where it arrived 
on October 6, and the various cletacl~ments com- 
posillg the column, then separating, marclied to 
tlieir olcl quarters at Orenburg, Orsl<,and Uralsk. 
The Mangisldak cletacbmeilt was the next .to 
leave. Quitting Khiva on August 21, they reacl~ecl 
Kiaclerly on the 24th of the next 111ontl1, and by 
October 1s had all been transportecl across the 
Caspian to Pet.rovsk. 
The Turkestail column left Khiva on August 24, 
and returiled vib Khailki and Shurakhana. This 
coluilli~ crossecl the Oxus at  Ehanki, at which point 
the river divides into three channels. There was 
only j limited' ancl insufficient number of ' kay~llrs,' 
and, in crossing the islands, the baggage had first to 
be transferred from the boats into carts, and tllen 
back again into the boats after the islallcls, had been 
crossed ; the result being that it took ten days for 
the whole force to cross the river. Then Kauf- 
mann havil~g selectecl a site on the right bank just 
below Shurs-Xhana for the new Russian fort, of 
Petro-Alexandrovsl~, the troops were employed in 
constructing cclefensive works. A garrison of two 
battalions of infantry ancl 200 Cossacks, with six 
guns, was left there ullcler Colonel Ivailoff; ancl on 
September 17  the rest of the Turkestan troops con- 
tinued their return journey, the cavalry crossing 
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the Kizil-Kum Desert to  Fort Perovski, while tlie 
illfantry retnrned by the route by wl~ich they had 
advanced, and reached Tasllkellt by October 25. 
13ut the Eussia11 forces had scarcely left the 
oasis when the Yomuds began to give evidence of 
the spirit of liatrecl ai~cl revenge which had been 
roused by the severe tlheatinent which they had just 
received. General Krijhanoffsky, the Goverilor- 
General of Orellburg, had declared that Kauf- 
mallll's atlack 011 the Turhoinails was perfectly un- 
llecessary and likely to cause serious trouble. B e  
said : ' It will now be necessary to sencl expeclilions 
,zgainst them for ma.ny years to come ; their 
coun~,ry will be a second Caucasus, ancl in the end me 
shall be obliged to take possessioil of it.' This pre- 
diction mas very soon realised, for in October 1873 
tlley began plunclering the villages of the Usbegs 
and Icirghiz, ~ 1 1 0  had beell friendly to the Russians, 
and forced the Kirghiz to migratz to the 'right 
bank of tlie Oxus, while at the same time the Tekk6 
Turkolnalls of Merv pluildered caravans of stores 
intended for Lhe garrison of Petro-Alexanclrovsk. 
For more than twelve months, with short 
intervals, Colonel Ivanoff was occupiecl in quelling 
these dis tu~ba~lces, enforcing the p aymelzt of taxes, 
ravaging whole settlements, and pntting the inliabi- 
tants to cleath ; ancl while lie was thus crushing 
the Turkomans of Khiva, the E ~ ~ s s i a n  uthorities on 
tile Caspian mere silliilarly employed in dealing 
16th the nomads on the borders of Persia. 
The increasing imporlance of the establishinents 
t,he easten1 shores of the Caspian rendered it 
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llecessarg that a new military district should be 
there created, wl~ich slioulcl be illdependent of the 
Turkestan authorities, and be directly ullcler tile 
orders of tlie Lord-Lieutenant of t,l~e Caucasus. 
Accordingly, wllen the Grand Dnlce Michael, in 
Noveniber 1373, submitted to his brother, the 
Czar, a proposal for for~llillg tlze whole region 
between the Caspian and Aral Seas illto such a 
district, snbordinate to the Goverlul~eilt at Tifis, 
Lomakill-now promoted to the ralllr of general- 
was at once sent to Ifiasuovodslr to settle the neces- 
sary clei;ails, ancl to report on the nleasnres vhich 
sho.uld be ailophed to develop tlle country ancl 
bring the Turkoman tribes into subjection. He 
soon had all interview wit11 sollie of the Turkoman 
elders, who prolvisecl to meet him again in tlie 
following spring, alid to bring with them several 
of the leaders of other tribes ; and, in spite of the 
opposition of the Russian Poreigli Ofice and Piilance 
Ministry, the Grand Duke's project was approvecl of 
by the Einperor in an order dated March 21,1874, 
whereby the new Trans-Caspian mi1il;ary clistrict 
was formed, with L01naki1i as its first governor. 
This district included tfhe whole of the eastern 
shores of tlie Caspiaii from Mertvii K ~ ~ l t u k  Bay on 
the north to tlie river Atrek 011 t,lle so.uth, arid as 
far eastmarcls as the borders of tlie Xhailate of 
- Klliva. All the islancls near the coast were included 
in this new disi;rict, and Krasnovodsk was selected 
as tlie headquarters of the administration. 
Shortly after Lom,zlcin's appoiix1;ment to this 
new post, he issuecl a circular to tlie Ak-Ata-Bai 
branch of the YonlucI tribe, informing thein that 
he had been illvested with supreme authority over 
the Atrek and Gurgen districts, and calling up011 
them to ~naintain orcler. Copies of this circular 
were also sent to the otlier Turko~na~l  tribes occu- 
pying the coun t~y  between the Caspian and the 
Oxus ; and the result m7as that tlie ~r inc ipa l  elders 
of the Yomuds and some of the Aklial TekkP chiefs 
visited Ashurada, a i d  declared their friendship for 
the Russia11 Government. During the summer of 
1874 Lo~llakiii made a sliort reconnaissance up 
tlie Atrelc river froin Cllikishliar, and constructed a 
small forl 011 the river bank ; but no other i~iilitary 
~novements could be made that year, as his time was 
fully occupied in organising the aclininistration of 
his new district, ailcl in opening negotiations with 
tlie neigl~bouring chieftains. 
- 
111 spiite of the friendly professions of the 
Turlromau elclers, a ba~id  of seine 600 TekkBs, in  
October 1874, made a raid on the village of Dashli, 
sollle twenty-five miles from Krasnovoclsk, when 
they killed 80 of the inhabilants a ~ l d  carried off 
150 prisoners. Letters were then sent to Sofi Khan, 
tlie cliief of LCizil-Arvat, demanding the release 
of the captives, ancI shortly afterwards 90 of the 
prisoners were sent back ; alld on February. 19,  
1875, Sofi Khan hiinself arrived at Kras~~ovodsk, 
with a large followirig of TeklcB chieftaius. Tliese 
men were received by Lomakin with great ilistinc- 
ti011 : lle presented Sofi Khan with a gold ineclal 
attached to a ribbon of the order of St. Stanislaus, 
and also gave hiin a khalat of silver cloth ; while 
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tlle~ll that  robes of hoilour were freely distributed anong 
xity over liis aclherents. The whole party was ta,ken for 
lillg upon a short trip on one of the vessels of the Caspian. 
3 circular Ijolilla, and they were then sent honle, after the 
ibes occu- advantages of Russian rule hacl been carefully 
1 alld t h e  instilled into their mincls.. This visit of Sofi Khan 
[pal elders was a matter of great importance t,o {he Iil;nssians, 
:kk& c,lliefs for tlzereby they got into friencll~7 relations wit11 the 
lldsllip fo r  Telrkds OF Ifizil-Arvat, alicl thus to solrle extent 
~unmer of  prepared the way for an aclvance into the more 
ssailce u p  eastern portions of the &<ha1 Oasis. 
Structecl a Shortly before the reception of these chiefs 
:r 111ilitary General Lomakin had visited Tiflis, and while there. 
s time ~vas  he hacl obtained the approval of the Grand Duke 
st'1-ation of Micl~ael to the despa-tch of a strong exl~edition- 
tiolis wit11 ary force t;o the Tur1rom.m settleinents on the 
Atrek. The Czar, however, refused his consent to 
1s of t h e  the despatch of ally aclclitiond troops from the 
Tekkds, i n  Caucasus, and Lomakin therefore decided to make 
a thorough exploration of the Uzboi-the ancient of Dashli, 
blr, when becl of the Oxns. 
:srriecl off This expeclii;ion left Krasnovodsk in two de- 
Sofi Kllan, tichments, one of which crossed to Michaelovsk 
he release in boats, while the other ma.rchec1 round by land 
90 of t h e  to the wells of Mulla Rari. There the .two parties 
lrllar~r ' 1 9 , ' re-united, a d  the whole force aclvancillg on June 8, , 
~s~iovodslc, 1875, reached the Uzboi three days later. March- 
IS. These iiig along the old bed of the Oxus, the Russians 
at ilistinc- reached Igdi on June 20, where a camp was formed, 
11cl medal while n surveying pasty pushed forward, wit11 a, 
; tnnislaus, small escort, through Bala Isbem to Sari-Kamish, 
th ; while where, in accordance with a previ0u.s arrangement, 
I / 1 F?i it was met by an escort of Kllivarls ; and afier a 
colnplete survey of the Uzboi and Sari-Kamisli 
Lalres liacl beell made, it returned to Krasnovodsk 
by the direct route through the .country m.liich 
Marlrozoff liad traversed in 1871. 
In the meanwliile the maill body remained at 
Igdi for ten days; during which time sillall detach- 
ments were sent eastwards to cover the surveyors 
from possible attacks by stray bands 01 Teklr6 
Turkomans. 011 July 1 Loinakiii received news tliat 
the topograpl~ical party had safely reached Sari- 
1 '  Kamish, and he therefore started on his return 
marc11 towards Mulla Kari, where the force arrived 
011 July 15, having lost only two men cluring the 
whole of the operations. This expedition produced 
a considerable impression on the Tekkks, who, 
tvlien Lomakin was at Igdi, sent in a deputatioil 
consisting of several of their elders with declaratioils 
of their submission and proffers of service; md, 
again, cluring the return march to Mulla Kari otlier 
parties brought provisions, carpets, ancl sheep for 
sale, and did all they could to propitiate the 
liussians. 
After givi~ig his troops a short rest Lomakill 
niarched soutl~wards t,owards the River Atrek, 
passing e n  ~ o z ~ t e  he great fresh-water lakes of 
Shairdi and Bugclaili, where he found large 
encampments of the Jafhr Bai . and Ak-Ata-Bai 
1)rsnches of the Yoinuds, wllo, though forlnerly 
hostile, had, since 1874, tenclerecl their submissioi~ 
and promised to .  raise a force of 500 horsemen to 
keep the TelrlrQs in checlc. About 25 iniles to the 
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south-east of Bugdaili the Russians came to the 
ruins of Mest-Devran (Mestorian), where they found 
the remains! of what must have been a large ancl 
important ancient city ; and a few miles farther 
011, at Musjid, a large number of clilapiclated 
temnples and shrines inarkecl the site of an ancient 
burying-grouncl of consiclerable extent. Other 
signs also were not wanting to prove that the sur- 
rou~~cling region had once been a well-populated 
and flourishing district, for traces of a large aque- 
duct were clearly seen, which a t  one time carried 
water from the Atrek to Mest-Devran. This con- 
duit was apparently ccarried across the Surnbar 
in large earthern pipes over a conple of large 
bridges, and there tvas a series of mounds stretcli- 
irig from Chat, past Mest-Devran, to Kara Tep& on 
the shores of the Caspian, each of which was 
crowned by a small fort, evidently for the purpose 
of protecting the water-supply and to defencl the 
settlement from the inroads of the neigl~bouriag 
nomads. 011 reaching the Atrek Lomakin came 
across several more encampments of Yomucls, who 
appeared to be frienclly, a i d  after advancing up 
the river as far as Chat the column returned to 
Krasnovoclsk, 
Before continuing the account of Russia's 
further operations in the Trans-Caspian district, i t  
will be necessary now to turn once again to the 
affairs of Khokand, as serious events there toolr 
place which necessi tateil Russian interference, and 
c~~l~nina ted  in the annexation of the whole of tliat 
IChanate to Bussia. 
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Insurrections in ICholtand-Abilur Rc~hmun Afto1)atoll~~ -Attack on 
Rnssiuu Embassy-Battle of Ilrtlrhm~n-Capturc of Anclijan- 
Bnnesalion ,of Eholtand to Russia-Tho Alrti Expedition-Ex- 
. 
plorution and mmexatioa of tho northorn part of the Pamir 
ragion. 
WHEN Khucl.ayar Khan was in July 1865, for tlle 
tlliril time, re-instal;ed as Khan of Iiliokand, he 
ibmlcl that his cloirlinioiis had beell very consicler- 
ably reducecl in size by the Russiail conquest of 
Tasl.ikent, and by the Bokliarail occupation of 
Iihojent. I11 the following year Khojent ailrl 
U1.a-tepd were wrested from Rokliara by General 
Iiomanoflsky, a i d  were permailelltly incorporated 
in tlie Russian dominions; aiicl Iihuilayar's au- 
thority was limitecl. to Fergllaua; or tlie eastern 
portion of his former Iriiigclom. But a1 tliougli his 
power was thus curtaileel, the k'liall, nctilig on the 
slil.ewd a,clvice of liis Atalyk (or colnmauder-in- 
chief), Ata, Bek, contrived to keep on gooil terms 
wit11 the Iinssians, and retaineel possessioli of llis 
throne for tlie next tell years. 
When Iianfinalui :~1~iveil at Tash,lter~l at the 
end of 1867 lie inSormeil I<liutlayar ICllan of his 
1--4ttack o n  pf Andijnn- 
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appointnient as Governor Geileral of Turlrestall, 
a~icl entered into negotiations for the purpose of 
conclucling a con-~~nercial treaty with Kl~okand. 
At firs!; Khudayar objected to the conditions of the 
proposecl treaty, and wislied to sencl an embassy 
to St. Petersburg in oi*der that he might obt a1n ' a 
clirecb assurance of peace ancl goodwill from the 
Empel*or. But be evelltually wi tliclrew his objec- 
tions, and signed a treaty whicli was approved of 
11y tlie Czar in Noveillber 18GS. 
117 spite of this treaty, however, Khudayar's 
attitude to~vards tlie Russians during their cain- 
paign against Sainarlral~d was very suspicious ; for 
he kept liis troops in readiness, ancl was appar- 
ently on the look-out for a favourable opportunity 
to recover Tashkent slid Khojent. But the rapid 
successes of tlie Russian force, ancl the brilliant 
defelice of Saniarkancl, caused him to abstain from 
hostilities, a~nd for his neutrality on this occasion 
he was invested mith the orcler of St. Stanislaus. 
I n  December 1869 the temporary cliilic~~lty 
arose regarcling I<arategin; and again in 1650 
there was for a time a dispute be t~een  the IChan 
ancl Icaufinann, resulting f ~ o m  a delllancl for in- 
demnity on account of an attack which had 
been made on Colonel Dennett's force during the 
Islrallder Kul expedition. Bul these differences 
weTe satisfactorily settled ; ancl had Khuilayar 
conducted the internal aflairs of his state wit11 the 
an~ouilt of cliscretion l ~ e  clisplayed in his dealings 
with the R~zssians, he would lllost probably have 
secured a much lorlger lease of power, and have 
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postponecl the annexatiol~ of the Iihanate by 
Russia. Ire, however, hail never been a popular 
ruler, and had been twice driven from the throne on 
account of his cruelty ancl rapacity; ancl. although 
after his accession to power for the tllird time lie 
refraiwed solnewhat from open licentiousiless and 
fresh acts of cruelty, still he appeared bent on ex- 
torting as much money from his subjects as possible 
for his own aggrandisement. Taxes, unjusltly im- 
posed, increased year by year, and the hatred of the 
- 
peo~le  agczi~ist their Khan increased accordingly. 
For a time open rebellion mas prevented by the 
fear of the population that the Russians would 
interfere in defence of the Iclian, wlio was believed 
to be completely uilcler Muscovite influence. But 
eventuall-y, in 1871, the people rose, and altliough 
tlie rebellion mas speedily suppressed the cause 
was not removed, ancl the popular (liscontellt con- 
tinued. Khuilayar, instetzcl. of being warned by 
this outbreak, continued to impose fresh burileils 
on his subjects, 'and in 1873 matters again reacl~eil 
a crisis, when the Kara-ICirgliiz of the mouiltaiilous 
region soutl~ of Osh and Andijnn refuseil to pay 
certain new taxes, and even attackecl. tlie ollicinls 
who l~acl. been sent to collect them. Troops were 
sent to enforce conlpliance, md after a few slrir- 
inislles the ICarrz-Icirglliz retired to tl~cir rnouiitaill 
fastnesses, where they were out of reach of pmiisll- 
ment. 
At this time a sou of Mussulillnil Kuli's, nnmccl 
Abd~lr Ralimaii, re turneil to Kl~okalid from a pil- 
grimage to Mecca ancl journey to Const,ziitiiiol)le, 
A o u u ~  RAHMAN AFTOBATCBA 
to tv11ich latter place he hacI beell sent by Ilis 
brother-in-law, Kliuclayar Khall, to aslc the S ~ ~ l t a n  
'en from the throlle on for assistance in repelling tlie Russians. This man 
pacity ; and althoilgh held the title of dftoba1;cha (i.e. ewer-bearer), anil, 
for the third time he being the son of the great Kipchalc Ming-Bashi, 
en licentiousness Mussulman Kuli, he hacl considerable influeilce 
appeared bent 011 ex- amongst the inhabitants of the Khanate. Shortly 
lis subjects as possible after his re-appearance in Hlokancl he was given 
Taxes, u~l jus t l~  im- the colnmand of the Khan's troops and placed in 
and the hatred of tile charge of the operatioils against the Hara-Kirghiz. 
ncreased accordillglJT, He soon prevailed upon l;he rebels to send forty re- 
las prevented by the presentatives lo the I(lian to state their grievailces, 
the Russians would in order that an understanding might be arrived 
at ; and the Kirghiz, relying on the good faith of an, who was believecl 
mite influence. I<huclayar, did so, when, in spite of the Aftobatcha's 
e rose, ailcl a l t h o ~ ~ l l  advice to the contrary, tlie Khan treacherously hacl 
uppressed the cause all of them executed. This 'act su enr'aged the 
ular cliscontent con- Ilirghiz that they at once recommeilcecl hoitilities, 
~f being warnecl by and quiclcly capturd  Uzlrent and Suk and carried 
.npose fresh burileils the rebellion into the Ferghana Valley. But 
latters again reached altllough Klludayar's troops r e r e  unable to success- 4 
z of the ~nountaiuozrs f ~ ~ l l y  cope wit11 the rebels so long as the latter con- 
lijan refusecl to 112~ fined their movemellts to the mouiitnins, as soon as 
~ttaclred the oficids they advanced into the low country they found that 
themi Troops were i;hey were no match for the Khan's better-armed 
nd afi;er a few slrir- forces ; and at t.he commencement of the revolt the 
cl to their rnou~ltaill Hirglliz met vi th little success in the valleys, large 
t of reach of puilish- numbers being lcilled and taken prisoners, while 
a chief named Mozuffer Khan, who hacl been put 
ulman Kuli's, ~ln~lled form-ard as a pretencler to the throne, mas captured 
3loka1ld frou a pi]- ancl impalecl alive. 
y to Const;antil~ople, But IChuclayar's position was claily becoming 
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illore diffic~111;. His Kipchak subjects, ~ 1 1 0  11ad 
beell grouilcl down by oppressioa, were ripe for 
rebellion, a i d  were oilly waiting for a favourable 
opportui~itjr to joiil the Kara-Kirglliz ; while his 
soil Nasr-Ecldin was intriguing against hiin. He 
therefore sent envoys to Tashkent asking I<aufnlann 
for nssistnnce, while tlie rebels also implorecl the 
Bussinils to intervene ancl save theill from the 
tyrant "110 opl3ressecl thenl. General Koll~akof~slry 
(who mas ackillg for Kaufina~liz d ~ ~ r i n g  tlle absence 
of the latter at Ichiva) telegraphecl to St. Peters- 
burg asking for permission to occupy Khokallcl 
in t,lie event of the rebellioil continuing; but 
sanction to tlie ~uovellleilt was refusecl, and the 
rebels began to believe either tllat the Russians 
were too weak to interfere, or that they were 
secretly supporting the I<llail. 
Shortly after this, Osh, Andij an, Uch-Kurgan, 
Suzak, a,nd Balilrcl~i were capturecl by tl~einsurgents ;
Abclur Ral~man, a110 frolli the first appears to have 
fi~vourecl the rebel cause, soon afterwa~cls shut 
himself up in the slllall fort of Tiura-ICurgl~an, 
neal- N~llanzgan, and ref~~seil  to take ally further 
action ; and tlie rebellion was not suppressed until 
the beginning of winter. 
I n  1874 the popular discontent was aga.in 
ilisplayecl in  plots against the Khan's life. The 
first of these was for the purpose of placing 
I<baclagar's secollil son, JiCahoilmlecl Arnill (or 
Madamin Relc), on the tlirone ; but the Khan was 
informed of the coi~spiracjr, ancl put the leading 
col~spirators to death. The Kipchalrs and Kirgliiz 
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were not long in finding another claimant to the 
throne in the persoil of Abdul Icerim, a grandson of 
Fazil Belc, Khudayar's uncle ; but tlie Khan again 
received aarning, and requested the Russiails to 
remove Abdul Kerim from Xhojent (where he 
then lived) to Tashlrent. This was done, and the 
Russiails at the same tillie sent Abclul Kaum, who 
was Abdul Xeriin's chief adviser, to Chiinkent. 
111 this -year also the illhabitants of the 
mountainous districts north of Namangai~ , ttvice 
broke illto open rebellion, but  on both occasiorls 
tlie risings were speedily suppressed. 
But the existence of IChokaild as an inclepen- 
dent state was fast drawing to a close. Altl~ousll 
the Kirghiz and Kipchaks llad repeateclly beell 
defeated, their clisconteiit and hatred of Khndayar 
were daily increasing, and to this was added a feel- 
ing of bitterness against the Russians, who had 
ref~~sei l  to aid the rebels, ailcI who were thus 
believed to be on the Khan's side. In July 1875 
Nasr-Eaclin, the K11cz1's eldest son, threw in his lot 
with the malcontents, and the rebellion broke out 
afresh ; and at the sailie time the Russians, by 
sending a diplolnatic mission to Xhokand, gave 
colour to the popular belief that they were sup- 
porting Kliudayar, and thus caused the insurgellts 
to enibarlc on a religions war against the infidels. 
The despatch of this Russian embassy to 
Khokalld was for the purpose of obtailli11.g 
Khudayar's coliserlt to the inarcli of a Russian 
force through Khokai~d to ICashgar, it having,been 
decicled that a force should be sent to punish 
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Yakoob Beg for his non-complia~nce with Eussiau - 
demands. Tlle deputatiolz was led by Mr. Weinberg-, 
of the Foreig~l Department, wlio was accompanied 
by a guard of twenty-two Cossacks; ancl Colcnel 
Slrobeleff accompaniecl the party for the purpose 
of exploring tlie TereB Devaii Pass betweell 
EClloBancl a id  Kashgar. In  orcler to propitiate 
Klluclayar and thus to gain his coilserlt to the 
Eu~siail clemancls, Kaufinaniz sent Abilul Kerim 
\vitli the missioli ancl handed him over to i;lle 
Kliall. This youllg mail was tlie relation of 
Khuclayar's ~vllorn the rebels had, in the pre- 
- 
vious year, attemptecl to place on the tl~rone ;
and his gratuitous surrender by Kaufnia~m, who 
thus violated the well-recognised laws of asylulu . 
x~lcl hospi~nlity, greatly increased the hostility 
~f tlze Kipchaks and Kirgl~iz towarcls the 
~uss ians .  
Tlle embassy reaclled Kl~okanil on July 25, 
1875; alzcl a few clays afterwards n e w  was 
received tliat Nasr-Eclclin ancl the Kl~aii's brotlier, 
Sultan Murad, hacl gone over to the rebels, who, 
liaving capt~~recl Osll, Na~nangan, Margelan, An- 
clijan, anit Asaki, were advancinlg on tlie capitd, 
lecl by A b d ~ ~ r  Raliman Aftobatcha, who hail also 
thrown in his lot wit11 the insurgents, ancl wllo was 
redly the prime mover in the rebellion. 
Khudayar at once iizade preparations to 
advance against the rebels, and i t  vas  arranged 
that the inarcli slloulil coinmence on August 3 ; 
but cluring the preceding night his seconcl son, 
Madamin Bek, ancl nearly the whole of his army 
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; second son, 
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went over to the enemy, when the Khan, finding 
himself thus deserted and rendered incapable of 
resistance, placed himself under the protection 
of the R,ussian embassy. He was accompanied 
by his younger son, one of his nephews, and 
by the Atalyk Ata Bek, besides numerous other 
followers ancl women, and lie also succeeded i11 
carrying off over a millioil pounds' worth of trea- 
sure wl~ich he had extorted froin his oppressed 
subjects. 
As ally further stay i11 tlie city was out of 
the question Mr. Weinberg decided to return to 
Khojent, at which place he arrived on August 5 
after a perilous retreat, during which incessant 
attacks were made on t,he long train conveying 
the Khan's treasure and wives. As soon as Kh~zd- 
ayar had thus fled from the country, his son 
Nasr-Eddin was proclaimed Khan; and although 
he ancl the principal leaders of the rebellion sent 
conciliatory letters to Kaufmann, expressing a de- 
sire to live in peace with the Russians, emissaries 
were at' the same time despatchecl with a pro- 
clamation inciting the inhabitants of the Russian 
frontier districts, as well as those of Khokand, to  
join in a Holy War against the infidels who were 
believed to have supported Khuclayar in his unjust 
rule. 
General Xaufniailn at this time was on a tour 
of inspection at Vernoye; but on hearing of the 
outbreak he hurried back to Tashkent, where h e  
arrived on August 12,  to fincl the whole population 
in the wildest state of alarm and excitement, while 
POL. 11: I) 
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the inost extravagant ruinours were being circulated 
and were readily believed. 
On August 18 bands of Khokanclians raided 
across the Kuraina Mountains, and, occupying 
t,he village of Ablilr, descended the valley of the 
Angren, hoping to be able to surprise the Russian 
post at  Tilaou, which was garrisonecl by a company 
of infantry aild'half a sotnia of Cossacks. Wncling, 
however, that the garrison were on the alert, the 
i11surgen.t~ did not attack the post, but cont,entecl 
tl~ernselves iuerely with scouring the neighboriring 
- 
coulltry and inciting the inhabitants lo join tlleill 
agnil~st the Russians, ahile other parties cut the 
Iinssian line of cornmunicat~ion between Tashkent, 
and Kllojent. Information of these raids rencllecl 
Tashkeut at 2 A.M. on Augnst 19,  ancl four hours 
later General Golovatcheff started for Tilaou with 
four and a half sotiiias of Cossacks, ancl at 8 A.M. 
a hattalion of illfantry and a clivision of field 
artillery marcllecl to his support. On the sa111e 
day Lieu tenant-Colonel Garnoffsl<y was sent with 
a battalioil of infantry and four gulls to reinforce 
the garrison of Khojent, tvhile Colol~el Sliobelefl; 
a i th two  sotliias of Cossacks ancl a rocket division, 
patrolled the nortll-eastern portion of the Rurnma 
ilistricl, and prevented the iiihabitallts from joining 
the insurrection. 
In the ~neanwllile a large force of I<l~olinndians 
adva~~ccd towards Khojent, and arrived in the 
~~eigllbaurl~oocl f that city on August 20. For 
t l ~ e  next four cla,-ys llle tow11 was closely l~esiegecl, 
:~11(1 (lense masses or the eneinv made r-cpcatctl 
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attacks on the principal gates. These onslaughts 
were, however, repulsed by the garrison; and, 
on the arrival of Baron Nolde, the 
commandant, made a sortie on the 24th a i d  routed 
the Khokandian army after a hard-fought engage- 
ment near tlie villages of Kostalroz and Ispissar. 
Wl~en Rauflnann ascertained the serious nature 
of tlie rising, and found that the Klloliandians, not 
content with the deposition of Khudayar Khan, 
were resolved to wage war against the Russians, 
he deternlined to assume the offensive, ancl he 
therefore sent orders to GolovntcheK to march as 
soon as possible towarcla Kliojent, where tlie ex- 
peclitio~lary force was to assemble. Including the 
troops in the Kurainn district and the detachment 
which had been sent to the relief of Khojent, the 
Governor-General found that the troops available 
for tlie invasion of Kholcand consisted of sixteen 
companies of infantry, nine sotnias of cavalry, 
twenty guns, and a rocket-batteiy, giving a total 
strength of only about 4,500 Inen with 1,600 
horses. This was by no ineans a large force with 
which to ullder take tlie concluest of the Khanate ; 
hut Kaufmann knew that pro~npt r~clioil Waf3 
necessary, as the enemy's forces were daily increas- 
ing in numbers ; and tllerefore, after hastily making 
the necessary preparations, he marched to Kl~ojent, 
where the force arrived on August 30. The siege 
bad by that time been raised, and the enemy had 
been driven across the frontier; but information 
was received that the main Khokandian army, 
about 30,000 strong, was collected at Makhram, a 
u :! 
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fortified village twenty miles beyond Kostakoz on 
the Khokand road ; and, after the troops had been 
given a day's rest at Khojent, Kaufmann moved 
forward on September 1 to try conclusions with 
the enemy.' 
That evening the Russian column halted a t  the 
frontier town of Ab-Khurelr on the banks of tlie 
Syr Daria, and at daybreak on the following day 
the adt-ance was resumed towards the village of 
I<aratcl~kum. As far as Ab-Khurek no opposition 
was encountered, and it was not until the force . 
had marched some four miles beyond tha t  place 
that the enemy's picquets were first seen on  the 
right of the line of advance, which lay  tllrougl~ 
undulating country sloping gradually down from 
the mountains towards the Syr Daria. But  soon 
afterwards large masses of horsemen appeared on 
the flanks of the Russian column, and by their 
harassing tactics greatly delayed its advance lo 
Karatchkum, ancl caused the troops m u c l ~  annoy- 
ance and fatigue. 
By this time it was well known that  the  Hho- 
kandians had made up their minds l o  dispute the 
Russian advance at Malrhram, where a large square 
mud-fort, with high crenelated walls, starlds on the 
edge of the left bank of the Syr Daris, the other 
three sicles being protected by a deep wet ciitc11. 
Russian spies and some friendly inhabitants of the 
Tho Russian force whioh left Khojent for the invasion of IUlo- 
kancl consisted of fifteen oompnnies of infantry, one dornpnny of' 
flappers, and eight sotnins of Cossacks, with 20 p n r r  and a, rockct- 
bntterg. The cnvnlry were placed under the commanil of Colonrl 
Sltoholeff, nnd WRPO cliviclerl into four divisions of two s o t n i n ~  cnch, 
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place had also informed I<aufmm~n that the enemy 
had extended the defences by the formation of a 
fortified camp on the south-eastern side of the for- 
tress, and that they had inundated a considerable 
portion of the road by which the Russians were 
advancing. 
The commandel.-in-chief therefore resolved to 
marc11 round the soul11 of the inuilclatiorls and 
take the position in flaulr and rear ;  and at 
five o'clock in the morning of September 3 the 
Russian troops marched out of their camp near 
Karatchkum in order of battle, with the cavalry at. 
a short distance behind their right flank. But as 
soon as they had got past the village large masses 
of the enemy's cavalry appeared on all sides and 
resumed their usual tactics, approaching with loud 
cries and yells to within a sliort distance of the 
Russian column, and then retiring a t  the first signs 
of any advance on the part of the Cossacks. But 
the distance from Karatchkuln to Maklirm is only 
three miles ; and the Cossacks, supported by a few 
guns and roclceta, easily succeeded in keeping the 
enemy at a respectful clists~iice, ahile the column 
steadily pushed forward. 
The Russians marched over the low hills to the 
south of Makhram until they had arrived opposite 
the south-eastern angle of the fort, when the direc- 
tion of the advance was changed to the left, and 
- 
a+on of K ~ O -  the troops moved towards the enemy's intrenched 
con~pnny of - camp. They had not proceeded far in  this new 
~ n d  a roakct- 
la of Colonel direction when the Khokandian artillery opened 
otnins ench. fire, but this was not at first replied to by the 
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Russians, who steadily pushed on until they 
arrived opposite the extreme left rear of the ene1-n~'~ 
position. The gulls then took up their positiorl 
and opened fire, and, after the bombardment 11ad 
lasted for about an hour, two battalions of infantry 
advanced to assault the position. After a cluarter 
of an hour's shai-p fighting the' iiltrellchecl cainp 
was captured, and the Russian troops, tlzea crossillg 
the bridge over tlie clitch, threw tl~emselves against 
the gates. Wi~hout paying any attention to the 
fire wlich was directed against thein from the 
malls, the inen, encouraged by the example of 
their ollicers, placecl their shoulders against the 
wooden cloors, and, keeping time to the tune of a 
soldiers' chorus, sooil forced them open. But little 
opposition was ellcountered within the walls, ancl 
vithin an hour such of the enemy as had remained 
in the fort mere killed or took to flight, arid the 
Russian ilag'was unfurled on the ramparts of 
. Malchram. 
While the illfantry were thus assaulting the 
intrenched camp and fortress, the cavalry, under 
~lrobelefl, attacked the masses of Khokandian 
horsemen which were d r a ~ n  up in the gardens to 
tihe east of the fort, and, after a sharp encouliter, 
put thein to. flight and pursued them for about 
ten miles along the banks of the Syr Daria, when 
large numbers were cut down or drowned in their 
attempts. to escapk across t l ~ e  river. On returning 
from: tlie pursuit the Cossacks c&me across another 
'body of the enemy's cavdry, who were also cluickly 
routed by a discharge of rockets. . ' 
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The effect produced by this Russian victoyy 
was no doubt very great, especially amongst the 
s~~rrounclilzg populatioa, who sooil came in witll 
professions of submission, and also brought pro- 
visions for sale to tlie troops. The results were s t 1  
tlie time greatly exaggerated in the Russ i a  press, 
wliicli appareiitly believed that the power of the 
Iiholtandialzs had been completely broken ; aud . 
Kaufinann also appears to have over-estimated tlie 
value of this success, for in a telegram addressed 
i 
to the Czar, reporting the results of tlie battle, he 
saicl that ' the impression produced i11 the Iihai~a~te 
by lliis battle is immense, but one cannot yet 
a,ppreciate all tlie consequences of tlie battle of 
Makbram.' It was not long, however, before he 
was ellabled to fully redise to what extent the 
victory at Mak'nrain had conduced to the pacifica- 
tion of the Khanate, and the discovery prohably 
caine solnewhat in the form of a surprise ; for 
before tlie close of the year he found himself eii- 
gaged in a contest which fully taxed tlie resources 
of the Russians in Central Asia. 
Immediately after this battle General Kaufnlarirl 
issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Klio- 
kand, pointing out the folly they had commil;ted 
in having embarked in a Holy War against tlle 
,Russians, and urging t l~em to seize and deliver to 
him the ringleaders who, for their own alnhitious 
purposes, had brought such trouble on the Khanate. , 
He advised .the people to return lo their homes 
an& occupations, and inforined them that, while 
unarmed persons wo~lld not. be interfered withj 
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all who mere foui~d in possession of arins would 
be punished; and he collclucled by stating that 
Khuclayar Khan had been sent to St. Petersb~lrg, 
ancl that he would not return again as their sove- 
reign, as it was known to the Russians that he did 
not, possess the affection of the people of Khokand. 
The Russians haltecl at Nakhram for three days, 
awaiting the arrival of a convoy which had been 
clespatchecl from Khojent with reillforcements and. 
stores; and on Septelnber 7 ICaufmann advanced 
towa~ds the Khokanclian capital, leaving a garrison 
of two conlpanies of infantry and twenty Cossacks 
in the Makhram fort, which was made the advanced 
base for any further operations that might be found 
necessary. Some miles out of Makhram Kaufmann 
was met by a deputation from the new Khan, Nasr- 
Eddin, who apologised for ' the accidental conflict 
of troops on the frontier, and the consecluent was rn 
unpleasantness.' The chief of this embassy was 
Isllan Fszil-Achmet lIagzoun~e, and be was accom- 
panied by Mullall Issa AuliQ, who was one of the 
principal leaders of the rebellion and one of the 
most prominent opponents of the Russians. Kauf- 
mann refused to have anything to do with these m a n n  
envoys, and continned' his advance, retaining Issa 
Alllit5 as a prisoner until he could give a satisfactory 
explanation of the part he had, talcen in the insur- 
rection. 
On the evening of the 7th the troops, after a. 
march of fourteen miles, halted at the village of 
Chaidam-Mazar, and on. the following day they 
reabhed Bish-Arik, which is some sixteen miles 
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farther on, and twenty-four miles from the city of 
Khokand. The country through which the colu~nn 
was now moving was extremely fertile and well 
irrigatecl, and during the advance the inhabitants 
came out to meet the Russians with presents for 
the general, and bringing bread and salt in tolren 
of their complete s~~bmission to their conquerors. 
While marchiilg from Bish-Arilc to Icosh-Kupir, 
on September 9, another envoy arrived froin the 
Kllan, accompanied by the prisoners who hacl been 
capturecl at Nau and the various post-stations at 
the commencelneilt of the war ; and the merchants 
of Xhokancl also sent a deputation deilying corn- 
plicity in the rebellion, and begging for nlercy. 
All along the route the troops were nlet by bands 
of peasants, who were anxious to display their 
friendship and peaceful intentions. The advance 
was more like a triumphal procession than the 
advance of an army through an enemy's country ; 
ancl on September 1 0  the capital of Xhokancl fell 
into the hancls of the Russians without any blood- 
shed, and even without a single shot having been 
fired. Sl~ortly afterwards N&-~cldin paid Iiauf- 
mnnn a formal visit, and, after the necessary 
arrangements had been made for the distribution 
of the troops, the R~lssian general accompanied the 
Khan a short way into the town. For five days 
tho Russian troops remained encamped near to 
the Djir Mosque, outside the city walls, and during 
this time convoys of provisions, felt tents, ammuni- 
tion, and other necessaries arrived from Makhram. 
But the s\.ituation was very unhealthy, and' the 
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number of siclr increased so rapidly that ICauf~nall~l 
clecidecl to move hlle force to another locality, and 
took advantage of this opportunity to overawe the 
inhabitants by ~narclling the troops through the 
But, altllough tlie ca1~itd of the Khailate had 
been thus easily captured, the political outlook was 
by no means promising. ICaufniann's proclanla- 
tfioi~ inet with but little response ; Osh, Namangan, 
Alldijan, a id  the other large tomrns showed no 
signs of s~~bmission, and bands of armed inen 
collected in tlie hills near Isfara and Malchrnlli, 
and necessitated the despatch of flying colunii~s ? 6 
from Kllojent and I<llolrancl. I t  is true that OIL 
September 11 Knufrnann received a lelter from 
S ultall Mu rad, Nasr-Edclin's uncle ailil Bek of 
Margelan, in whicll he declared his entire submis- 
sion to Russian autllority, and begged that the 
former friendly relations might be renewed ; and 
that on the followiilg day another paper was re- 
ceived, bearing the seals of Abdur Ralimall Afto- 
batcha and seventy-five other Kirghiz and Kipchak 
chiefs, in mrl~icl~ these leaders stated that, as the 
fortune of war was against the Mahommedans, 
they trusted that Kaufmann would restore peace 
and q ~ ~ i e t  i11 the same way as he had done in the 
city of Khokand. But these overtures had no 
result, for when Iiauf~nann replied that no one 
desired peace nlore than 11e did, and invited the , 
1 1  
chiefs to illeel him in his camp before Khokand, b 
4, 
no response was inade to the invitation; but, ou $, 
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Ral~man was busily einployecl in collecting a fresh 
force near Margelan, and tlzat he had persuaded 
or coinpelled Sultan Murad to join in the rnovenzent. 
At first these reports were vague and contra- 
dictory, but soon illore definite inforination was 
received, which clearly showeci that a formidable 
force 11~as asseinbling near Margelan ; and Kz~ufnzann 
therefore set out for that place on Septeinber 1 7  
to try and put an end lo the Aftobatclia's intrigues. 
TWO days later the Russian coluiniz reacliecl hlli- 
Arik, wlfich is about twenty miles froin Margelan, 
Abdur Rahinaa being then in occupation or a 
lsosition at Gurgil, seventeen miles farther on, 
where he had a force of 10,000 nzeil and 18 
guns, a i d  appeared delerlnined to make a stai~d. 
IIe, however, on hearing of the approach of Kauf- 
msnn's column, lost heart, mid, disbancling his 
force, retreated into the nlountairis with a small 
band of his most faithful adherents. On tlze 20th 
the Russians advanced, ancl took up an excellent 
position near Margelan, and in the evening the 
city was unconditionally surrendered. 
That night at  about nine o'clock the inde- 
fatigable Skobeleff continuecl the pursuit of the 
Aftobatcl~a wit11 a flying column, composed of the 
Cossacks, and two companies of infantry in couiltry 
carts, with four gune and a rocket-battery. Ad- 
vancing rapidly with his cavalry along the road 
to Asaki ancl Andijan, he reached Niaz-Batyr at 
'five o'clock on the following morning. He then 
hear3 that Abdur Raliman had turned southwards 
towards the nlountains, and therefore, without 
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halting, continued the pursuit with his Cossacks ri 
towards Ming TepB, where he had a sharp ellcounter 
with the enemy, who left forty dead on the Geld, 
and fled in disorder towards Osh. 
By this time the continuous hard marching 
had begun to tell on the Cossacks' horses, and it 
was iinpossible for the chase to be at once con- 
tinued. The party was therefore obliged to halt 
at Ming-TepB for some llours ; but during the night 
Skobeleff once more started off towards Osh, where 
he arrived at nine o'clock on the following morn- 
ing. The city at once surrendered, and by tell 
o'clock the Russian general was installed in the 
Bek's palace, where he received the subnlission of # 
various chiefs and notables. Here, however, he g, 
only halted for a couple of hours, and then, with 5 $ 
a hundred troopers, he moved t o ~ a r d s  the Kara g 
Daria; but  as it  was reported that the Aftobatcha 
had been allnost entirely deserted by his followers, 
and as Kaufmann had ordered him not to go too 
far, he returned through Asaki to Margelan, where 
he arrived on September 25. 
This rapid advance of Skobeleff's and his occu- 
pation of Osh, which was one of the chief centres 
of the Kirghiz and Kipchalc population, produced 
an excellent effect. Andijan, Balikchi, Shahr-i- 
khana, Asaki, and many of the adjacent villages at i". $<$ 
once tendered their submission, and Halyk Nazar #. Pa; 4j Parmanatchi-another leader of the insurrection- 4;. 
was d so  given up to the Russians ; so that out of 1; 4 
:the three principal instigators of the rebellion, $( A,
Abdur Rahwan alone remained at large. As g. z 
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hostility towards the Russians, and had ol~ly sent 
in  their sulsmission after Skobeleff had raicled into 
the immediate neigl~l~ourlioocl of their city, Kauf- 
inann, nevertlleless, sent two oficers (Mr. Kuhn 
and Captain Petroff) from Margelan to Aiidij an 
for the purpose of inalring ' scientific iiivestiga- 
t,ions.' A inore inopportune momelit for the pnr- 
suit of science conld not well have been selected ; 
and it is not surprising that shortly after Kauf- 
lnailn reached Namangan, these two officers also 
arrived there and reported that they had been 
ill-treated by the inhabitants, and that Anclijan 
was once again in a state of rebellion. I t  is not 
ii~~prol~alsle that Kaufmann expected this result 
from the ' scientific mission,' for he has not gene- 
rally displayed any lack of intelligence ; ancl it is 
inlpossible to avoicl the suspicion that he was not, 
altogether clispleasecl with the turn affairs Bacl 
t &en. 
He at this time had at his disposal a sufficiently 
strong force to overcolne any possible resistance 
on the part of tlie Ilholrandians, aiicl the oljpor- 
tunity which thus presented itself of coinpletely 
subjugating the Khanate was one which was not 
likely to be neglected. He therefore lost no time 
in fitting out an expeditionary force to punish the 
Andijanis, and on October 10 General Trotzky left 
Namangan with five companies of infantry, eighty- 
six snppers, ancl three-and-a-half sotnias of Cossacks, 
wit11 eight guns alicl four rocket-stancls-the in- 
fantry being carried in country-carts. Coinmen- 
cing their march at seven o'clock in tlie morning, 
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the troops crossed two branches of the N a y u  ; 
and then crossing the Syr Daria-here called the 
Kara Daria-at Balihchi, they encalnped for tlle 
night at tlie village of Chinorat, some five miles 
farther on. On the following clay they marched 
to the village of Alc-tepd (Xara-Xalpal~), wl~ich is 
situated on the banks of t l ~ e  Mussulman-Kuli canal, 
about four anrl three-quarter miles from Anclijan, 
and there Trotzky founcl that Abclur Rallmnn 11 ad 
collected a large army for the defence of t l ~ e  city, 
while another consiclersble force was encamped 
close by uncler a Kirglliz pretender to the tlzrone.' 
Skobeleff, who was invariably to be founrl wherever 
any fighting was exl~ectecl, was therefore sent out 
on the morning of October 1 2  with a sotnia ancl a 
half of Cossacks and the rocket-stands, to make a 
careful reconnaissance of the enemy's position. 
T11is party fouild that the briclges over the cand 
hacl been destroyed, and they were compelled 
to keep close to the left bank of the Sgr Darin 
until they arrived opposite to the northern face of 
the city ; but tlleli they moved soutllward, anil 
advancing up the Anclijaili Sar ravine, the intrepici 
Skobeleff succeeded in arriving within twenty-fin? 
pards of the enemy's outposts before be was clis- 
covered. Then a heavy though badly-aimed fire 
was opened on the Russians Born tlie tops of the 
~ntry, e i g l ~  l j7- 1 This man, who is said to hnve beon a humble tobacco-sollor of 
3 01 COSSS(? ks, Pisltent, assumod the name of F~~lllad Belt, and pretended to be t l i ~  
son of Atalyk Khan, and grandson of Ali IChon, who hod beell IChas 
rids-the i r k -  of ICholtllancl at the commencement of the present century. As n 
8. Comnlc3)ra- mfittar of faot, the r e d  l"n1~~d Bolr mafi then living quietly with his 
the mor~ ii T r:-, mother in Shmwkencl. 
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walls and roofs of the houses, and they were obliged 
to retreat to the plain north of the city, where they 
were joined by two fresh sotnias of Cossacks from 
the camp. 
During this reconnaissance Skobelef succeeded 
in checking a sketch which had been prepared 
by &pfaii~ Petroff, and as a result of his report 1 Genera1 Trotzky issued orders for tlle assault of the I 
city on the following day. For this purpose the 
force was divided into three detachments, mrhich 
were to push through the city by different routes 
and unite in front of the palace in the centre of the 
tom~n. A conlpany of infantry, with two guns and 
two rocket-stands, was left behind for the protec- 
tion of the camp and train. 
The troops detailed for the assault marched out 
of the camp at claybreak on October 13, but they 
had not gone far when swarms of Kholranclians, 
under the pretender Fulad Bek, made a determined 
attack on the camp. They were, however, repulsed 
by the detachment which had been left behind ; 
rind when the assaulting columns reached the open 
ground to  the north of the town the Russian gulls 
opened fire to cover the advance of the storming 
parties, which steadily captured barricade after 
barricade, and, in spite of the stubborn resistance 
of the Iihol.=andians, succeedecl in joining hands in 
front of tbe Bek's palace. 
But although the origiilal orders bad been thus 
carried out, Trotzlry found that i t  was impossible 
to nlaintain his position, as the place was still 
s~varming with armecl men who kept ~zp a con- 
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ti~luous fire on the Russian troops ; ancl he tllere- 
fore decided to retreat, destroyino. as much of the b 
town as possible during the retirement. After 
short halt the troops fell back, burning everything 
on their way ; but they encountered just as much 
opposition while retiring as they had met with 
during the advance, and their movemeilt through 
the town was simply a ~unning  fight. The greater 
portion of the city was, however, set on fire, a id  
on reaching his encainpilzeilt Trotzky added to thc, 
destruction by boinbarcling the place for three 
hours. 
On the following day the bombarcknent was 
resumecl, ancl on October 15 the Russians broke 
up their camp and started for Nainangan, burni~lg 
and ravaging the farins en ~uz6te. Daring their 
marc11 along the left bank of the Kara Daria, and 
until they had crossed that river, they were closely 
followed by the Khokandians, wllo illacle contilluous 
a~tacks  on the column, their opposition being of 
such an obstinate nature that the Russians took 
eight hours to cover the first seven versts (4% miles) 
after leaving their camp. Once the river was 
crossed the attacks ceased, and on October 17 t11e 
colurnn was met by General Kaufn~aln, ~ h o  had 
rnarched out of Nainangan to assist Trotzky. 
This attack on Andijan was without doubt n 
failure ; for although Trotzlcy received the Cross of 
Saint George and a sword of ~ O ~ O U T ,  and alt110ugh 
the Russia11 papers represented the affair in the 
light of a successful assault, the Russians nnques- 
tionably found it impossil~le to remain in the city 
VOL. 11. E 
for more than two or three hours, and their retire- Bek 0: 
ment was very naturally consiclered by  the Kho- IChokai- 
kanclians to have been nothing less than a forced against 
retreat; Tliat the ,Russians had sustained a serious ate wer 
clieck is clearly shown by the subsequent dis- had bec 
turbances in Kholcand, and also in Namangan and mann d 
the surrounding district. The people abandorled and t h ~  
their villages, and under the - - leadership -. of a former 
Belc of Namangan, named Batyr 'I'iura, they soon I newly E 
joined the rebellion, and although several flying I the Syr 
colunns were sent against them they invariably conside 
succeeded in evading the troops. rebel b; 
General Kaufmann, however, did not consider tinuiug 
that his presence in Klloka~xd was ally longer Defeati 
requirecl, and he therefore left Narnczigan on he pus1 
October 28, after he had handed over the corn- intelligc 
maid to Sliobeleff, who had beell promoted to tlie to retra 
rank of major-general in recognition of his brilliant, As so01 
services during the ca~npaign. During tlie whole hacl ent 
of his journey from Namangaii to ICliojent, Kauf- populat 
inann's escort was iiicessalitly attacked by bailils ber 5, t 
of Kirghiz and EFipclial<s, so that liia march had citadel. 
rather the appearance of a retreat tliail the return return I 
of a victorious commander. 11 
3 Fresh disturbalices also broke out in tlie city or U- , 
- - - - . - - - - . . - .  i; 
the Kip 
barded 
Xhokarld itself, where the inhabitants, on learnillg @I! 1. afterwa 
the conditions of the treaty of peace, deposed Nasr- gq ~3, forces a 
Eddin, and forced him to fly to Khojent, where 11e 
' .  - -  - . -  - - 
arrived alone, and without property of any liincl, district 
at  the saine time as General I C a h a l l n .  After his in othei 
departure, Kllokand was occupied by the adherents Kaufinl 
of Fulad Belr and Abclul Gtlffar Beli (the I'oriner. througI 
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BeB of Ura-Tep4, who bad made his way to 
Khokanci at the colninenceinent of the rebellion 
:L ~ i r s  of the IClia~l- against Khudayar) ; and as thc A: 
a te  were thus in as disordered a conclitioi~ as they , 
had been when the Russia~~s Grst interfered, Kauf- 
mann despatchecl a force to reoccupy &Iakhranl, 
and thus to cover the Khojent frontier. 
In tlze ineanwhile disturbances continuecl in the 
newly acquired Russia11 territory to the north of 
the  Syr Daria, and Skobeleff left Namanpn. wit11 a 
considerable portion of his colninand to punish the 
rebel balds uncler Batyr Tiura, which were con- 
t,iiluing their depredations in the adjacent country. 
Defeatii~g them at  Tiura Kurgan on November 4, 
he pushed on as far a8 Chust, but there received 
il~telligeilce on the night of the Gthwhich caused him 
to  retrace his steps with the greatest possible speed. 
As sooil as he Ilacl left Namangan the Kipchaks 
hacl entered the city, and, being joined by the entire 
populatioii, they began, on the evening of Novem- 
ber 5, to attack the Russiaii camp and unGilislled 
citadel. The small garrison held out until his 
returii at noon on the 7th, and on the following day 
the  Kipchak quarter of the town was heavily bom- 
barded and reduced to ruins, Skobeleff' shortly 
afterwards inllicted another defeat on Batyr Tiura's 
forces at Balikcbi, and captured that tovn. 
By these movements the rising in the Namangan 
district waa effectually suppressed; but the disorders 
in other parts of the Kllanate still conti~~ued, and 
Kaufina1111 therefore ordered Skobeleff to marc11 
throngh the country between the Naryn and Kara 
x 2 
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Daria, which was considered to be the centre from 
which the Kipchak illalcontents carried out their 
hostile demonstrations. I t  thought that this 
movement could be made with the most telling 
effect if it was carried out in the early winter, when 
the nomads hacl moved, with their families, illto 
their winter settlements, as they could then be 
more easily got at, and their escape would be 
renderecl dtBcult, if not altogetl~er impossible, on 
accouilt of the deep snow with which the sur- 
ro~mding mouiitains would then be covered. 
Skobeleff therefore left Namangan on January 
6, 1876, with a force of 2,800 men, and crossing 
the Naryn river, moved along the right bank of the 
Kara, Daria, while a detachment was sent, under 
Baron Meller-Zakomelsky, to reconnoitre the coun- 
trj7 to the south of the river. The cold at this time 
was intense ; but, in spite of the severe frost (15" R.), 
the force inarcl~ed eastwards, ravaging the country, 
2nd burning all the settlements which were passed 
tllrougll. The importailt village of Paitok was 
completely destroyed, and, while a force was 
cletached to operate against the Kipchak villages 
in the mountains, the maill body contiilued i t s  
advance along the northern bank of the river t o  
Yani-Sarkarba. 
As the Kipchaks saw that their settlements 
were threatened with complete destruction t h e y  
sent envoys asking for mercy; a~icl these men were  
informed by the Russian general that the tr ibes 
would be spared if they proved their sincerity a n d  
coinplete submission by delivering up the ]leads of 
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the rebellion aild the parties who had incited the 
people to enter upon the Eoly War against tlle 
Russians. As these terms were not complied wit11 
the advance was continued, ancl after sonle skir- 
mishes on January 12 ancl 1 3  the Russians crossed 
the Kara Daria at Yani-Sarkarba on the following 
day, and established a fortified camp on the left bank 
of the stream. A halt was then made for several 
clays while reconnaissances were pushed forward 
towards the city of Anclijall, where Abdur Rallman 
was reported to h ~ v e  collected a force of 10,000 
horsemeil and 5,000 foot solcliers, indepericlent of 
some 15,000 armed inl~abitants who had expressed 
their deternlinatioil to oppose the R~lssians lo the 
death. 
Two messages were bheil sent deinallding llle 
surrender of the city; but as these were not 
aliswerecl Skobeleff determined to assault the place ; 
and, advancing on January 20, lie storined  lie 
village of Iskylilc, and then commenced the born- 
bardlnent of Andijan. After the artillery had fired 
some 500 rounds, two storming columils advailcecl 
to the attack and soon penetrated to the centre of 
of the town, where another battery was brought 
into action aucl continued the clestruction of the 
place. By the next day all resistance had ceased: 
Andijan, which had inflicted such a serious reverse 
on Trotzky's colnmn, was now subdued by the 
ever-victoriouu Slcobeleff; and the Russian troops 
occupied the remains of the sorely-punished city, 
Skol~eleff hinlself taking up his cluarters in the 
Bek's palace, .crliicl~ TroLzky-in his ailxiet y to 
nlillirnise liis defeat-had reported to have been 
destroyed. 
On January 30 news was received that the 
Iihokandians who had fled from Andijan were again 
assemblillg near Asaki, and Skobeleff therefore 
marched out and captured that town after severe 
fighting. This baLtle, following closely after the 
capture of Aadijan, coillpletely broke the power 
of the Kl~okandiane. Margelan ancl Shallr-i-Khans 
tendered their submissioil onoe more ; ancl on 
February 5 Abdur Rahiuae, Batyr Tiura, Isfend 
Yar, and other leaders of the insurrection sur- 
rendered theillselves unconditionally to Skobeleff 
and threw themselves on the mercy of the Ein- 
peror. 
By this time also the inllabitnnts of the city of 
Khokand found that they were no better off under 
tlle leadership of Fulad Bek aud Abclul Gaffar Bek 
than they had been under I<hudayar's son, for 
these two chiefs, taking advantage of their acces- 
sion to power, appeared determined to enrich 
themselves as much as possible at the expense of 
their adherents, while the former also coininitted 
the grealest atrooities and seemed to revel in 
bloodsl~eil. The people, therefore, sent to Nasr- 
Eddirl a ~ d  Isegged h i~n  to return. The Khan was 
then a t  Makluam, and after some hesitation he set 
out for tho Kbokandia~ capital ; but before he 
arrived tbere the Kipchak and Kirghiz acber- 
eilts of Fulad Rek attacked him ancl forced him 
to return precipitately to the Russian frontier. 
Skobeleff waFj then ordered to occ~zpg the capital ; 
and 1 
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and this he did on February 20, when sixty-two 
gum and a large supply of ammullition and pro- 
visions were captured. FuZad Beli in the mean- 
while had taken refuge in the mountains to the 
north of Karategin, and when captured a short 
time afterwards he was justly hanged for his 
barbarous actions. 
By this time it had been decicled that the 
whole of the Khanate should be a~~nexecl. General 
Kaufmann had left Tashkent in the previous 
December for tlze Russian capital, and on his 
arrival there l ~ a d  persuaded the Czar's Government 
that such a step wa3s necessary for the security of 
the south-eastern frontier of theTurlrestai~proviilce; 
and on March 2, 1876, tlie Emperor signed an 
order by wl~iclz it was decreed lhat the whole of 
Xhokand was incorporated in the Russian Enlpire 
under the name of the Province of Fel.gballa, and 
that this new province mas to be under the direc- 
tion of the Governor-Gel~erd of Turkestan, who 
was to reorganise its administration by means of 
a provisional arrangement such as hacl been intro- 
duced in the Amu-Daria and Zarafshan districts. 
Ilnmediately on receipt of this order General 
KolpakoE~lry, who had temporay coml~land dur- 
ing IZaufmann's absence, set out for the city of 
Khokand, and there proclaimed to the still dis- 
quieted inhabitants that the While Czar hacl 
' approved of their submission' and hacl decided 
to take illern nnder his prolection. Nasr-Ecldin, 
Abdur Rahnlrzn, and other leaders of the insurrec- 
tion were lhen deported to Tasl~kenl, aucl General 
,.+.:-, . . .  v y w 7  
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.Skobeleff was placed in command of the new 
Thus Russia had at last gainecl her long-desired 
object ill obtaining command of the entire course 
of the river Jaxartes. Many years previously, 
%vl1en the Cossacks had first appeared a t  the mouth 
of that river, Russian writers hacl stated that the 
accluisitioi~ by Russia of the wliole length of the 
Syr Dayin was an indispensable part of the scheme 
for the effective protection of the Xirghiz, in order 
t l~a t  the Rpssian garrisons in the Steppe forts 
I might be readily suppliecl with fuel, forage, and 
wid ' provisions from the fertile tracts dong the upper 
course of the river. This point llsd never beell 
lost sight of, in spite of Prince Gortchalcoff"~ 
repeated protests that no filrtlier ailvarices woulcl 
be made ; and by the annexation of Kholcand the 
, Russians took up a new line of frontier far in 
advance of the one which Prince Gortchakoff had, 
I eleven years previously, declayecl to be suficient 1 
, for the protection of the Kirghiz, and which was 
t o  have marked tlie limit of Russian concluests i n  
this direction. 
Ailthough the Kara-Kirgliiz ancl Kipcllaks of 
the plains had by this time been con~pletely 
L subclued, tlie Xirghiz tribes in the mountaiiis to  
the south-east of the Pergl~ana Valley had not yet; 
been taagllt the power ol the R~lssian arms. 
Beveral clans uncler the command of a chief named 
Abclulla I3ek assemhloil in the rnountaii~s to the 
soutli of Qulclla, and, as they refused to take part 
in ths geneid submissioiz, Slrobeleff was orderecl 
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to lllarcli agaiilst then1 and pursue them as far 
into the mountains as possible, in order that they 
might be taught that their mountaillous retreats 
were not inaccessible to the Russian troops. 
Nor was this the only reason which caused the 
Turkestan authorities to send an expedition into 
the inhospitable regions of the Alai and Trans-Alai 
mountains. I t  was believed that a war wit11 
Yalcoob Beg of Kashgar was inevitable, and, 
althoug.11 it hacl been postponed on account of the 
rising in Khokand, it  was still understood that a 
force would soon be sent to subdue the proud 
Alnir of Kashgaria ; and it was therefore necessary 
that the passes between Fergbana ancl Ea9tern 
Turkestan sl~oulcl be thoroughly explored. Then, 
again, the Panlir region to the south of the Alai 
range--a district which had but rarely beell 
traversed by Zuropeans, and of which only the 
vaguest knowledge existed-was believed by many 
to offer a possible line for an advance against 11113s 
-if not for a large army, at  all events for a small 
corps, which might greatly hamper the British 
defence-and it was of the greatest importarlce 
that this mou~ltaillous table-laid should be exa- 
mined ancl mapped. 
In accorclance wit11 the instructions which 
he had received General Skobeleff divided his 
force into three columns, which started from 
Uch Kurgan, Osh, ancl Gulcha. ' I-Ie himself 
accompanied the Gulcha force, which WRS the 
priilcipal one, ancl several scientific ofXicers were 
attached to his sta& anlong whom were. Captain 
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Kostellko and Messrs. Oshonin and Bonsilorff, who 
respectively conducted the geograpl~ical, natural 
llistory, geodetical 013servatims. At the end 
of July 1876 a flying column of 100 Cossacks aild 
a few mounted infanlry was sent forward under 
fiillce Witgellstein to the SharL Pass, and shortly 
afterwarcls the three main colullllls pushecl forward 
to the Alai plateau througll wild and ruggedregions, 
wl~ere the paths in places zigzagged along high 
lvountaillous leclges, and wliere numerous frail, 
trembling bridges suspellded over gigantic chasnls 
and precipices had to be crossed in single file. 
The troops, however, reached the Alai with the 
loss of oidy a lew pack aniinals whicl~ had fallen 
over the  precipices, Abclulln Bek's lnotller aiid 
wives were shortly afterwards capturecl, with large 
jlocks of sheep and many horses, and illis was 
followed by the sublnission of tlie elders of the 
Icara-Kirgl~iz tribes who wander allout the Alai 
plateau. But Abdulla Uek remainecl at large a id  
escapecl lowarcla Kasligar. 
During this expedition llle Russians liacl 110 
lighliag ; but the scientific and geogr,zy,hical resulk 
achieved were ~f consiclerable inlportnnce. The 
Alai plateau (that is, llle elevded valley ljetwecn 
the Alai and Trans-Alai ranges, and through wliich 
the Kizil-Su, or Surld~-al), brnrlcll of tlic Oxus 
flows) was lraverseil, silcl I'rinoo Witgciislein's 
force was scr~ t lo llle Kizil-Yart ilelile in llle Trans- 
Alai range, from whence :L gra11~1 view w7;is ol->tnine(l 
of the I'atnir region gcncr.nllp, ;lltil l~nrlicul:~rly of 
tlie nor theru l->ur lion, cnllecl 111ia Iiliargoshi S'aini~., 
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in which lies tlie Great Kara-Kul Lake. This lake 
was carefully explored by Captain Hostenko, and 
found to be 13,200 feet above the sea level, rind 
ollly 800 feet below the suininit of the Icizil-Yzrt 
Pass. Its greatest length-from north to south- 
vas  found to be about fifteenmiles, atid its breadth 
eleven ~niles ; ancl it is almost divided into two 
portions by proinoutories wl~icli jnt out froin its 
northern and souther11 shores, ailcl between which 
there is a narrow strait coililectiilg the easteril slid 
western portions of the lake. After exploring tliis 
portioil of the Kliargoshi Pamir, Kosteilko tlieil 
proceeded in a south-easterly direction as far as 
the Uzbel Pass ; but being witllout a guicle, auci 
falling short of provisions, he was then obliged to 
retrace his steps. By this recollllaissance the geo- 
graphical knowledge of the mountainous regions 
to the soutll of Khokand was very largely extenilecl, 
and the Russian frontier was pushed soull~warils 
for some eighty iniles to the southeyn edge of the 
Khargoshi Paair. 
The Russian troops in the inearin~hile traversecl 
the camping-grounds of the Itcli k'ilik, Naiman, 
and Taiti tribes of the Kara-Kirglliz, and the 
expedition finally returned to Khokand early in 
September 1876, having satisfactorily proved that 
a Russian force .of all arms could, during tlie 
summer rnoiitl~s, cross the Alai and Trans-Alai 
ranges witllout serious difficulty. This knowledge 
was in itself of the very greatest iln~ortance, fop 
tile chief dificulty in tlie Pamir line of a(lvallc0 
towards India is to be found not in the Panlir 
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plateau itself, but in the regions immecliately to 
the north and south of it. O~ice the Russian troops 
had traversed the difficult defiles of the Alai, sild 
had succeeded in reaching the crest of the Trsns- 
Alai raiige, they found that the drop from thence 
to the Painir plateau was a trifling matter of 800 
feet,' and as soon, therefore, as the suminit of 
tlie Kizil-Yart Pass was reached the most difficult 
! portion of the journey was over. Once thus esta- 
blished on the northern edge of tlie ' Roof of the 
Worlcl,' there is nothing in the physical nature of 
the .country to prevent an army of several tl~ousand 
men, provicled with mountain artillery, froin con- 
tiiiuillg its advance; cluriilg the summer months, 
right up to the nortlzern elltrances of the Biildu 
Kush Passes, whence cletachmeilts could be pushecl 
forwards into Chitral and Gilgit, thereby turnirlg 
the right flanlr of the Eiiglish line of defence, ailcl 
spreading confusion and clisinay througllout Kash- 
mir and the frontier provinces of British India. 
This is the lesson which the Russians parhlly.  
learned from Skobeleff's Alai expedition ; ailcl fiom 
this tiiile they sedulously strove to perfect their 
knowledge of the Painir region, in order that they 
rlliglit be able to make a starLli~lg diversion in Ilint 
direction when the time sl~oulcl arrive fur the great 
final struggle for mastery in Asia. 
I 
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RUSSIAN INTRIGUI AT KABUL 
Rl~ssian conquests in twelve years-Rnsso-Turlrish War-Constan- 
tillople in pel*il-Rnssian ssnccesses ill the Asiatic provinces of 
Twkey-131.itish Fleot passes the Dardanelles-The Treaty of 
San Stefaao-Enghbncl on the verge of way-Agents born Rusfiia 
in ICabul-A Russian agent sent to India-Preparatione for 
Russia11 illvasion of India. 
SINCB the annexation of Kllolcand and of the 
northern porlion of the Palriir plateau, Russia has 
made no further conquests in the countries to tlze 
east and north of the River Oxus. There indeed 
remained but little territory in that portion of 
Central Asia which she could have appropriated 
wit2lo~1t becoming embroiled in a war with China. ; 
for by the time General Skobeleff had returned to 
IChokand after his Alai expedition the towns of 
Urumchi andManas had been recaptured by Chinese 
troops, and before the close of the following year 
Yalroob Beg hadceasedtolive, andEastenlTurBest,a~~ 
hacl become a province of the Chinese Empire. 
The Russians, however, had no cause to be 
dissatisfiecl with the resnlt of their work. In 
twelve short years from the time when Verefkin 
ant1 Tcheraaie~l' mmaclc their si~nultalleous aclvnnce 
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against the nortl~ern towils of Kliokand, Russia had 
succeeded in conqueriilg the tliree Khanates df 
Kholrand, K l ~ v a ,  and Bolchara. Khokand had been 
completely absorbed into the Russian Einpire ; large 
slices of territory had been wrested from Khiva 
and Bokhara and added to the Czar's dominions, 
and the rulers of those states, though nominally 
inclependeilt, had beell reduced to a condition of 
com~lete subjection ; and, ill addition to these great 
achievements, Russian troops were firmly estab- 
lished on the eastern shores of the Gaspiail Sea, nilrl 
had penetrated for soine distance into the Akhal 
Tekkd oasis on the nortl~ern frontier of Persia. 
But, wlile the Czar's troops .in Central Asia had 
been thus advancing from victory to victory, dark 
storm-clouds were gathering inTurkey, and before 
the sunlmer of 1876 had passed the troubled coiidi- 
tion of tlie Chrictian proviiices of the Ottoman Ein- 
pii-e hail become so serious as to endanger the peace 
of Europe. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro 
mere in revolt against the Portlea Bulgaria became 
the Bcene of a series of atrocious massacres per- 
petrated by the Christian and Moslem inliabit- 
ants against each other. On Julie 22 tlie Priiice of 
Servia declared war against the Turks, and tell 
claye later the Servians crossed the frontier at 
tliree different points. The Serbs, however, in 
spite of Russim~ assista~~ce in oilicers, men, and 
a Ohe of tho Servisn columna was under tho command of 
Canera1 Tchernaieff, the conqueror of Tashkent. About 500 Rusrian 
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sonie fighting, were forced to abanclon their posi- 
tions on the Morava, when Alexinatz fell into the 
hands of their enemies. At this moment, whel~ 
there was notl~ing to prevent the Turks from march- 
ing to Belgrade, Russia stepped in, and General 
Ignatieff- he Russian Arnbassador at Constanti- 
nople-informed the Porte that if within two days 
it did not accept an armistice of six weeks or two 
months' d~iration, and clid nol at once arrest mili- 
tary operalions, diplomatic relations between Russia 
and the St~bliine Porte would be broken OK 
At this time, wl~en war between Russia and 
Turkey appeared imminent, the Czar, oh November , 
2, 1876, at an interview at Livdia  with Lord c i . . i d  * 
Loftus, --"~. the -+Brih& Ambassador, ' pledged% 
v-mm.*-- $ 4 )  ;..\ 
sacred word of honour in the most earnest and 
solemn manner that he had no intention of acqair- 
ing Constaiitinople ; and that if ilecessity shoul(1 
oblige hiin to occupy a polllion of Bulgaria, it 
would only be provisionally, ancl until peace anrl 
the safety of tlie Cliristian population were secured.' 
'Intentions,' he saicl, ' are attributed to Russia of n 
future conquest of India and of the possession of 
Constar1tinople. Can anytlling be more absurcl ? 
Wilh regard to the former, it is a perfect impossi- 
bility ; arid as regards tlie latter, I repeat again 
the most soleillii assurances that I entertain neither 
the wish nor tlie intention.' Such were the words 
of the Czar Alexander 11. of Russia, and yet, as is 
Serbs ; thonsalids of nnssisn volunteers and 1,800 Cossnolrs passed 
tllrough Roun~nnia on their way to join tho Servian army, and 
batieries or artillery, mitraillours, rifles, and ammttnitiou wero fiont 
f~o11.1 Iiussis to nssisl in tho rclol~ion against tho Otlomaa Empire. 
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now well known, many months had not elapsed 
before the occupation of Constantinople by a 
Russian army was only prevented by the action 
of Great Britain ; and Russian columns actually 
marched towards the frontiel:~ of India, if not 
for its conqnest, at all events for the purpose of  
shalcing the of the British in that country. 
Eleven days after this meeting at Livadia 
orders were issuecl for the immediate mobi!isatiou 
of a portion of the Russian army ; ancl although n 
conference of the representatives of the Powers 
was held at Constantinople in the following Decein- 
ber ancl January, no satisfactory settlement was 
arrived at, and, after some further futile correspon- 
dei~ce, the Czar, on April 24, 1877, issued a mn- 
nifesto in wliicl~ he illformed his ' faitliful and 
lselovecl subjects ' that his ' desire to ameliorate 
and assure the lot of the oppressecl Christian popu-. 
lations of Turkey' had forced him to have recourse 
to arms, and therefore, invoking the blessiiig of 
God upon his ' valiant armies,' he gave the orcler 
to cross the Turkish frontier. Thus Russia once 
again waged war against the Porte, and for a brief 
space there was a pause in her attacks against the 
outposts of the Indian Empire. 
Before daybreak on the very day on which war 
was declared, Lieutenant-General Skobeleff, the 
hero of so many daring exploits in Central Asia, 
pushed forward with the Cossack cavally across 
the Russian frontier, and, after a ride of nearly 
sixty-five miles, seized the bridge over the river 
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ing. Three days later a Russiaii corps had occu- 
piecl Galatz and Braila on the left bank of the 
Danube, ancl tlie Russian army of invasion began 
to aclvance through Roumailia ; before the end of 
June the Russians had crossed the river Danube at 
two points ; and by the middle of July Nicopoli 
had been captured, the Dobrudja was at the mercy 
of the invading armies, a large Turkish force was 
hemmed in in the Quadrilateral, and Gurko, after 
crossing the Balkans by the Hankoi Pass, had 
made a raid on Yeni Sagra, scoured up the Tundja 
Valley, and had recrossed the mountains by the 
Schipka Pass. 
But an unpleasant surprise was in store for the 
12ussians. Flushed with their easy triumphs, they 
became over-confident, despised the military capa- 
bilities of their enemies, and neglected the most 
obvious precautions for securing the safety of their 
armies in Bulgaria. Although tlie existence of a 
large Turkish force in the neighbourhood of Wid- 
din was known to the Russian heacl-quarter staff, 
no steps were taken to guard against a possible 
attack from that quarter ; and mhen a force was 
eventually sent to occupy Plevna, after the capture 
of Nicopoli, it arrived too late. What follows is 
almost too well known to need relating. After 
three unsuccessful attempts to capture the Turkish 
position, in which the Russians lost 601 officers 
and 27,397 men, it became manifest that it would 
be necessary for them to remain on the defensive 
in all parts of tlie theatre of war until Plevna had  
been captured. 
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But as soon as Plevna had fallen, the Russian 
armies once more continued their marc11 towards 
tlie south ; the Turlsish positions in the Etropol 
Balkans mere turned, Suleiman Pasha's army was 
defeated and dispersed among the Rhodope moun. 
tains, tlie city of Adrianople was occupied by a 
Russian army, and on Jaiuary 31, 1878, all armis- 
tice a a s  concluded, on the understanding tliat the 
Turks were to cede Kars and Erzerouln to the 
Russians, to recognise the independence of Rou- 
mania, Servia, and 13ulgaria, and to evacuate the 
fortifications of Buyulc-Tcliekinedje, which consti- 
I tuted their last line of defence. Constan~ino~le 
was thus at the mercy of the Czar's victorious 
troops, and all Europe waited in a slate of intense 
anxiety to see whether the British Cabinet would 
adopt any measures to avert a Russian occupation. 
While tliese events were talcillg place in the 
European portion of the Sultan's domiiiions, the 
Asiatic provinces of Turkey were also being in- 
vaded by the armies of the Czar. On April 24, 
1877, while SlcobelelT was hasiening to seize the 
bridge across t,he Sereth river, four strong Russiali 
columns crossed tlie frontiers of Arinellia and 
moved forward against the Turkish fortresses of 
Kars, Ardehan, Batoum, and I3ay:~zicI. 110ulclltar 
Pasha, fearing lest he might 'be shut up in Kars, 
fell back, with a small force of 5,000 men, to tlie 
Sogllanli Dagh, and .there awaitecl the arrival of 
reinforcements. Raynzicl was occupied by the 
Fxivan troops, under General TergoulrassolT, on 
April 30, anti sevent,ee~z (lays hter Arilalln~l was 
cur  
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carried by assault after a brief bombardment. 
Tlius witllin the short space of three weeks two 
of the most important frontier towns in Armenia 
had been captured, and defeat and ruin stared the 
Turks in the face. 
But just as the brilliant defence of Plevna 
stemmed the tide of Russia11 invasion in Bulgaria, 
- 
so in Armenia the whole military situation was 
suddenly cha~~ged by the clever strategy of 
Moukhtsr Pasha, and by the natural genius for 
field fortification which the Turks seem to possess. 
As soon as Moukhtar heard of the la11 of Arclaha11 
he  fell back from the Soghanli Dagh, and occupied 
a position stretching from Olti on the north to the 
Delibaba Pass 011 the south, where he guarded the 
a,pproaches to Erzeronin from Ardahan, Kara, and 
Bayazid. Here the Turks remained ullmolested 
for a whole month, and during that time they 
- 
received considerable reinforcements, and threw 
up formidable lines of field-works at Zewin, which 
lies midway between Olti and the Delibaba Pass. 
111 the meanwhile Tergoulrsssoff liad been 
pushing forward from Bayazid, and on June 1 6  he 
routed a Turkish force wliclz attempted to oppose 
his march. He, however, failed to seize the passes 
of Delibaba, through which the Turks had re- 
treated; and as it was reported that the Russians 
showed no signs of advancing from the direction 
of Kars, Moukhtar Pasha resolved to strike a 
crusl~ing blow against Tergoukassoff before he 
could receive reinforcements. He accordingly 
concentrated a considerable portion of lus force 
B 2 
RUSSIAN INTRIGUE AT ICAI~UL 1877- 
--- 
on his right wing, and, after seizing the Delibaba 
Pass, he, on June 25, assaulted the Russian 
position at Tahirkeui. Tlle battle raged for ten 
hours with varying success ; but at niglltfall the 
Russians still maintained their positions, and the 
Turks were obliged to fall back to their positions 
of the morning-exl~austed, short of ammunition, 
and believing that the action had not been a 
success. 
But while this indecisive engagement was 
being fought on the Turkish right, a more irn- 
portant battle was taking place at Zewin. General 
Loris Melikoff, the Russian commander-in-chief,' 
hacl h e a d  of the movement of Turkish troops 
towards Delibaba, and he rightly assumed that 
Moukhtar Pasha intended to attack Tergoukassoff. 
As there was no time 'to reinforce the Erivan 
column directly, or to oppose Moukhtar's rnove- 
ment, Melikoff decided to attack the Turkish 
position at Zewin. Misled probably by the re- 
marlcable collapse of the Turkish defence at 
Ardahan, he believed that Turkish troops could 
not possibly withstand the attacks of the Caucasus 
infantry ; and, with but little artillery preparation, 
he gave the order for a frontal attack on the 
T~lrkish entrenchments. Such reclrlessness coulcl 
only have one result. As soon as the assaulting 
columns emerged from their shelter behind a low 
ridge which existed in front of the position they 
The Russian forces in Asia Minor were nominally under the 
supreme oommand of the ,Grand Duke Michael, but General Loris 
Meliioff Was practically commander-in-chief. 
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RUSSIAN DEFEAT AT ZEWIN 
were received with a murderous fire, and altllougl 
the brave Bussian infailtry returned again and 
again to the attack, the task which they had been 
called upon to perform' was quite beyond tlleir 
powers, and by nine o'clock in the evening Meli- 
koffs army was retreating in confusion towards 
the frontier. 
This disast'er rendered it necessary for Tergou- 
kassoff to abandon his isolated position, and he 
therefore fell back during the night. Tlle ~vllole 
Russian army hurrfedly retired to its frontiers, 
Bayazid was evacuated, the siege of Kars abau- 
doned, and nothing except Ardahan and a strip of 
territory in front of it remained in tlie hands of tlie 
Czar's troops. Zewin has well been called tlie 
' Plevna of Armenia ' for this battle brought about 
a .collapse of Russian strategy in Armenia which 
- was no less remarkable than the paralysis which 
followed Osman Pasha's victories at Plevna. 
But the parallel between the E~uopean and 
Asiatic campaigns does not end here. Just as the 
Turkish commanders in Europe threw away their 
~e C a u c a s u s  opportunity by neglecting to undertake combined 
aggressive movements after the Turkish victories 
at Plevna, so did Moulchtar Pasha fail to reap the 
sness cottlrl full advantage of his success. I t  is true that he 
had but little cavalry, nild that such as he had was 
:hind a low bad ; but nevertheless he must be blamed for not 
having followed up his victory by a pursuit of the re- 
treating Russians, and for not having assumed a bold 1d1y under tho 
: General Lor i~  offensive, wllcreby he might have carried the war 
even if he could not have entirely prevented, their 
subsequent aclvance. Instead of doing this h e  
contented himself with slowly advancing to the 
neighbourhood of Kars, and there took up a posi- 
tion on the Aladja Dagh, some fifteen miles to the 
east of that city. 
Nor was this his ollly fault ; for after his victory 
at Zewin he cominitted s series of mistakes which 
completely neutralisecl the effects of his previous 
souild strategy, The Russian army haltecl in a posi- 
tion facing the Turks, and there awaited the rein- 
forcements which were being rapidly pushed to the  
front. At first all went well ; but on the night of 
October 8, snow having already [allen, Moukhtar 
appears to have imagined that the campaign was 
over, and he fatuously abandoned his stroilg 
advanced positioils and concentrated his force o n  
the Alaclja Dagll ancl on the ileighbouring heights 
of Vizinkoi and Avliar. This was the Russians' 
opportn~lity. What did these hardy Northmen care  
for snow ? As a matter of fact, winter is the season 
most favourable for their military operations, f o r  
their troops, who are inured to all the rigours of 
frost and snow, have then a considerable advan- 
tage over the less hardy nations of the south. O n  
the night wbicl~ followed Moulrhtar's abandonment 
of his advanced positions, Lieutenant-Generafl 
Lazareff lnoved froin the Russian camp with 15,000 
infantry, 22 squadrons of cavalry, and 70 guns, 
and coinmeilced a flank march which was intended 
to bring hiin in rear of the Turkish position. 
The movement was well coilceived and b r i l -  
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liantly carried out. As Lazareff advanced, a, line 
of field-telegraph was unwouild, and he thus 
remained in coilstant communication wit11 the 
Russian headquarters. The Turlrs remained in 
ignorance of this turning movement until Lazareg, 
on the 14tl1, reached the village of Bazarcljik, some 
miles in rear of Moulrhtar's position. Here some 
6,000 Turks barred the way; but they were 
sooil driver1 back, and by that eveiling LazareK 
had established hiinself in rear of the left flauk 
of the Turlrs. A message was then seat alolng 
the wire to the Grand Duke Michael, who al; 
once issued orders for a general attack. At 
daybreak on October 15 the battle began, and 
from the very first the Turks had no chance. The 
right wing of their army was caught in a trap and 
forced to capitulate, and Mouhhtar Pasha, with 
the remnants of the left and cenke, was driven 
in dire confusion to Kars. 
This was the decisive battle of the war in Ar- 
menia. Kars was again invested, and, after a short 
; bomlsarclinent, was carried by assault on the night 
ofNovember 17 ; Moulchtar's army was once more 
defe,zt;ed on tlie Deve Boyun heighlis ; and Erzerouill 
was closely besieged until Februa~y 22, 18'78, 
when, in consequelice of the terins of the armistice 
which llacl been conclucled at Adrianople, the gates 
of the city were opened, and the capital of Armenia 
was occupied b~ R~1ssia.n troops. 
The Turks had thus been once nlore defeated 
and hui~iliaL;ecl by Bussia. All their fortresses in 
Armenia were in the hancls of thcir ene~nies, and 
a Russian army was encamped within a short dis- 
tance of the Golden Horn. But at this juncture, 
when a Russia11 occupation of Constantinople al3- 
peared imminent, the British ileet, under Admiral 
Hornby, passecl through the Dardanelles and an- 
chored off Princes' Islands at the western entrance 
to the Bosphorus. This inoveineilt was followed 
by the Russian occupation of the village of San 
Stefano, and, as the Turlcs clelayecl to sign the 
treaty of peace which was deinanded by the Rus- 
sians. it seemed as if the war between the two 
enemies was about to be renewed, with England 
acting in alliance with the Turks for the defence 
of Constantinople. But after a fortnight of anxious 
snspense the Turks came to terms, and on March 3 
concluded the Treaty of San Stefano, which brought 
the war to an end. 
The relations between England and Russia, 
however, became daily more strained. The British 
Cabinet insisted that the Treaty of San Stefano 
should be laid before the great Powers of Europe 
1 congress, who shoulcl determine how each 
article separately, or in coiijuiiction with the 
others, affected the previous treaties of 1.856 and 
1871. Russia objected, and both nations prepared 
for war. A credit for 6,000,0001. was deinanded 
by the Beaconslield Ministry in order to be pre- 
pared for extreme measures if no agreement could 
be arrived a t ;  the reserves were called out on 
April I, and seventeen days later it became known 
that two regiments of cavalry, two batteries of 
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and six regiments of native infantry had been 
ordered to Malta from India. 
The Russians also were not idle. They were 
startled at the despatch of Iudian troops to the 
Mediterranean, and decided to lnalre a dernonstra- 
tion against India in order that the Englisl~ might 
be fully occupied in the defence of their Eastern 
empire, and that their action in Europe might 
be thus lia~npered and wealcened ; a body of Baltic 
seainen were quietly embarked in a hired steamer at 
a harbour on the Esthonian coast and conveyecl to 
America, where vessels were bought and collverted 
into cruisers to ruin the British commerce in the 
Atlantic ; and while the naval and military autho- 
rities in Russia made preparations for the expected 
outbreak of hostilities, a committee was formed in 
Moscow ancl subscription lists were openecl in 
every town of the Empire for the purpose of form- 
ing a volunteer privateer fleet which was to prey 
upon the vast mercantile marine of England. 
I t  is only necessary here to refer to the Russian 
demonstration against India, which is an imnpor- 
tant episode in Central Asian history. 
In the spring of 1869 the Russian Chancellor 
declared that Afghanistan was ' completely out- 
side the sphere within which Russia may be called 
upon to exercise her influence,' and in the follow- 
ing November he informed Sir A. Buchanan that 
' he saw no objection whatever to English officers 
visiting Kabul, though he agreed with Lord Mayo 
that Russian agents should not do so.' 
Yet, in spite of these assurances, General Kauf- 
I 
! 
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man11 in 1870 sent Russian agents to Kabul with a halt I 
letters to Shere Ali, the Amir of Afgl~anista~. accom~ 
This correspondence between Tashkent and tile fifteen 
Afgllail capital was continued in a desultory missior 
inalmer mltil the year 1874, when it began to the fa: 
assulne a more important aspect, for in the sprilg 
of tliat year General Kolpakoffsky, in Kauflnann's 
111rote a letter to Shere Ali which was detain( 
very significant in tone, references being made 
tlierein to ' devotioll' on the side of the Amir and the ri- 
grace ' on the part of the Czar. After this there ICabul. 
mas LZ brief pause in the correspondence ; but in eventu 
tlie following year fresh letters were sent to the 
Alllir, and from that time they became more fre- 
quent aild more significant in tone, Kaufmann even with t 
noing so far as to propose to Shere Ali that he a visit tc 
slloulcl sign a treaty of commerce, and also enter presen 
into an offensive and defensive alliance with the 
Russian Government ; ancl, in spite of the cate- Du 
norical denial of Prince Gortchakoff, the corre- b the A 
spondence was continued, and after two years more views 
of secret negotiations it became, evident to the Shere 
Indinn Government that Kaufmarln had succeeded the pa 
in tiurning Sliere Ali from his alliance wit11 the (1: 
of Ru 
his te  
Th 
stration should be made against India, Major- Ieft sax 
General Stolietoff was ordered to proceed to Kabul Angufit 
accouilt 
to prepare the way for the advance of a Russian 
army towards India. This Russia11 ambassaclor 
left Taslikeut at the end of Xay 1878, and, afier that t11f 
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day 1S7S, aid, after 
a halt at Samarkand, set out for Kabul on July 14, 
accompanied by six officers, twenty-two Cossacks, 
fifteen Kirghiz horsemen, and four servants. The 
niission proceedecl through Guzar, and, traversing 
the famous defile known as the 'Ikon Gates,' 
reached the Oxus a t  Chushka-Ghuzar after a 
march of five days. There the Russians were 
cletained for some days owing tb the refusal of 
the Afghan commandant to permit them to cross 
the river until orders had been received from 
Kabul. The necessary permission was, however, 
eventually received, and the embassy reached 
Kabul on August 10,l where it was received with 
every honour. On the following day StolietolI', 
with the oEcers of his staff, paicl a ceremonial 
visit to Shere Ali, and, after the usual formalities, 
presented two letters to the Amir-one from the 
Czar a i d  the other from General Kaufmann. 
During the envoy's stay in Kabul he reviewed 
the Afghan troops and had many private inter- 
views with the Amir, during which he pressed 
Sliere Ali to agree to the following proposals on 
the part of the Bussian Government :- 
(1) Tllat the Anlir should permit the location 
of Russian agents at Kabul and at other places in 
his territory where it might be deemed necessary 
The Rz~ssisn accounts agree in the statement that Stolietoff 
lef* Sewarkand on July 14 (now stylo), and reschod Kabul on 
Azzgnst 10. Thcee dates clo not, howevor, agree wit11 the English 
accounts, which give July 29 as the date of the embassador'fi a~rival  
a t  the Afghan capital. The English accounts also state that tho 
firsl formal interview with Shore Mi was held on July 26, and 
that the review ot tho Kabul garrison (22 battalions) was held on 
August 2. 
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to locate such agents of Russian nationality, and 
that these agents should be vested with the powers 
of Consuls. 
(2) That permission be accorcied for the loca- In 
tion of Russian troops at four convenient points 
on the fi-ontiers of Afghanistan, and that the Amir 
should engage to protect such garrisons. 
(3) That the Russian Government should be 
permitted to construct roads from Sama~lcand to 
Kabul vid Katti Kurghan, Khojah Sale, and 
Balkl~;  to Berat 'wid the course of the Hamun 
River (Oxus), the Plain of Andkhui, Bala Mur- 
gllab, Maruchalr, Pandi (Panjcleh),' and Piroz Kol~;  ' 
and also from Herat to Kaudallar ' by the .Garmsir 
tenancc 
(4) That when necessary the Kabul Govern- externa 
ment would permit the passage of ltussian troops (4) 
proceeding to India by such routes as might be I :  their el 
considered desirable. It T 
( 5 )  That telegraph wires might be set up be- Kabul 
tween Samarkand, Xatti Kurgan, Ralkh, Kabul, which : 
Kandhax, and other places where the Russialz agents 
troops or agents were stationed. been r 
(6) That when necessary Russian troops should when \, . , e  a 1 :,-s.i 
i. ,# be supplied wit11 provisions and transport on pay- h a d  e bi, i :$ lnent of reasonable prices. effect. 
f ;I;,; ( 7 )  That if i t  became desirable that the Russian was tl11 1 -.!.;. 
: #h; Governlnent should send an expedition io wage suaded 
war in India, the Amir sl~ould furnish supplies and de 
pul-poc 
Thus, in 1878, the Russians in their dealings with Shere Ali NO 1 eoknowledged that Pandi (or Psnjdoh) was in Afghan territory, 
Ii This point appears to have been forgotten a few years later. 
~ i a n  GI 
I! 
to the Russian troops on payment, and that the 
Afglian Government sliould establish agents at 
the capital of Russia and in Tashkent, &c. 
In return for these concessions the Russians 
promised :- 
(I) To guarantee the contilluance of the 
country ol Afghanistan to the representatives, 
successors, and heirs of the Amir in perpetuity, in 
accorclance with the will of the last sovereign and 
legal rights. 
(2) In  no way to interfere in the internal affairs 
of Afglianistan, or in the aclininistration of the 
country. 
(3) Always to afford assistance for the main- 
tenance of peace in Afghanistan, and against the 
external or internal enemies of the principality. 
(4) To consider the enemies of the Ainir as 
their enemies. 
It will be thus seen that Stolictoff's niission to 
Kabul was the result of seven years of intrigue 
which had been secretly carried on by Xaufmann's 
agents at the Afghan capital. The ground had 
been most carefully prepared beforehand, ancl 
when the time arrived for Russia to show her 
halid she a a s  able to do so with considerable 
effect. Stolietoff marched into Kabul unopposed, 
was tliere received as an lionoured guest, and per- 
suaded the foolish Amir to enter into an oEensive 
and clelensive alliance wit11 Russia for tlle express 
purpose of making a joint attack on India. 
Nor was this the only step taken by tile nus- 
sian Government for the~purpose of weakening tile 
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British position in Hindostan. While Stolietoff 
was hastening towards Kabul a t  the heid of his 
impsing embassy, another Russian agent, named . 
Pashino, was sent to India for the purpose of sowing 
possible ; after which he was to have gone on to 
Kabul to help Stolietoff with the considerable 
lrnowledge of Afghan politics which he had sc- 
cluired during tlie two years which he had spent 
in Samarlxand as interpreter to Abdur Rahinan 
m ~ a n .  This emissary-if his own statement is to 
be believed-was despatcl~ed to India a t  the insti- 
gation of General Skobeleff, and he actually suc- 
ceeded in reaching Pesl~awar before his progress 
In the meanwhile Kaufmann was busily em- 
ployed in the preparation of an army for the prom 
invasion of India if the Afghans could be persuaded office 
to join in the attempt; or for the occupatioll of befor 
Kabul if Shere Ali refused to take up arms against leff, a 
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PROJECTED INVASION OF INDIA 
Sl~obcleff'a scheme of invesion-Adoption of some of Sltobelcff's 
suggeatione-Betlin Conference-British envoy stopped ai tho 
Afghan frontier-British invseion of Afghanistan-Rl~ssin's 
mistake-Fate of Shere Ali-Treaty of pence-Apologists for 
Russie-Assurance8 of M. de Giers-Colonel Grodekoff's ride 
to Herat. 
TIIE Russian scheme for the invasion of India froin 
Turl~estan was no new iden, and was merely the 
outcoine of Russia's previous advances ia Central 
Asia ; but there is no doubt that one of the most 
proininent supporters of this movement was ail 
officer who was at that time in the Russian camp 
before C~nstnnt~inople This oficer was Skobe- 
leff, and his opinions unquestionably carried great 
weight at the conference which was held near 
Constantinople to deterrnille what steps should be 
taken by  Rufisia in view of the probable outbrealr 
of war with Englalid. This brilliant general, i11 
January 1877, while in command of the Ferghaila 
district, prepared a remarkable scheme for such a11 
iiivasion of India in case the troubles in Turkey 
should lead to a war wilh England. 
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Tliis project, which was afterwards foulid of 
among the papers of Prince Tcherkasslci, was pub- 
lished at length in the Russian ' Monthly Historical 
Review ' for December 1883. The following are P" I As extracts from Skobeleff's scheme :- ma 
' I ain convinced that we need not anticipate f au 
any serious rising on the part of the natives of 1 
Turlcestan in the event of a war with Turkey. I ! 
! crii Therefore if we wage war with the Turks alone, and 
if the idea of the aggressive attitude which would i anc determine the value of Turlcestan in the event of add 
a war with England has not yet been matured at my; 
headquarters, it would be unbearable to remain pro here during the war. sive 
' One of the objects of this letter is to remind 
you of my recent independent command on service ; Brit 
but its main purport is to candidly inform you of it it 
my opinion that it is advisable, as it is practicable, 
~1101 
to send an expedition from Turkestan in case of 
war wit11 England in order to increase the triumph 
and prestige of Russia. that 
'The object I here indicate is of world-wide foun 
importance. No Russian patriot, recognising the oper 
practicability of the scheme and placed by fate i11 40,O 
a position to carry it out, could hesitate to call forcr 
attention to the vast resources which, I will per- tiom 
mit myself to say, our Government has accidentally same 
accumulated on this frontier, and by which-with our , 
resolution and due preparation-it is possible not \ sign only to strike a telling blow at the British in India, i Turk 
but also to crush her in Europe. All this, I repeat, 6 .  
can be effected so long as we retain full possession 
say, s 
vc 
of Turlrestall a i d  render it cz secure base of opera- 
tions. In  this I firmly believe, and have ample 
proofs of our power and influence so long as-in 
Asia more than anywhere else-we act up to the 
maxim, " Waste no words where you lnay exercise 
authority." 
'Firmly resolved to do my duty in a most 
critical time for Russia, I submit Led a memorandum 
on December 27,1876, to the Governor-General, 
ancl I also wrote to my uncle Alexander. I now 
a,ddress you without fear of {,he consequences to 
myself, and praying God that attention in the 
proper quarter may be given to that great aggl-es- 
sive force wliich we possess i11 Central Asia. . . . 
' I t  has often been said thal Russia can threaten 
British rule in India from Central Asia, and that 
i t  is therefore absolutely necessary that England 
should now check Russian advances ia Turkestan. 
' If we keep our eyes open we shall see that our 
position in Tnrkestan is indeed forinidable, aiicl 
that the fears of the English are not without 
foundation. We have established a strong base of 
operations in Central Asia, with an army of some 
40,000 men, from wliich we ca,n always detach a 
force of at least 10,000 or 12,000 men for opera- 
tions beyond tlie fi-ontiers of the province ; at the 
sanie time mre call implicitly trust the fidelity of 
our subjects, as even now there is not the least 
sign of any combination of the Mahommedans of 
Turkey with those of Central Asia. 
'By reinforcing the army in Turkestan with, 
say, six companies horn Western Siheria, with as 
VOTJ, 11. G 
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many Siberian Cossacks as could be spared, with 
one battery, ancl with three regiments of Cossacks 
from Orenburg, we could organise a column of 
some 14,000 or 15,000 men. 
' Such a force tllrown across the I-Iinclu-Kush 
could do a great, ded. 
'Everyoi~e who has studied the question has 
said that tlie position of the English in India is 
very precarious. I t  has been said that the English 
hold India by the sword a,lone, that the llulliber of 
British troops in India is only sufficient to maintain 
order in the country, and that the  alive army is 
untrustwortl~y. 
' Everyone in referring to tlie subject of a Rus- 
sian invasion of India has statecl t l ~ a t  an approach 
to the frontier would be suficient to lrinclle a 
rebellion. 
' I t  may be said that an enterprise against the 
English in India would be full of rislr-that it 
might end disastrously for the Russian force. I 
do think, and we must not shut our eyes to Ihe 
fact, that tlie uildertakjiig would indeecl be a risky 
one. We n~ust, l~owever, remember that, if we 
were successful, we shoulcl completely destroy the 
British Empire in Binclustan, ancl the effect of this 
in Englczild caru~lot bc calculatecl beforehand. 
C0mpeten.t English authorities admit that a dis- 
aster on the frontiers of India might ever1 procluce 
a social revolution in England, because for the 
past twenty years Englancl has been tied more 
closely than ever to her Indian possessions by 
causes ancl pheno~nena, inc;lnilil~g an incapacity 
187; 
- 
for 
Ill 
Hii 
do1 
SUC 
oul 
fro 
t o .  
s ta: 
an1 
be 
Em 
ext, 
in 
linf 
Tal 
Per 
b J'
Par 
imp 
favc 
curl 
shol 
shoi 
the 
Asir 
cluc 
wit1 
rise. 
4 18:s 
- 
pared, wit11 
~f Cossacks  
c o l ~ l m n  of 
uestioll has 
in 111ciia is 
t l ~  e En g l i s l~  
3 l l u n l b e r  of 
to m a i n t a i n  
;ive army is 
a g a i n s t  the 
is]<-%hat il 
ian f o r c e .  I 
eyes to the 
3d be a risky 
c tha t ,  if we 
y d e s t r o y  the 
effect; of this 
beforeliaacl. 
, t,lmt a dis- 
:ven p r o d u c e  
ause for the 
?n t ied more 
)ssessions by 
11 i n c  21.p x i  t y 
for war, identical with those observed in France. 
I11 short, the overtlxow of British supremacy in 
Hindustan would be the cominenceinent of t]le 
downfall of England. 
' Should our enterprise not result in complete 
success, that is, if a rebellioil should not break 
out in India, and if we sllould fail to cross the 
frontier, we should nevertlleless compel the British 
to keep the wl~ole of their Inclian army in Endu-  
stan, and nlahe it impossible for them to utilise 
any portion of it in Europe. They would, in fact, 
be compellecl lo transfer some of their troops from 
Europe to India. We could, in short, to a, great 
extent, paralyse the land forces of England, either 
in a, Eui-opeail was, or in the choice of a neTT 
line of operations fi.0111 the Persian Gulf througll 
Tabriz to Tiflis in conjunction mrith Turkish and 
Persian armies-an idea wllicl~ has been entertained 
by British oficers ever since the Crimeall War. 
' The necessity that Turkestan should take a 
part in forthcoming events is reizdered a11 the more 
imperative by the fact that, in the event or an un- 
favourable termhation of the war, we should most 
assuredly be obliged to evacuate Turkestan, or to 
curtail our autl~ority in tlmt region. But even if we 
should be defeated both in Europe and in Asia we 
should have proved by our disastrous undertaking 
the formidable n a t ~ ~ r e  of our position in Central 
Asia ; and if necesgty sllould compel us to con- 
clude a humiliating treaty, Russia might escape 
with tbe loss of Turkestan, which would then h a ~ ~ e  
risen in value. 
G 2 
'There can be no coinparison between the 
risk we run i11 inczking a dernoustration against 
British India, and the eilormous advantages which 
me should gain in the event of the success of such 
an enterprise. 
(The great difference in the results of success 
to us and to our enemies is of itself sufficient to 
urge us boldly forward. 
As soon as war with England was declared we 
should immediately commence in Turkestan by the 
despatch of a mission to Kabul and the forination 
of a column in Ssmarkand (which for effect should 
be called an army), composed of ten battalions, 
fourteen sotnias, and forty guns, giving a total of 
10,000 to 12,000 men. This should be the lowest 
possible strength of our aggressive force. 
The object of the mission would be to draw 
Shere Ali into an alliance with us, and to open 
up co~nrnunication with the disaffected natives of 
India; and the army should be pushed tl~rough 
13amian to Kabul to secure the success of these 
negotiations. If it be found that Shere Ali still 
adheres to the English (which is not very lilrely, as 
he did not accept tlie invitation to be present 
among the other feudatories on the occasion of the 
proclamatioll of the title of Empress of India at 
Delhi, and he even expressed his annoyance at 
having received tlie invitation), a claimant to the 
throne should be put forward in the person of 
Abdur Rallman Khan, who is living at Ssmarkand, 
by which means iilterilal dissensions might be 
brought about in Afghanistan, wl~ile, on the other 
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side, Persia  might be conveniently persuaded to 
renew h e r  claims to Herat. By turning Persia's 
attention to Afghanistan, we should divert her 
military forces from the Caucasus. The advance of 
Persian troops to Heral would call into requisitioll 
all the supplies and transport in the country, and 
this would effectually paralyse any Eilglish scheme 
for an advance from the Persian Gulf to Tiflis. 
' As soon as the invading force lzad left Samar- 
kancl, az-~otlier should be forined there, consisting 
of two battalions of infantry and sixteen sotnias of 
Cossaclcs, wit11 n battery of artillery, for tlie occu- 
pation of places along our lines of commuizicatio~l 
and for general service i11 our rear. 
' Witlzout going illto details, I would divide the 
cs~mpaign into two phases. The first should be 
one of extremely rapid action, of diplomatic nego- 
tiations wit11 Afgl~anistan, supported by the advance 
of tlze colunzn to Eabul. The second, comnzencing 
with the occupation of Kabul, shoulcl be a waiting 
period, during which we should keep up comniu- 
nicat io~i  with the clisnffec1,ed elenzents in Bindustan, 
giving t h e  iliealis of expressing tl~eil~selves in the 
way whicli would best promote our iliterests (tlie 
cllief cause of the failure of the Mutiny in IS57 
was a want of organisation on the part of the 
mutineers) ; and, finally, as aIso chiefly, lo orgaliise 
hordes of Asiatic horsemen, who, to a cry of blood 
and plunder, niight be launched against India as 
the vanguard, thus reviving the days of Timur. 
' T h e  subsequent operations of the Russian 
cvllllnn ca>nnot be traced in this plan of campaign. 
At best the oper,ztioiis might end in the pre- 
sence of the Russia11 banners at Renares; at tlie 
worst, the column would retire with honour to 
TIerat, meeting a force sent from the Caucasus, 
wllich should consist of several battalions, with six ! 
guns to every thousand men. An Asiatic force, 
especially of Turlroinans, is not formidable in the 
I 
open, nncl even tlie illvincible British army w o ~ ~ l d  I 
nielt away very considerably in advancing to 
Herat. The English, moreover, are not in a posi- 
tion to move more than 25,000 nien beyond the 
i 
I 
frontiers of India, 2nd a large proportioil of these I 
would have to be posted aloiig the lines of com- 
- 
~nunication. At the same time, it must not be 
forgotten that the Turkestan province is on the 
flank of the enemy's lines of comnmunication, and 
that we would grow stronger as we approached 
the Caspian. 
'I liave already stated that tllis undertaking 
would bc a rislry one ; but it would be justified by 
the greatness ,of its object, and by the stupendous 
results which might be achieved. From the stand- 
point of these results there can be for Russia no 
talk of ~ i s k ,  and as for Turlrestan, it is not worth 
mentioning. 
W e  should expect from the troops who shoulcl 
be so fortunate as to be selectecl for this campaigil 
soniething more than self-sacrifice, in the highest 
sense of the word, as it is understood by inilitary 
men. On crossing the Hindu-Hush, the column 
should, in my opinion, be so managed that every 
Illan might feel that he hacl come to Afghanistan 
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to conquer or to die ; that endl nlan rnigllt under- 
stalid that the Czar required even 1 . k  death. JVe 
coulcl not be repro~~clied for leaving our colours ill 
the enemy's lia~lds i f  not a siilgle Rnssian soldier 
I-ein,zin.ecl alive l ~ y o n d  the Hindu-Icush. 
'Such a se11t;iinent; and such n resolve can, in 
my opiliioil, be oilly based on tlie feeling which is 
cornmo~lly cherished by every soldier ill the army, 
of an u.nfalterizlg ancl boundless love ancl devotioli 
fnr liis sovereign. Tlie dificulty of so raising the 
spirit of tlie force in accordance with the nature of 
the ullclertalring could be overco~lle by attaching 
one of the Erllperor's sons, who, nt the proper time, 
might tell tlie troops what was expected of tllerrl 
by their Czar 2nd country. I an1 well assured 
t11at this force, in tlle presence of one of his 
Majesty's sons, ~voulrl do wonders, and would 
never dislrrace the Russian name. . . . 
O. 
' Asiatic tribes might give us trouble, but they 
cannot prevent ldie ~ccomplishlneilt of our purpose. 
We have a.rrivec1 at the stage at u7hic11, with 
jnclicious am1 systematic actions, writ11 art;illery 
and anzmunitiorl in excess of the proportions 
required in European warfare, we can strike with 
effect; in the open field and in tlie mountmains. I 
repeat that we call do this without any loss, being 
well versed in military operations. I11 short, with 
our present experience, with our splendid and, in 
my opinion, s~rlIiciently nunlerous troops, and with 
our resources, (;here is nothing in Asia capable of 
thwarting the ~vidcst strzltegical design which we 
might co~zceive. 
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'Our policy during the last ten years has 
raised tile importance of Russia ill the world. The 
English, as also the people of Asia, are of opiilioli 
that tllere are no limits to the great enterprises of 
our Government. On this belief tlie safety of our 
position mainly rests. I was inucll ilnprcsserl by 
a remark made by Colonel Cory, in liis " S11:~dows 
of Coming Events; or the Ensterll Mer~ace," tlint 
lle could riot imagine a power in Turkest:111 otlicr- 
wise than in coilnection with Iiussi:~ Ly n clil.c!cl, 
line of rail betweca Cli~tr:jui, 011 1,llc Osus, :~ild 
Moscow. Asiatics at  the yreselit in(11lie1it l)(:lic~~e 
tliat Bussiails spit lire tvlicil they clinrgc vitll :I 
cheer. 
' A lmowleclge of tliis provirlce ancl of its rc- 
sources naturdly leads to the conclusion tlial our 
presence in Turkestan, in pursuit of linssinn ill- 
terests, is only justifiable if vrc strive to solvc the 
Eastern Questio~l ill our o w l  i'l~vo~ur frorii t l~is 
quarter; otherwise tlie liidc is liot wort11 t<lie 
tanning, and dl tlie nioriey exl)en(lcil ill 'r~urkcsi nn 
is lost. We must, 7,e C:L~CSLI~ lest we, 11y our iii:~c- 
tion in Asia during :L crisis ill tlie Wcst,  rove, tc.) 
our enelllies tlic niinlcssricss of our :~nlic~sntio~ls. 
Tliis would u~idolul,teilly c:lusc n loss of l)rclsligci, 
ancl wo~uld entail in t11.e fulurc a,   till Inrgcr ulq~ro-  
fitable expenditure, I w.pr?nt tlial, ~ v i ~ l i  n llliriilli~ll~l 
forcc of 40,000 111r:n well lla~icllctl, TV(; niipltt, 1101 
only control tlic wliole uf 'l'nrkcst:l11, Ii:~sllg:~r, :111tl 
J3olrllarn coln1,ilicd in nrnI3 :tg:':li~l~(, 116, 21111. \yeb 
could even-nntl T. say il ~ I O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ( J V ; L ( ~ I I : I I ~ ~  ' r1114-  
liesla~l allil rtlcollcjllor i[. . . . . 
- 
' We have, no doubt, much to go through in 
the future in Central Asia. But the present gene- 
ration of Mahoinmedans, born under the ~ g i s  of
the law of Russia, has first to grow to manhood. 
Before the11 an entire class of influential natives 
will spring up wlio know us well, and mho under- 
stand the secret of our powcr and of our success. 
The notorious Nana Sahib was eclucated among 
Europeans, anci was received in the best English 
society, and it was only for tliis reason that lie 
became such a terror to the Englisl~, As yet me 
have no such spirits in our midst, and in this cir- 
cunlstslnce lies one of our chiel advantages over 
the English. When political affairs in the West 
are approaching a crisis, this important considera- 
tion, coilibined with many otlzers, should urge us 
to derive as much benefit from Turkestan as that 
province is capable of yielding. 
"'In Asia, when triumphs cease, difficulties 
coinmence." 
' This is undoubtedly true. In a political 
sense we are now living in a time of triumphs. 
Let us take acivantage of it. , 
' You see how much I expect from our power 
in Central Asia. Having for a considerable time 
shared the hardships of active service with the 
Turkestan troops, I have no desire to exchange 
service here for any other elsewhere. I could not, 
hoxever, remain inactive here while the majority 
of our army was shedding its blood in the country's 
cause in the Vest. This is why 1 beg j70u again 
to remember me in case war is declared. 
' MICHAEL SICOBELEFF.' 
' P.S. . . . I have just received the " Golos " of 
December 29, 18iG, and I see from the leading 
article in  it that " a declaration of war by Russia 
against the Ottomail Porte is the wish of our 
enemies," that " Ellrope has complicated the ques- 
tion and relies on Russia's impatience," and, 
further, that " tlle circumstnnces are such that a 
coriiplete and speedy solution of the question is 
perfectly impossible." 
' To us, who uilderstaiid our military resources 
in  Asia, the Eastern Question, of ~vhich the solu- 
tion should oilly be fearful to the enemies of 
Russia, appears in a difrereilt light. 
'So long ago as in tlle tlzird decade of tlie pre- 
sent century, General Field-Marshal Count Moltke 
dwell on the impossibility of acllieving rapid re- 
sults in European Turkey, and considerecl that i t  
would be most diflicult to carry on n war in that 
country without the assistance of a powerful fleet 
and complete command of the Black Sea. Field- 
Marshal Prince Varshafski, in 1829, gave it as his 
opinion that aggressive operations in Asia w o ~ ~ l d  be 
of little use, as there was no great and decisive 
object of attaclr, though he considered the traclc 
routes between Baghdad and Sciltari to be the 
best objectives in this case. The coizstruction of 
the Suez Canal has, however, deprived even this 
line of its importance. 
' I t  might, therefore, be positively asserted that 
however successful we might be in a campaigil in 
European and in Asiatic Turkey, we should still 
search in vain for a solution of the Eastern Ques- 
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tion. Sincere coilduct 011 the part of England in 
accorclance wit11 the interests of our Government 
might, so far as I uilderstand the subject, indeed 
satisfy our legitimate demands. I tllerefore think 
that we should not. have ally doubts as to the 
question of a war wihh England. Witl~out a 
formal declaration of war Bngland might still be at 
war with us through tlle despatch of officers to 
Turkey ancl by assisting Turkey v\ri~ll supplies. 
' FVould it not be best lo avail ourselves of our 
strong strategical position in Central Asia, and of 
our better lmomledge of the conlmunications and 
resources of Ceiltral Asia, so as to strike a crusliing 
blow against our real foes, if proofs of our deter- 
mination to operate against their weakest point 
were insufficient to make tlleilz yield. 
' The state of affairs is apparently serious ; 
therefore, while resolving to illaint,ain a defeilsive 
attitude on the Danube and in Asiatic Turkey, we 
could do what we want by landing 30,000 men at 
Astrabad for a march to Kabul in corijnllction 
with the Tnrkestan troops. In this may we should 
deliver the Russian army in Europe and in Asia 
Minor from the clifficulties against which it fights 
from time to time without success-on several 
occasions in the course of every century. 
I t  is not for me to say how we should defend 
the Caucasus against a Turkish invasion, nor how 
long the army of the Danube should remain 
strictly on the defensive in the midst of the help- 
less Clristian population of Turlrey ; but it is my 
firm belief that : 
PROJECTED INVASION OF INDIA 
' (I) If the invasion of Illclia by a corps of 
18,000 men is, under the present conditions of the 
extent of British supremacy in Bindustan, possible 
and desirable, though attended with risk, an in- 
vasion by an army of 50,000 men is absolutely free 
from all risk. 
' (2 )  From the cornmencelllent of spring mre 
have on the Caspian the means to rapidly con- 
centrate a force of 30,000 inen at Astrabad 
completely equipped. 
' (3)  A large force can easily inarch froill 
Astrabad to Eerat and Kabul. By bringing 
political pressure to bear on Persia we rnight get 
all our supplies roil1 Khorassan. 
' (4)  The Turkestan military district, reinforced 
v i  th six regiments of Siberian Cosuacks, three 
regiineilts of Orenburg Cossaclrs, six compa~iies of 
iafaiitry, and one battery of artillery from Western 
Siberia (mliich troops could reach Tasl~kent by the 
spring), could send a force of 18,000 nlen with 
artillery to IZabul. 
"(5 The troops can be marched from Samar- 
kand to the Hind~l-Kush, arid can be marched 
.from Khulin through I-leibak, Kuram, and Bamian, 
and across the Kara Kotal, Uancian Shikan, Ak 
valley of the Kabul Da~ia .  Altllough artillery has 
been taken over the above-mentioned passes 
.without special appliances, I have still given my 
attention to this subject in order to facilitate the 
passage of the guns. I am iiow able to state that 
we have an easy waj7 of transpor~ing g~uis : yesber- 
I 
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day a four-pounder was slung under a newly- 
designed cart, and a trial with il  was successfully 
made. We can only give an opinion on the merils 
of this method of transport after practical expe- 
rience in February next, when a trial is to he 
made with two guns over the snow-clad mouiltains 
in this district. 
' (6) Shere Ali, Dost Mahommed's successor, 
must necessarily contemplate the recovery of 
Peshawar, and it  is not difficult to raise all Asia 
against India by a cry of blood and plunder." 
' (7) Shere Ali is at present dissatisfiecl wit11 the 
English. 
' (8) These are scarcely more than 60,000 
British troops in India at the present time with a 
correspoildiilg force of artillery, and the native 
army is rather a menace tlian a support to the 
rulers of IIindustan. 
' (9) The very appearance of even a small force 
on the frontiers of India is sufficient to kindle a 
rebellion, and to ensure the overlhrow of the 
British dominion in Hindustan. 
' I n  my opinion all this should be talcen into 
serious consideration at the present moment. 
Xholtand, January 27, 1877.' 
Such was the remarkable scheme prepared by 
General Slrobeleff for the invasion of India from 
Central Asia in order that the English might be 
forced to abandon tlicir opp.osition to Russia's 
designs on Constantinople ; and it will be shown 
that this scheme was closely adliel-ecl lo  a t  tlle time, 
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when war between Great 13ritain and Russia be- 
cLme immii1en.t after the coilclusioil of the treaty 
of San Stefano, and no better proof call tllerefore 
be given that S1cobelefl"s sclleine correctly repre- 
sents the opinions which were then held by the 
Russia11 Government. 
Skobeleff suggested that a mission should be 
sent to Kabul ' to draw Shere Ali into an alliance 
with 12ussia,' ancl this part of the programme was 
carried out by the clespatcli of Colonel StolietolYs 
embassy. Then, again, he recomi~iended that if tlie 
Amir still aclllered to the English a,lliance, Abdur 
nahman Klian sllould be put forward as a claimailt 
to the Afghan tllrone in order that ' internal clis- 
sensioils inight be brouglit about in Afghanistan .' 
Xven this clotail was attended LO, for shortly before 
Stolietoff proceeded to Kabul, Abdur R a l ~ m a ~ ~  
h'han-who was the11 living at Samarkand-was 
told to submit a petition to the Czar's Government, 
'setting forth that he had beell residing there (i.e. 
in Samarkand) lznder the protection of the Russia11 
Government, for a long tiilie ; that he had often 
petitioned them to help him in securing the restitu- 
tion of his ancestral territory from tlze A~nir  of 
Kabul, but his prayer had not been acceded to ; that 
he had iiow heard that the Rnssiails were preparing 
to figlzt against the British Governillent ; that they 
liad sent envoys to wait upon the Amir to request 
him to allow passage through his couiitry to the 
Russians proceeding to Indis and returning there- 
from should rlecessity for such a passage arisc ; 
nricl that, such being the case, h e  offered his seivices, 
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in case His Highness refuses to grant the request of 
the Russian Government, to capture Balk11 with a 
small assistance from the Czar, and then to s~zbdue 
the whole of Afghanistan, which is not a difficult 
taslc.' Thus did the Russian authorities actually 
take steps to carry out Slcobeleff's recommendation 
. that Abdur Rahman Khan should be put forward 
as a claimant to th.e throne of Kabul in case Shere 
Ali was not found to be sufficiently pliant. 
I t  has also been' sliown how a Russian agent 
was sent to India to commence the agitation which 
the Russians believed-and still believe--m~ould 
cause the people of t.liat country to rebel against 
the rulers who, for Inore than n century, have 
endeavoured to raise them out of the depths of 
ignorance i11 vr~hich they live, and who, by good 
goverl-iment and the peaceful development of the 
resources of the country, have brought Inclia to a 
conditioil of prosperity and conten.tlzzent which 
has made the British rule in Hilliiustan to be a 
marvel to other nations and a glory to the British 
race; and it is only necessary now to show how 
Skobeleff's proposals for the clespat.ch of an expe,di- 
tionary force towards the frontiers of India were 
adhered to, even in so far as the strength of the 
invading army was concerned. 
011. April 25, 1878, the Russian Minister of 
\Tar issued an orcler for t,he organisation of three 
columns for the invasion of India from Central 
Asia ; on the 15th of the foll.owing mont,h another 
order Ijras issued for the formntion of eight batta- ' 
lions of infantry reserves for the reiilforcelnent of 
the Turl~estan military district, and for the aug- 
mentation of the Bashkir cavalry; and on Map 26 
General Kaufmann published the following ' orders 
of the day ' :- 
' In  accordance with the orders of His Imperial 
Majesty conveyed to me by the Rlinister of War 
in his despatch of April &%, Sub. No. 10, three 
active detachments are to be preliminarily formed 
out of the troops uilder my command; the head 
1 detachment a,t Samarkand, that of Ferghana s t  
f Margelan, and that of the Amu-Dariil at Fort 
Petro-Alexandrovsk. 1 
' The chief detachment;, under the command of 
Major-General Trotzky, is to be colnposed of the 
3rd, 5th, Gth, '3~11, and compound Turlcestan and 
3rd West Siberian line battalions, and of two 
companies of the 17th Turkestan line battalion ; 
of the wllole Turl<estan Rifle Brigade and Sapper 
Company ; of tile 4th ~ o r n ~ ~ o u n j  Orenburg-Ural 
Regiment of Cossacks ; of four sotrlias of the 2nd 
Orenburg, aid of two sotnias of the 5th Co~npoun.d 
Orenburg Regiment of Cossacks; of the 1st 
3rd battery, and hdf-battery of the 211d battery ! 
of the 1st Turkestail Brigade of Ar~illery ; of thc! 
mobile exercising battery; the 1st and fjt,ll Oren- 
hurg H, batteries, and one rocket battery. 
'The Ferghana detachment;, under the com- I 
mand of Major-General AbramoF, ii$ to be com- 
posed of six companies of rifles, two sotnins of l;'he 
5th compound regiment of Cossaclts, six pieces of 
the Turlrestan mountain battery, and a division of 
1' 
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' The Amu-Daria detachmeu t, under the com- 
mand of Colonel G~.otenhelm, is to be composed 
of six companies, two sotnins, and four guns, to 
be selected by the commancler of the Amu-Daria 
district. 
Tlle first detachment is to be concentra,ted at 
Samarkancl, and to march from thence en dchelons 
to Jam, and further, accordi~lg to instructions. 
' TBc second detachment is to be organised at 
Margelan, to msrcli through Vadil to the Valley 
of the Kizil-SLI, and further, according to instruc- 
tions. 
'The third cletachnlent is to be formed at 
Petro-Alexa~~drovsk, and to march along the Amn- 
Daria to Charjui, whence i t  will advance accol-d- 
iilg to instructions. 
'The time of forination and advance of these 
detacliments will be determined accordiilg to 
exigencies, and vill be fixed by special supple- 
mentary orders. 
' (Signed) KAUFMANN.' 
The principal column, which was intended for 
the advance on Kabul, consisted of some 12,000 
men of all arms, with 44 guns and a rocket 
battery; Abramoff's corps, wl~ich was to occupy 
BadaBshan and Wakhan, and to make a diversion 
in the mountainous districts round Chitral, was 
1,700 strong ; and Grotellhelm's detachment, which 
also consisted of some 1,700 men, was to have 
operated against Merv and the Herat district, 
Thus the whole army of invasion consisted of 
YOL. 11. K 
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some 15,500 men, with 54. guns aild a couple of 
rocket batteries-not a very formidalole force, it 
,is true, but one which, with Afghan assistance, 
might have caused much alzl~oyance to the English 
that, if they loushed forward even :t sinall force to 
/ horsemen. 
! While these colun~lls were being organisecl, 
M. Weinburg visited Bokhara a d  obtained the 
Amir's promise that he would assist the lZussians in 
every possible way; Colonel Maieff was sent for- 
ward to explore the country a i d  routes be t~ee iz  
Salllarkand and the Amu-Daria; and Colonel 
Matvaefl was also sent to Ballih ancl Badalcslian to 
prepare the for the aclvance of Abralrlofl"~ 
col~lnlll. 
%.? p*., The first &chelon of tlie 1nai.n colmnn com- 
menced its march 'piom Tasllkeilt on June 13, 
ancl after a march of nineteen clays, reached tlic 
village of Jain on the Rasso-Bolcliara~~i fron.tic+r. 
Tlic otlier detachir~ents followed shortly af'terw:u.cls, 
In nddiiion to thcxe three columns opcrnting from Tnrltehhnn, 
rtnothor force undcr Colonel Lornaltill so t  ont froin the R ~ O ~ G A  of 
tlie Ctlspinn 8cn for the purposc of o1)cmLing in tho Turkorrlr~n 
country on tho northcrnfrontiers of Porsir~. 'l'liis expaditinn, wliic:l~ 
will be briotl y descrihccl in tho following cllnptc!r, wnf, l ~ o w c ~ c r ,  :L 
miscmble 6~il[lrc:. 
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and the whole of Trotzlcy's force was concentrated 
at Jam and Sarikul,' where orders were received 
that no further advance was to inade until the 
result of the Berlin Conference was 1~1101n1. There 
the troops were attacked by clyseiitery w d  
typhus, ~vliile cases of suilstroke mere of daily oc- 
currence ; soldisrs' fuiierals mere to be mitilessecl 
every day, aiid ciuring tlie short halt in camp on 
tlle Bol~haraii Srontier the Russiails lost on ail 
average two men per day fro111 sickness alone. 
Grotenllcl~n's detachmeilt had, if possil~le, a 
more trying experience. Leaving I'etro-Alexu- 
drovsk 011 July 27, the force proceeded along tlie 
right bank of the Amu-Dwia over heatecl sancly 
plains, encountering violent storins of wind wllich 
raised great clouds ofsand, andwit11 the teinperature 
at 42" Rkaumur. The drifting sand proved the 
greatest obstacle to the inoveiiient of the troops, 
the soldiers and horses sinking deep illto the friable 
sand at every step, while the wheels of the gun- 
carriages 53111~ almost to the axle-trees, which 
rendered it extreinely clif%cult for the tired horses 
to make allyprogress whatever. But in spiteof 
these difficulties the Inen pushed cheerfully for- 
ward, in the belief that tliey would easily be able 
to march to Inclia, and there gain a share of the 
spoil which tliey were told was aaaitiiig them in the 
rich cities of Lahore and Dehli. 
But their hopes of gaining wealth at the ex- 
pense of the rich merchants ancl i~ative princes of 
India were soon dissipated, for, when they reached 
This is a village noer Jem on the R~zsso-Bolrharnn frontier. 
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Kizil-Robat!, news was received that the famous 
Berlin Congress hacl concluded its work, a i d  that 
the representatives of the Great Powers hacl signed 
a treaty whereby peace was securecl, and which 
necessitated the abandonment by Russia of any 
immediate attack on the British possessions in 
Hindustan. The detachment; therefore retraced 
its steps, and by August 30 the last troops of the 
main column hacl also returned to their canton- 
ments, and the projected invasion of India thus 
came to an encl. 
But although the Russians arrested the advance 
of their troops, they had succeeded in raising a 
storm on the' frontiers of India which led to a bitter 
war between the English and Afghans ; for, as soon 
as i t  became known that Shere Ali hacl received 
the Russian embassy at K a b ~ ~ l ,  arid hacl publicly 
discarded the friendship of the English for the 
sake of a Russian alliance, the British Government 
decided that a British missioil s h o ~ ~ l d  be sent to the 
Afghan capital to counteract the dangerous influ- 
ence which Stolietoff was seeking to establish over 
the Amir. On August 14, 18'78, Lord Lytton 
therefore wrote a letter to Shere Ali, in which he 
:mnounced his intention to send a mission to 
Kabul under Sir Neville Chamberlain, tmd aslred 
that it might receive safe conduct through Afgll:~n 
By this treaty M U R R ~ D  obtainod the territories of Ardnhan, 
ICars, and Batourn in Asia Minor; but was obligocl Lo relincluish 
tho valloy of Ala~cl~lrnrd and the tow11 of Bayazid, which had beon 
cedod to tior by Arliole 19 of tho Treaty of Ban Rtchlo. The iown 
1~[1(1 territory of I<hotonr, which hi~d long bosn in dispute botworn 
Tmlrey end I'prein, were t ~ l ~ o  coded to the I'srainne. 
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territory and be properly received ; and again, on 
Llie 23rd of the same month, he wrote a second 
friendly letter offering his condolences on the death 
of the Amir's son and heir. These letters, how- 1 
ever, remained unanswered. The mission reached 
Jamrud on Septeniber 21 ; but  when Major Cava- 
~ n a r i  rode forward with a sinall escort to Ali 
Musjid to demaild permission for its advance 
through the Kl~ylser Pass, Faiz Mahomrned Khan, 
the Afghan governor or the fort, stated that, he 
I 
liad received orders to oppose its passage by force I 
of arms, arid tliat, but  for his personal frienclship 
for Cavaanari, he would have at once osenecl fire 
- - 
on him ancl his aartv. 
I d 
What follotvecl car1 1se told in a few words. An 
ultiinaiurn was sent. to the Ainir, demanding an 1 , 
apology for tlie affront tvhich had been given 
to tlie British Government, insisting on the 
recept:ion of a perinanent British mission in Kabul, 
and claiming reparation for injuries which had 
been inflicted on the Afridi tribesinan mlio had 
attended the British envoys illto the Khyber Pass. 
Sllere Ali was informer1 that unless a satisfactory 
reply were receivecl. by November 20, he would be 
treated as a declared enemy of the Indian Govern- 
rncnl;, and war would inevitably enspe. 'In the 
ineantvhile the military ax~tJ~ositics were not idle. 
Troops were pushed Eor~vard towards Peshatvar, 
Thal, and Quettn, ancl preparations were made for 
an  iliinledinte arl\~:~~ice from those three points, if 
the Ainir adhered to his llostile attitude. : : . . , 
But Nov~niber 20calne and pafled without any 
reply from Shere Ali, and telegraphic orders were 
therefore sent to the various military coinmanclers 
to cross the Afglian frontier. Sir Salll~~el Browne, 
who comllla,ilded the Pesha~var field force, left; 
Jamrucl at daybrealr on the Zlst, and attackecl tlie 
enemy's positioil at Ali Musjicl, when a sharp 
fight took place, t'he position being aballdoiled by 
t11.e Afghans dui:ing the follomri~~g night. Daklca 
was then occupied without resistance, and on 
December 20 Major-General Mnucle's clivisioil 
entered Jalalal3ad. While the Peshawar column was 
thus successfully advancing tllrough the ICllyber, 
t.he Kuralll Valley field force, under Major- 
General Roberts (now Lord Roberts of Kandahar 
and Waterforcl) on December 2 defeated an Afghan 
army which had taken up x strong position at the 
Peimar Kotal, and 1;11e11 General Roberts pushed 
reconnaissances as far as the Sliutar Gardan Pass, 
which was the last mouiltaill defile which barred 
his way t o  Kabul. I11 t.he South, also, the Kan- 
clahar field force, ui~der Lieutenant-General D. M. 
Stewart, pushil-tg forward across the Khoja Amran 
range, reached the village of I<ushab (some seven 
miles south of ICanclahar) on Jnlluarp 7, 1879, and 
as Stewart there learnt that the Governor and garri- 
son of the. southern capital of Afghanistail had 
abandoned their charge and fled towards Herat, he 
took possession of the city on the followillg day. 
While the British forces were thus rapidly 
advancing into the heart of Afghanistan, the miser- 
able ruler of that Priilcipality gradually begail to 
perceive that in allying l~imself wit11 R'ussia he 
rere 
le rs  
me, 
left; 
t h e  
l a r p  
I by 
LBI.;~ 
. 011 
~ s i o l ~  
I WBS 
rbel-, 
%j o r -  
ahar 
&an 
,t the 
ishecl 
Pass, 
a r r e d  
Kan- 
D. M. 
.nlran 
seven.  
j ,  anti 
garri- 
1 had 
at ,  he 
.ay. 
z p i d l y  
miser -  
*an to 
ia he 
1878 FLIGHT OF SHERE ALI . r o; 
1 1 ~ 1  espoused the cause of a treaclierous l ~ r o p l ~ ,  
and placed his trust in a ilation which is 
perfidious in its dealings with its pohel-rul 
neigllbonrs, and is therefore 11ot likely to lieep 
its promises when the betrayal of a wealc ally 
would enable it to esc.;lpe from a false and 
darlgerous position. On account of the conclu- 
sion of the Treaty of Berlin, Colollel Stolictoff left 
Kabul on August 24 ; but even. then, mhell the 
entire witl~dratval of tlle lniesioll aucl disavowal 
by  Russia of any further interference in Afglian 
affalirs nzight have saved Shere Ali from the clis- 
aslrous consecpences of his folly, a i d  have avert,e(l 
the iilvasion of Afghanistan by British trool3s- 
even then, Colonel Rosgonoff ancl four other officers 
re~nain.ecl in the Afghan capital wit31 their Cossack 
escort, ancl the Alnir was still lecl to believe that 
Russia woulcl help him against tlle English. Thus, 
cluring tile critical period \vhich preceded the out- 
break of the Afglian mTar, the greater parl; of the 
R~zssian elnbassy still rema,inecl ill Kabul, and 
Shere Ali ~ v a s  upportecl by Russian advice in his 
macl policy of defying Ellgland ; and then, wheii 
the country was iizvacleil from three points, nncl it 
was manifest that nothing could plrevcn t the ral~irlly 
nclvancing British forces from seizinn the caljital, P 
the 1.ernainder of the 11-iission was wltl~d~:arnn, a l ~ d  
Shere Ali in his hour of t~:ouble was forced to 11y 
wit11 the111 towarcls t.21e liortl1. 
I t  is ilnpossible to unclerstand what Russia 
expected to gain by this. action. i3acl the czar's 
& ~ ~ . ~ r l l l u e n t  determined nt ill hazarrls to support 
of the fall of Ali Musjid, sent his family to Mazar- 
i-Sherif in Afghan Turlrestan, and twelve days 
later he llimself left Kabul and started northwards, 
accoinpaniecl by the E~xssian embassy. E e  in- 
tended to go to Tashlrent, and, if possible, to St. 
Petersburg to lay his case before the Czar, but on 
reaching Mazar-i-Sherif lle brolre dotvn, and there, 
died on February 21, 1879, an outcast from his 
people, and bet~ayed by the great nation whicli 
had used him for her own ends, and the11 cast him 
aside when he was no longer useful. The wretched 
fate of Shere Ali will long be remenibered in 
'Afghanistan, and the day will inevitab1;y come 
when Russia will have cause to regret that, in pur- 
suit of her own ambitious designs, she once proved 
to the Afghan people the worthlessiless of Russian. 
promises. 
ShortJy before Shere Ali fled from Kabnl, he 
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Shere Ali and to assist hinl against the English, 
their policy, however risky, could be appreciated ; 
but by thus embroiling that ruler in a war wit11 
: England, and then leaving hiin to his fate, the 
Rnssians committed a mistake such as they 
, had never before comrnittecl. in the whole course 
of their Central Asian policy. Their action was 
: nothing less than a gross betrayal of an ally, aiid 
',the history of Stolietoff's mission will long be 
rememberecl. in Afghanistan to the discredit of 
Russia and as a lasting prool of the t~qeachery and 
faithlessness of the Government of the Great 
White Czar. 
On December 1 Shel-e Ali, on receiving news 
ls'is THE TREATY 01.' GANDAAIAR 
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released his son, Yalroob Khan, from the confine- 
ment in which he llad for many years been lrepl, 
and appointed him to act in his name. For several 
weeks the Indian Governlnent lrnew nothing as to 
the intentions of this 'Regent,' and as there were 
rumours that he intended to continue the war, the 
operations of the three il~vading armies were 
carried on. While the Peshawar and Kuram 
columns mere occupied in subjugating the tribes 
in the neigllbourhood of the Khyber Pass and 
Kurain Valley, General Stewart advanced north- 
wards from Kandahar and occupied Kalat-i-Ghilzai, 
while General Biddulph marched westwards to 
Girishk on the river Helmund. 
Rut in February Yakoob Khan at lellgtll nlade 
overtures for peace, and after some interchange of 
letters he eventually announced his intention of 
proceecling to Ganrlamalr for the purpose of enter- 
ing into a conference for the settlement of the 
terms of peace. He arrived there on May 8,1879, 
and was received with tJze greatest honour and 
hospitality, and on the 26th of that month he 
signed in the British camp a treaty of peace, by 
which it mas agreed that in return for British 
support against foreign aggression and an annual 
subsidy of six lakhs of rupees the Amir would 
conduct his relations with other States in accord- 
ance with the advice of the Indian Government, 
and would permit a, British resident, accoinpanied 
by a suitable escort, to reside in Kabul, while 
other British agents could also be sent to the 
northern frontiers of Afgl~anistan on special occa- 
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~ions .  I t  was also st ip~lated that the ICura~~i, Pishin, 
and Sibi Valleys should be assigned to tlie Britisli 
Government, the Alllir receiving the surplus re- 
venue after payineilt of the expenses of admini- 
stration ; a11cl t l ~ e  13ritish autllorities were also to 
have complete coiltrol over tlle Khyber a i d  
niichili Passes, as well as over tlie iildepeildeilt 
frontier tribes in whose territory those passes are 
situated. Telegraphic c o ~ ~ ~ i n u i ~ i c a t i o ~ ~  was to l ~ c  
established between ICal~ul and ' India vih the 
ICnram Valley, and a separate agreeinelit regartl- 
ing conimercial facilities was conclucled for a 
period of twelve moatlls. 
011 tlie conclusion of tliis treaty the two 
northern clivisioils were at once withdrawn withill 
the linlit-s of' the new frontier, but it was arranged 
tlixt the evacuation of Kandahar sllodld be de- 
lay eil uutil the followiilg autumn, in order that; 
tlie troops might be snvecl froin tlie sickiless 
and llardsllips to wliicll they would liave been 
exposed if they had been fol.cec1 to rlzarch through 
the Bolan Pass during tlie great heat of tlle 
summer montlls. 
Thus eiicled the Afghan War of 18'78. Shere 
Ali, driven fi-om his throne, had fallen a victim to 
Russian intrigue and treachery ; the cliploillatic 
lnissioli wliich had been sent .to Kabul 'by the 
rRussian Governiiieilt in the hope that the British 
' power ill India might be shalren, had beell a c,om2 
plete failure, and Russia had been discredited in 
the eyes of a11 the peoples of Central' Asia ; . a.nd 
the Euglish, by their ~ ic tor ious  carnl-mign in / 
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Afghanistan, had secured a better frontier on tht: 
north-vest, and had overt11~0~11 the B ,~zsso -Af~h~~~  
I 
allinlice. 
Before leaving this subject it is llecesssry to 
I 
refer briefly to an argument which has beell freely 
made use of by certain people in England, vlio 
illvariably try to find sollle excuse for IZussia's 
actions in Ceiltral Asia, even if such actions are 
notoriously ui~scrupulous and clevoicl of any real 
j~zstification. These persons, in their aiuriety to 
clefend Russia, do not even hesitate to disparage 
P the actions of the British ailcl India11 authorities, r 
a i d  at times have given cause for h e  uzlpleasallt 
suspicion that Russian roubles can bbuy the s1ip110rt 
01 men wlio profsss to be true British subjects. : 
When Stolietoll?~ lllission was sent to Irlabul, and " 
during the sullllller montlis of 1678 wl~eii war 
-+% 
ancl peace were hanging in the balance, there were s 
many sucli apologists of Russia, who strove to 1 
inculcate the doctl-ine that the Czay's Government ' 
were perfectly justified in cloing what they did, ' i 
with a view to tlie immillellt outbveczli of hostilities ' 
i between England ancl Russia. 
It is not the intention here to cliscuss wlletlier 
the Russian Goveniment under such circn~nstallces 
were justified in violating the agreement of 1873 
ancl the solemn assurances ~vhich were give11 in 
1869, and repeated time after tillle since tliezi- 
that ' Alghaizistan vas con~pletely outside the 
spliere within which Rnssia iilay be called upon to 
exercise ller influelice,' ancl that ' Russian agents 
sl~ould not visit Jilabnl.' On this l~oint opinions 
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may differ, although it is possible that Englishmell 
miglit unallimously object to a Frellcli occupation 
of Belgium.in tlle event of a crisis arisil~g in the 
reliltions between France and Germany. But, 
whatever doubts there may be on this point, i t  is 
clear that as soon as the Treaty of Berlin had been 
signed tlie Russian mission should have been. at  
once withdrawn froid Kabul ; and as these friends 
of Russia have carefully avoided all reference to 
the continuance of Russian officers and Cossaclcs 
in the Afghan capital for five months after the 
, conclusioa of the Treaty of Berlin, it inay be 
' interesting to nlei~tion a few facts which will 
- 
display the absurdity of their arguments, and ( ml~icll shoulcl prove to unbiassecl minds that, 
altllough the Russian Government in the Grst 
illstance seiit Stolietoff's nlission to Kabul 011 
account of the probability of war with Great 
Britain, they, even after all danger of war had 
beell removed, coi~tii~uecl in their violation of their 
previous solemn proillises of coinplete non-inter- 
vention in Afghan affairs, and strove to improve 
their positioil i n  Central Asia at the expense of 
their good name. 
On July 2, 18'78, Lord Loftus had rn interview 
with M. de Giers at ' S i ~ e ~ r s b u r g ,  when the 
British ambassador inquired any Russian 
envoy had  beell ordered, either by  the Imperial 
Government or by the Turkestan authorities, to 
proceed to Kabul. To this question-although 
Colonel Stolietoff had left Taslllrent for Kabul some 
six weelrs previously-M. de Qiers replied, ' Tfmt 
720 W Z ~ S S ~ O ? ~  hacl hccn, or ~ U C I R  ilztcncZed to be, selzt 
to Ii?~zb~il, oiflio- I)?/ ille I?)Z~ICI'~(LL G O V G Y ~ Z ~ I L ~ ~ Z ~  or by 
1 f ~ t  -111 spit(? OF t,llis dcliinl, hoq-- 
prcr, llle t,r\ltlk t:O\lld  lot ~ C ) I I ~  S U ~ ~ ~ ) ~ C S S C I ~ ,  for cir-
(qli~st:l~lt i d  : \ ( l ( : o ~ i i ~ t  s (11 progress ol' t,lle l l , i s~ i~ l l  
sllo~qtly : L ~ ~ c A ~ T V ~ ~ I ' ~ S  :11)p(::11't~(l ill t l l ~  I111ssinll ~lctjrs- 
~ ~ ~ I C T S ;  :LII(I tl~tk~l, \ V I ~ P I L  ~ I L C  t,rlli: st,ate of afl!~irs 
could lin lollgcbr I ) ( >  c'oiic:c:il~!tl, (711 August 14-:1 
~l\ont 11 :LCLOS 1 1 ~ 1  sigliatustl of tlm 'l're:~t,y of Bcrlill- 
hl, clt* (iiilrs ildi 1r111ivI tlw l j~*i t~is l~ Cli ~rgti c1'AiT:~irps 
t11:it ' o1.tl~r~11:~tllrt:c~l~ girc:ii I,o :li+rest, ;dl the co111lnns 
.rvhic:li 1l:~tl I1r~c.11 I9llt ill i~lotiou fi.ol11 'I'x~llli(!llt~,' 
2111tl hc :~lso sl:ltcd(l wit llou t :lily l~c!sit:ltion t,llnt 
' everytl~illg l~\:ls l~cac!n stol)pccl; tllc political ns 
~vell :LS t llcl t d i  I: ~ r y  pr.t?cau tiol~s I\-l-llicll sve thougl~t  
~~ursctlvcs j11s1 ifiotl ill t:~kirlgr :tg:lirlst you-evcry- 
tl~ilig 11:~s 1 ) c . c ~ r l  s to~)~,stl . '  
Snc l~  wtbrc1 t lici ~\-ortls of 21. tle (Tiers, tlic present 
Foreign llitlistc*r c ~f llii? llussiaii I':mpirc ; and c m  it, 
I l,c svr~r~tlcri~il : i t  if tlicl ljritisli (3ovel.lililcnt believed in tlic! :lssllr:nli:r tll~is givtll ? Clonlil nnytliitlg 
Il:~vc ljeo~l rtli*:trc!r or more l~rc,( : is~? Il M':IB ]lot, 
s:litl 1;Il:~t irl*tlr,~*s 1 t t r d  h f r , ~  is.(;urd for 11lc c:cssatioll oP 
:dl tile i)c~liti(*:~l : L L L ( ~  lt~ihktsy 1)rcv+:~t1tions which 
1i:~cl l ) (wl  t : i k (~ l~  1 ty tlic ii11ssi:~~i ~ o ~ ~ c ! s r t ~ ~ ~ e r t t  ancl 
(.'cntr:ll L \ S ~ : I I I  :lllllioriticls \\-it11 n viclvr f o t l ~ c  pro- 
1,:tljlr c ~ i t  lrrc4:lk crl lit ~stili(ios 1)cltjvcrri 1hlgl:ulil n11d 
Itussi:~. I l:ul ,\L. tlth (1.ictl.s so \vortlad 11;s reply, i t  
itiigh~ 11:~vc~ \ I ( ~ I ~ I L  possil,lr for 1lussi:i :uid her apcslo- 
gists to lir~vr* t liro\vri 1 1 1 ~  l,l:~~nt! for wli:~l Sc)lIo~vc?tl 
I I s I 1 1 1 l t  o 1 1  ( i v t o - 1  oi' 
'Purhcltit:~tr. llu t ttct suc:l~ c!xcl~lsc? ~ : L I L  11e g i v a ~ ~  ; fin- 
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the words used permitted of' only one iaterpreta- 
tion. The Russia11 seiistor said : ' Everything has 
been stoyy~ed-the political as well as the military 
~xecautions.'  Tllus it, call well be believed that 
Lord Salisbury was astonished ~vhen Co~znt Schou- 
valoff, in the course of conversation on Decelnber \ 1 0  following (four months afterwards), casually 
1 1.einarlrecl that ' altllougli the Eussian envoy who 
' had bee11 sent to Afghsnisttln had been recalled i to Russia, the Russian mission still remained at ! I<abul.' 
I t  is doubtful diether  any episode in the whole 
f history of Russia's dealings in cent ra l  Asia wore 1 
clearli establishes the truth of Prince DolgorulcofYs 
~vorcls, that in Russia ' slavish subjection and arbi- 
trary force reign from top to bottom ; and through- 
out there is developed, in formidable proportions, 
the official lie-the lie erected into a political 
institution. ' Before the sigliature of the Treaty of 
Berlin, and long after Stolietoff had startcd from 
Tashkent, the British Government were told that 
no such mission had beell or was intended to  be 
sent to Kabul; then, a month after the conclusioii 
of the Berlin Congress, they were informed thal 
all political as well as military precautions had 
been stopped, and they vere thus led to believe 
that the Russian mission to Kabul had been with- 
drawn; and Ilien, four months after tliis last de- 
claration, it was casually reinz~rlced by Coulit 
Schouvaloff to Lord Salisbury that, although 
Stolietoff liad returned lo Tashkent, the Russian 
Sea La Vhifd aur In. R ~ ~ s s i e ,  by Prince Peter Dolgorukoff, 
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e!nbassy still remained in Kabul in spile of the 
,repeated assurances tllat; Russia u~ould not interfere 
in Afghan affairs. Who but a paid Russiall agent 
call be found to attenlpt any justification of .L;lle 
prolonged stay of tlie Russiall lnission in t'he ! 
ifgha11 capital nfrcr tlre sigllnture of i e  'Treky of 1 
I3erli11 ? Aricl can anyone, even in tlie pay of ': 
Xnssia, be fouild xrho be bold enough to say 
:iiiytliing ill defence of the ~l-~islcading st~ate~iie~zt 
which mas mczde to Mr. Pluillcett on August 14 ,  
1878, by M. de Giers? 
Russia, in violation of lier previous pl-oniises, 
retained tlie R~lssia~i eri1b:~ssy ill Icabul for five 
mont;lis after tlie coilclusio~l of tlle Tre:~t,y of Berlin. 
Nor was this all. When tlint treaty llad beer1 
conclucled, and after the troops for the l~rojectecl 
invasion of Iilrlia llarl reLurned to their canton- 
ments, Colonel, GroilelroiT, tlie chief of the staff' of 
the proposecl iiwailiilg arniy, left Snmarkancl wit11 
General I<auii~iann's perillissioll on October 9, 1878, 
and, tr,zvellirig in his uniform a's a Iiussisil s t a r  
ofElice~., crossed tlie River Oxus nine clays later, :111cl, 
l~assiing throu glxMzzar-i-SherX, S.iripul, and Maimcznn 
with an esco1.t or Afghan troopers, made way 
to Herat, mllere he a, -cvarm reception 
from the Afghan g0~7er110r BIIC~ iullabitants. Tliere 
lle rei~iainecl for tlil.ee clays, during which period 
lie was perinittecl to exalnine the city and to make 
a. thoro~zgh survey of its forLi.ficatjous ; and then 
he leisurely continued liis jourriey to Meshed, and 
t,llei~ce to .Astrabad. This o:ffic-,er, on llis ~-et,nrn t,o 
Russia, TVRS 110t gre(:teil with t , h ~  oflicial ~ ~ l ) u l < i ! s ,  
YROJECTI.:D INVASION OF INDIA 
which have been accorded to many British officers 
who have unclertaken sirnilar journeys in their 
desire to advailce British interests in the East. ; but 
another Russian move towards the frontiers of 
Thus it  will be seen that Russia's nlovements 
in Central Asia in 1878 caiznot be attributed solely 
t,o the necessity for precautionary measures with a 
view to the outbreak of hostilities with Great 
Britain, wlnicl~ was then imminent. The Czar's 
Government seized the opportunity to make 
another step forward i11 the direction of India. 
But the bold policy of the Beaconsfield ministry 
provecl. that they had been premature in their at- 
tempt to establish themselves in Afghanistan ; and 
d t h o u g  their miserable and deserted ally, Shere 
Mi, justly paid the penalty for his defiance of the 
British Government, it  must always remain a dis- 
puted point whether Russia should not also have 
been called to account for her wanton violation of 
her promises, and for her open support of an 
enemy of the Indian Gov.erameat. 
Since this was written Gxodekoff has been transferred from 
the Syr Daria District. 
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UNSUCCESSFUL CCdfPAIGN AGAINST TTTE TI<ICI(I?S 
R~~ssia 's  L n ~ i s s i o ~ ~  ' in Asia-Lomalrin's expodition-Retreat alld 
disaster-Loss of Rusfiian prestige-General Lazareff's expe- 
aition against the TelrlrBs-Lasareff's death-Loinnltin talsos $110 
commmd-Misrnaaage~uer1t and hcompetency-Thirsthlg for 
a glorio~ls victory '-The ' Colossns of May ' and tho ' p i p y  ' 
of September-A bravo defencc-'rho slanghter at Dengl~il 
TepB-Reheat-Lomalsin's last chance lost. 
SICOBELEFF, in his faillous project for the iiivasioil 
of India, suggestecl. that wlzile the columils from 
Turkestan were advancing across the Hindu-Kush 
Mountains, another force, consisting of ' several 
l)attalions, wit11 G guns to every 1,000 men,' should 
be despatched from the Caucasus, to operate in the 
Turkoinan couiltry on the northern borders of' 
Persia ; and this recommendation was not lost 
sight of by the Czar's Governlllent vhen h e y  
resolved, in 187 8, to malce a cl.emonstration agaii~sl 
India. But altl1oug.11 the Turkoinail expedi tioil o S 
1878 vas  tiined so that the Caucasus troops, by their 
ahrailce into the Alcllal country, could keep the 
Tel&Bs in check, and tllus in a, measure protect 
t l ~ e  right flalllr of the Turkestan columns, this 
campaign luust be considered in conllectioil wit11 
T'OL. 11. I 
the great design which for many years formed a 
postlion of Russia's po l i cy  in Central Asia, and I 
which had for its object t,he subjugation of the 1 ! 
whole of Turkomania and the absorption of a11 the 
remaii~ing territory to t h e  south of the 0x11s' which 
was not included wi t l i in  the recogilised limits of 
Persia and Afghanistan . The nussinns had, from I 
the time of their first perinanent occupation of 
I~~asnovodsk, been m o s t  persevering in their 
efforts to get a footing in the Alchal country ; ancl, 
I 
while they annexed li t t le or nu territory to the 1 
east and north of t h e  Oxus  since the conquest of 'I 
I<holraad, there was no peace in Turkonia~lia until 
b Skobelefi crushed the ~ e k l r h s  at  Pengllil TepB, 
and till Merv itself had become a ~ u s s i a i  
town. 
I t  is therefore iiecessary to again revert to 
the consideration of t h e  actioils of the Russian 
officials in  the Trans-Caspian Militaly district, aiid 
to review briefly tlie operations of the various ex- 
pedi tionary forces which were from time to tiine 
sent against the T e k k 6  Turlcomans. 
In the whole h i s t o r y  of the Russiall advance 
from Europe towards the borders of Hiizdustan 
there is n o  phase ~ v h i c l l  is more worthy of careful 
consideration than the Russian operatioils which 
1.esulted in the conques t  of the Turkomans of ! 
Alrlial and Merv, and which ellcied in the establish- 1 
rrlent of Russian garr isons  within easy striking 1 I distance of Herat, the ' Key of India.' For this I 
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display in their endeavours to extend their Enlpire 
in Asia, and the manner in wliich they aclllere to a 
certain fixed line of policy in spite of repeated 
checlss ancl disasters ; it is full of exalnples of the 
1 
I 
manner in ~vhicll they violate their pledges when, 
by so cloing, some territorial aclvarltages can be 
gained ; it clisplaj~s the subtlety with urhicll they 
gain tlie subinissioll of liostile tribes ancl obtais 
possessioil of important strategical centres by 4 i 2\ means of carefully-conducted intrigues, and by the 
ernploymeilt of so-called ' traders ' as diplolnatic 
1 agents ; it affords a lessoil as to the lllanlier in 
which they carry out their ' civilising mission ' in 
Asia by the remorseless butchery of innocent 
l~Tomell and children ; ancl it also shows how the 
Eaglish people, in their intense anxiety to avoid tho 
horrors of a great mar, actually per~ilitted tlie 
Russians to appropriate a portion of Afghanistan, 
and allowed them to take up positions from wliich 
they will be able to o c c ~ ~ p y  the fertile valley of 
Berat hefore a single regiment can be llloved 
west of Kandahar. 
Before describing these eveilts it is necessary 
to mention that oil April 5, 1575, Prince Gortcl-~a- 
lcoff inforn~ecl. the British Government that ' .His 
Imperial Majesty has no intention of extending the 
frontiers of Russia, such as they exist at present i11 
Central Asia, either on the side of Bokhara or on 
the side of Ifi~c~s7zovodsslc and of the Atl-ek.' This 
declaration was made at a time wheu no particular 
anxiety was displayed in England ou account of 
Russia11 moven~eiits in Cel~tral Asia, and it W:LS 
r 2 
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therefore acceplecl as a proof of the Czar's sincere 
desire to abstain fro111 furtl~er acts which migilt 
create suspicioii or darn1 in the miiids of the 
English. Such assurances, however, have fre- 
quei~tly heen but the preface of renewed aggression; 
and in the follom~iiig pages it mill be shomln how 
this promise r a s  broken, nut1 how the Einperor did 
extencl his frontiers beyond Krnsnovodsk. 
As has been already related, General Lomakin 
i11 the autuilin of 1875 inarched doag the barilrs 
of the Atre]., and, after visiling several encamp- 
ments of the Yoinud Turlromans, aclvaiicecl as far 
as Chat at  tlie confluelice of the Atrek and Sulnbar 
rivers. Shortly after he had returned from this 
reconnaissailce the Tekkks of Akhal warned the 
other tribes of Turlroinans I T ~ O  inhabited the 
country between Kizil-Arvat aizcl the Caspian Sea 
that they would Be extermiliated if they eilterecl 
into friendly relations with the Russians; and 
therefore in the autuinn of 1876 a Russian detach- 
llleiit was once more sent to Kizil-Arvat, where it 
was illtended tliat a permanent garrison should 
be establisl~ed, ostensibly for the protection of tlie 
tribes which mere friendly towards the Russians, 
but in reality for the purpose of extending Russia11 
influence over the Akl-~al TekkBs theinselves. This 
expedition, however, was not a success ; for tlie 
TeklrBs asseinbled in force, ancllnade snch persistent 
attacks on the Russian column that the coininaiicler 
was forced to return; and after he had reached 
Krasnovodsk tlie Tekkds pillaged the settlements 
of the tribes m~hicli favoured Rnssian rule. 
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Lo~nalrin, therefore, on Felsruary 16, 1877, i issued a proclaination to the elders and chiefs of 
the Yomud Turkomans, cleclaring his intentioil of 
advancing against the Telrkds to punish them for 
1 
r their attacks on the tribes wllicl~ clwelt in Russia11 
territory ; announcing his deterininatioil to con- 
struct a fort at Kizil-Arvat, and to retain a per- 
lnanent garrison at that place; ancl calling upoil 
thein to supply 1,000 camels for trailsport purposes. 
Thus, while the Chancellor of the Russian 
1 
1 Empire was declaring that there was 110 inteii- 
1 tion of extencling the Czar's doininioils f~-om the 
direction of Krasrlovodsk, the Governor of the 
Trans-Caspian Military district was loudly pro- 
claiming his intention of marching against a 
neigllbouring tribe, and of establishing a perlnallellt 
military garrison in one of their chief settlements. 
Such is the rnanner in which Russia has operated 
in Central Asia for tlie last thirty years, or, more 
correctly, throughout the whole course of her 
Asiatic history. While the Ceiltral Government 
have been preaching peace, the frontier oiEcials 
have bee11 waging war ; and meanwhile the Czar's 
Empire llas been steadily expanding, and all the 
petty States in the heart of Asia have been 
swallowed up to satisfy the Muscovites' insatiable 
lust after territorial aggrandisement. 
Early in the following April Lomakin left 
Krasnovodslr with a large force, and carried out 
his intention of occupying Kizil-Arvat. Noor 
Verdi Khan, tlie leading Akhal cl~ieftaia, theu 
assembled a large force of Telrkds, and on May 24, 
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with some 6,000 men, delivered a determined 
attack against the Russian detachment ; bu t  the  
nomads, in spite of their bravery, could not s tand  
before the fire of the Russian artillery and breech- 
loaders, and, after a fight which lasted about four 
hours,. they were driven back in hopeless confu- 
sion, after some 800 or 900 men had been lzilled, 
wounded, or taken prisoners. But, although they 
liad been thus severely defeated, the Tekkks llaci 
no intention of abandoning the struggle. They 
shortly afterwards re-appeared in greater force, 
and after besieging Lomakin in his camp, finally 
coinpelled him to bury his gulls in the sand 
and retire in disorder to Krasnovodsk, when the  
Turkomans hotly pursued the retreating Russians, 
nncl even b~oclsaclecl Krasnovodslc for several  
tveeks. 
This reverse occurred just at the time when t h e  
prestige of the Russian ilatioil had been grea t ly  
wealcened through Osman Pasha's victories a t  
Plevna, ancl on account of the precipitate r e t r ea t  
of the Russian armies i11 Asia Minor after t h e  
battles of Halijas (Tahir Keni) ahd Zewin. No 
troops could be then spared to reinforce t he  
garrisons on the eastern shores of {;he Caspian, 
dild the knssians for several months were obliged 
to maiiltaiiz a strictly defensive attitude, ancl t o  
rest content with the bare occupation of t he i r  
fortified posts on the sea coast. But before t h e  
close of the year all danger had passed away. 
The Turkomans, finding that they were unable to 
drive the Russians into the sea, retunled i;o t h e i r  
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homes; and when Kars had been captured, 2nd 
the tide of victory llad once more set in in favour 
of the Bussians, Lomakin was sumlnoned to Tifjis 
to receive the Grand Dnlce's orders regarding a 
fresh campaign against the Alclld TelclcBs, which 
was intended to obliterate all traces of tile previ- 
ous l%ussiail defeats, ailcl to permanently establish 
3lnscovite influence tllrougllout the wester11 por- 
tion of the Tekk6 country. 
111 accorclnnce wit11 the instructiolls whicl~ 
were then issued, the greater portion of tile 
Krasnovodslc garrison was reinoved to Cl~ilrishli~r 
in the early spring of 1878, ancl additional troops , 
were also sent to that place from the Caucasus; 
then, as the clouds on the political horizon grczcl.u- 
ally became blacker and more threatening, the 
'l'raiis-Caspian forces were still further reinforced ; 
and, fiiielly, when the Russian Government resolved 
to coiiililence a hostile' movement towards the 
frontiers of Inclia, the small expeditionary colurn~l 
wliich had originalIy been inteilcled for the occu- 
pation of Kizil-Arvat, and for tlle prevention of 
raids by the TelclrB Turkomans, became trans- 
forlried into a considerable force, which was to act 
as circ~unstaices might require in connection with 
I<nufi.naml's irivaclirlg columns. ICrasnovodsk and 
Chiliis1ili:a were soon crowded with troops of d l  
:urns, ailcl Ijy the encl d July everytliing was reacly 
for tlle projected invasion of Turlcomania by a 
Xussir~rl force of some 6,000 men and 24 guns. 
Ei~rly OIL tlle moriling of August 3 the camp at 
Chilrisliliar was struck, and the column co~rimenced 
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its march, screened by strong bodies of Cossacks, 
Kirghie, and Tnrkoman militia. Karaji Batyr was 
reached at  ten o'cloclr on the following morning, 
and there twenty-seven wells, containing excellent 
water, were found at the foot of a ilunlber of 
liillocks which rise out of tlie surrouncliiig tract of 
friable sand. Having talren in a goocl supply of 
water the column left this camping-ground on the 
next day, and, after a l ~ l a r c ~ l  of ten miles, arrived 
at  the post of Raiat I-Iaji, on the banks of the 
Atreb. There the troops relnainecl for a weelc, 
nnd tlien contiriued their advance aloilg tlie riglit 
, 
bank of the river, past Yagli Olunl alicl Dairanl 
Olum to Chat, which is situated at  the junction of 
the Atrek ancl Sumbar rivers. 
The Russiaus reluaiiled at Chat for over a 
week, during v~liicli Lillie General Lomaldn llialle 
a reconnaissance along the upper valley of the 
Atrelc to ascertain if it mould not be possible to 
reacli Asltabacl, and to l~enetrnte to the eastern 
limits of the Turltoinail co~ul~try without being 
obliged to fight liis way along tlie plains to the 
ilorth of the Kuren Dagh range. I t  would have 
1,een a iiinller of tlie greatest advantage to tlie 
lZussiaiis if an easy route could have been found 
dong tlie Airel< Valley, for they coulcl then l~nve 
sirnck a suddeil blow at the very I.ien,rt of the 
Teltk6 settleineizl,~ withont being exposeil to lengtlly 
arid harassing operations against the Turkom:~ils, 
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But althougli Lomakin found that the co~u t sy  
was eininei~t~ly suited for military operations so far 
as forage and water were concerned, it was soon 
seen that an aclvance could no1 be made in that 
direction unless several months were first spent in 
road-malring. For a distance of about thirty-three 
iniles beyoncl Cliat no difficulties were encountered 
by the reconiioitring party ; but at a place called 
Su-Sium they came across two enormoils rocks, 
which rose abruptly out of the bed of tlie river, 
mcl sharply defined the change which there took 
place in tlie geological formation of the country. 
According to a ct~rrespondent of the ' Moscow 
Gazette,' who was apparently attached to Lomakin's 
staff, the Atrek, which below Chat was of a clisty 
green colour, 'here became clear, tlie becl stony, 
aiid the banks coverecl with rich vegetation ; the 
grass here grows up to one's waist, and whole 
copses of oak clot the surface of the country. 
Wild grapes also grow in abundance, and pheasants 
are also numerous.' But althougli the country 
was pleasant to look upon, ancl appeared to be a 
perfect paradise to the Russian soldiers, who had 
just crossed the sandy desert and saline marshes 
which lie between Chikishliar and Chat, it was 
foui~cl qnite unsuitable for the passage of an army ; 
for at Su-Sium the road becmne impassable for 
camels, ancl seven iniles further on it became 
difficult even for horses. 
Lomakin, however, still pushecl forward, in hopes 
of finding a less difficult country farther on, and it 
was nol until he had marched 72 miles beyvnd 
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Su-Sium-that is, to a point 105 miles above Chat  
-that he eventually determined to abandon t h e  
Atrek line of advance, and to march northvr7arcls 
towards Kizil-Arvat. Retracing his steps, he then 
marched down the river to a place called Alun 
Yalc (14 miles from Chat), and thence marched 
across the Sugun Dagl~ range, which rises to a 
height of 2,000 feet above the sea level, and forms 
a mountainous wedge between the Atrelc a n d  
Sumbar rivers. The main column had in the 
meanwhile moved along the ba~llcs of the Surnbar 
to Khar Olum, and was there joined by the recon- 
noitring party, and, after a night's halt;, the whole 
force advanced past Sharol Dau to Belr Tep&, a 
prominent ridge-one of the spurs which run o u t  
from the Kuren Dagh range into the country 
between the Sumbar and Challclir streams. 
From this point it was necessary that the move- 
ment should be collducted with the greatest caution, 
for the route to the Akhal country passed through 
a series of long ancl dangerous defiles, which are 
' severally known under the narnes of Dairon, 
Nisl~ik Sund, Turugai, and Kuvmius,' and which 
' present most dangerous places for caravans,' as 
' the road winds tlirough them dong steep ascents 
and descents ; and only two horses can proceed 
abreast at one time along it.' Lomakin, however, 
successfully carried his column through these 
passes, and on September 2 encamped at Klloja 
Kala, which is described by the correspondent of 
the ' Moscow Gazette ' to be ' an old deserted eartli- 
work in the shape of a regular quadrangle, Banked 
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by two conical crenelated towers about fourteen 
feet in height, the upper platforms of which are 
protected by a low wall pierced with apertures for 
musketry fie.' Two nziles to the south of this 
there is another similar fort of smaller climensions, 
ancl will1 one flanking tower, standing in the centre 
of cultivated and well-watered fields, the water 
being obtained from a small rivulet which flovr7s 
tllrougli the neigl~bouring bushes and reeds and 
ul~i~nately reaches Khoja ICala. 
Froin I<lloja K d a  detacliments were sent out in 
all directions : Icizil-&vat was visited, and recon- 
nnissailces were pushed forward towards Eami and 
Ueurina ; while otlier parties visited Bendesen, and 
from neigl~bouring mountaills obtaiiied good views 
of the Althd oasis, and were able to examine the 
Teltki! forts of Bami, Beurma, and Kara Kala. 
But Lomakin's position was at this time one 
ol  consiclerable difficulty : his supplies hail run 
short, and Ihe neigllbou~ing Turkomans of Kara 
Iialn aucl Tarsakan ref~lsecl to comply with tho 
Iiussian requisitions; the force suffered greatly 
fi-om sicliness and disease; ancl large bands of 
hostile Teltkds soon appearcd in the neighbour- 
lioocl ancl obliged tlie Eussians to withdraw their 
:~clvnncccl parties, and to concentrate in the neigh- 
1)ourhoocl of Ir'ara Icala. Even tliere Lomalcill 
fh1111cl that he could not possibly maintain his 
position, and he Ihercfor e infornzecl the Teklrds that 
lie would retire to the Casl~ian if they would permit 
llirn to hoist the llussian flag in their country and 
le~ive a garrison to protect it. Tlie nomscls, how- 
ever, scornfully rejected this demand, and, gather- 
ing in thousands round the Russian camp, closely 
blockaded it for several days, and eventually 
forced Lomakin, on September 20, to coininence a 
retireineilt towards the Caspiaa. T l~e  commence- 
ment of this retrograde step was the signal for 
more determined attacks on the part of the Turlco- 
mans, w11o harassed the column during its retreat 
tllrough the defiles of the Kopet Dagh, and con- 
tinued tlieir attacks until the cleinoralisecl Russia11 
troops gainecl shelter behind the intrellchineilts a t  
Chat. There a short halt was made, and then, 
leaving a garrison of G O O  men at Chat, Lomaliin 
continued his retreat towards the Caspian. Unt 
as sooil as he hacl marched out of the fort the 
place was closely besieged by large masses of the 
TekkBs, ancl the main column was also chased past 
Raiat Haji and up to the very guns of Chilrishliar, 
where the remnants of the Russian army arrived in 
a completely demoralised condition. Hundreils of 
soldiers diecl from disease alone during this ~mi'oor- 
tunate campaign, aiicl many more were lost during 
the retreat ; while the Turlcomans carried o r  large 
numbers of camels froin the immediate neighbour- 
hood of Chikishliar. Througl~out tlie followirlg 
winter the small garrison at Chat were closely 1x3- 
sieged in their intrencli~nents and cut off froni a11 
comillunication with the Caspian. Tlie Tek1ti:s re- 
paired the fort of Khoja Kala, and for some tiirle a 
large body of tlie noniads remained t'licre in expcc- 
tation of a renewed allt,zclr on tlzeir settlemerlts; thry 
rxiacle constallt raids down the bu~llrs of tllc iltrck, 
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and even appeared before Chilrisliliar, 011 olle 
occasion forcing the garrison to abanclo~l the place 
and take refuge in their boats. 
Thus ended this disastrous calnpaigll against; 
the Teklcds of Alrhal. IZussian prestige in Celltral 
Asia had indeed faller1 to a very low ebb, and it 
is necessary to go baclr to Simonitch's attaclr on 
EIerat a i d  to Perovslri's disastrous expedit;ion 
to Caspian on the west, it was know11 that the 
ambitious designs of the Great White Czar 11ad 
been frustrated. The rendition of far-distant 
Kulja was claimed by the Emperor of China, who 
threatener1 to wage, war if his cleinancl tirere not 
complied with ; Afghallistan was once more occu- 
pied by British troops, a11cl Shere Ali, driven from 
his throne and deserted by his treacherous allies, 
was flying for safety towards Bolrl~ara, accom- 
panied by the members of the Russian mission 
w110 had offered so rlzuch but had done so little 
when the time arrivecl for the fulfilment of their 
pledges ; the Rnssian columns wllicli had beer1 sent 
forward with so much ostentation, and which were 
to have carried the Russian banners to the gates of 
Dehli, liad returiied tritllout even crossing the 
Oxus, ancl then stood fast in their caiztonments, 
while the British armies clrove tlie victim of 
Russian treachery- fro111 the throne of Afghani~t~nn; 
the Russian army whicb had beell sent to crush 
tlle Telik6 Turkomans hacl heel1 driven baclr in 
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disorder to its base; and, in addition to these 
many troubles, it was iloised abroad tl~roughout 
the Mahommeclan states of Asia that the British 
Government had stepped forward to save Stalnboul 
I from a Muscovite occupation, and had forced the 
I t 
Russian armies to fall back wheil tlie defenceless I 
city lay almost in their grasp. 
Rut, although the campaign of 1878 against 
the Ald~al  Telckd Turlromans had been most 
disastrous, the Russians had no intention of sub- 
mitting to the defeat without making an effor~ 
to regain their lost prestige. The very illagilitude 
of the disaster, in fact,, compelled thein to at once 
talce steps to break the power of the Telrlrds ; ancl 
when the result of Lomakia's last campaign became 
a known, i t  was decided that General Lazareff l 
should be sent to take commai~cl of the army 
whicli was being asseinbled on the eastern shores 1 ;I 
of the Caspian for a fresh advance against the 
Turkoma~ls. The newly-appoiatecl commander- I 
1 This was the officer who made the brilliant march round 
tIie righi, flank of Moukhtar Pasha's position on the Aladja- 
Dagh in the last Russo-Tnrlrish war. He was born in 1819 at 
Sheesha i n  the Trans-Cwcasian province of Elizabetpol, and 
saw a large amount of fighting during the operations against 
Schamyl, t h e  famous Daghestan chief. He was a man of gigantic 
stature, and powerful in proportion to his size ; he was full of 
enorgy, breve almost to recMessness, and invariably led his troops 
to the attack in the same manner as Skobeleff did; but he had a, 
most violent temper, which a t  times broke out in perfect storms of 
H e  had been twice wounded in action, m d  had been 
presented wit11 the second and third classes of the Order of St. 
George, besides numerous other decorations; and at the close of 
the Russo-Turkish war was prolnoted to the rank of Adjutant- 
G-enerd, and made Comuander of the Second Caucasian Army 
Corps. 
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in-chief set out from Baku early in April 1879, 
and, after a passage of forty-cight hours, landed 
at Chikishliar, where h e  was received wit11 the 
usual salutes, and was welcomecl. at the pier-head 
by a body of friendly Turkomans, who presented 
bread and salt and sacrificed six sheep in toke11 
of their friendship towards the Russian general. 
He, cluring the day, liberated soille Turlcoinan 
prisoners who l~acl. been seized by Lonlalcirl as 
hostages for four Russian soldiers who had been 
captured by the Telrlcds ; and at daybrealc on tlie 
following morning he set out for a rapid recon- 
naissai~ce of the country between Chilrisliliar ancl. 
Chat. Accompanied by an escol-t of two sotiiias 
of Cossaclcs and eighty irregular horse, the 
general and his staff travelled at express speed in 
a couple of carriages past Ksraji Batyr ancl Yagli 
Olum, ancl. reached Chat at noon on the following 
day. There he remained for twenty-four hours to 
settle the details for the advance of the expedi- 
tion ; and after reviewing the garrisoil he re- 
turned post-haste to Chikishliar, ancl witl~in an 
hour of his arrival on the coasl lle had elnbstrlced 
on the steailier ' Ural,' of the Caspian flotilla, and 
w,zs steaming nor~hwards towards Krasnovodsk 
to confer with Lomalcin as to the conduct of the 
approaching campaign. Proin Krasnovodsk he 
returned to Tiflis to arrange for tlie clespatch of 
troops and stores from the Caucasus ports to 
Chikishliar. 
Owiilg to general mismanagement, as well 
as lo the difii(;ull,y in obtaining camels, a con- 
of cavalry, and 24 guns, giving a 1;ol;al of 
18,000 men of all arms. Tlle advanced 
coi~structioil of a bridge across tlle river. 
The main body inarched along the banlcs 
Atrek, vid Bevou~l Bashi, Gudri Olu111, and 
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siderable delay occurred, and it was June 18 
loefore the advallced guard, uilder tlle cornma~~d 
of Prince Dolgorou.lcofl', set ofI' fro111 Clhikisliii:~, 
and August 11 before tlle main body started. 
The total st;rength of the force coilsisted of 
164. battalions of infanLry a i d  sappers, 22 so(;nias 
passing through Clmt, reached DUZ 01~111 011 
June 29, where the troops at once colninenced the 
of the 
Baiat 
Eaji, t,o Chat, m~l~ich was reached on August, 18. 
The main body of the expeditio~lary force did 
not remaill long in this inhospitahle region, but, 
pushed on rapidly towards Khoja Iinla. Duz 
1 Ollznl was reached by h e  infantry c)il August 21, 
and the cavalry brigade reached Lhe same place 
on the following day. The advanced guard in 
the meanwhile llad push.ed forwarcl towarcls the 
Alrhal Oasis, and on August 20 Prini:e Dolgoroukofl 
encamped at Bendesea, sixteen iniles to tlle east 
of Klloja Kala. On the following day lle pusllecl 
across the passes with his cavalry and a conl- 
pany of infantry, seized the Telrkd Iorts of Ba~tli. 
and Reurma, and, marching throughout; tlie wholo 
of the following night, surprisecl a Tu~~Icolila~~. 
eilcampment at the Niaz wells at  datvil 011 tllc 
2 3rd, when, after a short engngemerlt, some 3 0 0 ol' 
the nomads were killed or wonnilcil, anzd :1.,20(1 
camels and G,000 sllr?ep were! cal)t,urecl. 
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Just at this tirne, when the Russian troops 
were arriving 011. tlie Inorders of Lhe Aklid counLry, 
a, melsilcholy event occurred, which for a time 
threw a deep gloolll hver (;he whole force anil 
over~llelmecl all rnnlrs of the army with grief 
const;crnation. Qenernl Lazarell', R ~ I O  mras 
grea,(;ly beloved hy his soliliers, nnil who 110s- 
sessed in n remarlialole degree the: confide~lce of 
all ranks of liis followers, was destined to be 
one of the first victims of I;he l)oisoneil air and 
impure water-supply of tlle clesola1;e e11c:~mpment;. 
on the borders of the Caspian Sen, where Ille 
army had bee11 forc,eil to remaill cluring the mont11,r 
of June and July. Shortly hefore t-,lle innin coluin~l 
left Chikisliliar he was at,taclrecrl by a pniilf~ll 
lualacly, and, in spite of an operation, it was 
founcl that his systein had l~ecome so cnmpletely 
l~oisonecl tllat; llollliiig shnrl; of c,ornplete rost;. 
ancl careful trentmellt could lmssil~ly restore Ilillx 
to health. This, 2io11~ever, would have n.eces- 
sitateil the reliilrluisliii~ent of his coinm:~ncl-at all 
events, for n considerable time-and, as lle could 
not; bear the itlea of :~lnn~iiloning the enterlrisr: 
which he was al~out to cnmmencc!, ;LIIC~ which he 
l,ulicvc(l he r:onld successfully ncconiplish, 11(! 
macle up his illiilil to 1111~11 forward so long :LH 
he had strength to move. A few (lays nfi;ar t,lio 
ol~erntioii linil beell l~e~f'o'ormetl he comlnenccid t l ~ e  
i;rjrillg jounley to Cllnt; :md, a1t;liough the dist,ance 
was Lr:~rrcrseil ill an ol)c~r cnkl,cho, lie was so 111.0lie1l 
do~rlz with pain :111.(l H ~ C I C I L ~ S S  01.1 llis arrival at 
i , l ~ ~ ~ , t ~  (lcs(,)lat,c! sl)oi, idl:~I, i,ll(, soldi(?s,s 11:~l 1;o r;arlsy 
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him from the carriage to the commandant's tent. 
The strain proved too much even for his once 
powerful frame, and before the next clay had 
dawned Ivan Davidovitck Lazareff, one of the 
bravest soldiers of the Czar, had passed auTay- 
a victim to his unflinching fortitude and constant 
adherence to duty. 
After LazarefYs death the command devolved 
upon General Lomakin, who was the next senior 
oficer with !;he force ; and tllus, by an extra- 
ordinary piece of good fortune, Lomakin found 
himself in a position to wipe out the memory 
of his previous defeats, ancl to re-establish his 
reputation as a military commancler. Ue, how- 
ever, failed to seize the opportunity, and the over- 
whelming disaster' which soon befell the Russian 
army before the Tekki: fortress of Denghil Tep4 
obliterated his last lzopes of obtaining military 
distinction, wiped out the memories of his suc- 
cessful advance against Khiva, and caused his 
, name to be mentioned in Russia with indignation 9, 
,I and contempt. Lomakin., indeed, possessed but 
',it, little talent for command. When he ailvancecl 
r I ' i towards Khiva from the Kinderlinsk Bay, in 1873, 
there were many brilliant oficers attached to his 
' * 
column, who, by their energy and military alitri- 
butes, ensured the success of that undertal~ing ;l 
but since then, when these officers were enlployed 
in other parts of the Empire and he was left 
I t  is sufliciont meroly to mention tho nen~es  of Slrobeleff and 
Grodekoff to show lh&l Lomnlcin wtts served in this anrnl1nig.11 by 
some of tho best oficers in the Rnss i~~n  nmnly. 
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to his own resources, he was almost uniformly 
uns~~ccessful in his military ventures. 
Ldzareff had intended to conc:entrate his force 
near to Khoja Icala, and there to halt until supplies 
ror two nloilths had been accumulated at an acl- 
vailced base on the horclers of the Akllal country, 
so that the army could be free to act against the 
mosh clistailt  orl lions of the Telrlrd Oasis, aild 
even penetrate to Merv itself if such a slep mere 
founcl to be necessary. But after his death this 
plan was abandoned ; and on August 31, when 
the wl~ole of the expeclitionary force had arrived 
on the frontiers of the Akhal Oasis, a council 
of war was held, at  which it was decidecl that 
a sinall coluinll should cross the Kopet Dagh 
Mountaills by the Kozlinslri Pass, near Bami, 
and, by a rapicl and unceasing forward movenzent, 
force the Telrlrds to a general engagement, in 
which it was expected that they would be cleci- 
sively defeated and subjugated once and for 
ever. 
In  accordance with this determination the 
scivancecl guard of the 'Akhal Teklrh detach- 
ment' illarched out of the camp at  Bendesen at 
daybreak on September 3, and on the following 
inorlliilg the main body also commenced its marc11 
lowarcls Bani. According to General Loinalrin's 
report of the operations, the force whicll was 
einployed in the actual illvasion of the Akhal 
count~y consisted of 2,467 inrantry, 850 cavalry, 
271 artillery, ,znil 202 militia, giving a grailcl total 
or 3,790 well, will1 12 guns slid 8 roclcet-stands, 
Ir 2 
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The rest of the army was left s t  various l~oints 
011 the road between Chilrishliar and Bendesen 
to protect the line of commuaications, artd, as 
AliklisnofF very truly remarked, ' the Colossus 
of May had by Sel~teiuber 9 becolue recl~~ced 
to the cliineilsioils of a veritable pigmy.' 
The i~lunclers which had been illnde nf; tlte 
co~nluellcement of the cainl~aign sooil bore frnit;, 
and the Xussians were about to real) n t c ~ r i l ~ l c  
harvest from the initial mistakes of the milit,ary 
oficials and because of the iiicoinl~etence of 
Lazarefs successor. 
I-Iad Loiuaki~l adllered to IJazareff s origiital 
design the force .would probably have l~eeii 
obliged to halt in the vicinity of IChoja Iialn for 
some ~nonths, 2,s-with the inadecyuate supply of 
transport animals-the large quantities of stc)~:es 
tliat were necessary coulcl not possihly Iiave 1,een 
accumnlated on tlle frontier before the close of the 
year. fIe was amrare that he only llelil the com- 
mand temporarily, by virtue of his superior 1.ailk, 
and that a new comrnai.~cler-in-chief would sooll 
arrive 011 the scene, when he ~vo111il lose llis last; 
chance of distinction ; ancl as he was naturally 
anxious to wipe out liis previous disgrace, i t  c:ul- 
1101; be woilclereil at  that he sl.tould have cleciilud to 
try and silatch renomrn by rl~nkiilg a suilil[?~l i1;~slt 
al; the Teli'lrk stro~~ghold. I11 this ilecision lie TI~:IS, 
no clonl~t, slzpl~ortcd by tllc nclvice of tllc :~n11:1i1;io~1s 
Court-soliliers by mrlloln lie was sarrc~u~~tlotl ; :uttl 
as there w:~s 1leiLllc:r t r :~~~sl )or t  ilor s~qq~li(:s 1, w i,Itc 
T11o CII~LLI C ~  LIN IJILLL~O of' 1 )o11:hi1 llol)h, 
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farther advance of the wllole army, it thus 
happened that a weak brigade puslled forward 
from Benclesen to try conclusions with the brave 
people who had on so lllally previous occasions 
preve,nted the Russiails from establishing them- 
selves in the Akhal country. 
Passing througl~ Bami, Beurnia, and Artchinan, 
the advanced guard, 'under Prince Dolgoroukoff, 
reaclled the Telrkd settlement of Dnrun on Septeln- 
ber G ,  after a slight brush with seine 300 TekkBs at 
a place called Begreden. The Turkomans, who were 
unrler the leadership of one of their most renomiled 
chiefs, namecl Kara Uatyr, had merely aclvanced 
from Denghil Tep6 for the pul-pose of observing 
the illovellieilts of the Russia11 column, and as sooil 
as t11e Cossacks pusllecl forwarcl to meet them they 
llastily fell back alld got away without any loss. 
The main colupn, under Count Borcll, reached 
~ u r u n  on the following day, ailcl oil September 8 
tlle whole force aclvancecl as far as the small Tekkd 
fort of Yaraji, which is tllirteen miles to the west 
of Denghil Tepd, where it was well known that 
the TekkBs hacl resolvecl to make a stand. 
No one .iu the lZussian camp at that time knew 
how far the enemy's stronghold really was, sild 
while some saicl i t  was only nine miles distant, 
others declared tllat it was three times as far. 
Bxsggeratecl rumours also began to cil-culate as to 
the strength of the enemy, and it was reputed that 
fifliy thousand armed men liad been gathered 
together to dispute the further advance of the 
Russian column, ancl hacl solemnly vowed to con- 
I 
"F 
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quer the infidels or to die in the attempt. Every I 
man in the force felt that the task which was i ;I 
before them would not be an easy one, and that I j 
unless they gained a victory over their desperate I !! 
foes they would be in a perilous and, perhaps, 1 1  
inextricable position. I /  
During that afternooil anotlier couilcil of war 1 
was l~eld, and it was then arranged that the . 
advanced guard should comnlence its marc11 to- i 
mards the Tekk6 fortress at three o'clock on the.  
following morning, and that the main body should ! I 
follow an hour later. But, in spite of the orders 
-to this effect which were issued, Prince Dolgorou- 
koff - accompanied b y  General Lomakin, Prince 
Witgenstein, and the headquarters' staff-marched 
from Yaraji with the advanced guard a t  two 
o'clock on the morlliilg of September 9, while the 
main column, uilcler Count Borch, did not start 
~ult i l  G A.M. ; and thus, although Loinakin Phew 
full well that the eneiny was only a few miles 
distant, the marching orders were, for some in- 
explicable reason, igaorecl, and the small Russian. 
army advanced up011 the enemy in two detach- 
ments, separated from each other by a four-hours' 
march. Can anyone who possesses the most rudi- 
The baggage-train~consisting of 3,500 camels-advanced a t  
n short distance behincl Borch'a col~unn. It was escorted by six 
companies of infanhy, olio sotnie of Cosseolts, and two mountain 
guns, the whole under the command of Captain Iccgemoff. The 
advanced guard consisted of some 900 infantry and five sotnias of 
cavalry, wilh six guns and eight rocltet-stands; slid the main 
column was composed of about 800 infant~y, two sotnias of 
Cossacks, and a detachment of irregular horse, with four guns.. 
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mentnry knowledge 01 military matters be surprised 
tllal a disaster occurrecl when the day's work 
began with such an extraordinary blunder T 
Tlle remarkable :tdvnilce of the force fro111 
Y:iraji to Denghil Tep6 w:is the first mis t,alce which 
rllarlrccl tlic 11:ijr's l>ro~cei[iilgs; but it was not 
the o~ily oilc, [or cl~lsiiig tllc s~~bser~ucilt  ba tle 
Tloin:ilriil, ill his grc:it ailsiety to will a ' glosious 
vic:lory,' :ic:l.ed wit11 ,z sec:kless walit of jndgmeut, 
wliich brongllt :ibout his owl1 discomfiture, c~illlil 
turned wI~:LL sliol~ld have bccn a certaiil viclory 
illto :in ovcr\vlicliliilig del'e:ir;. 
It is a 111:~xinl ill C:inc:isi:iu warS:tre tllal wllerl 
an c ~ ; : i i i i i t  is nt,tac:lred one side sllould 
always Lc lclt opcn to perinit the defenders to 
csc:nl)(:, in orclrr i;li;~t t l l ~ y  111igllt tllcll be attacked 
ill tlle ope11 wliilc retrcnting. I3ut olic of Lomakill's 
lilxt :~c ts  (311 ;irriviiig wit11 t l l ~  ac1v:incecl guard 
1)eforc tdle TekkQ strol~gliolcl was to sencl the 
c:~v:ilry ru1~11(1 Lo the soulll-cnslern angle of the 
lortress, t u  dkhl)rive the 1101n;~ds of 1J1~ir 011ly liiie 
of rclrcln(,. Ilaviilg tt.lins 1)eilllccl iIhem in 1.llcir ill- 
tre1i(:li11~(~1its, lle co11nllc:ncctl the 1,onll)arclmcnC of 
ill(! l)l:~c.cj, :ind 1 ) o ~ ~ r ~ d  n 1)erf'e'cc~t rain of lnissiles 
1111011 1,11c: rlelise 1li:Lsses or liul1i:u1 I)eillgs ~rl lo were 
l~~~tltll(:tl tog~t11(>1+ )cllilld ill(! low (11:iy ramparts. 
'l'llr! c~llilc~t ol' this 1ir.c: was trc!lllcwtlous ; each shot 
lwot2uc~ctl 111(? ~ I ' c ; L ~  :S~ (l(!v:~st:itio~~, the ki1)itlr:rs 
IVOIY! Lorn 1 o l)i[j(lc!s, :iri(l t l~o sl:iiigllt(~r was 11orril)lo. 
'l'l~(! I ~ I ~ I ' u ~ ~ L I I L : ~ ~ , ~ !  ~~oi~ l :~( l s  t11!11 triixl to l~r(h:~k out o l  
I],,! :LII~, '  :LTI(I I ~ ~ ; L S ~ C : S  OS tll(8111 wcw? soc!~i to I)(; 11yiilg 
I oiv:wtls Xsk:d,a(l. 1 3 1 ~ t  I licly \v.\r(!r(! r[l~i(:Ir[y sl.ol)l)c(l 
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by the cavalry ancl. forcecl. to return to the forlrcss, 
wliich was still niacle tlie target for the Xussian 
shells. TelrmB Sirclar, a 1.enegaile Turlroinaii chief, 
who was at the time i11 tlie Russia~l camp, tllcii 
begged that the bol~ibarcli~leilt iniglit be disc011- 
tinued, in order that he might proceed to Dengllil 
Teyk to iiiduce his cou~ltrymeil to al~aili[oil tlie 
unecl~xal contest. His offer was, liowerer, ~*eSused, 
ancl the fieaclish slaughter coutinued. Tliis ~ v a s  
the state of affktirs at  tliree o'cloclr i11 tlie nfter- 
noon, wheil Count Borch's colnmil arriveil before 
Deaghil Tepk. 
After these troops had restecl for a short wliilc, 
they were placed in positioii along the nortllerll 
front of the fortress ; a~lil  at 4 P.M.-IV~ICI~ the 
l~o~iibarclment had lasteil for nearly four hours- 
the Turlcoinan women aud children streaine(1 out 
of the ' aul ' in the hope of passiilg tlirougll the 
Xussian lines ailel escaping; ancl a t  aboul tlle same 
time a deputation arriveel before the Russinii 
l~ositioii, aslring that the artillery might cease 
firing ailil that negotiations iiiigllt be entereil into. 
' The beautif~~l,  swarthy Telrlr6 wonien tllrew thcnl- 
selves on tlicir lrilees at the feet of the llussiail 
i,roolwrs, liolilii~g forth iii their haids suclrlii~g 
l)abes, a11il iinploring the soldiers in nil urllriiowi~ 
tong:.ue to have iilercy on thein. llows of cainols, 
l~envily ladei~, lay exteiiclecl alongsiile, c~lle~ving tllc 
cud aiicl llowling wit11 their i[isagrucal)lc voices. 
Tlie weeping ol' tho ol~ili[reil, the? crics ol' tllo 01(l 
men, llie il('ip11i11g of I,IIc ~ ~ O I - S C ~ S ,  111(1 1111111( 1 ~ 1 '  of 
the canlion a11c1 riflc firi~lg, 1lii11glccl all in Lerril,)lc+ 
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rmi~ble.' Such is the descriptioil of this piteous 
episode which was given by tlie corresponcleilt of 
the ' Novoe Vreinya.' But the writer then goes on 
to relate that ( all were turned baclc to the " aul." 
Arecting were these scenes ! But tvar will always 
reinain war.' Such, indeed, is war as waged by 
nussia in Ceiltral Asia. Inoffensive women alld 
1it;tle chilrlren were rutlilessly hulltecl back into 
t,lle set,tlement, so that the butcher's bill might be 
increased at the exliense of humanity, ailcl in order 
l;liat the very ~nagnit;ude of the slaugllter miglit be 
pointed to in proof of the greatness of the expected 
viclory. 
The Telrlrd cleputatioil was also turilecl back, 
:~ i l~ l  after the bombarclinen t hacl been mnintained 
wit11 iilcreasecl fierceness for anotl~er hour Lomakin 
gave orders for the place to be stormed. 
This decision ancl the rllailller in which the 
assault was delivered were the crownillg mistakes 
of the battle. I t  was little short; of machess for 
c 1,400 Russian troops to attempt to assault a 
fortilied enclosure clefendecl by some 15,000 men, 
who were cut oE from all cllailce of escape, who 
lalew fuCul well that they coulcl expect no quarter, 
~ I L L I  wlio hacl beell driven to desperation by the 
.terrible rnassacre of their wives %nil children. 
rl?lic bonibar~lmeilt had clone its work ; and if the 
:~ssault had not been clelivered tlie Teltlcbs would 
Altho~~gh tlio IZn~eicm form boforc Donghil Tcpd was aomo 
8,000 ~trong,  only 1,400 lrian ntlvnncod to tho a~tlanlt. 'rho 
roiri~~i~liler coalprisod 111 cnvdry nncl tlio oticorL of tho buggage- 
train. 
- 
open plain the infantry of the enemy, wlio, as 
tlie aKair at Denghil Tep6 clearly deinonst,~nt,cd, 
could not withst,and 121e shock of our infalltry. 
T l ~ e  disposer seemecl to be f~igl~tened lest Dcngl~iZ 
Tepk sl~oz.dd come into OUI- possession zoitl~ozdt uu 
ussclzdlt.' 
Precisely so. An assault was necessary in 
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cert;ainly have either surrendered at discreti011 or 
have endeavoured to escape during the night, in 
which case they could have easily been overtaken 
by the cavalry long ere they reached Askabacl. 
But as the ' Moscow Gazette' very sagely 
remarked : ' In giving the order to sLorm, tlie 
disposer thought, as the oficial statement puts 
it, " that the combined and prolonged action of 
twelve guns could not but inflict; enormous losses 
un the enemy, and produce on him an overwhelm- 
ing impression ; " in consequence of ~vhich there 
was reason to believe that "the population and 
clefeiiclers of Denghil Tep4 were dreacly recluced 
to an extremity which would force thein to dfer 
US complete submission." Rut this is dl worcls- 
mere words. Reduced to preteiided " ext;remity," 
" struck with panic," the eneiliy " continued from 
the walls everywhere a strengtl~ened fire," wliicli 
could hardly have been accepted as a symptom of 
cleinoralisation. This .strengthened fire was more 
against the advisability of an attack than in favour 
of it ; and the same also with the " news received " 
of the intention of the enemy to abandon the " aul." 
I t  only remained to increase tlie cannonacle an<1 
I to take inensures to overtake and disperse on the 
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order that the finishing touch might be to 
;I the ' glorious victory ' which was expected, ancl so 
that Lomakin and his lieutenants migllt p i l l  ;I clistinction. But although the assault was a mistake, the 
1 lllaniler in wliicll it was carried out was still more 
I faulty. Ills tead of concelltrating his force allcI 
! 
i niaki~lg a determined attack at one point of tlle 
i works, the 'disposer' puslied his troops forward in a long weak line, without nny supports, and 
I\ 
I even without scaling-ladders, although nunlbers of 
these useful articles hail been brought forward 
froill Y araji, nlld could have been utilised cluring tlle 
assault. Tlius, wllen tlie attaclring soldiers reached 
the first line of obstacles, they soon got separated 
into small detached g~oups, and, in spite of their 
brave efforts, were qnickly cut down or driven back 
by tlie overwllelming numbers of their enemies. 
The fall of evening put an end to the battle, and 
tlie reinrln~lts of the Russia11 army then gradually 
concentl.ated in a camp about a lnile from the 
fcirt1-ess, where they spent the night in momentary 
fear of attack. But the TekkBs were too fully 
occupied wit,h their own inisfortunes to have any 
dasire for further fighting. The night; thus passed 
ill silcnce, a~zl when the following morning dmvned 
Illo Ti~zssi:~i~s were ill full retreat towarcls Ihe Atre'k. 
r >  .I.hns eiitlecl this clisnstrous coinpaign of 1879 
;l.p~insl; 1;11c! Tolrkd Turliomans of the Akhal Oasis. 
All !.llr: Russian troops were soon afi;erwarcls sent 
I..,;~ctlr 1.0 t,l~c! C;':~ucssus, will1 the exception o' eight' 
bllttaliolls whicll were left to guard the line of 
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fortilied posts between Cliikisliliar and Duz Olu~n ;
ancl on January 8, 1880, General Tergoukasoll; 
who had been appoiiited to succeed Laznref, 
arrived in Tiflis to confer with the Grancl Dulre as 
to 'the arrangements wliich had to be inade for a 
fresh cainpaign against the brave clefeiiclers of 
Deiighil Tepk. 
Loillakin had thrown away his last chance, a i d  
he soon disappeared from off the Ceiltral Asiaii 
stage amid the execrations of his countrynien, ancl 
with no one to defend tlie feeble tactics ancl merci- 
less concluct which were clisplayecl by liiiii 011 this 
nieinorable 9th of September, and which were the 
chief causes of the terrible disaster which then 
occurred. Alikhanofl', who was present during the 
action, has said that ' the ~.vhole course of the battle 
of the 9th of September, fioni beginiiing to encl, was 
in defiance of the coinmonest elelneiltary rules of 
the art of war,' ancl such uncloubteclly was the case ; 
axid, in addition to this, the whole course of the 
action was ~na~rked by such pitiless severity, ancl 
by such a wanton aiicl unnecessary destruction of 
human life, that Loinalii~l's cliscomfiture call oidy 
be collsiderecl to be a just retribution for the cruell;y 
which ninrlrecl the clay's proceeclings. 
Such is the story of t h e  iiiiserable failure 11o- 
fore tlie Tekk6 settlement of Denghil Tep6. The 
whole expedition had been lliisrrlanagecl from l ~ e -  
ginning to end : the troops llncl beer1 collectccl 
at the base before they were recluirecl, t l~e  trans- 
port arrangcinents llacl bee1.1 hulty, :mil ~11011 i l
siviall detxchrx~eiit was eventually brougllt face to 
1 face with the enemy, the Russian solcliers were I!, sncrificecl tlirough the feeble tactics ancl incom- petence of their lcncler. The 'glorious victory ' 
I 
I xrllicll had heen expectccl was ilot won, but in it,s steacl a cr~slliilg clefeat llnd beell sustainecl ; the eilorlrlous clcstruction of huinbil life and the 
I wailtoil inassacre of iiiiloceilt women nilcl cllil- (Ire11 llnd unexpccteclly f:iileil to czdv,ance Russian 
interests; arid tlic close ol l,l~e year 1870 foui~il 
i,lle Telrlr6 Tnr1coni:~lls of Alrllal still inclel)cni[ci\t 
of Muscovite coiltrol. 
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WHEN the treaty of peace between Great Britain 
ancl Afghanistan was signecl by Yakoob Khan at 
Gandainal~ 011 May 26, 1879, it  was generally 
believed, both in Xngland and Russia, that British 
supremacy had been definitely re-established in 
Afghanistan, and that there was no immediate 
prospect of any fresh collision between the English 
and Afghan armies. I t .  is true that no one ex- 
pected that the new order of things would be 
accepted by the whole of the turbulent inhabitants 
of Afgl~anistail without some clisplay of hostility 
towards the Amir, for it was well known that 
there were several factions which were opposed to 
the new ruler of the kingdom of Kabul. Such a 
co~idition was, however, unavoidable, and the pro- 
bability of civil war would bave been equally greal; 
if any other claimant to the throne had been chosell 
instead of S11ere Ali's third son ; for no chief ever 
{rained possession of tlie Afghan throne until he b 
first cruslied his rivals ancl. t11u.s demonstrated llis 
aljiliLy to upliold liis position by force of arms. 
13ui; al~hougli the onlbreak of intertribal Tvar- 
fare ancl. faction fights was believed to be by no 
i1leai.s improbable, i t  was nevertheless generalljr 
, 
consicl.erer1 that, among all the possible claiinants 
to the throne, Yalcoob I(1ian was the one who m~oulcl. 
prove llzost capable of mnintaining his l~osition al~cl. 
authority ; ancl. tllere were reasonable grounds fo'or 
tlie belief that he would wisely abstain from furtller 
cluestionable correspondeizce anci iiltrigues with 
the Russian authorities in Central Asia. 
I11 Russia, dso, the settlement was believed to 
be so advantageous for the English, and therefore 
so unsatisfactory from a Russian point of view, 
that tlle Muscovite press was flooded mitll articles 
on the triuillph of English policy in Central Asia, 
i11 wllich tlie writers were unable to disguise their 
lnortification at the cliange wliicll 11d tklcen place 
i11 the political situation. They displayed con- 
sic1er:thle alarm at the resullts which had been 
brought about by the sigr1al;ure of the Treaty of 
Ganclamak, aiiil soine even went so fnr as to sug- 
gest tlie possible extension of British i~ifluerice . 
tlrrouglioul; E~~s tc rn  Turkestaii rind as far north as 
the 'l!lliaii-Sllan Mo~ull;ains. 
13ut ~vliile the Ellglis21 were concrratulating-~g P ' 
tlici~~sc.lves 011 the suc:c:osd~~l co~iclusion oi' an 
alinc~sl; blooilless campaign, nnil wliile llie JX~ussinns 
were discussing the best means of counteracting 
the advantages which had been obtained by 
Englancl, intelligence was received from India of a 
terrible event, mhicli caused a profound sellsation 
tl~rougl~out the civilised world ailcl recalled to 
memory the dark days of 1841, ~ v l ~ e n  Buriles 
and Macnaghten were treaclierously murdered a t  
Kabul, and when Elphinstone's brigade was aani- 
hilated in the wild passes of Eastern Afgl1ai1istai1. 
011 Septenlher 3-i.e. six clays before Lomakin's 
defeat at Dengliil Tepd-Sir Louis Cavagnari, the 
newly app oiatecl British Resident at Kabul, toge- 
ther with the oficers of his staff and the whole of 
his escort, had beell slain by the fanatical populace 
and solcliery of the Afghan capital. 
I t  is not necessary to enter illto details of this 
treaclierous deed, or to describe the sulssequenl; 
military operntioi~s which were carried on fAr the 
P U ~ I O S ~  of avenging Llie murcler of the British 
elivoy and his devoted companions, and for the 
re-establishment of British supreinacy tlirough- 
out Eastern an(! Nortl~ern Afghanistan. I t  is suf- 
ficient merely to state tllat by the 11th of the 
following lnoilth tlie Kuraili Valley field force, 
under Sir Frederick Roberts, had twice defeated 
the Afghails and liacl occupied Kabul ; Yalcoob 
KIlail was del~osed and serlt to India ; ailcl, after 
the British troops llad occupied the couiltry for 
several montl~s aiicl had sonie severe figl~tins, it, 
was filially decided that Kabul slloulcl be evacuated 
slid hailcled over to Abclu~ Rahman Khan, wllo 
would be recognisecl by the Iililiall Govcrnmellr; as 
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Amir of Afghanistan,' but that Kandahar tvould 
I 
I be placed uncler tlze independent rule of a Barakzsi 
princes2 
But five days after Mr. (now Sir Lepel) Griffili 
had p~lblicly announced ill a clurbar at S1lerpur 
tlzat the Indian Government recogllised Abdur 
Rahman Klzan as Amir of Kabul, Ayub I<han, 
with a large army from Eerat, defeated Burrow's 
brigade a t  Msiwancl ; I<anclalzar was shortly after- 
wards besieged by the Eerat troops; and Sir 
Donald Stewart, who was corninanding the British 
forces in Northern Afghanistaiz, received orclers to 
despatcl~ a strong division, under Sir Frederick 
Roberts, to relieve the garrison in the southern 
capital ancl also to scatter tlie forces of the dan- 
gerous Herat chieftain. While General Roberts 
Early in 1880 it was rumoured that ~ b h u r  Rahmau Khan, 
wl~o had for ,so many yews been a refugee m Russian territory, had 
left Samarkand, and it soon became known that he bad crossed the 
Oxus and was endeavouring to gain the support of the pe0pl13 of 
Afg11o.u-Turltestan. The British authorities at Kabul shortly ufter- 
war~ls entered into negotiations with him ; and, althougl~ he at first 
&splayed a very considerable amount of mistrust as to the inten- 
tions of the English, he eventually advanced slowly towards Kabul, 
and on July 22, 1880, it was formally cleclared, at s, grand d ~ ~ ~ b a l -  
at Sherpux., that the British Government ' publicly recognised Sirdar 
Abdur Rahman Khan, grandson of the illustrious Dost Muliommed 
Khan, as Amir of Kabul.' 
I n  April 1880 Shere Mi, the Afghan goverilor of Kdndahar, 
and cousin of the Amir of the same name, was informed, in n, lotter 
fioin the Viceroy of Indin, thaL he wns recognised by th6 British 
Government as the independent ruler of Kanduhar. He was told 
that a railway would be constructed to connect his capital with 
India, that a British Resident would be appointed to his court, and 
that a British force would be mainiained at Kandahar. He was 
styled the Wali,' and a monlll later be was invested with the 
insignilt of hie dignity. 
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was hastening soutl~wards Abclur Rahn~an Khan 
reached Kabul, and Sir Donald Stemrart, with the 
remainder of the Bengal troops, evacuatecl his 
positions and marched towards Inclia. 
Although Sir Frederick Roberts, by his brilliant t 
forced niarch to Kandahar and subsequent victory t I 
over Ayub's army, relieved the British garrison i 
under General Primrose a i d  removed all imne- I 
iliate danger froin tlie direction of Hernt, the F 
recent events causecl the Governnient to reconsider 
the question of the retentioil or abandoilmellt of \ 2; 
Kanclallar. In the previous April the Beacoilsfield 
Ministry had been defeated, ancl had beell suc- 
ceeclecl by  the Liberals, who viewed with serious 
misgivings the forward policy of their predecessors 
with regard to Afghanistan. I t  was cleclared that a 
prolonged occupation of Kandaliar would endanger 
the stability of British rule in India, on account 
of the increased expenditure wliich would be in- 
curred, and because it was believed that %uc l~  an 
occupation would lead to still further extensions I 
of the British frontiers in the clirection of Herat 
and towards the Hindu - Kush, with incessant 
military operations and constant conflicts with the 
inhabitants of the countiy. The press, both in 
England and India, was floodecl with articles on 
the subject. Everyone who had any knowledge 
of Central Asian affairs, ancl many xho had none, 
joined in the controversy ; ancl while some 
adduced reasons to show why the retention of 1 
Kandallar mas of vital importance for the safety 
of Inclia, others endeavoured to explain hotv the 
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Indian Empire would assuredly fall .to pieces un- 
less the Government decided to scuttle from the 
country and revert to tlie old line of the Indus. 
I t  was not long before the Glaclstonian Ministry 
announced its deternlination to witlldraw Prom 
every portion of Afghanistan, and t l~is  declaration 
was soon followed by corresponding action. The 
Khyber was handed over to the marauding Afridis ; 
the Kurum was placed in charge of the Turi clan ; 
and soon afterwards Kanda l~a~  also was evacuated 
and cominitted to the care of Abdw Rahlnail 
Khan, the new Amir of Kabul. Strategical aclvan- 
tages were abandoiled for political considerations. 
The idea of a Russian invasion of India was said 
to be a question which oiily coilceriied future 
generations, as it was stated that ' the probability 
of our having to slruggle for Herat or to clefella 
India from Kaildahar is so remote that its possi- 
bility is hardly worth considering ;' ancl, in accord- 
ance with these optimistic ideas, orders were issued 
for the discoiitinuarlce of further work on tlie 
proposed railway towards Kanclahar, 
Such was the state of affairs in the early spring I 
of 1881 ; ancl while the British Governmeat were 
thus flinging away the fruits of the Afghan War, 
which hacl cost tlle country soille 18,000,0001. and 
hundl*ecls of valuable lives, nem7s was received that 
General SkobelefY hacl captured the Tekk4 strong- 
hold at Dengllil TepO, and had coinpletely broken 
the power of the TL~-lcomms of the Akhal Oasis. 
-1 
When the Russiall govern men^ received intel- 
ligence of Lomakin's defeat at Dengllil TepQ iu 
L 2 
September 1879, they at once began to prepare for 
a fresh campaign against the Telrkds. For the 
next few months Tergoulrassoff was busily engaged 
in withdrawing the sickly ancl. demoralised troops 
who had taken part in the expeditioli, and i11 
making arrangements for the safety of the Russiail 
posts between Chilcishliar ancl. Duz Olum. In tlie 
following Marcli General Slrobeleff was appointecl 
to the command of the field army in the Trans- 
Caspian region, and on May 7, 1880, he left Tiflis 
ancl. proceeded to the eastern sllores of the Caspian. 
Profiting by the experience gained in the pre- 
vious TekkP, campaigns, Skobelef determined to 
advance cautiously and systematically, and to 
make no decisive attack until he had prepared an 
advanced base at the western extremity of the 
Akllal Oasis, and hacl there collectecl. such troops 
and stores as might be considerecl. necessary for a 
prolonged cainpaigii. In accorclance wit11 this 
idea he, shortly after his arrival in the Trans- 
Caspian Province, proceeded up the Atrek, and, 
pushing forward with a detaclinlel~t from the ad- 
vanced post of Duz Olum, on June 9 ot:cupiecl 
Klioja Kala, and after a furt;lzer march of two days 
reached the TekkP, forts of nami and Beurma, 
which were hastily abandoned by the inllabitnnts 
on his approach. He then co~nme~~ced the csec- 
tion of a fortified store clepbt at Bami, ailcl on 
June 28 made a reconilaissniice ia the clirectioii of 
Artchnian, which was evacuated by the clic:my 
afber a sligli t skirmisli. 
111 the meanwllile tho Russia~ls cxpc~;icncetl 
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great difficulties on account of the scarcity of 
camels and other means of transport. To over- 
come this, General Petrusevitch, who had suc- 
ceeded Loinakin in the civil administration of the 
Trans-Caspian district, devised a service of traction 
engines and wagons for the carriage of stores from 
the Caspian to the advanced store depbts. Tliis 
scheme eventually expanded into a more ambi- 
tious project for the construction of a tramway 
between Chil~ishliar and the AMlal Oasis ; and 
finally, when Skobeleff decided to make Krasao- 
vodsk his base of operations, General Annenkoff, 
tlie Controller of Military Transport, suggested 
that a regular line of railway sl~ould be con- 
structed froin Michaelovsk to Yizil-Arvat. This 
proposal was approved of by the Russian Govern- 
ment, and as one hundred miles of railway plant 
were lyiag idle at Bender it was decided that this 
mathiel should be utilised for the purpose. In 
this way the Trans-Caspian Railway was begun, 
and althougl~ it was originally intended as a tem- 
poray line for use during the war, and was looked 
upon as a very doubtful experiment, it  has 'since 
developed into an excellent broad-gauge railway 
connecting Central Asia with Buropean Russia, by 
nleans of which the military resources of the Cau- 
casus can be speedily transferred to the borders of 
the Herat province of Afghanistan, and which thus 
materially increases the aggressive power of Russia 
in Central Asia. 
But allhough some *forty miles of line were 
laid by the middle of November, Sliobeleff 11ad to 
depend on camels and carts for transport purposes, 
and it was not until December tllat he was ready 
for the final advance against the TekkB stronghold 
at Denghil TepB. He, however, made another re- 
collllaissance from Bami in July, with three com- 
panies of infantry, tluee sotnias of cavalry, four 
field guns, two howitzers and n rocket-battery, and 
after some skirmishes with the enemy's cavalry at 
Artchinan, Durun, and Ak Kala, he on the 17th 
occupied Egl~ian Batyr, and on the following day 
macle a close exmination of tlle TekkB position. 
According to the ' Iilvalide R~zsse,'  the Rnssian 
force was inet by considerable numbers of the 
enemy's cavalry, and fought its way to within one 
thousand yards of the outworks of the fortified 
auls ; " uilcler their cover a reconnaissance of the 
fortifications was effectecl, as also a survey of the 
locality ; on the conclusion of which-at 1 P.M. 
-the Russiatl force retired. Notwithstanding 
tlze repeated attacks of the enemy's infantry 
and cavalry, d u ~ i n g  whicl~ hand-to-hand fights 
occurred, the sanie evening the columli reached 
Eghian Batyr Kala without sustaining any loss ; 
and having at claybreak on July 19 repellecl a 
fresh attack of the TekBBs, the force returned to 
Bami after destroying a considerable aiiloulit of 
crops and quantities of stores at the " auls " on 
the line of march. 
'During the nine days the casualties on the 
Russian side were three soldiers killed and eight 
wounded; they also lost eight horses killed and 
thirteen wouncled. Sncll illcoiisiclerable loss is 
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explained by the long raiige and iilaccuracy of the 
firing. The injury done to the elle~ny by tile 
clestructioi~ of the crops, &c., in the vicinity of 
Gok Teph, where about 10,000 Telrkds are concen- 
trated, x h o  have been joined by 700 Merv Telrkds, 
General Skobeleir reports, is felt in the difficul1;y 
the Teklrds expe~ience in obtaining supplies and 
in the outbreali, of c:zttle plagne. Moreover, in t l ~ e  
engagements of July 18 arid 19 several TelrlrB and 
Merv chiefs were l<illecl.' 
Bllt while Slrobelefl was gradually pusl~ing 
forward trooj~s ailil supplies Lo tlie advanced base 
at  Bmi ,  the Turkonians did not remaill idle, and 
rnade frecluent; attacks on tlie Russian patrols and 
convoys. Tllus on July 3 a band of some 300 
Teklti!s attaclred a small party of twelve Cossaclrs, 
and, after killing or wounding eight of the number, 
retired as soon as liussiall reinforcemellts arrived 
in tlie slinpe of a conlpany of infantry. During 
August repeated attacks were made against the 
Bussian lines of commu~iicatioii between Duz Oluln 
and Bnmi, ancl also on a Eussiall post near the 
Aiilin Wells. Siiriilar raids occurred during tlie 
montlls of September, October, and November ; 
z~nil eve11 on Decernl~er 23, when SkobeleiT was 
preparing for his decisive attaclr against the 
'I'ur1rom:ul strongholtl at Denghil Tepc!, a force of 
some 1,000 !I'ckl;i,r; suddmlly attackeil a Iiussian 
train of 2,000 cnlncls wliicll was being convoyed 
by lialf a c:alnp:Lny o l  tlic! A~isl.ieron liegii~ient. 
r l  l ic snsprisc W:LS ~oir~~)let(!, nuil tlie Tclikds snc- 
ceederl in driving ulr thc cnlllels ; b u t  llslf a s o t ~ ~ i a  
- 
of Cossaclcs quickly pushed forward froill the neigh- 
bouring post at Kazanjilc, and, after a hot pursuit 
for ten miles, eventually overtook and defeated 
the nomads, and recaptured the valuable transport 
aaimals. In this affair, hom~ever, the Iiussians lost 
twenty-five nlen killed and eleven wounded. 
By the commencement of December, 1880, the 
necessary stores had been accunlulated aL Bami, 
and troops were then moved forward to that poi~lt 
in order that the fiilal blow might be struck. On 
December 9 Colonel Navrotsky, advailcing along 
the u$-per course of the Sninbar river, captured 
the Telrlc8 fort of Kariz Kala ; and a few clays 
later Artchman, Durun, and Eghian Batyr I h l a  
had all beell occupied by Russian detachments, 
and were speedily converted into advancecl pro- 
vision dep6ts. The last-named fort, which was 
afterwards called Samur, was selected as tlie base 
and point cl'cypa~i for the further decisive movc- 
ment against the fortiliecl Tekkd villages of Yanglii- 
Icala, Denghil Tepd, and Gijlr Tepk, and for this 
purpose it was considerably strengthened by the 
addition of new defensive worlcs. I t  was situ- 
ated close to the foot of the northern slopes of the 
Kopet Dagh range, and was 13+ versts, or 9 miles, 
distant from the great Tekkk fortress. 
On arrival at this point Slcobelell* receivecl 
illformatioil that the Alchal Telrlrks had gained 
considerable reinhl.cements from Merv, ancl. that 
40,000 warriors were asscinbled behincl the fortifi- 
cations at Deaghil Tepb,  here t,liey hacl resolvecl 
to make an obstinate resistance. 111 order to test 
I 
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tlie accuracy of this report, and for tlie purpose of 
completii~,n tlie information which had been gained 
in the reconnaissance of the previous July, Slcobeleff 
moved out of Sainur at claybrenlc on December 16, 
wit11 rz force of 1,600 me11 and 1 G  guns, a11d, rnarcll- 
ing by the road which runs parallel to the 1110~11- 
tains, occupied Ihe high ground on the lelt banlc 
of the Selcyz-Yab stream wliicll flows past the 
Teklcc'! position. 
Pronl this point great masses of the eilemy 
vere ol~served to be nlaniling llie ra1npal.t~ of the 
main positioll at Denghil Tepc', in evideill expects- 
tioil of an attnclc, while large lluinbers moved 
sout1iw:~rds to Ynliglii Iinla, and begail i;o close 
rouncl the fl:~nlts and rear of the Russian detach- 
, 
t ment. Sliol~eleiI', however, illovecl slowly north- 
wards past the wester11 front of Denghil TepB; 
mlcl after he h:ld carefully examined the defences 
and liatl bonil~arded tlieivl for s short time, lie 
1 nave orilers for the force to fall back towarcls 
j h Sarnur. As so011 ns the Russians began to retire 
f t,hc Tek1ii.s rcdoublecl tlieir f ie ,  arid, issuing i11 
I dense lnnsses from tlieir intrenchments, comnlenced 
,z series of onslauglits against the flanks and rear 
of tlie column, which were coiiti~lued until darkness 
put an end to tlie conilicl. 
I 011 1)or:mnl)ol. 23 alltl again on tho following diiy f~~r t l l c r  sc~c:o~ln:~iss:~ncles were mnile, and on both 
1 occasitras i 11e T(tlik4~ violerll,ly :~tt:~c:lrecl lhe liassian 
dcl.:iclu~zcnts. The Gglitirig on tlicse clays, however, 
W:LS l r ~ s  (;vclre tllari it 11x1 hecliz on tlle lOth, and 
i 
r 
8kohclcff gnin~il  infonuntion 1~11irll enal~lecl hill1 to 
F 
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make final dispositions for a decisive attack on the 
Turkoman stronghold. 
I n  the meanwhile fresh troops were daily 
arriving at Samur, and by the evening of De- 
cember 31 the total force at that place consisted 
of 35 companies of infantry and 7 sotnias of 
cavalry, giving a total of 4,020 bayonets and 
750 sabres, with 61 guns and 2 rocket-troughs. 
Among these reinforcements there was a small 
contingent of Turkestan troops which had made 
a remarkable lnarcll across the Kara Kum sands 
from Jflliva. This detachment, which consisted of 
three conlpanies of infantry and two sotnias of 
cavalry, with a division of mountain guns and a 
rocket section, was under tlie commalid of 
Colonel Kuropatkin, who had served under Sko- 
beleff in the Kllivan and Khokandian campaigns 
and had acted as his chief of the staff during the 
campaign in European Turkey. After an arduous 
march from Tashkent to Khiva this detachment 
had to cross the Kara Kum Desert by an calmest 
unknown route ; but, in spite of the great difi- 
culties of the undertaking, i t  accomplislzed the 
journey in a remarkably short space of time, and 
arrived at  Bami on December 20 'clean and 
trim and fresh as a claisy,' ' having traversed a 
distance of 400 versts (or 267 miles) in eighteen 
days, over a sandy desert, starting from the lower 
course of the Amu Daria, and proceeding by way 
of, Ortakuya, Igdi, and Kizil-Arvat, during which 
march only two Inen fell ill.' This splendid body 
of me11 reached Salliur on December 27, and froin 
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that luolncnt Liusc~l3nLkiri became one of the ledillg 
spirits ill tlie 01)crntions npixist the Teklcd fortress. 
F ro~n  llie various reconnaissmces which had 
bectl 111:itlc, it W:LS fonnd that tlie Telrkds were 
occupyiilg n posilioll of considerable extent, vllich 
lind 1,ueil grenlly strcngtlicned by tlle construction 
or r~idc f'orl,ificb:~Lions at various points. On the 
north of lllc liilc! tllere was a huge fortified enclo- 
sure rountl t11t2 hill of De~igllil Tepd .wllicl~ consti- 
tutccl tliu key of' tlic: wholr? position. This enclo- 
sare xT:.:ls :L iililc lollg Sroin irorth to so~it l~,  and had 
n grcnt,c:st wid111 c)S sol~ie 1,100 yards. It  was 
surround(:il 1) J' i1~:tssivc clay minparts, in which 
tlic!re were iluniarons eiitrnrlces 011 the northern 
sl~cl easlnrl~ f:lc:r!s, : ~ l ~ r l  OIL the outside of this wall 
i,llcrc ~ v i i s  :L ~11:~110\~ dry (lilch about five feet cleep 
allil sislcc!li Soc!t, witlt?. At various points to the 
~vcs l ,  nrlcl cast of this fortress there were several 
snr:~11 f i r t ~ ,  :.:lriil : ~ t  :tl)out 2,500 yarcls to the south 
tllcrc \\r;~s tlici I<islilali uf Yanghi Kala, which was 
also stror~pljr fol.tiGvt1, and was siinilarly supported 
ljy snlall outlyil~g '1r:d:ts ' of varying strength. 
11s it m:\s c.viiloi~t; 11i:lt ihe fortress of Denghil 
T(q~t\ tro~l'l(l n o l  I,(: 1:ikcn willlout a regular siem 
" '  Sk111,rllr~Jl' il(!rbiilvtl to lirst cnplilre Yalighi Kala, in 
crrtlcr t11a1, iuigli[ o1)taiil 1)oss~ssioll of' lhe water- 
s1qrl11y : t r ~ r l  t llr.c~:~l oil tllc! c~lcliry's line of retreat 
l owartls iZsk;\I );~tl. 1)uring the reconi~aissmces 
w\.l~ic~li w\.circ rlz:ttl~ ill I lo('t!lk~b(!r il was see11 that the 
'I'cilckt'~ 11:~d :1 t ~ l ) : ~ ~ t ~ n  113' 110 illtention of offering 
:I, sl.1111l~r~rri ros st,:ulc:c: on the sidc of Yallghi Kala, 
1)u t  irl(cllirlt!il f ( 3  c30ilc:tlnlrnle llleir cilcrgics on 111e ' 
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defence of the large enclosure at Denghil TepB, 
and Skobeleff therefore determined to carry the 
works a t  the southern end of the position by storm. 
The assault was successfully delivered on January 1, 
1881; and by sunset the troops were securely 
established in an intrenched camp which was con- 
structed at a distance of about 2,000 yards from 
the southern wall of Denghil TepB. 
On the following day Major-General Petruse- 
vitch and the commanding engineer made a re- 
collnaissance of the eastern and northern fronts of 
the fortress, and as it was then decided that the 
south-eastern angle of the enclosure could be most 
easily attacked, Golollel Ku~opatlcin, 011 January 3, 
seized a couple of outlying Kalas on the south- 
eastern front so as to secure the riglit flank of the 
approaches, and he also drove the enemy out of 
the gardens and fortified enclosures farther to the 
north. The first parallel was commenced at dawn 
on January 4, at a distance of 700 yards from the 
walls of the fortress ; and in order to divert the 
attention of the enemy from the working parties 
a demonstration was again made against the gardens 
on the north-eastern side, which had been re-occu- 
pied by the Tekkks. There a desperate encounter 
took place, and although the Russians gained a 
footing in the ontskirts of the gardens they were 
unable to expel the defenders from their main 
position, and, being in turn attacked by masses of 
Tekkes who sallied forth from Deilghil TepB, they 
* These were afterward8 named the 'Right.flenk Kela' and 
Grand Duke Kale.' 
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were at last compelled to fall back, after they had lost 
three officers and nineteen men killed, and one oficer 
and forty-nine men wounded. Among the killed was 
Major-General Petrusevitcll, who commanded the 
attack, and by his death Skobeleff was deprivecl of 
the services of an extremely energetic~assistnl~t, ancl 
Russia lost oilc of her bravest and most distia- 
guishecl officers in Central Asia. When the Russian 
columil had reached the fortification which formed 
the key of the Tekkds' outlyiilg position, Petruse- 
vitch dismounted, and, placing hinlself at  the 11ea.d 
of the leading troops, rushed into the gateway of the \ fort. The entrance was speedily carried ; but as 
the assailants were forcing their way into the courl- 
yard beyoncl they were received by a. heavy 
volley from the Telckds, who were hidden beI~ind 
a cleverly constructecl ambuscade. Petrusevitch 
fell mortally wouncled, and with hill1 another 
oficer, and several privates were either Irillecl or 
wouncled. In  the evening a funeral service was 
performed over the bodies of the officers and inen 
who hac2 fallen in the fight, a~zd at the moment 
when the words in the Russian burial service 
' eternal remembrance to the dead' were repeated 
the whole of the artillery fired a volley into the 
fortress,. from whence ' cries and groans imme- 
diately issusd, showing tliat the iron tears had 
not been shed in vain.' 
Whilst this denlollstration was taking place on 
the right flank, 1,260 men were busily employed 
in tlze corlstructioll of the first pardlel ; and 
berow dawn 011 the following day this had been 
completed, approaches lisd been made to it, aild 
three redoubts and a couple of siege batteries 
had d so  been finishecl. and armed. 
From this time the approaches were steadily 
pushed forward, and, in spite or the constant 
sorties of tlie garrison, the reniaiiiing outlying 
forts on the south-east front were capturecl; ancl 
by the eveni~~g of January 22 the sappers had 
reached the ditch of the fortress, and a mine gal- 
lery had been driven uiicler the ramparts at  the 
soutli-eastern corner of tlie defences. 011 the fol- 
lowing day 2,600 pounds of gunpowder were laid 
a t  the head of the mine, alicl during the next niglit 
the tainpiilg was commenced, ancl. orders were 
issued for the grand assault of the fortress, whicl.1 
was to take place on the illorili~lg of the 24th. 
The orders for the attack were briefly as 
follows :- 
(I.) At 7 A.M. a column, under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Haidaroff, consisting of four and a quarter 
companies, two volunteer detachments, and one and 
a half sotnias, with five guns and five rocket-stands, 
was to move out of the cainp and attack the ' Mill 
Kala' aud other outworks on the wester11 side of 
Denghil Tepd ; and when these had been captured 
it was to operate against the interior of the fortress 
with a heavy rifle and artillery fire, so, as to divert 
the attention of the garrison from the main attack- 
ing columns under Kuropatkin and KozelkoK. 
(II.) Wliile this detachment was thus engaged 
tlie whole of the artillery was to open fire on the 
fortress, and to iliailitail~ the bon~bardment until 
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the signal for the assault was given by the explo- 
pion of t l ~ e  great mine. 
(111.) Colonel IKuropatlcin was placed in com- 
maid  of orie of the storming columns (consisting 
of eleven and a half companies, ancl one del;achment; 
of volnnteers, with six guns ancl two rocket-stands), 
' ancl his orders were to cal~ture the breach made by 
the explosion of the mine, to erect a juncbion wit11 
I<ozellcon"s p u t y  , and to inl;rench lliinself within 
the south-easten angle of the fortress. 
(IV.) Anotliel* stormiilg party, consisting. of 
eight and a quarter compaiiies, and two detach- 
ments of volunteers, with three guns ailcl two rocket- 
stniicls, under Colonel ICozelkofT, was at tlie same 
time to capture the breach \vl~icli had been made 
by the artillery four clays previously at the extreme 
southern angle of tlie fortress, and after i t  hacl 
forrned a junction wit11 Kuropatlcin's force it  was 
to intrench itself in general co-operation vi th that 
column. 
(V.) The reserve, uilder tlie personal command 
of General SkobeleK consisting of twenty-one corn- 
l~anies with twenty-four guns, mas to assemble at 
the r c c l o ~ ~ l ~ t  on tlle left of tlle first parallel for 
elnployme~lt as might be found iiecessary ; a11d the 
remainder of tlie force (i.e. four corn.l3nnies, nntl 
two auil a half sotni:~~, wit11 forty-one gu~is) was lielcl. 
in re:~dincss f01* tlie dcI'(+nce oE the camp and lines. 
In  accortlauce a i th  these orders H:~iilaroK's 
column moved out of tllc canip &at 7 A.M. on J a n u a ~ y  
24, :lncl wil;lii11 : L I ~  1101:~~: and n half tlie Mill Kala 
:~(ljoi~ling out,~)osI;s 1 11een c:~pl;zzrecl ancl 
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placedin a state of defence. The guns and roclcets 
attached to  this party then bombarded the southern 
corner of the fortress, and at the same time twenty- 
seven guns opened fire on the breach at the south- 
ern extremity of the enclosure, so as to complete 
i t  and make it practicable for the storming party. I 
Notwithstanding this terrible fire the Tekkbs made 
heroic attempts to repair the breach, and con- 
tinued tlleir endeavours up till the moment of tlle 
assault, in spite of the hail of shrapnel and coininoil 
shell which was poured ince~sailt~ly upon the spot. 
The slaughter at this point was fearful, and 
this appalling scene of destruction and death was 
coiltinued until twenty minutes past eleven, when 
! a trelnendous roar was heard above the, din of the 
: 
J cannon and rattle of musketry, and, mhile the 
earth was shalren by a violent concilssion, a dense 
colunin of inud and smoke rose high above the 
ramparts on tlie eastern side of the doolnecl 
fortress. The mine hacl beell sprung, and a I 
i practicable breach had been formed nearly fifty 
yards wide. 
Almost before the smoke from the explosion 
had cleared away Kurop,ztkin's column issued 
from its cover and advanced impetuously towards 
the breach ; but before they had traversed half the 
intervening space they were received by a inlur- 
clerous fire from the Tekkks, who, in spite of the 
force ancl unexpectedness of the explosion, had 
rushed without any hesitation into the gap which 
had been formed in the ramparts. For a few 
~nornents the Russian column hesitated, and 
appeared to stagger under the storin of lead which 
tore through its ranks ; but on fresh troops being 
sent to its support the advance was cluiclily re- 
newed, and, alter a fierce hand-to-hand fight with 
bayonets, lances, and S W O ~ C ~ S ,  the breach was won, 
and the mlalls to its riglit a i d  leIL were occupied 
by the brave troops of tlle Shirwan Regiment and 
13  th Turkestan line battalion, who were gallantly 
assist,ecl ljy a detachment of dismounted Ural 
Cossaclrs and n party of volunteers uilcler Lieu- 
teilaiit Voropaliofl'. 
Wllile Iiuropatkin's coluinil was thus success- 
fully assailing tlle breach on the south-eastern face 
of the fortress, similar eilcoullters were ttllring 
place a t  otller points of the clefeiices. As sooil as 
t,he mine exploded Iiozclkoff's party issued from 
the trenclics aild aclvaizced at a run towards the 
breach on the south, mlhich tliey soon reached in 
spite of tlie hc:~vy fire ~vllich was kept up by the 
TeltkCs. On arriviilg at the foot, of it, however, 
their progrcssw:~~ checlied, ancl tliey lay down in 
the ditch and maintained an obstinate engagement 
with the defenders until reinforcements were sent 
forwsrcl from the reserve. When these fresh 
troops arrived the advance was once inore con- 
tfinueil, anrl mliile the main body forced an 
c?nlraricc at tlia bre:icli, otllcr 11:~r~ies on the flanks 
clsca1:lilcil tlic: walls l ~ y  nlcniis of scaling-ladders 
xnil soot1 joiucdl 11nnil~ wit11 Rurop:~tkin's column. 
1I:~iilaroff s t rool~s ; ~ t  1 lie saine i iiiic sc:~lctl tlie 
ramparts on tl~ct ~~osi,c!rri £ ~ c L ! ;  i~ i i i l  1)y 12.30 I).~I. 
l llc I ~ I L S S ~ : L ~ ~ S  ll:ti[ f o r ~ ~ ( 1  :LIZ ('I ltvy i~lf o i he lor1 rcss 
VC)J,. 11. I\\ 
at  three points, a i d  tlle Illtimate success of the 
operations vas  fully assured. 
I n  accordance with the orders which had been 
issned the troops at once began to intrench them- 
selves a t  the points wliich liad been captured ; but 
as Sbobeleff saw the undonbtecl success which had 
been gained by all tlle columns, he at once decided 
to follow up tlie attack by a general advance on 
t . 1 ~  Dengllil Tepe hill, which was the tactical key 
of the fortress. By this time the TeliliBs hncl 
begun to give n7ay at all points, and, seeing the 
hopelessness of further resistance, a tlisorderecl ri' 
crowd of men, women, and children began to 1 
stream towards the llortheril walls of tlie fortress, ! 
! a i d  thence contilluecl their flight into the desert. 
t The fighting was over, a i d  ~ 1 1 a t  followed was 
ilothiiig less than a merciless massacre of an un- 
I resisting mob. The infantry contiilued the pursuit 
k 
I for seven miles, and the cavalry carried it  on for 
another four miles ; and when clarliness put an end 
to the sla~lghter it was founcl that 8,000 TekBQs 
of both sexes had been slain during the pursuit, 
while 6,500 corpses were also foulld within the 
enclosure. Slcobeleff himself estimated the total 
loss of the Turkoinans during the siege at 20,000 
-or, in  other vords, half the defendcrs of Denghil 
TepQ perislied. 
Thus encled this great campaign against the 
TelskB Turkolnans of Alihal. The brilliant Skobe- 
leff had comp1et;ely avengecl tlie previous clisasters 
which had beell brought abont through the in- 
competence of his predecessors ; and after a long 
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, series of cllecks ancl defeats the might of the 
troops of the Great White Czar llad been at last 
clearly established before the mrilcl races of Cent~al 
Asia. 
As soon as Dengbil Tep6 had fallen, Slrobeleff 
pushecl rapidly eastwards in pursuit of the two 
Telr;k6 leaclers-Tekmi! Sirdar and Malrlldum 
Kuli Khan-who had escapecl, and were flying 
towards Merv; and Askabacl, the capital of the 
Akhal country, and Annau, a Tekbh fort sake 
few miles farther east, were speedily occupied by 
Russian cletachmeats. Any further advance ill 
the direction of Merv, however, mas at that time 
impossible on acco~ult of the heavy losses wl~ich 
had beell sustained by the Russians during the 
~ampaign ,~  and it was oilly for this reasou tllat 
' Telnn6 Sirrlar surrendered to Skobeleff a t  A6knba~l on tlie 
9th of the following April, and, having tel~(lered his sulbmission, he 
was sent to St. Petersbr~~g with his soil and t h e e  otlior Telrlri'! 
chieftains, in order that they might obtain an insight into tlie ro- 
sources of the Einpire of the Great Wllitc Czar. The deputation 
reached St. Petersbnrg on May 27, and nine days later the chiefs 
were presented to the Emperor at  Gatchina, when they were 
cordially received. Dwing the interview the Czar with his ow11 
hands gave to Telcmk Sirdar the silver epanlettes of a major of 
militia, and informed the chieftain of his elevation to that rank 
in the Russian service; ant1 he slrortly afterwards received nil 
appointment in the Civil Administration of tho newly-ecquired 
territory. Malclicl~im lIuli Kllall, however, held aloof and rejected 
111&11y offers which'were made to hiin by the Itussian secret agents ; 
and it wns not ~ u ~ t i l  A ilcl~nnoff visitod the Merv Onsis i l l  the 
spring of 1882 that this chief eventually decided to throw in his 
lot with Russia. 
During the ol~erations holn January 1 to 24 the Ilusfii~ns 
lost 1 G  officers a i d  267 men Icilled, and 55 oficeus and 770 nicil 
wounded; or a total of 1,108 out of e force of nbout 5,000 
men. Thus, aftor gai~isoils had been l~rovided for Dongliil Tep;, 
a1 9 
Merv was not then attacked and annexed to the 
Czar's dominions. 
Aekabad, ana other points dong the route, Skobeleff couild n o t  
have mustered more than 2,000 or 2,500 ~nel l  for active operations 
against Merv. His ammunition and provisions had, moreover, 
become nearly exheusted, end the transport nrrangelnents could 
not have borne the strain of such an extension of the cctmpaign. 
I t  will thns be seen that Merv escaped beiulg attaclred on account 
of the ailfitness of Skobeleff's nrmy for further fighting on a, lnrgo 
scale, and not because the Russian Government had any regard for 
Engliah susceptibilities. 
CHAPTER 
ANNEXATION OF MEIW 
English fears regarding Morv aild Russian assurances-The 
Trans-Caspian Territory '-RUEEO-Persian frontier line- 
Russian intrigues at Morv-Commsrcial treaty with the Turlro- 
mans of Merv-Russian ' traders ' and ' scientific explorers '- 
Tricks to hide aggressive intentions-lLessar's explorstions- 
The Atak Oasis-England's hour of trouble R ~ ~ s s i a ' s  oppor- 
tunity-Annexation of Merv. 
IN England, where the exhausted eonditioil of 
SlcobelefYs army was at the time unlmown, it was 
commoilly believed that an advance was about to 
be made on Merv immediately after the taking of 
Dengllil Tepd, and the general anxiety was there- 
fore solnewhat allayed when the Russian Govern- 
ment aililounced that they had no intention of 
undertalciiig any further military 01)erations in that 
direclion. On January 26 M. de Giers informed 
Lorcl Dufferin, the Britisli Am11,zssador at St. 
Petersburg, that as tlzc power of tlie Tekk6 Turko- 
mans hail been signally broken, ( the time had come 
for tlle Russian Government to show its modera- 
tion, and to take care not to allow itself to be 
entangled in ally filrther military operations in that 
quarter of tlie woulil;' and, ill order that there 
-- - 
lnigllt be no misconception, the Czar's entire 
approval of this declaration was shortly afterwards 
conveyed to the British Ambassador. Nor weye 
.Ihese the oiily assurances which were then given 
that Merv would not be occupied, for on March '7, 
after similar proiilises had been made to Lord 
Granville by the Russian Ainl~assaclor in London, 
M, de Giers once again told Lord Dufferin that h e  
11ad beell authorisecl. by the czar to declare that  
his Majesty had no intelltion of advancing towarcls 
Merv. ' Not oilly,' said M. cie Giers, ' do we not  
want to go there, but, happily, there is nothing 
which can require us to go there.' 
The word of tlie Russian Enlperor was thus  I 
pledged that Merv m~oulci not be occupied, ancl, i 
as Sliobeleff sliortly arterwxds returned to Russia, 
the Ellglish people believed that tlie Russians st 
last honestly inteilcied to abstain from further 
conquests. They forgot tliat similar pledges hacl 
been given on illany previous occasions, only t o  
be broken whenever it suited R,ussia to do so ; I' 
I 
and althougli a large slice of Khivan territory h a d  
been annexed to Russia eight short years before, 
i11 spite of an Emperor's solemn promise to t h e  
contrary, yet some people were still to be found 
in England who believed, or pretenclecl to believe, 
that Merv would not be occupied because the same 
Emperor gave a similar assurance that he had n o  
intention of advancing beyond the limits of t h e  
territory already occupied by Skobeleirs army. It 
was undoubtedly a pleasant and convenient theory, \ 
and eiialslecl politicians in Englancl of a certain 
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class to point to tlze moderation of the -reat P Russian Emperor, and to explain to admiring 
audiences that this happy condit;ioa of affairs mas 
due to the conciliatory policy of the Gladstone 
Cabinet in having ordered the evacuatioil of 
I<a.ndaha~, little dr eanzing, lzowever, that while 
-they were exl~ounding their comfortable doctriiles 
Slsobeleff mias 'sending agents illto the bazaars of 
Central Asia to spread tliroughont that region 
the report that it mas tlle WBit,e Czar who had 
compelled England to evacuate Bfgllanistan.' 
It vas merely a repetition of tlie old farce 
which had been playecl so often on the Central 
Asian stage ; and on May 24, 1881, a final touch 
was give11 to tlle comedy by the publication of an 
Imperial Ukase, in wl~icll it was annouilced that; 
the territory of the Tekkd Turkomans which was 
then occupied by Russian troops was annexed to 
the Czar's Empire, and that this new tract of 
country, together with the Trans-Caspian military 
clistrict, M~ZLS tl~enceforth to be known as the 
' Trails-Caspian Territory ' and forin s portion of 
the Caucasus admninist~ation. Thas, at the time 
when a series of fresh promises was being readily 
give11 by tlze Czar ,md his ministers with regard to 
Merv, previous engagements of a sinlilar charac- 
ter were being deliberately set aside by Imperial 
edict.' 
I t  must bo remembered, 8s mentioned in Chapter XV., that 
on April 5,1878, Prince Gortchdroff, in 9, letter to the Russirtn Am- 
bnfisaclor in London, uinieil : ' His Imporid Majesty has no intontion 
of extending tho frontiers of Ruesin, wch RR they exist nl; present 
in Centrsl Asia, either on the side of Uolrharo, or on the aide of 
Such is diplomacy as understood by Russia, 
and such it will remain until the patience of Eng- 
land is exhausted; and then-when a clisplay of 
force takes the place of blind belief in the pledges 
of Muscovite Czms and statesmen-a period will 
be put to Russia11 advances to~vards the British 
Empire in India. Until such a Lime arrives-as it 
I 
sooner or later must-there will be a conl;inual 
display of restlessness at one or more poiilts on tlie 
Russian frontier, some sore will always be kept 
open, ancl Russia will be ever ready to nzove for- 
ward ancl secure some fresh strategical posil;ion 
whenever the attention of the I3nglisli people is 
attracted to some other portion of their vast Empire. 
This fact must be clearly understood ; for Russian 
promises albrd no guarantee for the peace alld 
safety of the liiclian Empire, arid the time is near 
at hand when further aclvailces must be resisted 
by force unless the Eiiglish people i~lteild to maclly 
respond to the cry of 'Perish India,' and ilecicle- 
which they assuredly will never do-that peace 
with dishonour is preferable to a war in clelence 
of the great Empire which their forelathers have 
built up, and which i~ the pride and mainstay of 
Greater Britain. 
Ihasnovodslr and of tlio Alrolr.' h i 1  yot, aftor six yoars spont i ~ i  
incessant inilitrtry operation8 bnyond tlio froiitior, an orilor appo~~rod 
annexing a largo slico of torritory, nncl ndvancing tho frontior lino 
to a pnint 370 milcs e a ~ t  of Hra~novodsl~. 
Sir Goorgo 13irilwoocl, in l i i ~  ititroilnction to Tltc First Lcttcr 
Book of thc Enat Inrliiz C O ~ ~ L J I ~ ? ~ ,  1600 1010, ut~~tos  Lli~~t it was 
tlio Cornpnny'ti PORHORH~OII  of Iliilil~ ~vhic11 0111~1)lod I':llfil~~tiil, I L ~  tho 
comrnonoemon~ of tho prcsolit contmy, to : I I I G C L I U H ~ L I ~ ~ J J  ros i~ t  tlin 
mnchinntions of N~~poloon I., a11d hc docluros tlint tho continucd 

the year, and no definite inforination 011 tliis point 
could be obtained unt,il a convelllion had been 
signed a t  Teheran on December 21, 1881, in which 
the Russo-Persian frontier line was fixed as far 
eastwarcls as the fort of Baba-Durlnaz. ' 
But, althougll it was a matter of considerable 
satisfrtc~ion to the Eilglish that this portion of the 
frontier had been thus definitely laid clown, the 
general feeling of relief which had been caused by 
this settlemeilt of one section of the Busso-Persian 
boundary was sooil followed by a fresh revival of 
inistrust when it was realisecl that the lnost impor- 
tant portiou of the frontier line (viz. that in the 
clirection of Merv and Herat) liacl been omitted 
from the treaty. It, moreover, gradually became 
known that Russia intended to contest Persia's 
unquestioliable rights over the Atak, which is the 
strip of fertile territory to the north of the moun- 
tains stretching from the Russian froiltier at Baba- 
Durmaz to the neighbourhood of Sarahks ; and 
sinister rumours were also heard of Russian in- 
trigues at Merv and of movements of Muscovite 
agents iil the vicinity of Herat itself. 
This Convention contained nine articles, the first of which 
describecl the new $ontier line. The other articles provided for the 
appointment of comlnissioners to trace the boundary in detail, and 
settled other nlinor points regnrdillg the water-snpply from the 
streams which flow &om the mo~mtains into the Akhd country, kc. 
Article 111. contained a strange proof of the high-handed manner in 
which the Russians laid down the hontier line ; for in that article it 
was expre~sly stipulated that the Pwsians should evacuate the  forts of 
Germab and Killsilab within one year from the dale of the retifica- 
tion of the treaty, tt being thus tacitly acknowledged that those 
forts were within the former Persian frontier lino. 
Soon after the occupation of Aslrabad secret 
emissaries were sent to Merv for the purpose of 
creating a pro-Russian party amongst the more 
influential chieftains in the oasis. These agents 
encouraged the Telck@s to visit Askabad to traffic 
in the bazaar which the Rrrssians had opened at 
that place, and before many weeks had passed 
numbers of the inhabitants of the Merv Oasis were 
to b e  seen bartering in the sliops of Askabad with 
the Armenian merchants from the Caucasus, who 
had found their way to the Akhal couiltry in the 
hope of establishing a lucrative trade vith the 
countries beyolid the borders of the new Russian 
province. When the first arrivals found that 
they were well received and obtained high prices 
for their supplies, they were followed by many 
others, and in course of time the more influen- 
tial chiefs also followed suit, aiicl in this way 
the Trans-Caspian officials gradually gained tlie 
friendship and support of a by no means incon- 
siderable section of the population of the Merv 
Oasis. 
But while the Askabacl authorities were thus 
preparing the way for a Russian occupation of 
Merv, the T~rrkestan officials were also busily 
engaged in similar intrigues from the direction of 
Samarkanil and Kliiva. The Turkestan administra- 
tion had up till this time taken a leading part in 
Central Asian affairs, and as Kaufmann and his 
subordinates viewed tlie rapid growtli of a rival 
adniinistration in Trans-Caspia with a certain 
anlouilt of jealousy, tliey also adopted tlie same 
nieasures as were being so successfully einployerl 
by General Rohrberg.' 
The Tekkks of Merv at this time clicl not grasp 
the fact that the Turkestan and Trans-Caspiari 
administrations were oFs1ioot;s froin orie and Ole 
same Central Government, and, in their ignorance, 
niany of them saw i11 the overtures from Turkestail 
a l~ossible means of escape from the more clearly 
defined danger which threatened tl~em from the 
direction of Askabacl. Thus, while Russian agents 
from Akhal were engaged in their encleavours to 
create a pro-Russian party in Merv, a deputatioll 
of the elders of the 0l;amish tribe of TekkQ Turko- 
mans went to Fort Petro-Alexand~ovsk and there 
concluded a treaty with the Governor of the Amu 
Daria province, whereby they agreecl to place 
themselves under the protection of tbe Bussian 
Government as represented by the commandant 
of the Amu Daria, and promised to receive any 
agents who might from time to time be sent to 
them by that officer.2 
Gonoral Rohrborg succeeded Slroboloff in tlio acbinistmtion 
of Lhe Trans-Caspian militmy district in tllo spring of 1881. 
"urno~us concorning tho riogotiation of this Lroaty soon 
roschecl England, and whon Mr. Wynilhnni drow M. do Giors' 
attontion to tho mattor tho Rnssiau Boroigu Miniator iloniccl tthnt 
thoro ~ I L R  any trutli in  tho ~~epor t  that such a treaty wn.r bciilg 
nogotiatod with tlio Turlromans of Qlorv ; and Baron Jonlilli 11180 
statod that no formal nogotiations woro talting plnco for a trcaty 
with tho Turliomans of Morv. I n  tlio ~uinmor of tho following 
year (1882), homovor,tha Britieh Ambassnclor at 'I1oheran fforwnrilod 
a copy of tho troaty to Lord Granville, togotl~or wit11 oopios of a 
coilplo of lottor8 from Baron Aminoff, tlio cl~iof of tlio ~ t a f l  t ~ t  
Aslmabnil, in whicl~ that officor conjiratnlatcil tho ICli~~ile nnil rlrlcrs 
of Morv on tlloir h a ~ i n g  ' u,t l r ~ ~ t  u,\volcc to tlloir tr11o illtorosLsl 1)s 
1 The Turkestan authorities thus scored the first 
1 success in the game which was then being played 
as to which of the two rival Russian administra- 
tioils in Central Asia would obtain the honour of 
being able to lay the submission of the people of 
Merv at the feet of the Imperial master ; but it 
was not long before the Trans-Caspian officials in 
their turn aclopted measures which proveci far 
more effectual in gaining the desired object. When 
news reached Askabad of the conclusion of the 
convention between the Otamish tribe and the 
commandant of Fort Petro-Alexandrovsk, Colonel 
Rohrberg-the governor of the Trans-Caspian 
district-had left Aslrabad for St. Petersburg to 
confer with the authorities there on matters con- 
cerning the administratioil of the newly-acquirecl 
region ; and ill his absence Colonel Aminoff thought 
it advisable to make it clear to the elders of Merv 
that Turkestan and Askabad were portions of the 
same great Empire, and that therefore the fact that 
they llacl sougllt the protection of the commaildallt 
of the Ainu Daria arorded much satisfaction to the 
Governor of Trans-Caspia, as being a proof of their 
desire to solicit the friendship and protection of 
his master, the.Czar. 
Having thus hinted to the Tekkes that they 
were in a helpless condition between two out- 
stretched Russian arms which were graclually 
l~eing drawn towards each other, and which would 
envelop and crush everything that lap 
scelriug the protection of the Czar. The tl*utll of the origins1 reports 
Tvas t1111s clearly established in spite of the 13nssian deniale. 
between them, Baron Alnilloff then decided to send 
Russian officers in disguise to Merv in order that 
a survey of the Oasis might be secretly prepared, 
and in the hope that more of the inhabitants might 
be won over to the pro-Russian party. 
The method in which this idea was carried out 
was quite in keeping wit11 tlie time-honourecl 
traditions of Russian policy in Central Asia, and 
affords an excellent exalnple of the manner in 
which the Russian authorities employ so-callecl 
' traders' or ' scientific explorers,' as a cloalc to 
hide their aggressive designs against the milcl 
states of Central Asia. .VVllenever they find that 
they have (zrrivecl on the borders of a state or tribe 
whicli is unusually s ~ s p i c i ~ ~ u s  01. resentful of inter- 
ference, there coines a pause in their oizm~al.cl 
advance, and then a scientific mission or trading 
caravan starts off-of course purely in the interests 
of science, or for the cle~~eloplvent of peaceful and 
cominercial enterprise. The scientific missioll 
generally consists of some topographers and other 
oficers, accompanied by an escort of Cossacks, ~ 1 1 0  
make a reconnaissallce of the country; 1~11ile the 
trader is usually accompanied by surveyors sent 
for the same purpose. In  either case intrigues are 
carried on with the inhabitants, wllo are given a 
glowing account of the advantages of R~~ssian rule, 
and are iinpressed with the dangers of resisting 
the authority of the Great White Czar ; the country 
is quietly mapped, and its rcsources are carefully 
noted; and thus preparations are rnacle for its 
subsequent annexation. In some cases tllc leacling 
ii 
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I chiefs or rulers are persuacled to volnntarily tenrler 
their submission, and the cduntry is tllen qnietlg 
occupied ; bnt as ofteii as not an attack is ruaile 
on these parties, when the ultimate result is tlie 
same, for tllereby n plausible pretext is obtained 
for armed interference, such attack being held np 
as s convincing proof of tlie barbarity of tlie state 
or tribe in question, ailcl of the ilecessity for es- 
tending to it tlie blessings of civilisation. 
I This may appear to be an cxngger,zted descrip- tion of one of the irielhocls ~ ~ ~ h i c l i  the Russiails frequently ailol~t for the exteilsion of tlieir frontiers 
in Central Asin. Such, howevel; is not tile case, 
for fi-om the earliest days in wliich they liave ]lad 
any denlings with Asiatic races they have had 
resort to similar-auci even inore quesliousble- 
subterfi~ges for tlie purlme of ailvitncing tlieir 
interests at Llie expense of tlieir weaker ncigW~ours. 
I t  has already been seen how tlie merchant Klilu- 
doff combine(1 diplolllacy with trnclc, and was sent 
, 
I to Eastern TurBesta~~ at a time wliell Yskoob Beg, b y  his dignified independence, put n stop to 
Russiaii encroacliments in the direction of Iiasll- 
gar. Since tliat time this metlioil of spying out 
the strength of neighbouring states lias bee11 
frequently adopted; and it is only necessary to 
I, mention the names of Aliklianoff, Lessal-, and 
Naziroff to coinplete the proof of the accuracy of 
j the above description of one of the tricks of the Russians to llicle their aggressive designs under 
i the mask of civilisatioi1, science, ailcl commerce. Alikhanoff's recolinaissatlce of the Merr Oasis is 
ail excellent example of tlie way in wl~ic l~  Russian 
explorers i11 Central Asia frequently gain their 
object while inasquerading in tlie clisguise of 
traders.l But while he was obtailliilg illforillation 
regarding Merv, another party, uncler tlie young 
engineer named Lessar, was carefully exnniiniiig 
the couiltry between Askabad and Herat ' i11 the 
interests of science.' 
The Trans-Caspian Railway, wl~ich had been 
co~nrnencecl during Slrolnelefl"~ caillpnign against 
the Telrlrc!s, mas coillpleted as far as Icizil-Arvnt 
by the micldle of September 1881-nine nlolzths 
after the capture of Deilghil Tepi. ; and as General 
h~iienkoff, tlie original desigiler of tlie line, llad 
a, short time previously pul~lished a b ~ . o c h ~ ~ r e  in 
vhich he proposed that the line slioulil he con- 
tii~ued through Sarakhs anrl I-Ierat to join t,lle 
Indian railway system in the neig1ll)onrhood of' 
ICandahar, advantage was tnlren of tllc iclea to 
obtain a thorough survey of 111c country between 
Askabacl and Herat,. 
At the beginning of October 1881 Lessar, ac- 
companied 11y an escort of Cosxac!lrs, coinmcncecl 
the survey of the first sectioil of the proposed line 
from Icizil-Arvat to Askabad aiicl Sarnlrhs, and 
having thoroughly cxalnined the wholr, of t.11~ 
intervening conntl.y aiid fouild thn,t it was :dnlost, 
perfectly level anrl wcll nd:q)teil for ih(: co~lst,r~~r*- 
tion of n r:lieal? railway, he tllc~l rc!Lul.nod to 
Askd)acl in Uer'cinl~cl-, vi5 Mcsl~c~cl ;tilil M:~l~onlnlc)- 
F o r  a11 inlorofiting acco~mt of tllis rcconnai~snnro,  ~ r o  Y'ltr 
Rrlsainne nt J f c ~ ~ v  n7~rZ I I c ~ n l ,  1 1 ~  t h e  I t~ lo  Mr. C:IIILI*IL!H i l l i~r\ . i l~.  
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~l:li)atl, wd so011 nf1er1vnl.d~ ploc(vdt~(l 10 ]<LInllxJ 
to  011taiii the latest n l a l ~  of the count1.g tllrclupll 
urhicll liis subseq~ient ravels I\-ere to llln(lc. 
h l t h ~ u g l l  orily four lllo~illls el:il)secl l)etIv\.ccll 
llis first and secolld jollnleys, yet the st:~tc of :LGlirs 
011 the Russian border 1i:ttl gre:itly (+11:111p(l durillg 
the interval, for the TelrkPs and otl~c~r tri],c~d 
iillial~iting the Atdr  and districts l~!-onil S:~r:lk11~ 
h:ld becoine Illore accustolnetl to tl~cir lirw llcigIl- 
l ~ o u r s ,  and the country bet~rccn Ask:~bntl :~ntl 
Sal.alths liad become so pncifictl t1i:tt tr:LvclIers 
could move about witllout nrly larger escort t l l : ~ ~ ~  
1 ~ : ~ s  necessary for their protectioa against c:isual 
1.ol)bers. For this reasoil lie dispensed wit11 :~ny 
regu la r  military escort :~ncl urns nccon11,allicld by 
twent;y well-moulited hlieli Turkc,mnlls fioin tlltl 
T\'nl~lia settlement,, wllo supplied their ow11 f(10~i 
:111(l fodder for Ilieir llol.ses, but  rt2rei~rril p:~yluc~nt 
for t he i r  services at tlle rate of forty roul~lrs pcr 
iuontlz. Tell of these 11ie1l ?rere sul)l~lied ~vitli 
Berclaa rifles, nrllile tlle others c~rriecl tlluir oIrn 
muzzle-loading gulls ; and, iu :~(lclitio~r to tl~cse 
weapons, each man ca~ricil 011 hi8 l>ersr)ii :L ~vllrrle 
:~ rsena l  of pislols nncl lmives. 
Leaving Askabad on t l ~ e  evening of Apl-il SS, 
1682, Lessar travellecl over tlie gouild wliicl~ lie 
liad previously surveyed, and reachrcl S:traklis oil 
May 3. There he halted for a day as the guest 
of the Persian comn~ancl:~lit, and then, crossil~g to t 
the rigllt bank of tlie IIeri-Rud,' continued liis 
T l ~ i s  river I~ns its soiircos in the  g r e ~ ~ t  rilo~illtnil~ous l~luss 
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jourlley toma~cls IIerat through districts mllich 
had never before been traversed by Europeans. 
A marc11 of about 150 miles through an undu- 
lat,iilg country, covered witjh rich grass a i d  
numerous groves of pistachio and mull~crry trees, 
brought the explorer to the h o t  of the 13urlrliut 
range, which is a portio~i of tlle I'arol~amisus 
Ilountains-the mytllical barrier which for 1nol.e 
than half a ceiltury was believed to constilutc ail 
almost impossible obstacle to auy nilva~icc: on 
Herat from the norill. 
There a great surprise was awaiting him ; for, 
instead of finding n great mountnin-cllniil barr i~ig 
his further progress, he met wit11 no greatel- 
. . 
obstruction than was to be foounil in an infig- 
nificant range of hills traversed by a pass whose 
summit was only 000 feet above the s ~ ~ r r o ~ ~ i l c l i i ~ g  
locality, ancl not illore than 3,100 feet above the 
level of the sen. The ascent of the pass from the 
north ' presented no cliificulties, atiil the clesceilt 
towards Kusan on the soutllern side wns Illore 
sloping and convenient than the ascent,' nilcl c;onlcl 
even then have been traversccl l ~ y  carts ; wliile the 
entire defile-if such a llalne can l ~ e  npplicrl to 
such a ridiculously easy crossing-conld with but 
Sonnet1 by llio junction of tlic Koh-i-Balm, Snfctl-Roll, r~llil S i ~ ~ l i .  
Bol~rangus. Tllcro aro two priilcipr~l t r i l~~~tnr ic~- - t l i~  T ~ I ~ ~ I L ~ - I L ~ I  11,1111 
llio Jul~~~il-r~l)-wliicll uriito nc!nr tllo poet of 1)iurltrt-Yor. Icro111 
tEint point tho rivcr I I O C O I ~ ~ O H  1~110~11 by llic! IIILIIIO IIcri-Iill11~ I U I ~ ,  
flowirlg in IL wc~torly tlirtlrtion P I L H ~  1110 forlrcn~o~ of I Iur~i t  nntl 
Bhuri~m, il  turn^ townl-il~ ti110 north nt Rnsl~ri, ~ ~ r l d ,  aftor prrtising 
St~rnlclis, flown in n nortll-wutilorly clirt!cLion, r~utl lir~t~lly ~ ~ H I L P P O I L ~ H  
iri IL ~ o r i c ~  of swampH i l l  tlie R~vt~.lcniti 1)u~crt. Uclow (i.1: to thc 
ntlrtli of )  S n r l d ~ ~  it is cnllcd tlic 'L'c~je~lrl. 
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little 1nl)our liave been illacle travers:J,le by x~lieeled 
vehicles. At about half-may dotvil [lie soutliern 
slope, wlierc tlle track talies the form of a regular 
roadway, there is a sweet-water spring naniecl 
Clioinbon, from m~lleiice tlie same gentle descent 
contillnes for another six versts (four miles), after 
~ ~ b i c h  t e road divides, one brniicli leading to 
Pesli-Robnt (Toinan Aga) on tlle western 1,anli of 
tlie IIeri-Eud, vliile tlie otlier goes to I<usan, boll1 
ruiiiiirlg tllrough level country. 
Lessar, in his report, after clescrihing tliis roulc, 
tlleil goes on to say :- 
The road tlirough Choinbou is the iliost con- 
veliient for wheeled traffic. In addition to it 
there are several other routes vliicl~ illso rill1 
l)ei,ween the Beri-Encl and Murgliab from north to 
sonth, ancl mrbicll are conaected with eacli other 
by lrailsvcrse roads. 
' I  collected information rcspectirig all tliese 
roads. As a possible road for ~vheeled ~iel~icles 
Srom Merv to IIerat, tlie liiost i~lterestiiig is t1i:tt 
~vhicli branches ol'f from the roacl traversed by IXIC 
at  tlie Robat-Kunprueli ruins. P1.oin that point 
the road runs to Ak-Robat, a locality al~ouiidiug 
i r ~  fresli water, wliicli is obtainecl from wells r~ t  a 
depth of' not more tllsln seven feet. These wells 
may be dug allnost anyvhere ancl water will he 
obtained. The roacl then passes throng11 Guilen 
(Gulran) and Chilime-Souz (Clieshina-Sebz), two 
streams yielding a plentiful supply of fresh water. 
The pass over the Rarkllut range near C1iesli1ii:~- 
Sel~z is saicl to be of the same cliarncter ns that 31 
N 2 
Chombou. Beyond the pass one road leads to 
Kusan along a perfectly level country, and another 
to Shekivan over inconsiderable elevations. This 
road from Nerv to Ak-Robat first runs along the 
River hlurghab, then along tlie Kushk river to 
Cllamail-i-baid. After this it strikes off in the 
direction of Ak-Robat, and passes the 1sli1-n 
Springs. By this route the Paropamisus Mountains 
are avoided, as is also tlie pass a t  the source of the 
Kushk River, which gave rise to the supposition 
that the road from Merv to Herat was impractic- 
able for wheeled traffic on a large scale. The 
whole distance from Merv to Herat by this route 
is about 580 versts (2553 miles).' 
Suclz was the information gained by this 
young Russian engineer, who by his intelligent ex- 
ploration ' dissipated the fallacies which hitherto 
obscured the subject of a direct line of communica- 
tion between Russia and India, and gave us for 
the first time a true contour sketch of the face of 
the country between Askabad ancl Herat.' As Sir 
Henry Bawlinson very truly remarked, ' the 
" great mountain chain" which, according to the 
optimist school, was to serve as a palladium for 
India, turns out-on the showing of M. Lessar- 
to be a mere paltry line of sandstone hills, not more 
than 1,000 feet in height, which cortld be crossed 
by a carriage-road in a couple of hours, and 
which wonld crumble before the touch of a 
Xussian railway engineer.' The Paropamisus 
,myth had been exploded, and, thanks to the 
energy of M. Lessar, the people of England at last 
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begall to realise that there were 110, patllless 
deserts ' or ' stnpei~clous illonnt,aiil ranges ' betweeIl 
the Russia11 frontiers in Trans-&+a alld the 
British outposts in the Pishin Valley. 
After having mecle this in te res t i l~~ and valu- 
able discosrery, Lessnr proceeded to tlie Afghan 
town of K ~ ~ s a n ,  where he was hospitably receiyed 
by {;lie co~nitlaliclailt of the fort, alld thence he 
went eastwards to the fortress of Ghurian, forty 
~niles west of I-Ierat. There he had to remain for 
a, couple of days until permission liad been 
obtained from tlie Goverilor of I-Iernt for him to 
cross over into Persia ; but on May 1 2  he resumed. 
his journey and marclled tl~rougli Khaf and Tur- 
bet-i-I-Iaiclari to Meshecl. After a short rest there 
he once again moved towards tlie Afghan frontier, 
and marclling along the rnain trade route between 
Meshed and I-Ierat, tlirough Turbet-i-Shaikh-Jam, 
reached the Heri-Rud at PesBRobat, whence he 
returnecl to Sarakhs ancl Askabad by the direct 
route which runs along the valley of the 'River of 
I-Iernt .' 
I n  the following September this young explorer 
travelled thro~igh Deregez ; and, after making ex- 
cursions in vnrious directions between the Heri- 
Rucl 3rd  Murghnb rivers, he went from Sarakhs 
to Merv, where he was cordially received by the 
Tekkds. Froin tlleilce lie proceeded along the 
0x11s to Khiva, ancl returned to Askabad through 
Shaikh-Senem, Bala-Isllem, ICazi, and Durun. Even 
then he was not satisfied with his labonrs, and- 
filled wit,h a spirit of restless energy-he in the 
following moat11 explored the couiltry between 
Askabad and the Tejend Oasis, again visitecl Merv 
a t  tlle invitation of the Kllan of the Sitcllmaz t,ribe, 
a1113 drew up careful reports of the various routes 
leacling to that place from the Akhal Oasis ; and 
finally, in November and Decen~ber, he surveyed 
the - mountainous districts of Icelat-i-Nadri and 
Deregez, and obtainecl complete iilforlnatioil re- 
garding the irrigation of the Atak country.' 
In addition to Alilchanoff and Lessar another 
Russian officer perforllzecl a very l~zardous  jouriley 
from AstrLzhad through Meshed, Merv, and Cllarjni 
t,o Tashkent. This explorer was Lieutenant Nazir 
Beg (or, as he was called in Russia, Naziroff), a 
Caucasian, m~ho served under Slrobeleff jn the Alai 
expeditioi~, and in 1878 went to Kabul as a topo- 
grapher attached to StolietofYs mission to tlie 
L 
Court of the Amir Shere Ali. He, wit11 two com- 
panions (one a Persia11 and the other a native of 
~ a l r u ) ,  penetrated to Merv in disguise, thence went 
on to the Oxus, surveying e n  ~ - o z ~ t e  the intervening 
desert ; ant1 having thus accomplisl~ed the object 
of his mission, he quietly rode on through Bolrl~ara 
to Tashkent. 
Thus by the close of the year 1882 the Rus- 
sians had obtained complete information concern- 
ing the various routes from Askabad to Bokhara, 
and from the Arsll Sea to the borders of Afghan- 
istail ; while, in aclclition to this, the independent 
Pro111 April to Deccmber 1882 M. Lessar travelled over 5,000 
versts, and gained important information conceining the geography 
and politioJ condition of the countries between Iihiva, and I-Ieret. 
Turlioman tribes graclually became accns toil~eci to 
the presence of Russian visilors, aiicl tllc way was 
thus prepared for f ~ ~ r t l ~ e r  auiie~stioiis.~ 
In tfie menllvhile i t  had lsecolne evident that 
t121e Russian GCoverninent iiite~lded to displ~te the 
Shah's claiiu to sovereign rights over tlie htalr 
Oasis ; and, arhile they wese protesting Lliat llley 
woulcl. not aclvalice beyoilcl thcir present posi- 
tions, i t  was clear that they llnd resolved to $eel) 
open a sore on the Tersinll I'rontiel- in oriler 
{,hat an excuse for n f~~r the r  advance inight, be 
available whenever a suitable ol)porluriity arrived. 
This district hacl loiig formed an inlegral portio~t 
of tlie kingclom of l'ersia, ancl no oiie liail ever 
clreaint of disputing a fact wliicll .tlTas based ou 
a long-cont;inuecl occupntion, a11cI proved by tlie 
habi~ual  payment of taxes by the iiiliabita~lts lo 
' Among the Tckkh chieftains of Morv the one who at tlri~ Linio 
was most obdurate in his ho~tility towards tlie Rn~ttinns was 
Makhiltlm K ~ d i  Khnn, who, with Teltnl6 Sirdar, hncl conduclod tho 
\ defence of Denghil Tep6 in 1881. After tho cnpture of that placo Mnkhdurn ICuli fled to Merv, and at first rojocted n11 offers of friend- 
ship fiom the clirection of Asltabad. But when AlikhanofT visited 
Morv in February 1862 he foimd that t h i ~  chiof rvns alrcady ra- 
gretting that he had not followed Tolrln6 Sirdnr's exnnlple in su11- 
mitting to tho R ~ ~ s s i m s ,  wlioroby he lost a share in tho bellofits 
which hacl boon conferrecl on his more discreet kinsmnn. IIo &t 
t h t  time made secret overtures to tllc Bussinn officer, and stated 
that ho would like to visit Asl~abad, butt fearocl that ho might be 
punished for having led the defence of Donghi1 TepB. Alikhnnoff, 
after his r e w n  to Aslmbad, lnaintrrined close relations with JInlth- 
. 
clum Icu~li, and evontndy, in tlie nutumn of 1882, persu~ded h i n ~  to 
visit the Russian headquastors, where 110 took the oath of alleginnce 
to the M1hite Czar. By his suibmission the Russians got rid of their 
chief opponent, nnd froill that time there was not much danger that 
they woIlld have t o  storm the @'eat fortress of I < ~ u s ~ I I ~  I~hall itl 
order to gain possession of the Merv Oasis. 
- 
the Sliali's officers. But when the British Foreign 
Minister pointed out to the Russian Goverilnlent 
that the Shah had an undoubted right to this 
district, and suggested that an arrangement should 
be arrived at  between Russia and Englancl, re- 
cognising this fact and determining the limits of 
Persia towards the northern deserts, the reply was 
made that ' the Russian Governlneiit could i ~ o t  
acquiesce in the proposal made by I-Ier Majesty's 
~overnlnent  hat the Atak country from Sarakhs 
to Baba Durinaz and between that line and the 
River Tejend should be handed over to the care 
and into tlie possession of Persia.' 
Matters reinailled in this unsatisfactory state 
during tlle spring and summer lnontlls of 1883, 
tlie Persians being practically prohibited from 
exercising any control over the Atalr Oasis, while 
Russian iletachments inoved at will throughout 
the district; and towards the close of tlie year 
General KomaroffY1 the new governor of the Trans- 
Caspian district, sent a force of' 1,000 infantry, 
500 caval~y, and 10  guns - to occupy the Tejend 
Oasis, while reillforcements were at  tlie saine time 
sent from Turltestan to Khiva to talte part in tlle 
occupation of Merv as sooil as a suitable occasion 
for such a step sboulcl. arrive. 
Nor was it long before ~uc l i  an opportu~lit~y 
u7;\.as afIorcled 1)y the embarrassme~lt of tlie ljritisll 
Governnlent 011 account of seriolzs t1.oul)les in the 
Soudan. I t  was at this critical perioil-wl~etl the 
' Genornl IComui40il fincc~odod Goi10r1~1 Iiohrbo~g in tlic ~ ~ r i ~ i g  
of 1888. 
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Mahdist insurrectioll was spreadillg in the Easterll 
Soudau, when Balier Pasha's arnly had beell griev- 
ously clefeated near Trinkitat, and when Gorclon 
was ill difficulties at Khartoum-that the British 
Ambass2zdor at St. Petersburg, on Febru3ry 15, 
1884, telegraplled to Lorcl Granville tliat His 
Imperial lMajesty the Czar 'had determined to 
accept the allegiance which the representatives of 
the Merv Turkomalls had sworn at Askabad, and 
to send an officer to adilliilister the government 
of that region.' The time was well chosen. 
Zi~gland's hour of trouble was Russia's oppor- 
tunity, and this opportunity was not allowed to 
pass, even although tlie advantage was gained in 
direct violation of repeated pledges, and at the 
expense of tlie last remaining shred of any repu- 
tatioll which remained to Bussia for honesty and 
straiglltforwardiless in her dealings in Central 
Asia. 
I t  will be well to explaiil briefly how this 
submission of the representatives of the Merv 
Turkomans hacl beell brought about, and how 
I<omaroff shortly afterwards took po~session of the 
Oasis, As soon as it was decicled that the fitting 
opportunity had arisen for striking the final blow 
Alilcllanoff was again despatched to Merv with a 
s r n d  escort, and accompailied by Makhdum Kuli 
Khan. On arrival there he convened a public 
rneetiilg and called upon the Mervis to beg for 
rncrcy and to subinit to the rule of the White 
Czar, ernpEiasising l~is  cleinan(1s by calling their 
attention td tlle force which had been assembled 
in the Tejencl Oasis, and llinting that it mas nierely 
Ihe advanced guard of an army wliicll mas mov- 
ing forward for the occupation of their country. 
Makbcl~lum Kuli Ifiali apparently joined'his exhor- 
tatioils to the tlireats of the Russian oficer, and, as 
by t,llis h e  there was a strong pro-Russian party 
in the oasis, Alikhanoff eventually persuaded some 
of the principal kllans a i d  elders to sign a docu- 
ment tendering their subniission to 12ussia. This 
having been satisfactorily accomplisllecl, tlie party 
returiiecl to Asliabad, accompaniecl by a cleput,a- 
tion of four chiefs and twenty-four other 11otal)lq 
M-110, on the morning of February 12, 1884, took 
the oath of allegiance to the Wliite Czar in tlie 
presence of eeneral KoniaroK.' 
A fort;night later General Komarol~left Aslrahad 
for tlie Tejeild Oasis, accoinpaniecl by an escort of 
a l~out  100 men, aiid shortly afterwards four other 
detachments, nuinbering in all sollie 800 men, were 
sent forward to Kari Be11.t. On arrival there the 
whole available force commenced its nlarcll on 
Merv, preceded by the chiefs ~ 1 1 0  1 i ;~ l  jilst tell- 
ilered their sublnissio~l and who were sent on a1le:~cl 
Geiloral IComaroff announcod tho sulbmis~ion of tho Morv 
Turlrornn;lls in n; tologram to tho Czar, detotl Fobrnary 12, 1884, of 
which tho following is e trtmslation : ' I ]lave tho ho11ow. of report- 
ing to your Mejosty thtrt tho lrhnns of the four tribo~ of Mcrv 
Turlromans ttlld twenty-fonr deputies, ench rcprcsonting 8,000 
ltibitlms, ~ I ~ V Q  tlliu dt~y, t ~ t  A~ltnbad, forrnt~lly Lalten tho oat11 of 
[~llogianco to your Miijeuty, for thorusclvcs and on bohalf of nll t l ~ o  
pcoplo of Merv. The l<l~nna nnd rcpresontrrtivo~ ~ t r ~ t o  het tho 
bIervi~ hnve decided on tliifi utcp 11oi11g co~lecions of tlioir i ~ l a b i l i ~ ~  
to govern tllorn~elv~s find C O I I V ~ I ~ C C ! ( ~  LllnL yolir MI~~OHLS'H pon,oyl111 
Govorlln~ent rrlono ifi cr~rlnblc (IT ctiL~~blitil~ii~g 1111~1 c ~ ~ i s o l i i l n t i i ~ ~  oy11er
and prosperity in RIorv.' 
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to prepare the nay  for the entry of the Iiussi:ul 
troolbs. But there  as still a strong lxlrty ill tllc 
0:tsis n.hich ol~jected to n Wussiarl occul~:iiioii, :111rl 
ns soon as it becnnle kno~vn tllnt n force m:ls 
>~pprn:~clling for that purpose a multituile of annril 
r >  lurlcoi~inns s:kllicil onl; Iiopiiig to drive b:~cl< tlie 
in trnclers. Tlieg, bos~ever, were too 1:l tc, and, 
nllliougli some sllots were fired n u 1  the :~[l~~a~lc,t! 
was tcmpornrily dclnged, they 11:1c1 no time to 
c~rgaidse :I defence of tlieir great fortified euclosulr~, 
and oil the monling of lfarcli IG tlie 1lussi:ul 
coluiiul mnrched in nnd occnpied the fortress of 
I<ausliut 1<11ai1. 
111 this Iuanner vas lIerv, ' 'I'llc Quce11 of tlie , 
IVorlcl,' annexed to the Bussinii Ein11ir.e ; nilcl il 
will be well to close this c1i:~ptcr of' Iiussialii ~ I L -  
triguc and perfidy by cluoting Blnr~rin's opinion 
cliplomacg a1 Merv was slladg, it -\\.as not onc ~vllil 
I 
regarding this inci(1eiit. Ue says : ' If Alilili:i~lun's \ 
ilmrker in hue tlian tlie cliplonlncy escrcist~d by tllc 
liussiail BIiilister for Foreigtl hlY:~irs :lt St. I'etcrs- 
burg. The nllllesntion of M e n  \i7:ls dcli1)er:~tcly 
l ) lmi~~~ed by tlie Russian Governrnc?~lt, n~iil carricil 
out ill strict nccorc~aiice wit11 its orders. 'Uhe 
c o t 9  cle muin wns tot:~lly wiprovokecl by tllc 
Tek)<& ; it was done in violntioll of ,z whole scrips 
of solemn assurances to E~~glxnd ; slid tlie blo~v 
nq,s struck in a treacllerous n11d co~~~ar( l ly  manner, 
disllonourable to natioll th:~t had produced sllc'h 
hard-liitting, fi~ir-figl~ti~lg hero ns Skobeleff.' 
1 T ] L ~  Rzlasia,bs tr t  tlrc Gates of Ilernt, 11y t h ~  late 3Ir. Cherlcs 
Marvin. 
CHAPTER XVIII 
1884-1885 
TIIE AE'GHAN BOUNDARY QUESTION 
bclventeges to Russia horn the occupation of Merv-The Afghnn 
frontior-The Bonndary Commission-Ru~sia gaining time- 
lComaroff's intrigues-Uneasiness in Englmcl-Soieure of Pul-i- 
IChatarn-Explanation of ha. de Giers-The IZiver Murgl~ab- 
District of Pmjdeh-Russian movements near the frontier- 
New Russian proposals-British counter-proposd rejected. 
BEBORE describing the serious coinplications which 
followed tlie ailnexation of Merv, i t  will be  well 
to briefly consider the eflect which this occulsatioil 
had on the general military position of the Russians 
in Central Asia, 
While Cossack detachments were being pushecl 
forward across the Kirghiz Steppes, and even nntil 
the capture of Samarkand, Russia had no footing 
on the south-eastern shores of the Caspian Sea. It 
is true that she held the islaild of Ashurada, ancl 
from time to  time tried to gain n fooling on the  
mainland in the neiglibourhood of Gez ; but these 
attempts were invarid~ly frusijl.atecl by tlze cleter- 
mined oppositioil of the Shall's Goverimlent,, sup- 
ported as tliey were in this matter by (3reaL 
Britain. Th~zs, ll~ough tlle Russia11 advances 
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tlirougli I<liolrtnlcl 2nd 13oklinr:l c:tusclti Illu,.ll 
anxiety iu Enplnnd, they in tliriuselvcs (lit{ uot 
c~onstitute ally very serio~ls nlennc1e to Tlrc1ia, I)(,- 
c:tnse n Russinn army ndvnncillg to\n.:~rds I Tudllq 
fro111 tllnl direc,tion ~vould 11:~vc to cross tllc gipnlltilb 
mountnin range of the IIinilu-I<usll, : u ~ d  tvonltl 
even then he obligcd to tr:lversr dillic~nlt, defil(.s 
l~eforc it coulcl debouc~h into the 1)lnins of PilcIia, 
t ~ h e r e  i t  would be quite ~uifit ted :iftclr its toiIscnnc~ 
)narc11 to enter 11pon s series of y . c l : l t  c:ulll,nipll.: 
fur tlie coilquest of Hinilustan. 
Unt wlie~l the Russians oc~cul~iotl ICrasnovotl~k 
in 1869 tliey corlznleilccil a nenr Inovemrbut ~vllic*li 
was of far greater danger, for tllcy tlier.(~l)y seizthtl 
the western extremity of a lint of :~ilvm~cc. l)p 
M-llich they could move lot~\.nrcis I I t ~ a t ,  I<--:iiidaIi:ir, 
anrl the lower Irlclus williont encout~lcring :in? 
snch obstacles as would hnve to l)e tr:~vtll.scd 1,.
an invading force rlloviilg from t l ~ c t  di~+ci'tion 01' 
Turkestan. Tlic full nieailiiig o f  this tlr~v dcvc~lo1)- 
mcnt was not at first rcnlised ; hut when Skol)t~l(~A' 
conquered the ABllal Tekli;s, nlld as soon as 1,t~ss:ir. 
had exploded the I'aropnmisns myth, tlw pooj)lt> of 
England began to anrake to n serlsc or thr grc,:tt 
d'znger which threateilecl Iuilin, nl~il fc~untl t h a t  
R~zssia was in a position to make a11 : ~ t  tack on tllr4r 
most possessioiz from t ~ v o  cliRerent tlircilliol~s. 
But so long zs Merv xsas unronrlucretl, nntl 
remained in the possession of inclepen(le11t arid 
llostile tribes, these two TZussian nnnies (in Tr.:nls- 
C:gjpia, alld Tllrkes tan) %\?ere ~lliablc to :kf7t t ogr- 
t]lel., separated as they Irorr sOIlltJ 200 lllilrs 01' 
independent territory ; and thus in the event of a 
war with Ziiglancl Russia woulcl a t  the outset have 
been obliged to ulldertalre tlie concluest of Merv 
at a time when she could ill spare troops for such a 
purpose, or she would have been compelled to hold 
back a considerable portion of her availaljle forces 
to, protect her coi~muiiicatioi~s fi-om the attaclrs 
which would undo~~bteclly have been made by the 
iiiliabitants of tlie oasis on the Murghab. 
By the occupatioll of Merv, however, aU t,llis 
has been changed; tlie Turkestan troops then be- 
came available for use if necessary on the Herat- 
Kandallar line, and free ancl di19ec t con~illunicatio~~ 
was obtained thronghout the Russian provii~ces in 
Cerltral Asia, from the Caspian Sea to tlie far- 
distant borders of China. Nor is this all : for, 
before Merv mas annexed, reinforcemellts for the 
Turlrestan army coulcl only reach Tasllkeilt by  the 
teclious route from Orenburg to Kazala, or by the 
equally trying journey from Krasiiovodsk to Klliva, 
a,ncl thence either to Kazala or up  the Oxus ; ~vllile 
now, Russian troops can be sent by the direct 
route tlirougli Askabad, Merv, and Charjui, 
whereby several weelrs are gained. 
Thus the possessioii of Merv has stre~~gtliened 
tlie strategicd position of Ilussia in Central Asia LZ 
hunclredfolcl, and sirnilai. advantages have also re- 
sulted from a. colnmercial point of view ; for since 
Sillce the construction of the railway through Merv and 
Charjui to Samarkand the saving in time may be colnputed in 
months as. compared with tho old post route across the ICirgliie 
Steppes, or even by the shortor route though  Khivs. 
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tllis ( I i ~ c t  Lrncic routo 11:)s 1)tlell g ; l i t l~yl  (-'tl~ltr;tl 
Asian cottotl :~ t l i l  otllc'r prorlu~t:: ( * : I I ~  c;\sil!- 
trnnsferrc~il tto tllc Europ:ul uiurk~ts, ~v l i i l tb  clir.alr 
cottoil fal~rics :lnd otllcr 1iussi:ul c.otllnlo~litio.: (h : t~ t  
11otv l)e ljroiitnbly c ' o n v ~ ~ y ~ ~ d  to C'clltr:tl :lsi:i 1i,1. 
sale in  the 11:lz:~ars of Uokllar:~ : ~ t l t l  the c1ist:irrt 
Fergharl:~ TT:~llc~. 
$11~11 were tlle results n.llii.11 n-cre to 1)c cBs- 
pected from tlle Ilussinn a~lnes:itioll of I l r r ~ .  I h t  
alt,11011gll this step pointed c.lc:lrly t ( )  :ut ti:trly :crlcl 
consiclern71le increase of 1iussi:i's l)o\vrr for at t:ic+lc- 
ing Iilcli:~, tlic inuucc1i:ite sourcae i,f t l : l l~g~r 1r:is to 1 ~ 1  
forincl in tlic stlildeil :ipl)rar:uic4c1 of Kr~ssi:t~i troop.; 
in close prosilllity to the frontic1.s of iifgllnlli~t:tll 
a t  a point wherc those f~ontiers \veyti impcrf~*c*tlg 
definecl, and where there were, thilrcfc~rc, ~ullillliti~tl 
o~por lun i t i c~s  for flirther coiiip1ic:~r iolts. 
I11 the Anglo-liussiml n ~ r c ~ c n i c ~ t ~  of 3873 tl1c1 
territories and bonlldnritls o l  tll:~l l)ortioii of tl1i1 
Amir's doillillions ~jdlicli lies l,et~vec~n tlie C)sus :illti 
tllc frontiers of l'crsi:~ were tlefi~l~tl il the follotv- 
ilig \vorils : ' The internd distric-ts of ~tk(*ll:t, Siri- 
pul, Maii~lann, Shibergllan, : t ~ i t l  Aiiclkiii, tlle 1ntli.r 
of wliicll would be tlle estrcine Afgllan frorl(iilr 
possessioll Lo the nortll-~~lcst, lie Descl.t bclyoi~d 
belonging lo indel,eudent tribes of Turko~n:uls.' 
I t  will be see11 tllnt this dciiilition of tlie itorlh- 
western fronlicr of ~lfglinnist:tll \\-:IS 1 ) ~  110 llle3llS 
satisfactory, in tllat the chief border provi~lc~rs 
were only melltioltetl, wllilc the nctunl, or eve11 
llortllern liillits of these districts were 
in 110 % T X ~  Sl,e(~ili~(l. l)Oillt, 1 i O l V t 8 ~ ( * l ' ,  1V:lS 
clearly statied, and that is that the Desevts beyond 
the borders of these provinces belonged to the in- 
clependeilt Turkomalls, and by this it was clearly 1 implied that the Afghan districts tl~emselves corn-" 
L ___._--.-- prised all the cultivated lands and pastures up to 
the southern edge of the deserts i11 question. 
For years after this agreement was concluded 
it was geilerally understood, both in England allcl 
Russia, that this porl;ion of the Afghan frontier rai l  
in a nearly straight line fro111 ~ l l o j a  Sale on t h e  
Oxus to a point 011 the Persian frontier at, or in 
the immediate neigl~bourhood of, Saralchs ; the  
frontier was thus shown in Euglisll and Russian 
official maps ; and the Czar's Goverilnient unques- 
tionably accepted this interpretation of the clause 
of the agreement. 
In orcler that there might be no mistalre 
regarding this point, it is as well to mention t h a t  
so lately as February 22, 1 852, the Russian Anz- 
bassador i n  London informecl Lord Granville t h a t  
his Government acknowledgecl the validity of t h e  
agreement of 1873, and he also stated that, as tha t  
agreement 'was incomplete,' they were ready t o  
supplement it by a settlement of the frontier of 
Afghanistan ' from the point where it had been left 
undefined ' as far as Sarnlchs ' ; and again in the  
following April 81. de Giers himself informed S i r  
E. Thornton that, ' in view of preventing disturb- 
ances on the borders of Afghanistall, he consiclerecl 
The Ambt~ssador here meant IChoja Salo. East of Ichojn, 
Sale tho northern frontier of Afghanistnn is mnrlred by the couree 
of the River Oxus. 
it, to be of great iiuportance tll:it the 11omltlary of 
that c,oulitry f i . o n ~  Ichoja ,711112 to the I')L'~:sit~~~~,fi~ollti,:r 
in the neiyl~buz~~~hnod fl , S i ~ i . ( ~ k h ~  .shoi~l~t h~ bfi~rriz~illy 
alld tlcji~~itdy Iuid tlorcn.' 
Tllus it is evident from tlie ~~rorcls of tlle 
Eussinu Foreign Millister llinlself t11:tt until Jlerv 
llntl l~eeii occupiccl tlie Russi:til Govclnincnt clenvljr 
uiidel~stoocl and ack~lo~vledged tlint the north- 
western froi~lier of Rfg11:uiistttn ~vxs  uinrkcd bjr a 
line ruinling from Iihoj:~ S:~le t.o Snr:~klls. But, 
sliortly after Merv hnrl been aiulcsed a new  ill:^^) 
was preparecl by t l i ~  St:lff' of [lie 1Zussi:ul :Lrmy, 
wlllerein the boundary between Merv n~td Xfglim- 
iststi W:LS inarkecl by a colourecl line, which was 
clrs~vn so ns to meet the Beri-Rucl at :L point far 
tn the south of Sn~nklis. Tlic first sign was thus 
given that the mi1it:~ry l~artjr ill Eussia i~ltcildecl to 
coillest the valiility of tllc olcl recogniscd frontier ; 
l ~ u t  even then, tvhen the British h~ub:issador showed 
the riiap to M. de Giers, he W:LS ass~~recl tlmt it 
coald ?lot be co~lsidercd as oficinl,' as tlle boulkilnr~ 
I n  nddition to this map, n copy of which wns nont to Lord 
Granville by the British Alnlsnasnrlor at  St. Potorsbnrgon Mt~rcli 26, 
nnothor mq) of Asintic Russith and the adjoining conntrios WHS 
p~~bl ishot l  in the following blny by tho hlilit~lrg Topographicel 
Department oE the Russinn ChieE Staff' Oflico; and in this lnter 
produotion, which wns declared to be oilicial, the frontiers of Persia 
and Afghtlnist~n from Babn Durmaz to Iihoja Sale wero shown by 
a, line traced in tho following manner:- 
Frorn Beba Dnrrnnz tho north-eastern frontier of Iillorassan 
followed the mountain rnnge which forn~s tho south-\vestern 
boundnry of tho Atak Oasis, lenving Lnftnbad und Iielnt-i-Nndiri 
to  Persia, but depriving tho Persinns of control over tho fitrerblns 
watering the Atak. Tho frontiur thon roac!led the Tejend River I L ~  
R short distance to the north of tho Perfiinn fortress of S~~rnl i I~s ,  
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line so drawn was not in accordance with the 
ideas which he had exchanged in conversation 
with the Russian Minister of War ; aiicl the Foreign 
Minister then added that the frontier would be, 
more or less, a line from Khoja Sale to Sarakhs, 
but he, on this occasion, qualified this remark by 
observing that there would, perhaps, be some de- 
viations to the south so as to meet the mohta in  
ridges. 
I n  spite, therefore, of M. de Giers' continuecl 
assertion that the boundary would run from Khoja 
Sale to Sarakhs, it was plainly seen from the pro- 
duction of the map in question, and from the 
Russian Minister's reference to ' deviations to the  
south so as to reach the mountain ridges,' that the 
Russians intended to dispute the Ainir's claim to 
certain lands to the south of the central portion 
of the old frontier line-i.e. on the banks of 
tlie Murghab river -and this belief received 
and then, without orossirlg the rivor, followed the course of the 
stream up to a point about 184 miles north of ICz~san, whence, 
leeving the river, it followed the ridge of the Peropamisns as far as 
the Pass of Araevan, ahozct 16$ miles t o  the nmt72 of Herat. 
The eontier, as shown on this map, then turned due north 
along the road leading to Msrv, and crossing the Eushlc nt Chnhil- 
Dolctar i t  followed the right bank of that streem to within about 
49 miles of Icala-i-Msnr, and then, trending in an easterly direction, 
passed 9 miles to the sowtlz, of Mariich~k, 17 miles to tho north of 
Maimena, 5 miles to the north of Andlthui, and finally roached the 
left bank of the River Oxus at IU~oja Sale. 
This oflicial map appeared three weeks nftor Lord Granville 
had suggested that a Joint Colnmiasion should dotarmino tile 
point8 on the frontier, and it thus became perfectly olonr 
from the earlieet stage of the negotialions thnt liussia inlended to 
insist on nothing leas than a reconsicleration of the whole quostion 
of the north-western frontier of Afghanistan. 
confirmation in a well-authenticated report tlint 
Russian reinforcements had been rlespntched to 
Merv, and that Russian agents had been sent to 
tamper with the Sarilr tribe of Turkorzans who 
inhabit the oases of Yulatan and Pailjdeh. The 
British Cabinet, therefore, decided that it .would 
be advisable to  accurately clefine the north- 
western frontier of Afgharnistan with as little delay 
as possible, and Lord Granville accordingly, on 
April 2 9, 18 84, informed the Russia11 Government 
that England was prepared to accept the proposal 
put forvard in 1882-aid since repeated by M. de 
Giers-for the delimitation of the frontier fro111 
Khoja Sale westwards, and suggested that tlie 
principal points on the boundary line should be 
laic1 down on tlle spot by a Joint C~rnniission,~ wliicli 
should comlllence operations in the following 
autumn. After a short interchange of cornmuni- 
cations this proposal was approved by the 12ussians, 
and October 13, 1884, was nained as the approxi- 
nii~te date on which the two Commissioners were 
to  meet at Sarakhs on the lefb bank of the Lleri- 
Rud. 
I n  accordance with this understancliag, Major- 
General Sir Peter Lumsclen was appointed British 
Commissiorler for the delimitation of the Afghan 
Lord Grmwille in this note suggested that the Commission 
should include an Afghan representative ; but the Russian Govern- 
ment objected to  this, and it was eventually settled that an  Afghan 
official should merelybe attached to the Boundmy Commission ne 
an expert to furnish explanations on questions of detail t~nd purely 
local matters whenever tho Commissioners of the two great Powers 
might wish to consult him. 
0 2 
Boundary, several distinguished officers were at- 
tached to  his staff, and arrangements were made 
for the despatch froin India of a suitable escort 
of native troops. Sir Peter Lu~nsden and such 
inembers of his staff as were in Engla,nd a t  the  
time left Lolldon early in September, so as to be a t  
Sarakhs on the appointetl date ; but as the escort 
from India. had to march by a long and ilnpcrfectly 
explored route through Beluchistan in order that 
there iniglit be no possibility of coinplications with 
the fana~ical Afghans, the Russian Government 
~vas informed on September 15  that Her Majesty's 
Cominissio~ler would probably not reach Sarakhs 
before November 7. The Russia11 Government had  
in tlie rneai~while llomillatecl General Zelenoi as  
their Commissioner, and at the end of September 
it was understood, both in England and Russia, that 
the Joint Comlnission would commence operatioils 
tturly in the following November. 
13ut although the St. Petersburg authorities 
agreed to the principle that t,l~e frontier line 
should be definitely fixed by the officers thus 
a~pointed, they soon showed that they had no 
desire to have the question speedily settled, by 
entering into negotiations regarding trifling mat- 
ters which both wasted time and retarded t h e  
co~nmencement of the actual delimitation of t h e  
boundary. 
Thus, although it was abundantly evident to 
the meanest intellect that the most important 
portion of the frontier was that lying between 
the Eleri-Ruii and Murghah rivers, and tlia,t it 
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was, therefore, desirable that this portion shoultl 
b e  first cleiined ill order that clulwrous complica- P tions might not arise, the Russia~i Goveriunen~ 
nevertlleless iiisisted thaL the demarcation of the 
frontier should be coinnlenced at Khoja Sale, 
and that the Boundary Coinnlissioners shoulif wo~lr  
from east to west ; and they olily ~vithdrew tllcir 
objections after illally valuable -il.eelcs had beell 
wasted ill the discussioll of Illis point. 
This, however, was but tlie colilmeiicenleiit 
of the series of subterfuges by whicll the 1Xusco- 
vile diplon~atists ei~deavoured to gain tiine uiilil 
they had pushed forwarrl reinfbrcerneilts to Ask- 
abad and Merv, ancl had seized the most important 
points in the territory which they were cleter- 
mined to wrest from Aighulistan. A second * 
example of this trickery will not be out of place. 
Altl~ough the Russiall Goveriln~ent had coilseiltccl 
to the nppoiiltmcnt of bou~ldary commissioners 
in the previous April, and liacl 1)rolnisecl tllatl 
tlleir representative pvoulil be ready to m e t  
Sir Peter Lumsdell at Sarakhs in tlie follo~vii~g 
autumn, M. de Giers, oil October 2, iiiforir~cd 
Sir E. Thoriltou that General Zeleiioi would not 
be able to reach Sarakhs ever1 by November 7 ; 
and he then proposecl that, as owiug to llle 
severity of the climate nothing coulcl be done 
till February, the Commissionei~s sliould meet 011 
January 27, 1885. He at the same time ob- 
jected to Saraklis as the place of meetiilg, and 
suggested that some other place fnrtller towards 
the south, such as Pul-i-KllaLun, should be 
agreed upoil instead.' General Zeleiloi hacl been 
seized a i th  a convenient indispositioa, and was 
therefore unable to study the question or to 
receive his instructions until it was too late 
for him to join Sir Peter Lumsden before the 
commencement of winter. 
In the meallwhile the British Coln~llissioiler 
and his escort from India mere hastening towards 
the borders of the Herat Province.' Gell.eral 
1 As the British Government objected to changing the locality 
at which the Commissioners should meet, M. de Giers on October 21 
once again agreed to their cominencing work at  Sarakhs. 
Mr. Condie Stephen, C.B., C.M.G., and Captain A. P. Barrow, 
of the Bengd Staff Corps, accompanied Sir Peter Luusden from 
England; and on his way to Sarakhs he was jolned by Colonel 
C. E. Stewart, C.I.E. 
The Indian contingent consisted of 4 British officers and 
200 men of the 11th Bengd Lancers, and 3 British oficers and  
250 sepoys of the 20th Punjaub Infantry. The caval'y were under 
the command of Major W. I. Bax, and the infantry were com- 
manded by Major W. Meiltlejohn. 
The following staff olEcors also accolnpanied the mission :- 
1. Lieutenant-Colonel (now Sir West) Ridgeway, who acted a s  
Assistmt Commissioner to Sir Peter Lumsden, and snbsequently 
became Chief Boundmy Commissioner. 
2. Caotain E. L. Durmd . . . , \ 
3. Captain C. E. Yate . . . . 
4. Mr. W. K. Merlc, C.S. . . . . 
5. Captain F. de Laessoe . . . , 1 
6. Major T. H. Holdich, R.E. . 
7. Captain St. G. 0. Gore, R.E. . . 
9. Captain P. J. Maitland . . . 
8. Lieutenant the Hon. M. G. Talbot, R.E. . 
Intelligence 
10. Captain W. Peacocke, R.E. . . : } officers. 
11. Surgeon-Major J. E .  T. Aitchison, C.I.E. Naturalist. 
12. Surgeon W. Owen, C.I.E. ' ' Medical o E c e ~ s ,  la .  Surgeon R. H. Charles . . . . 
14. Mr. C. L. Griesbach . . . . Geologist. 
The contingent left Quatta, under the command of Lieutenant 
Colonel Ridgeway, on September 22, and marching v i b  Nusbki, 
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Lumsdell reached Sarakhs on November 8, to find 
that the Russians had not o ~ l y  established them- 
selves in the neighbourhood of Old SaraHls, on 
the right bank of the Heri-Bud, but had also 
seized Ph1-i Khatun, some forty miles higher up 
the stream, while a similar advance was made 
on the Murghab, through Yulatan, towards Panj- 
cleh. The true meaning of Zelenoi's supposed 
illness and of the Russian desire to commence 
the delimitation of the frontier at Khoja Sale 
then became clearly apparent. The Muscovites 
had been trying to gain time in order that a 
sufficient force could be assembled for the purpose 
of seizing the chief avenues leading to Herat ; 
the necessary delay had been obtained by the 
various pretexts which had been put forward 
by the Russian Government, and then the mask 
was cast aside and Russia once more appeared 
before the world in her true character. 
When Komaroff visited Merv in March 1884 
agents were at once sent southward to Yulatan 
and Panjdeh for the purpose of obtaining the 
submission of tlie Barik Turkomans who in- 
habited those places. The result of this action 
Galicha, ILhwaja-Ali (on the Helmund), Kale-i-Fath, Kala-Kin, and 
Zighin, reached Iinssn on November 17, having thus traversed 
767 miles in 57 days, which gives an aversgo day's march of 184 
miles. 
By this maroh it was proved that enot,her fairly easy line 
of advance was eveilablo for an army moving towmds the 
Lower Indns from the direction of Herat, and one edditional 
proof was thns given-if enoh were necessary-of the danger 
which would inuvitably rosult from a. Russia11 occupation of the 
EIeret Valley. 
was that the people of Yulatail sent a deputation 
to Askabad in the following May, and there swore 
allegiaiice to Russia before Prince Dondoukoff- 
Korsalroff, the Governor-general of the Caucasus, 
who was making a journey to the Akhal and 
Merv 0ases.l Their kinsmen at Panjdell, how- 
ever, held aloof, for they had long been tlle sub- 
jects of the Anlir of Kabul, and, having no desire 
to become the vassals of the White Czar, they 
dismissed the Russian agent wit>h the declaratioil 
that they owed allegiance to the Aiilir Abdur 
Rahman Khan. 
Having thus cominencecl fresh intrigues anlong 
the Sariks on the Murghab, Kornaroff himself 
started off from Merv with fifty Cossacks and some 
TekkP, horsemen, and went to the sinall Fersiail 
fort at  Old Sarakhs, on the right bank of the 
Heri-Rud, and some seven miles from the Persian 
fortress of the same name which stands on the 
left bank of the river. There he fouild a garrison 
of forty Persian soldiers, whoill he unceremoni- 
ously ordered out of the place ; and, having . 
proclaimed that the district was Russian soil, he  
left a Russiail detachineilt in possession, and made 
his way back to Askabad. 
When news of this fresh movement reach.ed 
England the greatest uneasiness prevailed for a 
At this t h e  also M. Lessar went to Yulaten, and then, 
pushing southwards along the banlrs of the Murgheb, visited 
Panjdeh, from whence he travelled np the Kushlr Valley as far a s  
Chaman-i-baicl. There he turned woatward to Ak-Robot, aurl, 
skirting the salt lakes o f  Yer-Oilail, returned through ICoy~ul-kui 
to Yulalan. 
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short tinie, until it was stated that the Persian 
fortress on the lert bank of the Heri-Rud had not 
been interfered with, that the Russinils had no 
intention of going there, and that as for Old 
Saral~hs, which haci been occupied by Komaroff, iit 
was notl~ing but a mass of ruins, and was a place 
of but litlle import,zuce. The fact was ignored 
that the value of the district consisted not in the 
strength of any wretched Persian f o ~ t  whicli existed 
therein, but in the strategical importance of the 
locality itself to an army moving from AsBabad 
towards Her at. 
However, although Merv, Old Sarakl~s, and 
Yulatan had all become Russian possessions, none 
of these clistricts were to the south of the olcl 
rccognised frontier line extellding from Saral~hs to 
Khoja Sale ; and it  was not until the Russians in~cle 
their next move in ' the game of grab' that the 
full significance of their designs became appa- 
rent. This move was the sudden seizure of 
Pul-i-Khat-un and the advance of Russian detach- 
ments towards Panjdeh, while Sir Peter Lumsden 
was journeying towards Sarakhs, a i d  while the 
Russian Government were raising obstacles to 
the early cornme~~cement of the demarcation of the 
boundary. 
General Lumsden first Ilearcl of these move- 
ments when he reached Meshed on October 31, 
and he at once reported the matter to Lord 
Granville; but i t  was not until he had reached 
Sarakhs a fews days later that he received confir- 
mation of the report from ari ,4fghan officer who 
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had been sent, with an escort of 100 horsemen, to 
meet him at that place. He then also heard that 
General KomarofT was at Old Saralrhs, personally 
clirecting the movemen.ts of the Russian cietach- 
ments ; but as the Governor of Alrhal, with a 
remarkable want of courtesy, at once made 
arrangements to leave, to avoid meeting the 
British Commissioner, Mr. Condie Stephen was 
sent to inquire wheth.er the Eussiails liad thus 
advanced into Afghan territory by orcler of the 
Czar, and he obtained the reply that Pul-i-Khatun 
had been occupied as an outpost in accorclance 
with instructions received from Prince Dondoukoff- 
KorsakofT 
Now, in forming an estimate of the true 
character of this movement on Pnl-i-Kllatun it 
must be borne in lniiid that in 1882 the Rns- 
sian Government proposed that the north-western 
I 
I 
frontier of Afghanistan should be accurately cie- 
fined froin Klloja Sale ' as far  as S~a.alcl~s ; ' that on 
March 26, 1884-or some six months before this \ 
violation of the Amir's dominions took place-Jt. 
cZe Giers had again declared that ' the boundary 
wonld be, more or less, a line from Khoja Sale to 
Sarakl~s, with, perhaps, some deviatiolls to tlie soutli 
so as to reach the .mountains ; ' that il; 11311 beell 
arranged that the Boullriary Colninission s21uuld 
meet at Saralrlis, as that place was : ~ t  one end of 
the frontier line ; and LhaL ever since January 1873, 
and until the suirmer of 1884, Saralrhs h:~d been 
recogrlisecl l)y 110th tlie nril;ish anrl tlie liussia~l 
Governmen~s: as tlie l~oint in tlle neigllbourhood of 
Batun 
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which the frontier line of Afghanistan shoulcl meet 
that  of Persin.I 
By this sudcle11 occupation, homrever, all these 
previous understandings aere set aside, and, be- 
cause Great Britain was embarrassed elsewliere, the 
Cossacks aere pushed forward to a point some 
forty miles south of the locality wllicll hact been 
repesteclly mentioned by M. de Giers and other 
nlembers of the Russian Government as forrnilig 
- 
the extreine wester11 extremity of tht: Afgllati 
boundary. M. cle Giers endeavoured to explain 
away this uilwarrailt,ed act of aggression by stating 
tha t  as Russia ' had succeeded i11 establishing trail- 
quillity in the Turkoman Steppes, she mas forced to 
seek means to consolidate the state of aEail-s thus 
created, and to take stepmagairist the disorders 
which there was every reason to npprelienil in 
consequence of the considerable milita~y prepara- 
tions of the Afghans on the northern border of 
E e r a t  and the approach of llle Uritisli escort, the 
numbers of which greatly exceeded what had beell 
agreed upon.' He, however, cleclarecl tllal it 
I t  was only k December 1884 that the British Govenln~out 
were definitely informed that Russia deoided to abandon tho idea 
that  Smdths should form the western terminus of the frontier lino. 
In the previous Mny, howover, the official map was published, 
showing the  oilt tier line hawn holll a, point close to Kusan, and 
that date therefore has been taken as the time when Ru~sia first 
showed signs of upsetting tho previous understmding. 
a I n  August 1884 Sir E. Tliornton was inforxned that tho 
strength of the Russian escort would consist of froill 200 to 250 
Cossacks, dopending on the strength of tho sotnias, and it was 
apparently understooa that the British esoort should be of similar 
strength. As the troops from Indis, had, however, to n~nrch 
through an inlperfectly explored aountry, exposed to tho possible 
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would be quite iinpossible to witliilraw the 
detacliinent, and tlie lZussiails tlius reniained in 
possession. 
I t  is ahnost superfluous to poilit out tlie 
absurdity of tlie reasoils given in ilefeilco of this 
step by the IZussiaii Foreign Millister; for if llie 
Eussiails were to mass troops on the borilers of 
Asiatic Turlrey, would tlie Go~7ernor-C3ciieral of tlie 
Caucasus be justified in seizing Erzcro~uli or T3:xyazid 
because the Porte commenced inilitary preparations 
to safeguard ils frontiers f'roni tlie lliresteiled 
attack ? Or call it be for one momelit maint,aiiieci 
that Russia was justified in seizing a llortion of 
Afgha,n territory merely because tlie Turkorllans 
on tlie border might possibly be iillecl with dnrin 
on hearing of tlle :~pproach of a few srpoys and 
sowars from Iiiclia ? No : M. ile Giers' explan a t' 1011 
of this inoveinerlt was the best he llail to give ; ant1 
its very absurclity proves the wenlrncss of llie 
Russian case. 
Leaving tlie Russiniis tlius est:xl)lisheci at  Olil 
Saral~lls and Pul-i-Iihat,un 011 tlic Beri-Rucl, il is 
llecessary now to exl)lni11 tlie situ:xtion 011 tlie 
Murgliah at the time? wlieil Sir Teler T J ~ ~ ~ n s i l ~ i i  
reached Snrnklis a i d  rct:eivcjd rcl~ort,s tlinl, :t 
Russian cleLac1~ilment 11:~il l~usllcil ul) tlic! 1)nrilrs of 
that river in the clircctioll of l';~~ljclcli, 
attack# of El~llr~ticnl tril)~c;nic>n, tho Tnrlil~n nntllorilic!~ firorl tllo 
nzunbor of Lllo osco14 ILL 'LOO c~rvulry 1~1111 2fiO illfi~t~Lry, I I H  I)(+illg t110 
sllllillonL 1 ) 1 ~ ~ t y  wllicll oo11111 bo ~ ~ ~ H ~ ) I L L o I I ~ ! I I  it1 H L L ' O L , ~ .  'l'll(3 I I I I ~ I I ~ ) ~ ' ~ ~ R  
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The river I\iIurghab, which rnaters the Merv 
Oasis ancl the11 disappears in the szl~~cls of the 
k{ara-I(uln Desert, takes its rise in the Inass o l  
llloulltaills which connects Llie eastern extremities 
of the snfecl-Koh a11cl Tir-Band-i-Turkestan ranges, 
and, flowing in a weslerly clirectioil l;l~rough the 
great valley separatiiig those moulztr~in-chains, it, 
afier receiving the waters of nnmerous tributaries, 
turns towards the north-west, and passes tlie 
Afghan fortress of B d a  Murghah and the post of 
I<arawal Kllana. At this latter point it receives 
t,he waters of the ICaisar amucnt, and, contilluing 
in a nortll-westerly direction, flows past the Afghan 
fort of Maruchalc (on the right bank), and Panj- 
deb; ancl Ak TepB (botlz on the left bank). At 
Ak Tep6 it is joined by the I<ushk river, which 
rises in the Paropai~~isus range, ancl fro111 this 
point the Murghab runs in a due nortlzerljr 
The Kas11a.n stream joins the M~rgElab at  e short distance 
below Mari~chak. 
2 There are two places of this name, viz. Old Pe~ljdeh and 
New Panjdeh. The former, which a t  this time was a mere 
of ruins, was built by a Haznsa chieftain, nimed Bumyad 
ICIlan, on the left bank of the Mnrghab, at a, distance of sollle 
twelve ~niles below the Bnnd-i-Nnciri. About two miles further 
d o m ~  stream, snd a t  abollt the same distance from tho river, is 
situated New Panjdeh, wliich was b d t  by the Sarilzs some time 
betmeen 1875 and 1880. I t  wns a great inc~osuro 01. fort, the 
ralllpasts consisting of two walls a fow paces apart, with the 
illtenoning space filled up with enrkll so that they might resiat 
artillery fire. I t  was of sutficiellt size to enable the whole of the 
popula,tion of the oasis to take reCuge in it, in case of attack; but 
there were no houses inside, aud the people generally lived in reed- 
huts or felt-tents in the vicinity. Such is the description of 
Panjdeh, as given by Colonel stewurt in Marcli 1884, before the 
Afghan frontioi* troubles commenced. 
direction past Yulatan to Merv, and thence into 
the desert. 
The unclulatiilg country betveen the Murghab 
and Heri-Bud, and extending from the northern 
slopes of the Paropainisus range to the desert, is 
callecl. Badghis-a well-favoured district, covered 
with grass and groves of pistacllio and mulberry 
trees, wild rose a id  blackberry bushes, and watered 
by numerous rivulets. I11 early times this district 
of Baclghis, which has always been connected with 
the Herat Province, included the oasis of Yulatan, 
but, a t  a later period of its history, the tract of 
cnltivation between Panjrleh and Yulatan remained 
~ ~ I O W ,  ancl, beyond the traces of early canals, 
presen1;s no vestige of former occupation, and has 
become a desert. One of the most important 
portions of Badgllis is the Panjdeh district, m-llich 
is watered by an extensive sjrstein or cailals issuing 
from a dam called the Bund-i-Nailri, which was . 
thrown across the Murghab at a short clistance 
below the Afghan fort of Maruchak. The most 
direct road from Merv to Herat runs dong the 
bailks of the Murghab as far as Ak TepQ-at the 
junctioii of the Kushk and Murgliab rivers, just to 
the north of Panjdeh-and then, followii~g the 
valley of the Kusllk, crosses the Paropamisus range 
by either of the passes of Ardevan or Baba. Thus, 
Panjdeh is a most important strategical point 
which must be held by a force advancing on 
Herat from Merv, and its value to the Russians is 
increased by the fact that it covers the left flank 
of an army niarching froin Askabad by the easier 
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routes, along the Heri-Rucl and vi8 the Cllombou 
Pass. 
The district of Panjdeb, wllicll comprises the 
country 1)etweeii tllc ICuslik ailci Murghal~ rivers 
from tlle Bund-i-Nadri t;o Ak Tep6, was formerly 
subdivicled i i lh  five zoiics or parislles, and from 
this circurnst~ni~ce its name of tlle ' Five Villages ' 
was ilerivecl. It, together mritll the otlier portions 
of Baclghis, formed a part of tlie I-Ierat Province 
ever since Afg1ianisi;an l~ecanle a kingdom ; and 
eve11 wlierl the old empire of Allmed Shall becarne 
split up mi(1er tlle feeble rule ancl divided couiicils 
of his descenda~lts, Bndgliis ancl Tanjcleh still 
reillnilled liillieil to IIesnt, ancl tlieir inhabitants 
loolrecl on tlie ruler of tliat province as their 
master. I11 former ti~iles, a11d during the first 
clnmter of tlie present century, Palljdeh was 
occupiecl by tile tJalnslliclis or Hazaras, according . 
as tlie Jarnsllidi cliief at  Kusllli or the Hazara 
ruler of Ical:~ Nail was at the time most powerful 
or tlie most; in favour at I-Ierat. Towarcls tlie close 
of tlial; period, Ilowever, soille Turkomalls of the 
Ersari tribe-whose sct;tIements are scattered along 
the hnliks of tlie Oxns, 1)etween Clln~jui and Balkh- 
nloved to P:~iljclell, and ol)tnisle,d pcrrnission to 
settle tllese oil paymciit; of a regular tax to the 
Afgllnn autlloriticis. 
At t,llis tiilie Mcrv was occnpied by the Sarilr 
tri l~o of 'I!u:.lioll~iti~s, who were in some slight 
(l(?grcc? s~~l~jc!c t  to tile 1<11:~11s of ICliivn ; arid the 
c:trniltry ill t l ~ :  i ~ ~ i g l ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ i ~ ~ ~ l  of' Old Saraklls (on 
the &yi-:lt,nci) K:LS iill~al.)ited l ~ y  tlic S:tlor tribe. 
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In tlie year 1832, however, Prince Abbass Mirza 
of Persia, as has been mentioned in s previous 
cl ia~ter ,  attacked the Salor fortress at Old Saralrhs, 
and, having overcoine the resishnce of the Turlro- 
mans, slaugliterecl a large number of the defenclers 
aricl carried off some 5,000 prisoliers. The Khan 
of IChivx then ofkrecl to ransoin the captives, and 
the Persian Crown Prince conseilted to liberate 
t.hein on receipt of 50,000 tonians, on the under- 
standiilg that tlie people of the tribe unclertook to 
preveiit the Tekkbs ancl Sariks from raiding iiito 
K2ior'assan ; or, if tliey were unable to do so, that . 
t11.ey should, at all events, give tirnely notice of 
any threatened ' alai7nai1,' or foray. During this 
troublous period many of the Salors fled to Merv 
and Yulstsm., wliile a few other fanlilies settled at 
h n j d e h  on the same conditions as the Ersaris ; and 
for sollie years after this the E~sa r i  and Sslor 
settlers at Panjdeh paid tribute to the Herat 
authorities, either th.rough an Afghan naib, or 
deputy-governor, who resided ainong them, or 
through the Hazara chief of Kala Nau. . 
In 1857, however, the Ersaris withdrew, and 
retur~led to the settlements of their tribesmen on 
the banks of the Oxus ;, ancl at the same time the 
Salors were attacl<ecl by the Sariks, driven out of 
Merv and Yulatan, and forced to seek refuge near 
Zurabad, on the left bank of the Heri-Rud, while 
Inany families also fled to Panjclell. Soon after 
this the Sariks were themselves forced to leave the 
Merv country by their more powerful n e i g l ~ b o ~ r ~ ,  
the Telrlrks, and, moving southmrards, they occupied 
Yulatall : ~ i d  Fn~ijdeh, a~lrl coillpelleil the &lor 
falllilies to migrate fio111 t;he latter pl:lc:e t,o tile 
ljalilis of tlie %xi-Racl. 
Ali;llo~igh h e  ilistrict; of I'ai~jclell liad from tjlne 
t,o time bec?il c.)ccupied by various tribes who 
fled t11el.r: to 01)t:~ili ~21'I'cty from their enemies, yet, 
in spite nl tllcse frcqaeilt ch:~nges, the iilhabitai~t~ 
or tlie cliutrict-nrlletlier J:unsllidis, 01- I-Iazaras, or 
Sariks, or Snlors-iiivari:~l)ly :~clrnowledged that, 
t,lley were on Afgllsn soil, aiid nearly always pnicl 
1 revellac in solilc form OT other to the Afghan 
flovenlineiit. Being 11ot;hing better tlinn savages, 
~srllo cleliglitcd in violence., and whose chief occn- 
1.' patioil coilsist,ecl in ~naliiilg forays into tlie neigh- 
i! l~ouring couutries for tlie purpose of carrying o f  1 
slasres, it c:~llnc~t 1je ~vonderecl at tllnt their pay- 
illeilts of' revennc to the Afqhan oihcinls svere lllacle 
in nn irregnlnr nlanller. \Vllei~ tllcre were troublcs ! in ~llgllai~ist:~n they paid little, and at times even p:~icl nollli~i(,~ ; l ~ n t  wllcn there was a stroilg ruler 
1 in h-al)~11 tliry lxlid n regular tax, and although L_ tl~rly : L ~ T V : L ~ S  I r i ~ ~ d  1.0 pay as little as possible, they 
still nc:lili~~~lctlg~:tl tlicir lial~ility to pay a lalld tax 
' 
of 23  per cc!~it,. of their agl.icultural produce, ant1 
one in forty of their cnttlc.' Tlicy occ:~sionally 
I 
i clvc?n sul)l)lic~tl t,~+oops to t llc Afghan Goverili~leli t, 
P On A p ~ i l  !), ltiH4, (Ioloncl Sto~vart  reported nti flrl1ow~:- ' I 
11nvn nricert~iinntl tlltrt tlrr! ravonno actually colloctpd 1 : ~ ~ t  yoar by 
tllc! Afglrnn r~uthoritic~i fro111 tllo Turkolnun~ of .l':~ijclcll W ~ A  13,000 
II~ILIIH.  h l c r~~ l i  is worth r~bor~ t  ninrbponco.' T ~ I I ~ F I  i t  will bo Reon thaL 
tho 'L'rirkoll~nnu of l'nlljil(1ll pi~id nbont 4871. Lo tho Akllnna dl~ring 
f tlio Spar i ~ n m t ? d i a t o l ~  prcroding LhnL in which Merv WILR onrlc~xetl l)y 
~ ~ I I R R ~ I L ,  At tllis ti1110 thore wlro fiotne 4,000 tvnls ill tllo dintrict, 
rr.prct;olting n pr~ptll~lt iot~ f ~ ~ h o u t  10,000 ~0111~. 
VOI,. If. 1' 
b 
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and so long as they paid a little to show their 
aclsno\vlecIgaleilt of Afghan rights, they were left; 
alone by the frontier officials, who looked up011 
tllem as a convenient barrier against the more 
powerful and turbulent clans further to the north. 
The Goverilor of Herat posted a 
Naib, or Deputy-Governor, at; Fanjdeh to collect 
taxes, and to represent the central governlnent ; 
and in 1883, and up till the time when Merv was 
by the Russians, the Afghau represen- 
tative there was Mir Osman k'han. He, however, 
returned to Herat in February 1884 to report that 
the Sariks would only pay a portion of the revenue. 
due from  then^, and the Governor of Herat then 
wrote to Yaluntash Khan, the Jamshidi Chief of 
Bala Murghab, reminding him that Panjdeh was 
under his orders, and ordering him to make the 
best settleineilt he could ; and two months later, 
when a Russian agent visited Panjdeh, the Sariks 
wrote to Yaluntasli Khan begging that solneoile in 
authority might again be placed at Panjdeh to 
prevent Russians visiting the place, as they would 
be unable to do so without Afghan assistance. 
From the above facts it will be seen that 
the district of Radghis, and its most. important 
portion, Pailjdeh, had long been under Afghan 
~uule. During the first quarter of this century 
Panjdeh was occupied by the Jamshidis or Hazaras, 
both of which are undoubtedly Afghan tribes; and 
a'lthongh during the last seventy years tile district 
was inhabited by various Turkoinan tribes, still 
these always acknowledged that they had settled 
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ill Afghan t,er.ritory, they as x general rule paid 
some tax ill recogliition of this fact, and all 
Afgllan Deputy-Governor generally resided alllong 
them as tlle representative of the Afglian Goverllor 
of EIerat. 
Sucll being the case-and tliese facts have been 
estal~lishecl beyond cloubt-it was only natural that 
tlie Alnir of 1C:~l)ul sllould have tnlren steps to 
vindicate his sovereign rights over the Panjcleh 
district as sooil as it hecaine kilown tliat tlle 
Russia~is llacl oc.:cupied Merv a i d  liad begun to 
tainper with his s ~ ~ l ~ j e c t s  on tlle Murghab. Troops 
were 1)11sbecI forward to Maimana and Bala 
Murgllnb iii April 1884, and by tlle commence- 
illelit of tlie followiilg June an Afghan garrisoii 
occupied Pai~jcleli aiid took possession of Alr Tep6, 
1v11el.e tliey began tlle construction of a fort on tlie 
huge t,uinulus at the juilction of the Kuslik and 
Murgllal~ rivers wliicll gives its name to tlie locality 
(' Wllite Hill ' ). 
As soon as the E~lssian Gover~~ment heard of 
t.liis ~novement on tlie part of the Afghans, tliey 
: ~ h  once prott?sl;c!il agnillst tllc clespntcl~ of Afgh:tn 
1,roopsto I'n~~jclcli, nild disputed the Amir's claim to 
t,ll:tt p1:~ce on tlle ground tlmt it dicl not form a por- 
tion of 1:11(! tcrl*it oric!s (rf tlle kingdoin of k'abulm~hich 
werct. :~ctually in l~ossession of the Ainir Sllei-e Ali, 
: L I ~  t,ll:~t ih tllerr!f.in:e was not included within the 
1-)oun(laries of Af'gl~nr.~istan :IS iisecl by the agree- 
I f , 'l'l~cy invil;ed the attention of the 
nrit.isll Gc,varrirric?l~ t to t l ~ :  f : ~ t  that it was only 
in cu, lsccluancx: of 1;hc engagement which Great 
F a 
Britain had entered into to use all its influence to 
prevent the Amir of Afghanistan from committing 
aggressions that they had ultilnately agreed to the 
limitary line as set forth in the agreement of 1873 ; 
2nd as it had been arranged that the delimitation 
of the frontier should be carried out in accordance 
rnitll the terins of that agreement, they expresseil 
n hope that the Anlir would be led to understand 
that the best guarantee for the secu~ity of his pos- 
sessions was to be found ' not in the exlension of 
his own possessions, but much more in a friendly 
understanding between the two Great Powers.' 
Fronl the preceding accouilt of the Panjdeh 
district and its various inhabitants, it will be seen 
that tlle Russia11 Government were incorrect in their 
statement that Panjdeh did not form a portion 
of Afghanistan during the reign of Shere Ali. 
Although Afghan troops had noL been permanently 
located there, the Turkornan settlers had never- 
theless always recognised the Amir's sovereignty, 
and Shere Ali's authority in particular was upheld 
by n Naib named Kafar Beg, who was placed in 
charge of the district by the yonilg Governor of 
Herat, Yakoob Khan. The fact that the Afghans 
had not permanently nlaintained a garrison in 
Pmjdeh was no proof that the district was 
illdependent of Afghanistan, ancl afforded no reason 
why the Amir sllould not have sent troops there 
whenever he desired to clo so ; for if a permanent 
garrison is lo be considered as the only true test of 
possession, there are no frontiers in the world 
which could not be violated on similar grounds. 
Panjdell liad been Afghan territory for a long 
course of years, slid llussia knew it, and acknow- 
ledged it  in tlie reign of Sliere Ali, and to that very 
Amir Ililnself ; for wllen StolietofY visited I<abul in 
:878 for tlie purpose of concluding an offensive 
and defensive alliance wit11 tlle Arnir Sllere Ali, 
one of his requests mas that the Eussians should 
be permitted to co~lstruct a road ' to Herat vid the 
I'Ianun Biver (Oxus), tlie plain of Iiidlrho (Andhkui), 
13a1a Murghnb, M,zruchak, Taiiili (Panjdeh) a i d  
Firoz Koh.' ' If I'ailjdeh did not l~cloiig to Sliere 
Ali, 1vhy did Stolietoff aslr: tlie Amir's permissioii to 
construct a road t~lirough that district? When it  
suited Irlussia's purpose, she ack~iowledged that 
Panjdeh v a s  an rlfgllan possession; but wlien 
times llnd cllangcd, axld slic found it to be to ller 
advantage to c:dl b1:~:lck white nncl to clispute facts, 
she founcl tliat slie was well served by inen who 
liar1 frequently p1:yecl the same game on previous 
occasions, and thus the Afgllnn Pnnjdeli of 1878 
became i11 1886 n district which hacl never bee11 an 
Afglian possession an(1 had never belonged to the 
Amir Sllere Ali! 
For so~ilc montlls after the Afgllrhnn occupation 
of the I':~ilj~le11 district ilotliing oc~usred on the 
Murgh:~L to c1ist1zl.b tlie pc:Ice in t l~nt  portion of 
tlie frontier. Tlle liussi:~~is knew that their forces 
at  Merv ancl in tlic Alcknl Oasis .tIrcre insuficient 
to ennblc t l ic~n to inakc, an attcnipt to expcl the 
ASgliun garr'isori wliich had est:~blishetl i~aelf in llle 
Soc Corrc~pondonco rcepootiug Ccnbrd Asia. No. 1 (ltJ7tJ), 
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angle between the Kushlc and Murghab strcaills ; 
they were therefore coinpelled to wait till reinlbrce- 
lllents arrivecl from Turkestan and the Caucasus, 
and, above all, they consiclel.ed it to 1~e advisable 
to ascertaiil if the British escort would bc lsermilted 
to march to Herat without molestation, or whether, 
as many Russiails believecl, the Afghans ~ ~ o u l d  
display their hostility towards tlie Eiiglisll by at- 
tacking Colonel Ridgeway's party during its long 
and difficult journey. 
But while the Russians were tllus waiting for 
reinforcements and watching f'or the commence- 
ment of complications betweell the English and 
Afghans, Xoinaroff and his restless lieutenant, 
Alikhanofc utilised the iilterval by despatcliing 
sinall partics along the Murghab, to obtain inform- 
ation regarding tlie strength and position of the 
Afghan garrison at Parijdeh, and to secure a foot- 
ing in the valley to tlie south of Yulata-n. These 
movements commenced in September 1854 by tlie 
despatch of an oficer with a small escort of Turko- 
man horsemen, who, under the plea of liuntirlg 
for mediciilal herbs, wandered about the valley, 
and coi~tinued his explorations until required to 
leave by the Alghan commandall t. This recon- 
naissance-for such it undoubtedly was-m-as 
follomecl early ill November by thr, clespatcll of 
a~iother ofricer with a party of' Russian. troopers, 
and on this occasioii tlie intruclers aclvanced 
several miles beyoizil Yulatan, and est:~blislied :L 
siviall supply del10t at n place c::~llcil Snndu1;- 
ICucl~an, so111c tell iniles to the 11orll1 of Sari Yszi. 
Such was the state of axairs when Sila Peter 
Lumsdell reached Saraklls on Noven~ber 6, 1884. 
The s i t u a h l  was f ~ d l  of clan~er ; the excitelnellt P 
among the border tribes was increasing in conse- 
quence 01 the delay in the arrival of the Russian 
cornmissioucr, and because of the gradual all- 
proach 01 Mussian troops towarcls the Afghan 
outposts, whilst; the possibility of a satisfactory 
settlement of the Lo unclary qllestion waEt claily 
becomiug Inore remote on account of tlie bitter 
feelings which were rapigly arising bot,h in Eng- 
land and Russia. It seemed almost as if the ques- 
tion of peace or war mas t o  be depenclelit on tlze 
cliscre tion of the Eassian and Afghan outpost 
comm:uzdel-s, and in this emergency Sir Peter 
Lurnsclen l?asi;enecl fro~ii Sarakhs to Kusaiz, and, 
after mceling the Iaclian contingent at that place, 
he proceeded with an escort of fifty horselnen to 
Panj dell. 
On reaching AB TepQ the general was received 
will1 great cordiality by tlie chief and elders of the 
Sarilr Turkomans, by Yaluntasl~ Khan, chief of tlie 
Jmshiclis, and by his brother, Aminullah Khan, 
while General Ghaus-nd-din Khan, the Afghan 
conimandmt, came out to meet hill1 at the head 
Lumtidon dcficribes Ak Top6 in tho following worde:- 'Ak 
Top;, ~vhich covers tho northern npproclches to Panjdoh, is a, 
nt~turfil l l l o ~ ~ n d  in tho co~ltro of the valley with a command of 
xotno 100 foot above tho snrrounding country, but itself com- 
~ntuldcd f ~ o m  hoights across tho Murghoh at a distance of gome 
1,'LOO ~ I L Y ~ H .  It has I L ~  801no timc 11ee.n built over n,nd usod ao e 
fort, and tho Afghan troops wcra busy at work intrenching the 
wholo pobition, vhich ia a strong:ono, excopt agdnst artillery.' 
of liis troops, and causecl a salute to be fired in his 
honour. I-Ie there fo~~iicl that tlie inhabitants aiiil 
Alghan oiEcials liacl been tl~rowii into a great 
state of alarm by fresh movements of the Iiussian 
troops in tlie valley or the Murghab. I t  appears 
that as soon as tlie ' Britisli Cloilliilissioner left 
Sarakl~s for Kusaii, Alilrliailoff set OK post-haste 
for Merv, and takiiig wj th liini 150 liorseinen, moved 
tl~rough Yulatan to the ruins of IIazret Iinaiii, 
where he formed a junctioil wit11 General Koma~ofI', 
who had previously arrived at tliat place with 300 
troopers from Sarak1is.l News of this moveinelit 
reacliecl Pailjdeh on November 18, xrlieii Gllans-ud- 
din at once reported the niatter to tlie Governor 
of Herat, and o~dered up reiiiforcements from 
Marucl~nlc and Bala Murgliab. Yaluiltash I<11a11 
immediately resporiclecl to the call, aiid starling olr' 
with 400 infantry and 200 horsemen, a~r ived  at 
Panjdeh on the 2211il, to find, however, t1i:~t tlie 
danger had passed away, and that tlie llussinils 
had once agaiii retired toward the iiorlli. 
Moving from IIazret Irna~ii along tlie bank of 
the river, the Russians-led, be it rememl~erecl, Ly 
the Goverilors of tlie Trans-Caspian district ancl 
of Merv-occupied Airnak Jar oil November 21, 
froin wliicli place Geilc?ral ICoinnroll' sudilcnly rc- 
turned towards Merv, while Alil\rlinriolI' colitiiinccl 
liis advance, after lie liacl sent a troopcr on :~lieacl 
to illform Gliaus-ud-din of liis des i~e  for :~ii iriter- 
r 1  view. llie AJgl~ali coinnianclei., tliercu~,un, sell1 :L 
messenger to st:lte tliut Iic slioulcl 1i:~vc reccivcd 
IComaroff loft Morv on Novornlror 10. 
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earlier intiination that a meeting was desired, and 
informed the Russian officer tllat if he waited 
vhere he was the interview mroulcl be promptly 
accorded. Alikl~anoff, however, would not halt, 
but insisted on moving forward in spite of t l ~ e  
repeated protests of the Afghan officials; and i~ 
was only when he had arrived within a short 
distance of the Afghan positioi~ that he evelltually 
was forced to halt by the receipt of a distinct 
wariling that any further advance m7ould be made 
at his peril. IIe the11 addressed a most insulting 
and provocative letter to the Afghan Colnmalzdant, 
ailcl after waiting for a reply, in wliich Gllaus-ud- 
din boldly drew attention to the treachery of llis 
proceedings, he, on the following morning, retraced 
his steps towards Merv. 
111 coilsequence of these tllreatening demon- 
strations on the part of the Russians, General 
Ghaus-ud-clin Khau sent a small picquet to Sari 
Yazi for the purpose of obtaining timely warning 
of ally further moveinents against his position at 
Ak Tepk. In taking this step he merely did what 
any good soldier in his position would have done 
under similar circ~~mstances, for he knew tllat the 
Russians were padually concentrating troops at 
Merv, ancl from tlle advance of armed reconnais- 
sance pr t ies  along the Murgliab Valley towards 
Panjdelz he had good grounds for believing that a 
serious attaclr was about to be made against his 
position in the Panjdeh district. Had he takenno 
steps to secure his troops fl-0111 a surprise he mould 
have beell guilty of gross dereliction of duty, and 
so long as he clid not cross the recognisecl fron- 
tier of Afghanistan he was perfectly j~zstifieil in 
establishing an outpost well in aclvance of his 
maill position. Sari Yazi was within the frontier 
of Afghanis tan as generally understood both in 
England ancl Eussia a t  that time,' ancl Llle establish- 
ment of an Afghan piccluet at that place cannot; 
therefore be consiclered to coilstitute a reasonable, 
excuse for the Russian aclvailce ~ ~ h i c l i  ltook placc 
soon afterwards. 
After the Afghans took possession of Sari Yazi 
tlie Russians made no f ~ ~ r t h e r  advances for the 
next two months, and the chief interest in the 
Rounclary Question ouce inore became ceiltrecl in 
the negotiations which were beirig carried 01.1 
1)etween Lonclon ancl St. Petersburg. On October 
15, 1884, Sir E. Thornton llacl all interview wit11 
General Zelenoi ancl M. ZinovielT, the IIeacl of the 
Asiatic Departmerit in the Russian Foreign Ofice, 
when the Russian oIhcers atated that they feared 
:that the Boundary Commission woulcl result in  
failure unless a zone sliould be first agreed nl~oli 
between the two Governments witliin wllicll [;he 
Comn~issioilers shoulcl be instl.ucted to consiiler 
Evon AlilrlianofT, the Govol*noy of Morv, acltnowl(~clgci1 tlial 
Snri Yi~zi  WRH at nll ovoiit~ not boyond tlio Afglinn fivonLicr, for oil 
Xovombor 10, 1884, Sir I'clcr L~mlsclon roporleil thtrt lio lir~il l iul 
cm iiitorviow oil tlitrt ilny with Aliltlia~iof'f, on w1iic:h oactwioli hlio 
B~issian oficor, aftcr a loi~g convorsrrtion, inforiiicd h in~ llicrl ' 1110 
bomidary balwocii Ynlc~tmi rbnd l'finjileh ~vns  a l  Sari Yazi on the 
hf~wghab.' Seo altio tho ~tntolnonts iiinilo Iry lior11 Qm~l~*i l lo  aliil 
Lord Eilmntid Pitzmn~~rioo o ~ i  hlnrch 3, IHHT,, Lllr~t lhn %itlfil{ar 
l'nst;, Ali-Robut, Stlri Yazi, and I'111.i.khitiLi woro rrll within Afghr~n 
tomilor y, 
- - 
where the north-western boundary of Afgl~anistan 
nzigllt lie, and outside of which they should not 
ex-tend their explorations. This suggestion was 
in itself a ~easonable one, but when tlie Russian 
Government some six weeks later (November 26) 
clefined what they considered should be tlie 
nortliern and souther11 limits of t.lle proposed zone, 
the extravagance of their proposal at once became 
evident, for not only did they suggest that the 
norther11 bouildary of the zone should start from 
Daulatabacl--a poilit on the f-leri-Rud at some 
distance to tlie soutl~, of Saralrhs-but they also 
proposed that the soutlleril liinit sllould be formed 
by a line followii~g tlie crests of the Paropamisus 
Range as far as the Ardevan Pass, and thence past 
B d a  1VTurgliab and Aridkliui to h%,oja Sale.' 
In spite of the one-sidedness of this suggestiorl 
tlie 13ritisl1 Cabinet, in their desire to arrive at a 
peaceful solution of the ~ l ~ c u l t y ,  accepted. the 
norther11 limit of the zone proposed by Russia, but 
they refused to agree to any southern limit, as they 
did not wish on the one hand to fetter the freedom 
of the action of the Cornmission ia districts as to 
the possession of which real doubts might be found 
to exist, nor, on the other hand, &d they clesire to 
iillply even a possibility of doubt as to the rights 
of the Amir of Afgllanistan over the districts so 
far south as the soutliern line proposed by 1Eussia. 
I t  is unnecessary to enter into an account of  
' This southorn limit run solno milcs to Ihc soutl~ of Zul6lr~x 
and Mni~~chak,  and approclchocl to within sixtoon miles of the cit'y 
of EIerat.'. 
tlie subsequeilt negotiations regarding this ques- 
tioil of a zone witllin which the Coln~llission was to 
limit its investigations, and it is sufficient merely 
to state that the Russian Goverilmeilt eventually 
cleclined to sencl their Comi~iissioner to the Afghan 
frontier uiltil the matter had been settled ; and as 
tlle British Cabinet. refused to accept their extra- 
vagaiit clemands, they, on Jailuary 28, 1885, pro- 
l ~ ~ ~ e c l  a definite frontier-line on the condition that 
the Afghans sl~ould not erect fortifications be- 
tween the line so proposed and tlie crest of the 
I'nro~ainisus Range. The memorand~~m contain- 
ing this new suggestioll was conveyed to England 
by 14. Lessas, and froin that time the discreet 
young railway engineer took a prolninent part in 
the negotiations. 
Tlie line th~ls uggested was defined by M. cle 
Giers in the following words : l- 
' Starting from a point on the right ba lk  of the 
Heri-Rnd situated at a distance of about ten 
versts south of Zoulfagar, the line woulcl run by 
Kehrizi-Xlias and Kehrizi-Soumk to the rivulet of 
Yegri-Gueuk, - would follow the crest of the I 
heights wliich fringe the right bank of this rivulet, 
as far as the ruins of Tchemenibid, and then the 
chain of hills from the right bank of the Kouschk 
- 
as far as Havuzi Khan, whence it would run to 
I t  is interesting to note tho exact wording of the proposnl, 
because this bounduy-line, which was rejected as such by the 
Gladstonian Cabinet in March, 1885, was, with tho exception of o, 
slight modification at its wefitern extremity, procisoly the same a8 
the frontier-lint which was eventnnlly accepted by that Ministry 
after the Russian8 attaclced and defeated the Afghans at Psnjdeh. 
a point situntecl to tlie 11orl;li of Meruchak, ~ ~ ~ l i i ~ l ~  
would be left to Afglisiiistan. From this p o i ~ ~ t  
tlie line of frontier would follow the crest of the 
lleigllts which to the north border the valley of 
Hai'sor, ancl to the west that of Sangalak, . and 
leaving A~ldllioi' to the east, it would reach Khojs 
Sale on the Amou-Da~ia.' 
Tliis suggestion meant nothing lllore nor less 
tllari that the British Government should agree, 
without a prelimiiiary investigation on tlle spot, 
Lllat Iiussia should appropriate Pa11jdeh ailcl the 
other clistricts to tlie nortll of the proposed boun- 
dnrp-line, in spite of tlie fact that tliose districts 
were claimed as portions of Afghanistan, and 
,zltliough it liar1 been previously arranged that the 
true frontier should be laid do~vn by Coiilmis- 
sioilers norniilated by the two Governments. It  
c:~l~not be vonderecl at, tllerefore, tlzat on the 13th of 
the following Marc11 Lord Granville informed tlie 
Russiail Ambassador in London that Her ltajesty's 
Govel.nment weye uilable to agree to the proposed 
Dontier-line, or to the conditions annexed to it, as, 
from the information in t,heir possession, the true liile 
of Afghan bounclary voulcl run from Shir Tep6 on 
the Heri-Bud to S a ~ i  Yazi on the' Murghab, ancl 
thence dong tlie slrirts of the cultivation of 
1Mailnana and Aildkllui to fCl~oja Sale. Ee, how- 
ever, statecl that tlie British Cabinet still. adhered 
to their opinion tliat tlie boundary sllould be 
tracecl on tlie spot by the British md Russian 
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Commissioners, and with this view they were pre- 
pared to agree that the frontier-line proposed by 
Russia should form the southern limit of the zone 
of investigation ; the ilorthern limit being the 
above-l~entioi~ed line from Shir Tepk to Sari Yazi, 
and thence to Khoja Sale. 
I t  will be seen that in malring this counter- 
proposal the British Government, in their intense 
anxiety l;o avoid war, really assented to a possible 
and most probable curtailment of the territories 
~rhich they believed to belong to Afghanistan. 
For many years, as has been repeatedly mentioned, 
the true north-western frontier of Afghanistall was 
considered, both in Russia and Bllgland, to be a 
line running from Sarakhs to Khoja Sale. But, in 
spite of this fact, the British Cabinet first agreed 
to abandon Sarakhs and to consent to a zone of in- 
vestigation which should be limited to the nortll 
by a line running from Daulatabad through 
ITazret .Imam. By this concession i t  was made 
eviclen t that they would accept sonie frontier-line * 
which at  all events would not be to the north of 
those two places, and would, therefore, be more 
achantageous to Russia than the old Saralchs- 
Khoja Sale boundary. But this would not satisfy 
'the Muscovites. Their outposts were grsdually 
pushed southwards ; and then, after their troops 
hacl seized important positions in the clel3atecl 
territory, and after several moilths spent in nego- 
tiations, Ei1gla.nc1 made further . concessioi~s by 
placing the northern limit of the zone still more to 
the south, and at the same Liine suggesting that t,lle 
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southern liinit slionld be the line extending from 
a point six miles to the soutli of Zulfikar, past 
Karez Sumblla and Maruchalc to IChoja Sale. 
Tl~rouglzout these negotiations not one word 
was said-as might very reasonably have been 
done-of extending the zone of investigation to 
the north of the old Sarakhs-Khoja Sale line, and 
th.e Britislz Govenlnient honestly adhered to the 
spirit of their former agreements by making no 
suggestion that the iilcluiry of the Commissioners 
sllould extend over any portion of the country to 
the iiortll of tliat line. Witli tlze Russians, hom- 
ever, tlie case was different. As soon as Merv was 
annexed they clisputed the old-recognised frontier, 
and the inore the Xnglislz conceded. the more 
extravagant becanze tlzeir demaiids ; and thus Lord 
Granville's last proposal of March 13 was rejected 
by tlze Russian Foreign Office, and the BI-itislz 
Government was plainly given to understand that 
if they wished that the Russian Cominissioner 
should meet Sir Peter Luinsden, a further conces- 
sion woulcl have to be made by their acceptance 
of the definite frontier-line proposed in the Russian 
inelnorandurn of January 28, 1885. 
The clespatch containing this rejection of Lord 
Granville's proposal was written on March 27, ancl 
tbree days later a serious collision occurrecl between 
the Russian aizcl Afghan troops on the Murglzab, 
~rlli~11 renclers it necessary that the military move- 
ments on the Afghan frontier should once more be 
co~lsidel.e(l. 
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Ya,zi, about tell nniles to the south of Sanduk 
Kuchan, wllere tlie Russian outpost was esttt- 
blished. 
Early in February 1886 a, party of Cos~acl<~, 
100 strong, thrcatened to attack the Afghan 
picrluet at Sari-Yazi, and then pushed past it and 
occupied Airn:llc Jar, which is some three miles 
fartlier to tlie south. By this sudden movement 
the Russians deliberately c~ossecl tlie line which 
AliktlanolT himself had 9cknowledged to be the 
t;rue boundary between t,he Panj cleh and Yulatan 
districts ; asii as the Afghan picc~uet was thus 
placed in a dangerously isolated position, the 
Amir's representative-Kazi-Saacl-ud-din Khan- 
asl<ecl Sir Peter Lumsden's aclvice as to whether the 
Russians sllould be clriven back by force. The 
British Commissioner, however, was most anxious 
to prevent any collision, ancl he therefore told the 
Afgllans to vithdraw their troops from Sari-Yazi 
to some point to tlle south of Aimak Jar, bui; 
advised thein to inform the Russians that any 
further movement towards I'anjdeh would be 
resisted by force. Be at the same time wrote to 
hlikhnnoff, poillting out the necessity of both sides 
avoiding friction, and proposing that as the Afghans 
would limit their patrolling to the country to the 
sonth of Orush Dushan, he should in like manner 
abstain from advancing beyond Sari.-Yazi. 
But Lumsden's pacific overtures were of no 
avail, and the Russians no longer attempted to 
conceal their int;ent;ion to seize d l  the most im- 
por tan t point,s on the principal avenues leading to 
VOIJ. 11. 0 
Herat. Cossack detachments were pushed foward 
to Zulfikar and Ak-Robat ; the Afghans were forced 
to fall back from Orush Dushaii (on the Murgbab), 
and a Russian post was established at Xzil  TepB ; 
Alilil~anoff began to write letters to the Sariks 
of Panjdeh, instigating them to rise against tlle 
Afghans, and threatening them with the c o n k -  
cation of their flocks of sheep in the event of non- 
coinpliance ; and on March 1 6  a party of Russians 
even tried to push past the Afghan intrenchments 
at Ak-Tepd. 
As soon as it became known that the Russians 
1 had commenced a fresh movement toward Herat 
the British Foreign Ofice made a strong represen- 
tation to the Russian Government, pointing out 
the disastrous consecluences which would i ~ l e v i t a b l ~  
result froin such continued aclvances, urging that 
orders might, be issued for the witlldrawal of the 
advanced detachments at Zulfiliar and on the 
Murghab, and engaging that the Afghans on their 
side would not advance from their position before 
Panjdeh. This cominunication was met by a 
distinct relusal on the part of the Russian Govern- 
ment to eva,cunte the points -cvhich had been seizeil 
by their troops ; but they at the snllie time declareil 
that the Russian troops woulrl advance no farthey, 
Rizil Top6 i~ a rnonnil on tho loft bank of tho I<nslllc river, 
one mile to tho nortli of Pnl-i-klii~ti, and about tlio snmo distnnco 
from the confluence of tho ICnshlc r~nil Mnrghnb ~ t ~ + e r ~ i l l ~ .  
1'111-i-ltllisti, or tho Briclc Briilgo,' is LL Lriilge or niilo srclios 
spanning tllo river ICnshlc nt n (list1~17~o OP 1~h01lt ~ I I P ~ ! o - ( ~ I I I L ~ ~ o ~ ~ H  
n, mile to tllc ~ioutli-wosi of Alt-Tep6. I t  in c~lao cnllod I)nsli.I~opri, 
nnd is thns roferrod to ill tho Rnssinu rcgorts. 
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and that the most stringent h a d  been issued 
to the co~nrnanclants of Russiw posts to abstain by 
dl means from anything wllich could Cause a 
conflict with the Afghan troops. 
011 the strength of this assurance Mr. Gladstone, 
on March 13, inaile a statelllellt ill the Youse of 
Cominolls to the effect tllat i t  had  been agreed 
between England and Russia, t h a t  no f a r t h e r  
advance sllould be made bj7 tile Russian or Afgllall 
forces respecbively to poillts withill the debated or 
clebatable ground. 111 orcler, however, Lhat t h e r e  
mioht be no mistake reprdillg th is  nlat.l;er, t l ie  P British Ambassador at St. Pe tersburg  was in- 
i 
t .  
i structed to  inquire of M. de Giel-s whe the r  he agreed 
F that the assurances which liacl been given. 1nig11L 
1 
correctly be held to coiistit,ute an  a g r e e m e n t  to t h e  
effect stated by the P.rime Minister ; and n few days 
later the answer. was received tha t  ' the R-clssian 
forces would not adva~~ce from the positions t h e y  
now occupy providecl that the Afghans should 
not advance nor atlack tllein, or uiiless some ex- 
traorclinary circumstances should l l appen ,  such as 
a disturbance in Pa,njdeh.' This fresh promise was 
i given b y  M, de Giers to Sir E. T l l o r n t o n  on 
.I Marc11 16, 1885, and two days later  the R u s s i a n  1 Foreign Minister again informed the B r i t i s h  A ~ b a s s a d o . ~  Lllat Mr. Gladstone's s t a t e m e n t  in t h e  
I House of Colnmons was a faithful r ep resen ta t . i oa  
1 of the declarations given by tlie Russian Govern- 
ment, and that the agreement t h u s  e n t e r e d  into 1 had received the approvd of his Majesty the Czar.. Unfkrtullately, tlle proinise so g iven  was of 1x0 
li fi Q 9 
greater value than the many similar pledges which 
had been give11 011 previous occesioas, only to 
be broken one after the other; ailcl it will soon 
be shown how the Russian troops not only did 
aclvance beyond the positions which they occupied 
on March 16 ,  but actually made a deliberate and 
unprovolced attack against the Afghan positioil 
before Pandjeh. 
While the St. Petersbarg authorities were pro- 
testing that they had no intention of making ally 
further advances, reinforcements were being 
rapidly pushed forward up the Murghab, and 
on March 25 General Komarofl arrived at Kizil 
Tepd with a force of some 1,500 men, with the 
avowed intention of driving the Afghans out of 
their intrenched position at Alc TepB aiid Pul-i- 
khisti. This advance of the main body of Russia11 
troops, although undoubtedly a hostile demonstra- 
tion, a a s  not contrary to the agreement of March 16, 
for the Russians were in possession of Kizil Tepd 
at the time when tllat agreement was macle ; but, 
as the subsequent movements of the Russians were 
directly opposed to the terms of the agreement, i t  is 
necessaryto mention that ahen  M. de Giers promised 
that the Russian troops would not advance beyond 
the positions they then occupied, Icizil Tepd was 
their most advanced post in the Murghab Valley, 
and the Afghan position at that time extended from 
the right banlc of the Murghab river to a point some 
distance to the west of the Pul-i-lchisti bridge. If 
Komaro~,  therefore, had remained at Kizil Tepd, 
and had talcen care to prevent his t,roops from 
advancing ally closer to tlie Afghan position, the 
subsequent conflict would not have occurred, and 
Russia would not have laid herself open to the 
charge of having violated the proinise which she 
had given that her troops urould ~nalte no farther 
advance. He, however, having massed his force 
almost within range of the Afghan position, deter- 
mined to push matters to extremities,and made daily 
attempts to provoke the Afghans, ancl thus to in- 
duce them to commeilce the conflict. For this pur- 
pose a party of about 100 horsemen advanced in 
a threatening manner froin Kizil Tepci: towards Pul- 
i-khisti on Marc11 26 ; and again on the following 
day two bodies of Bussian trool~s siinultaneously 
advanced, puslled past the Afghan picquets, and 
tried to turn both flanks of the Argl~an p0sition.l 
In spite of these hostile delnonstrations the 
Afghans displayed remarkable forbearance and 
control, and would not permit themselves to be 
clram into a conflict; and when Komaroff found 
that he could not provoke them to fire the first 
shot, he-on March 29-sent an ultimatum to the 
011 this occnsion AliltlinnoTf, wit11 300 ho~scmon, pushor1 
tllrougll tho Afg1:hon picquets 11oforo Pul-i-khi~ti, snd n t ton~ptd  to 
runch Pnnjdoll round Iho loft flnnlr of tho ACg11nr1 position, but wns 
forced to ro tnn~ by n euporior Af~llnn forco rnl~ich wns senl in 
pursuit ; whilo r ~ t  ho snttla tirno 250 Xuuuinll infirntry ccro~socl tho 
Mnrgllnb and n~ovod ro~lntl tho iqight flnlzlr of tlio po~ition, but thoy 
nluo fell L~LCIC w1ie11 tho ACglin~ls bnrred tlicir wny by rill oclunl 
forco, nnil wnrnoil Llio Enrtsinn oflicor thnt if 110 ntlvo,ucod fi~rthor 
110 would bo firoil upon. I t  A~CILICU hig1:hly for tho ftrrbonrrnlae 
of Llle Afgl~rnls thlkt thoy on t ho~c  occa.sione did rlot fir0 on tho 
Rllssinns, mlio opnnly cli~pllryod their llo~tilo ir~to~ltions by forci~ig 
tho picquets and by advnnailig boyond tho flnnlm of tho Afgl~l~n 
position. 
TI-IE PANJDEII INCILIENT 
Afghan commander, requiring that every single 
Afghan soldier should be withdrawn from the left 
bank of the Kushlr by that evening, and that the 
Afghan posts on the right bank of the Murghnb 
sllould not advance beyond the co~flueilce of the 
I<ushk and 1Eurghab. As soon as this letter was 
received Captain k'ate-wl~o was in Panjdell, 
m~~tching events-obtained an interview wit11 
Colonel Zalrr-chevski, Komaroff's chief of the sta.ff, 
and, after explaining that the Afghans' position was 
the same as they hacl occupied on March 16 ,  h e  
earnestly asked that the ultimatum might be  re- 
considered. Ghaus-ucl-din Khan also sent a letter to 
Iiomaroff stating that he was preparecl to meet the 
Russian commander's wishes as far as possible b y  
altering the position of picqucts and vedettes i n  
LS ' 
J front of his position, although he was in other ! 11 respects bou~id to loyally obey the orders which he  
hail received froin his master, the Anir. 
But Komaroff was not to be turned froin his 
I purpose. He would accept llothing less than the 
, 4 '  
entire evacuation of the Afghan intrerlchments on 
the left balllr of the Kuslik ancl the withdrawal of 
their posts on the right bank of the Murghab, 
lrilowing f~111 well that if his terms were coinplied 
with Ak-Tepi! would have been no longer tenable, 
and the Afghans mould have been obliged t o  
abandon the whole of their position and fall back 
to the south of Panjdeh. Compliance with such 
an extravagant demand was, however, quite im- 
possible. Ghaus-ucl-din had received distinct 
orders to defend the Panjdeh district ; he had been 
told by Sir Peter Lulnsden that ally farther 
Russian advance should be resisted ; ancl as this 
colnmunication from tlie British Cominissioner was 
made in accorclance with instructions received from 
the British G~verilrnent,~ he without doubt acted 
rightly in fefusing to agree to terms which woulcl 
have necessitated the abandonment of his position. 
What followed is almost too well lcnown to 
need relating. On the following day the Russiaus 
attacked the Afglian intrenchments, aacl, although 
the defenders oKered a stul~born resistallce and 
suffered a loss of 900 men, they had no chance 
against their better arrnecl opponents, and were 
soon driven in coi~fusion towarcls Hernt.2 After 
the battle a temporary aclminisl;ration, uilcler 
Russian control, was formed in the Panjdeli district, 
and the 1311ssiaii forces were then withdrnvrrn to the 
le.ft baiilr of the Xushk. The British Commissioner, 
with his staff and escorl;, at oxice fell back from 
Gulran, and after an arduous inarch over the 
Paropa~uisus range reacllecl l'irpul, near ICusnn, 
with a loss of three Afghan troopers and eight 
followers. 
When the news of this iigllt reachecl Ellgland 
011 April 7 all llopes of a peaceful settle~lierit of 
On Mnrch 3 Lord Grnnvillo wrote to Sir Poter Lnrnsdo~i as 
follows : ' 1-Tor M d e s l y ' ~  Govorn~nont citnnol ndviso tho Afglian~ 
to attncb tho RU~H~&II  troops in order to clislorlgo thorn from tho 
positions Lhoy now occ~~py,  but IIcr i'vInjcrit!l'a (foveriz?newt 
coizsido?. lkut t7~o f r ~ ~ t l l o .  advenoo of t l~o 13t~s~ ians  SJLOZLZ~, aubjool 
to r n i l i t c r , ~ ? ~  co?uidr~cttiona, be ~eBZ'~frd 11y tho AL11han8.' 
111 hhin nflnir tho 1%11nr;i1~ns IWQ R I L ~ ~  to I I I L X ~ ~  lofll one off ic~r  
(T~wlro~nnn) end ten men killed, encl three oflicor~ find twenty-nine 
nlen W O I I I I ~ O ~ .  
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tile frontier difficulties were rudely dispellecl, 
and a conviction prevailed tllrougllout the country 
t,hat war was inevitable. I t  was evident that the 
question had entered upon a dangerous phase ; 
and as it  did not appear likely that Eussia would 
her troops or ciisavow tlie actio~is of her 
agents, no  one was surprised to see tliat the 
Millistry was being bor~lc along, i11 spite of the 
well-known sympatllies of its leacler, on a roacl 
which could have no other issue than the bntt,le- 
field. In India also, where the sitaatiun was 
better understood, the eff'ect of this iutelli; C I ~ C ~  
was even greater; and it was generally believed 
that tlie time had at last arrived ~vller~ Iiussia's 
advances mroulcl. have to be clieckeil by force of 
arms, and that tlie great struggle for mastery in 
Asia was about to coinmeIice. 
Preparations for war were ral~idly puslieil 
forward ill bot,h countries : fast crixisers, selected 
from amongst the finest s l i ipmf the rnercautile 
~narine, were chnrterecl by Governnle~lt for the 
p ~ q o s e  of protecting Britisli comrncrce, and to 
liarass tlie enemy's trade ; tlie troops which h:~d 
been sent to Egyl~t  for furtlicr oper:~tions ill tlic 
Soudan were stop~)ed at S o ~ ~ n l i i n ~  :/lltl ot,llc~r pni~ll s 
on the irlni~i ro:~il to India ; o~uders .nrere issuecl lor 
the rapid slzpplgr uf  ariiis ant1 :utu~nrndtion, ntltl ror 
tlle pse~~ara t io i~  of' n grc:~t rl:t~r:~1 sclu:~'l~.c I I L  lor 
oper:~l,ious in Russia11 w;ttcrs ; : ~ ~ l t l  011 Apl'il 27, 
Mr. Glnclsloue nslieil 111~: TIousc uf Clo~n~lioll~ for a 
vote of' credit of 11 ,OOO,OOO1.l 
Of Illis HLIU 4,500,0001. wnb asliuil for to covcr tho eoet of tllo 
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Oil th is  occasion, ill the course of a brilliant . 
slid successful speech, the Prime Minister declared 
that h e  ancl liis colleagues had laboured, and would 
to labour, for an liononrable settlement 
by pacific means ; then, after sketiching the outline 
of the facts of tlie case, lie alluded to the agree- 
ment of March; 10, ailil expressed the opinions of 
the Goverllirlent in the followiilg weighty worcls : 
I: Sir, it was a very soletnn covenant, involvirig 
great issues. 'I'liere were tllousands of men-on 
the one side stsiiding for their counttry, a i d  on tlle 
other s ick for what they tliouglit their patriotic 
duty-placed in a position of dangerous contiguity 
and in rlanger of bloody collision. Tliis engage- 
iiient came between the danger and the people 
exposed to i t ;  nncl we believed that it woulcl be 
recogaisecl as one of the most sacrecl covenants 
ever m r ~ d e  between two great nations, ancl tllal; 
tliere woulcl be rivalry betwken the two Powers to 
sift the iricicleiits h a t  followcd to the end, and how 
it caiile d ~ o u t ,  and who ailcl wliere were the 
Ijersons upor1 ~ l i o n i  the responsibility reStec1. -All 
this, sir ,  remains in suspense. 
' MTllat liappcneil ? The bloody engagement 
of March  30 follotireil tlle covenant. I sliaU. over- 
state ~iothing.  I shall not purposely overstate 
aiiytliing. All I say is this--that t11at woeful 
engageluent of Marc11 30 clistinci;ly sllowed tliai; \ 
operations in the Sourlnn, wl~ilo tho romoiiling G,R00,0001. wns 
for ~ p o c i n l  p r o l ~ ~ ~ r n t i o i ~ ~  ill cnli~iootion will1 tho Afgl~nn dillicnlty, 
viz. four i~ l i l l io i i~  for thc nruy, ~lilil LWO and a half' millions for tho 
navy. 
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one party or both had, either through ill-will or 
through unfortunate mishap, failed to fulfil the 
ement. conditions of the engag 
' W e  considered it, and we coilsicler it still, to 
be the duty of botli countries-and, above all, I 
will say. for Lhe holiour of both countries-to 
examine how and by whose fault this calamity 
came about. I will have no foregone conclusion. 
I will not anticipate that we are in the right; aild 
all;hougll I have perfect coiifidence i11 tlie lloliour 
ancl intelligence of our oficers, I vill not now 
assuine that they may not have beell mislecl. I 
will prepare myself for the issue, and I will abicle 
by it as far as I can in a spirit of impartiality. 
What I say is that; those wlio have caused such 
all engagement to fail ought to become known 
to their own Government ailcl to every contracti~ig 
party, I will not say that; we are even now in 
possession of dl the facts of the case, but me are 
in possession of facts wliicl1 create i11 our minds 
iil~pressions ui~favou~able to tlie concluct of solfie 
of those who form tlie other party to these 
negotiations. But I will cot  cleviste from the 
strictest principle of justice in cznticipating any- 
thing of the ultirnate issue of that fair iiicluiry 
which we desire to prosecute, anil are e11cleavour.- 
ilig to prosmxfie. The cause of tli:~i; deplor,zl~le 
~vllisioil may lje wlcertaii1. 
' Whose was the provocatioil is n mattcr of 
t l ~ e  ul;inosL c:onscquence. We lruow Lhnt tllc 
atlack was a Eussiail attnclc ; we ki1.u.w ~1i:lc; t,11t: 
dfgllans s~~lrered in lift, ill spirit, and in rq>ute ; 
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kllow that a blow was struck at the credit and 
au t l lo r i t~  of a sovereign-our protected ally-who 
llsrl no offence. A l l  I say, sir, is that 
we callnot in that state of things close this book 
allrl say, " We will. look into it no more." We 
lllust d o  our best to have rigllt done in this 
m:~tte~-.' 
Such were the words in which Mr. Gladstoile 
the situation and expressed the views 
of llis Cabinet. It was 110 longer a question of 
i lebat~ble  frontiers, but one of national illonour. 
Tile agreement of March 1 6  had failed to avert a 
collisioii between the Russian and Afgllan troops, 
:~ncl the British Government collsidered it to be 
the duty, and for tlie honour of both countries, to 
exnlnine how, and by whose fault, the conflict hacl 
arisen. I t  was a clear issue ; and as there was but 
litkle hope that Russia would consent to such an 
iiicluiry, it was no lollgel- believcd that hoslilities 
could be averted, and the actual dec.laration of 
war was daily expected. 
B u t  after a week had passed in anxious sus- 
pense the  crisis came to an end in an unexpected 
manner. The &ar declared that he was the sole 
judge as to whether his officers had acted in con- 
formity with his orders, and he refused to permit 
any inquiry illto the acts of General Komaroff; 
but, while he insisted that all further discussion of 
the military question should be dropped, he con- 
sented to refer to the judgment of a friendly 
sovereign ally differences or niisunderstandi~lgs 
which might be foullil to exist in regard to the 
a 36 TIIE PANJDEH INCIDENT 1884- 
-- 
-- A ~ - -  
il~terpretation of the agreement of March 16. 
This offer was made on May 1, and three clays 
later Mr. Gladstone announced that it had been 
accepted by the British Government as a settlement 
of the difficulty consistent wit11 the lionour of botli 
States, and that negotiations regarcliilg the delimi- 
tation of the frontier would at once be resumed in 
London. 
I t  is not the intention here to iizqnirc m~hetller 
this solutioi~ of tlze question was a salisfactory one, 
or to what extent it was in' accorclance with the 
i~iteiltions of tlze Ministry as expressed by Mr. 
Gladstone in his speech of April 27. 11 112s been 
variously clescribecl as a piece of consurnmale 
statecraft, lanzentable vacillation, or abject sur- 
render ; but, while leaving the reader to lorm his 
own opinion on the matter, i t  will be sufficieiit to 
state that it was eventually arranged that Panjdeh 
sliould be exchangecl for Zulfikar, and that in 
other respects tlie f~ontier line slloulcl be practi- 
cally the same as that proposecl in the Eussian 
ineinorandum of J a i ~ u a ~ y  28, 1885, and rej ectecl 
by the British Foreiga Office on March 13.' 
I t  must, llowevor, Lo ~~lontioilcd thnt wlicn tho Rri l i~h Govoril- 
rrlont rcfi~soil to nccopt tliis lino tlioy l~oliovc!d that tlict Arriir wol~ltl 
insist 011 tho rotontioil of Pnnjdoli t~liil 1'nl-i-k111~t1111, ILH tho for111(,r 
wns known to havo long formot1 n portion of Afghnniutnn, rbrltl wns 
tho11 hold by an Afglinn garrifion, wllilo tho Arriir ill 0110 of liis 
lettors to S h  Peter Lnrnndon strongIy proto~to(l ~jinillut tlio l t i l~e i l~ l i  
ocoupoCion of Pul-i-Lllc~tnn. Sncl~ 1111ing tho cnuo, t111)y morn 
bo~md unclor tllo otigngonlonts of 1880 lo sttpport whral tlloy 
bolioveil to bo tho just c l n i ~ n ~  of Cho Alrlir,  nil, rtlitlor tho  air- 
c~unlstnncou, they riglilly con~idorod lhl~t  lioy coulrl not occc~pt t l ~ a  
lino in quoslion. 
On April 4, 1885, howovor, tho Amir, wlio wns thon ot Ilowul 
16 .  
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13ut altllougli the Russinn C3o~rernment agreecl 
to liaild over Zulfikar to the Afgllans in excllallge 
for the Pancljeh district, the ~legotiations soon 
came to astanclstill o~viiig to a difference of opillioil 
as to the illcalling of llle word ' Zulfikar.' The 
Rritisli Ministry, who oilly agreed to this exchallge 
because the Amir had insistccl on tlie exttenle 
importallce of retairlirig command of llie Zuliilxtr 
Pass, illtended th J the line should be clraw~l some 
distance to the north of the pass, SO as to leave i t  
ant1 the adjacent heiglits entirely in tlie hands of 
the Afghans. Hut the Russians ol3jected to this, 
and contencled that only the old ruined watch- 
tower of Znlfikar on the banks of the Eeri-Rucl 
should be left to the Amir, wllile Ihe pass and the 
surrounding heights lo the north a id  east were to 
be entirely excluclecl from Afgllan control ; and 
they ~ o u i l d  up by saying that .if tlie British 
Government cliil not coilsent to this arrangement, 
hifaruchak would have to be ceded to Russia in 
exchange for the llills ~l'llich ovei-look the pass. 
It was a preposterous demand, but olle which 
was quite in  l~eeping wit11 the attitude which tlie 
Pindi, infornlod Lord Dufferin that he did not sot much store 011 
Panjdoh, a8 he could not count on the loyalty of tlie Sarilrs; but 110 
said that he attachodvital hpgrtance to the retention of RiI~r~ichalc, 
Gulmn, and the Pass of Zulfikar. This declaration, of couree, 
placed thematte? in a very different light ; but it unfortunately carno 
too late to prevent tho fight at Panjiloh and the complicntions which 
followocl. 
I t  is aatisfaotory to know thnt when the Amir was informed of 
the settlement which had been arrived at he sent n, most friendly 
reply to the Viceroy of India, and said t h d  he u~illingly accepted 
tlie line agreed upon. 
Czar's Governmeilt maintained throughout the 
whole of these wretched negotiations ; for no 
sooner did tl~eG.laclstonian Cabinet make any con- 
cession than fresh demaiids were put forward : and 
so the game continued, England giving way time 
after time at all points dong the line, while the 
R~~ss ian  outposts were gradually puslied closer and 
closer to the ' Key of India.' 
But the time had a t  last arrived wlleii a starid 
was to be made against any further concession. 
The Gladstonian Ministry was defeated on tlie 
Budget, and as sooil as Lorcl Salisbury came into 
power he inforn~ecl the Russian Ambassaclor that 
Eer  Majesty's Goveriiinent found i.t impossible 
to depart from the position they llad taken up. 
The Russia,n Government, he said, liad agreed 
in the previous April tliat ' the frontier would start 
from zl point on the Heri-Rud a little to tlie north 
of Zuliikar,' and no reservation was made as to 
a portion of the pass being retained by Iiussia. 
Confiding in this engagement, the Anlir had been 
illformed that the Zulfikar Pass would be included 
in his dominions ; a i d  such being the case, Her 
Majesty's Government considered that they were 
bound b y  the declarations thus inade, and could 
not assigli to the Russian promise ally vdue which 
would detract in any degree horn tlle right of the 
Afghans to the f~111 possession of the pass w1~ic;h 
had been guaranteed to tliein. 
This was dl that was requireil. Rnssin hail 
been  laying ' n pnle of brag,' alicl liad traclecl on 
tlie notoriously pacific chmact,er of the prcvions 
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;\Iinistry in ordtlr to pct ns c'lo*cl :I.; 11o~sil1le to tllcl 
f:tir v:lllcy of 1I~r:lt. 1311t :LS .SUOII :L* 111,~ .Ijriti*ll 
(;ovcrnnlcnt took lip n st ~ ~ o n g  positioi~, :liicl 1)l:~ii11y 
iiltiiil:ltc~(l that tllc liinit ll:~(l ) ~ ~ b 1 1  iv:~(~l~c~(l  l) yo11(1 
\vIiic:l1 1Iussi:t c20ulcl ilot b i ~  l,tin~~ittrtl to l j : ~ ~ ,  
3 tuscovit c clil)loluncy n-\-:ls r1lr~c'kill:lt ctl, :111(1 1111' 
estrav:ig:u~t denlnllds of 121wsin n.rl .c l  iuotliGc~tl i l l  
f:~vour of the :lfgli311s. (Jil Sq)tt*inl)(>r 10 t110 
g ~ l ~ r : ~ l  line \\-llicli the fro~l~icl. \\.:IS to tnkt! n.;~.; - 
recordrtl iii n protocaol, nrlcl it was ngr.t~rt1 t11:~t t l~c~ 
r1ct:tils sliouhl l ) i b  lisetl on the spot :IS c.spc>tli~ic~~~sl\. 
as 1'ossil)lc by joint Cloniniissioiiers :~l)l)oi~~ttltl 1)y 
the tn.o I'o~vers. Tlle tlt.limit:~tic~i~ of tlie l~ou~id: l~ .~-  
w:is to be conimciiccd :LL %uliik:Lr ; :u~tl it ~v:1s also 
agrrcid tllnt tlie rscorts of llie Conunissioiicrs slioultl 
bc liiriiteil to oile liuri(lrc~tl nl(.n 011 cacli side. 
111 nc:clordnricc wit11 the arr:ulgc1nlc~iit, I 11us 111:1(10, 
Coloilel liidgcl\c:~y \\-as :~ppoi~~tibcl Ijritisli C'oiii~~iis- 
sioncr, n~ith A1:ljor 13. 1,. l)uraiid :IS I~is :is~is(:~ilt ; 
:111(1 on i l ~ e  Iiussinn side (:ol011()1 I i ~ i I i l l ~ ~ r ~ [  XIS 
nl)poii~tc~d C'c~uullissioiics, wit11 ;\l:l*jor C+ntltlc~oiloll' 
:~il(l &I. Lcss:lr :is ~lssist:iilt Coinniissic~ncvs. 'These 
rcpresentativos of [lie two ~lovcrrinic~nts ~iict : ~ t  
%ulfili:tr on Novenibrr 10,  tlie d:~tc fisctl it1 the 
protocol, anit t\vo claps later tlie first pillar of t11~  
Russo-Afghan bouiltlnry was erccbtecl in tlieir 
presence mil  witll Ille concurrence of the Aiair's 
agent. For the nest seven weeks the demsrcntio~l 
of tlie frontier progressed r:tpi[lly, and hy Deccni- 
her 26, 1885, the line vrns clefillit ely Inid clo~v\.n as 
far as the RIurghd~ river in the viclillit;v of t l ~ r  
fortress of Nnrzrnc~llnli. T3y this tiilir, 11nwevr.l-. tlie 
240 DEMARCATION F THE BOUNIIARY 1884- 
winter had set in ;  and as further demarcation 
work was for the time impossible, the British 
 omm mission went into winter quarters at Char- 
shamba, and the Russian party retired to Panjdeh. 
Olle of the most in~portalit and difficult prob- 
lems which the Commissio~lers had to settle during 
the delimitation of this portion of the boundary 
between the Heri-Rud and Murghab rivers was 
the question of irrigation. The lands cultivated 
by the Sariks of Panjdeh were entirely clependent 
for their water-supply on the streams which take 
their rise in the Paropmisus range, and it was 
therefore evident that unless some satisfactory 
settlement could be made there would be constant 
disputes between the Afgllan and Russia11 settlers 
on the two sides of the frontier. Colonel Sir West 
Ridgeway, however, appreciated the collsequences 
of such a state of things at their proper value, and 
attached the greatest iniporta~ice to an equitable 
partition of the water in order that subsequeilt 
complications might not arise ; and he accordingly 
agreed to the maintenance, so far as irrigation is 
concerned, of the status quo in the valley of the 
Kuslik between Chihil Dlukl~tar and Knra Tappa 
Khurd (i.e for a distance down the stream of about 
eight miles), and in the Kashan Valley bctwccll 
Torshekh and the dam above Robat-i-Kashan ( i . ~ .  
for about fifteen miles). I t  was then clefinitely 
agreed that in the two above-mentioned sectiolLs 
the' Afghans should not have tlie rig11 t 10 illcrease 
the number or exteiit of the canals in actual use, 
but that, provided this conclition was observe(l, 
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I they should retain the use and absolute control of 
all existing calzals without interference ; and it was 
further decided that if there should at any time be 
any de6oiency of water in the caizals whiclz flow 
froin Afghan into Rr~ssian territory, Russia would 
not be justified in making any claims, 110 matter 
from what cause such deficiency might arise.l 
.The Russians also stipula,tecl that they sl~ould be 
I 
permitted to construct a new dam across the 
1 Murghab in the vicinity of Maruchak,?n order that 
they might obtailz a grealer supply of water for the 
Panjcleh district ; and this point was also conceded, 
on the uizderstanding that tlie dam should noL be 
used as a passage, that no military post sl~ould be 
constructed on it, a id  that the Russians should 
have nothing whatever to do with the lnilds on tlze 
Afghan bank of the stream, excepting the actual 
head of the dam. 
As so011 as tlze winter was over tlze Com- 
inissione~s once ag ail1 resumed their labours, and 
the middle of March found them hard at worlr in 
fixing the frontier-line between tlze Murghab and 
tlie Oxus. Several slight cliffere~zces of opinioiz 
naturally arose, but these were all amicably settled, 
and by May 26, 1886, the bounclmy to the north 
1 of Mainlana and Daulatabad had beell marked out by pillars as far eastwards as the Wells of Imam 
This settlement regarding the irrigation of lands between the 
Enshlc and Murghab bad subeeq~~ently to be sliglltly moclifiecl when 
the boundary itself was dtered in July 1887. 
"The frontier line follows the conrse of the MurghaL (in 
mid-stream) for Yome distance to a point a t  the north end of the 
i?I,laruclialc Vitlley. 
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Nazar, some miles to the north of Andlrhui. There, 
however, the work came to a standstill once more, on 
account, of a serious cliEculty which arose regard- 
ing the precise point at which the frontier-line 
should meet the left bank of the lZiver Oxus. 
111 tlle Agreeinent of 1573 it was stated that; the 
northern frontier of Afghan Turkestan was ' the 
line of the Oxus from the mouth of the Kokclzs . 
river to t1s.e post of Khoja Sale inclusive, on the 
high road from Bokhara to Balk11 ; notliing to be 
claimed by the Afghan Amir on the left ba11B of the 
Oxus bel.ow Khoja Sale ; ' 2nd from thence the 
line was to be so drawn as to leave to Afghanistan 
the internal districts of Akcha, Siripul, etc. But 
when the Coizlmissioners reached the Oxus, they 
found that, properly spealring, no post of Xhojn 
Sale existed on the left bank of the river, although 
they found an old tomb of a Mahomeclan saint 
bearing the name of Ziaret ICl~oja Sale, while o n  a 
neigllbouri~lg bill there mTas also a heap of ruins 
which some of tlze inhabitants knew by the desig- 
nation of ~ k r a i  Klloja Sdle ; and t l ~ e  matter was 
still further complicatecl by the discovery that 
there was no existing ferry across the OXUR bearing 
the name of Khoja Sale, although at the time of 
t,he Agreement of 1873 it was understoocl that 
such a ferry was actually in use. 
Several important facts, however, were clearly 
establishecl, the most important being-(1) that 
Khoja Sale was the name appliecl to a district on 
the left bank of the OXUS, which was divided into 
four sub-r1ivi.sions ca,lled h'hai~lid), Dd i  (including 
the 
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Islarn), Karlriil (commoilly called Khoj a Sale), and 
Alsjui (including Dogharasi); (2) that this district 
of Kl~oja Sale hacl always formed a portion of the 
proviilce of Alrcha, and siilce the time whert Akcha 
was conquerecl. by Dost MaIioinnlecl in 1850-51 the 
disl;rict of Khoja Sale had always remained in 
Afghan possession ; (3) that a ferry had formerly 
existed at Islaill in tlie Dali sub-division of the 
district for the beliefit of trafic between Bokhara 
and Maimana, but that it had gradually been 
superseded by the Kilif ferry-further to the east 
-until, ill 1872, it practically ceased to exist ; and 
that this passage at Islam, while in existence, was 
lrnow~l as the ferry of Khoja Sale, taking its name 
from the district to which it belonged ; (4) that 
the Afgl~ans a i d  Bohharans, on being informed of 
the Agreeineilt of 1873, had conjointly demarcated 
the frontier in accorclance with their interpretation 
of the Agreement, and had fixed the boundary on the 
western limits of Khamiab, which was the extreme 
western sub-division of the Khoja Sale cl.istrict, 
thus clearly showiilg that they recognisecl. Afghan 
rights over the whole of the district of Klioja Sale. 
Taking his stand, therefore, on these well 
authenticated facts, Colonel Sir West Riilgew:~y 
claimed aiat the frontier should follow the line 
which had been laid dowil by the Bolsl~aran and 
Afghan officials, so tliat the whole district of khoja 
Sale shoukd contiil~~e under Afghan co~ltrol, as it 
had been for the previous thirty-six years. He 
.u~ishecl merely to p:reserve the stc~tzrs quo, a i ~ l  as 
These sub-divisions are llemed consecntivel~ ~ Y O I I I  west to anst. 
It 2 
3gt ; i j i  no i~lace could be found which corresponded exactly -- - I-- 
with ' the post of Khoja Sale upo'the high road 
between 13dlch and Bokhara,' be proposed that 
recourse sl~oulcl be hacl to the spirit and intention 
of the Agreement of 187'3, whereby it had been 
., 
clearly illteilded by the t;wo goverilnlents tllst both 
Hokllara a ~ l d  Afghanistan should retain possession 
% $1: of all the territories and lallds they then held, ancl . - .. 
by which i t  hacl been agreed th"at Alrcha ( a n d  
therefore all its sub-districts also) should remain 
under the rule of the Ainir of Kabul. 
The Eussiail Commissioner, however, insisteci 
L 
on the question being settled in accordalzce with 
I ! tlie strict wording of the Agreement, without any 
regard to other considerations. He  therefore 
endeavoured to prove that the oficial residence of 
the governor of the district was ' the post of Kl~oja 
Sale ' referred to in the Agreeinent ; and althougli 
it was collclusively proved by the evidence of the 
inhabitants of the locality that t11e house in question 
was not built till long after the Agreement had 
been concluded, he still refused to give way an 
inch, and rejected all attempts which the British 
Commissioner made to arrive at a compromise. 
Thus, matters once more came to a standstill, and 
when it a t  last became evident that no satisfactory 
settlement could be arrived at on the spot, it was 
agreed between the two goverilments that the 
Commission should at once be withdrawn, and 
that the boundary from the Irnaru Nazar well to 
the Oxus should be settled by direct negotiation 
between t,lle 1,wo governnle~~ts either at  L O I Z C ~ O ~ ~  
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or St. Petersburg, on the understanding that no 
alteration was to be made, except by mutual con- 
sent, in the portion of the Trontier which had been 
already demarcated, ancl that everything should 
remain in stntz~ qz6o in the undefined gap. 
In accorclance with this agreement, tlie British 
Colnlnissioner left Khamiab wit11 his staff and 
personal escort on September 15, 1886, and com- 
i~~enced his march to Snclia tl~rough Kabul aiid 
Jaldabad. Eleven clays later, on reaching Heibalr, 
he joiilecl hands with the main body of the mission 
and escort, wliich had passed the summer in the 
mountains near Mazar-i-Sherif, ancl from thence 
the party moved in three detachinents across the 
Hindu Xush by way of the Chahardar Pass, while 
several sinaller cletachecl groups under the Survey 
and Intelligence oficers were sent to the right ancl 
left to explore the other passes which lead across 
the great mountain barrier. The passage was 
effected just in time, for a heavy snow-storm was 
encountered berore the last range was crossed ; 
but Cllarilcar was reached on October 12 with the 
trifling loss of two men, and there it was learnt 
that the Ainir was encamped a few miles dislant 
with a considerable force for the purpose of pro- 
tecting the Gommission from possible attacks of 
the Kol~ist~mis, who had been the bitterest foes of 
the English during the last Afghan war. 
During the progress of the Mission from 
Charikar to Kabul, Abdur Rahman, with his army, 
marched backwards and forwards on its flank to 
prevent disturbances ancl any possible outbreak of 
farialicisnl on the part of the people; ailcl froin the 
date of Sir West Riclgeway's entry into tlie Afghan 
capital (on October 15) until he leJt for India (on 
the 24th) tlie utmost consideratioll was shown to 
every ~neinber of the party, and all were treated 
wit11 the most princely hospilality. At the A~nil.'s 
special request the stay of the Mission was pro- 
longed beyond the date whicli l ~ a d  been originally 
iixecl. for its departure ; ail address of welcoilze a ~ l d  
- 
friendship was presented by his military officers, 
who expressed the hope that all former l~ostilities 
would be forgotten, and that the two nations 
would always be allies in future; decorations 
were conferred by hiin 011 all the British officers ; 
t,he nieillbers of tlie Mission-including the Sepoys 
~ n d  followers-were allowed to freely visit the 
city and its environs; and from first to last they ! 1 
were treated wit11 an amount of kindness aiid I i
respect which ernpllasised the satisfaction felt by 
:~11 classes of tlie people at the success which hacl. 
attended the labours of the Coillinission on behalf 
of Afghanistan. . 
As soon as Sir West 12idgeway arrived in Eug- 
land, the Russian Governnient were aslced if they 
were prepared to enter upon the discussion of the 
1Clioja Sale clifficulty. The British Foreign Office 
in re-opening tlie cluestion su.ggesl;ed that the 
~iegotiations sl~ould be resun~ed in London by the 
same persons who conducted tlie 1~reliininaa.y 
negoLia.tions terrni~ial,ing in I;he Frol.oco1 of Scbp- 
teniber 1686 ; buL as M, Lessa~: l.t:~il hccorne 
seriously ill from the efkcts of rxlmure 011 [,lie 
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~ @ h a ~  frontier, it Was (3Ventually agreed that the 
should be coliducted in St. Petersbup, 
and Sir West Ridgeway was instructed to proceed 
to the Bussian capital so as t;o be there by 
April 19,  1887, llle dale fixed for the Arst meeting 
of tlze ilelegat,es. 
It sliould liere be inentiollecl that., before tile 
 omm missioners sepal-ateti hi tlle previous Septem- 
ber, Golollel ICulilberg iriforiilecl Sir West Ridge- 
way that the 'boundary in tlie u.eighbourhood of 
Andlrhui had been irregularly drawn, and lie put 
forward a claiiu to certain wells wliich had been 
allotted to Afghanis tan. This Gonte~~tion, however, 
was resisted by Colonel . Iiidge~vay, who pointed 
out that the line had been demarcated by the 
Chief Commissioners xfter ail exhaustive inquiry, 
and as the settlerneilt lrad been confirmed by the 
two governmeiiLs, ancl the froiltier pillal-s had been 
actually erected, he very naturally refused to re- 
open the quesLion which had beell definitely settled 
some weeks before. Colonel Kuhlberg, however, 
refused, as usual, to give wa,y, ancl as he declined 
to sign the inal) of tlie frontier which had been 
fixed as far the Imam Nczzar well, the settlement 
of this dispnte was oiic of tlze taslrs wllich was laid 
before tlie ileleoates in St. Petersburg ; a l c l  thus, 7 
when tlie negotlatiolzs were res~lmed in the Russian 
capitnl irl April 1887, ~llere were two dis~inct 
po in~s  of issue between the British and Russian 
(iovemments :- 
( 1  ) li.egi~~~tliit;;r a ilisLniic.:e of sonic thirly miles 
ol' ~.lgl,ta?.,:atod fyo11.1ier to the vest of Luiun Nazar. 
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(2) Regarding t l ~ e  midefined g a l ~  of thilvty-four 
miles bet~veen Ilnanl Nazar a11d tlie banks of the 
oxus. 
The llegoti,ztio~ls, Iiowever, were s])eeclily 
brought to a satisft~cl;ory coilcl.usior1, nl.lcl on I 
July 22, 188'7, a filial Protocol was signed, where- I 
by it was agreecl that the Axnir of' Afgllanistan 
J I 
shoulcl retain possessioil of the mllole of' tlle E;lloj,z 
Sale district (inclu~ling I<liaiiiiab), aiicl that tlie 
frontier between tlie Kushlr a ~ ~ c l  Mlurglial, Xivers 
shoulcl be  slightly moclified, ill order that tlre Bariks 
of Pailjdeli might regain possessioll of certnin culti- 
vated lancls which they llatl been cleprived of by the 
clemarcation whicli had been previo~zsly carried out.' 
- By the signature ancl coilfir~natioxi of this Pro- 
tocol tile delimitation of tjhe north-western fi-oriticr 
was at East completecl ; aild as illany imagine t.llat 
the settlement thus arrived a t  tiras nnfavc)u~able to  
the Alnir, il; will be well to quote two opinioiis 
on the matter. 
The first is that of Sir West Riclge\v:~y, .ivllo 
saicl :-' I clo not think t;lie Arnir llns ally reasorl 
.to be dissatisfied wit11 the resnlt of tile tlclnarcn- 
tion. He  lii~liself pressed fol* tlla ilc!lirui tntion of 
the frontier., nncl lie IiiilzselI' ilec:iileil Ili:tt I'arljjilell 
Whuil tho I'1~otoco1 of Snpto~nhclr 1HH6 WILH rortc!lndrlrl, i t  WILH 
not ltnown t h t ~ t  tho Snriltr; of t ' t~r~jdoh I I ILC~  cxtcuclod tlloir cul- 
tivatioll into tho rlido vnl lny~ of  th(3 IClltil~lr ulltl Ki~nllnrl, ulllc!rt! 
they hncl opcncd c!~~i~nlr; nnd roclnirllr!(l Inncl, n lLl~o~r~l i  L lc,y  till 
contiln~orl to ro~ ida  in tho I ' r~nj~loh Vl~lloy. 'J'llcy wcr.0 ~ I ~ I I H  do-
privod of thcir 1nr11lt1 i r ~  tl18 ICn~l~lc, I<rr~htcn, i~nr l  B ~ I I ~ R I I I L I I  VILII(~YH, 
with 1,118 osrc~ption of caorleirz  plot^ 1111d P I L ~ I I L I H  wl~ic-11 Sir \V(!nt 
Tlirlgcwny agrccd In Lhrir rulnining in ~ ( ' I I I P I I  lor coll(+(fihhiotlti c11;ll. 
whoro. 
was not worth iigllting for. I t  seeins to be sup- 
'posed that we forced the Arnir to acquiesce in the 
Russian annexation of Paiijcleh, but at the inter- 
view between Lord Dufferin arlcl the Amir at 
1.awuI Pincli, the Amir-without any pressure by 
the Viceroy-clecidecl to give up the valley. His 
Highness then meiltioilecl those places which he 
colisidered essential for Afghanistan, viz.-Zulfi- 
kar, Gulran, ancl Majruclialr. Accordingly, if the 
frontier had been cleniarcatecl just north of tliose 
three places, tlie Amir woulcl have hacl no cause 
of coniplaint. But inucli more lias been done for 
the .Amir, and he has gained land which was never ' 
before in his possession. Indeecl, I calculate that, 
after allowiilg for the loss of Panjdeh and tlie 
lancls i ~ o w  given up in the valleys of the Kusl~k, 
Kashan, ancl Murghab, the territories of the Amir 
are increased by 400 square miles. Panjcleli was 
lost to the Ainir before the clemarcation began, 
but through the cleinarcation of the frontier he 
lias not lost; a penny of revenue, a single subject, 
or an acre of lxllcl which was occupiecl or culti- 
vated by any Afghan subject.' 
Tlie second opinion which it is proposed to 
quote is that of the Amir Abclur Rahman Khan 
himself, who expressed his approval of the final 
settlemerit in the following words : I-- 
' I n  the fimt place I feel much obligecl, and am 
Soo lotter from tho Amir to tho Viceroy of India clated 
AugnsL 16, lBH(j, cmcl w ~ i t t o n  in roply to a cornmnnic&tion fkorn 
IJoril I)uKcri~l in w l~ ich  I-Iis EIi,ghnc!ss wn8 lnbrrnoil of tho final 
scttlcrrlont ol' Lho nor~h.wcstcrn bonndary of At'ghanislan. 
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inspired with hope on accouilt of the great at- 
tentioli ancl. fay-seeing and royal consideration of 
Ber  Imperial and Dignifiecl. Majesty, the great 
Queen of Bngland and Empress of India. Secondly, 
the good and the state-adorning opinioil of the 
representatives of the illustrious government is 
worthy of praise and the cause of happiness and 
thanks, for the lmots in the thread of discussioii 
with the Russian Government, which were tied 
with regard to the Afghan frontiers, have been 
untied and opened with the tips of the fingers of 
excellent measures. They (the Queen and the 
representatives) adopted the right policy, whicli 
is better than the first one. I know for certain 
that the representatives of the illustrious British 
I Governmeut have, froill the first stage of the demar- t cation (settlement of the bouildsry) of AIghanistail 
J with the Rnssiail Government until the conchision I 
of the cluestion, viz. : the decisioil and settlement of 
the clainl of tliat (Russian) Governmeilt to the 
I<liamiab district, reached their destination after 
having traversed inany h a d  ancl. difficult stages of 
discussion on the noble steed of minute tlloughts. 
I t  is oile of the results and consequences of' tlie 
' 
sincere friendship of the two parties tliat the 
Russian Government, notwithstanding its 1asg.e 
number of troops, its power, and its ilatilral iioise 
and despotism, has entered the door of refraining 
and abstainiag from concluest ancl war wit11 these 
two 'anspicious governments, as it knew that the 
war woulcl have a n  L I I L ~ ~ ; L ~ I ~ Y  result and wonld 
i 
elltail a heavy loss on itself'. Had it not see11 the i 
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foundation of the frienclship of these two uaite(1 
lcingdoins strong and firm, and the basis of the 
affection and sympathy of the two goverrimeilts 
solid and stable, it would hardly have come dowll 
from the palace of its desires and the mansion of 
its wish to subjugate Afghanistali and occupy India. 
I loolr upon the lcincl frieilclsllip of the illustrious 
Britisll Government, as the cause of the flourish of 
the tree of tlie Af'gban Government, and il; is 
undoubaedly so. I t  i s  also pli~ill and clear in the 
gracious sight of IIer Bul~linle Majesty, the great, 
Queen, a i d  in that of the representatives of the 
ill~zstrious governinei~t, tllat my person, which 
exhibits sincerity, shuns a i d  Beeps away from the 
course and system of the former Aivirs of 
i Afghanistail; aiid it will, please God, remain so 
lirrn and constant in the ensagements of perpetual 
friendship with the said Government, that among 
,211 tlle powers it  will be famous and distinguished 
ill coiisecluence of this exalted name and exalted 
char-acter. I agree to, and approve of, the settle- 
nlerlt and decision of the question of Kl~nmiab with 
the Russia11 Goverrunent, viz. :-that the represen- 
tatives of tlie illustrious British Government have 
considered it advisable and good for the time being 
to exc1i;nige Llie piec:e of land in which tlie Sarik 
flocks are riow grnziiig, ~vitli my permission. In 
:tccoril:~nce with what your Excellency wrote, I 
have issuer1 explic:i~ orders to the oificials of Herat, 
elijoii,i~lg iht?~u to 1n:ike over to tlle Sarilrs t;hat 
I piece u l  lnnd.' 
CHAPTER XX 
RUSSIAN hlOVJBhlENTS IN TBE PA31IRS 
Revolt in Afghan-Turlrestan-Persian concessions to Englnncl, and 
Russian jealousy-Secret conventioil betwoen R u s ~ i n  nnd Pcrsiu 
-Outrage on  Younghusband and Davison-Ruseian nctivity in 
the Pemirs-Afghans and Cliirlese bonndnry-Affn,ir nt Sonla 
Tash-Riots a t  Tashlcenl-Latest Russinn ns~un~ncc~--Fc~rt  on
the Mnrghnb-Chitral and Ranjnt-Rtuuowa end dnngors. 
FOR two or tliree years aRer the conclnsioil of 
the liegotiations between England ailcl Russia re- 
gardiug the nortli-western bo~ulclary of Aigllalii- 
stan, t,he chief interest of Central Asinn caollcerlls 
was centred in the serious rebellions w1lic:ll lxolce 
out in Afghanistan, aucl which threntenecl the very 
stabi.lity of Abclur Rallman's rule. The l i r~ t  s i g ~ ~ s  
of disaffectioiz appeared among the Cxllilz:~is, ~ 1 1 0  
in 1887 broke out into opela rebellicm. Y'liey, 11(1w- 
ever, were recluceil to order after n l)r(.)E'r.ac:t,c?tl 
campaign., and tlie Amir the11 had leisure to t111~11 
his attention to the sul)jlqation of sorat? of  1!11c: 
i~ldependent or senii-i~ltle~)e~ldel~t t,rii,c!s \vlli( 41 
inhabit the country to the nortlz of l;h(! Ii'llyljc!r 
Pass. But befire this seconi[ carnl~aign wr;is c!otl- 1 
< 
cilnrlccl, the Amir, who hat1 c:stal)lislzetl his I l c ~ ~ t l -  
qi~arters at Jnlalahad, ur:ks rcc::~llcd to T<:d )u l  l ~ y  i 
- ---  -- - -- - 
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news of a serious revolt which had occurred ill 
A f g h a n - T u r k e ~ t ~ l .  
-During the Ainir's exile in Turlrestan, one of his 
,ompmi~ns i11 iaisfortul~ewas his cousinIshak Khall ; 
alld w l l e l ~  Abdur  Rahman was proclaimed Alnir of 
K~J-,~~~, this chief ]lad cordially assisted him in his 
efforts to consolidate his kingdom, and as a reward 
for his services was made Governor of Afghan-Tur- 
Bestall. T h e r e  for several years Ishak llad loyally 
out his duties, but in 1887 the &nil. began to 
have grave reasoils to suspect his fidelity, and there- 
fore s u m n i o n e d  him aiid otl~er suspected chiefs to 
~ ~ b u l .  T h i s  order brought ~natters to a crisis, for 
Ishak Khan not ollly declined lo obcy, but induced 
the  Mir of Maimana to join him in his defiallce of tile 
central anuf;hority. I t  was an inopportune moment, 
for the  Ghilzais  had been suppressed, Ayub Khan 
was a p r i s o n e r  in the hancls of tlie English, alld 
Abdur R a h m a n  was therefore able to devote the 
whole of his attention to the suppression of t,his 
new revolt. Ishak, however, determined to lnalre 
a bold bid for tlie throne of Kabul itself, and after 
p roc la iming  himself Alnir lie endeavoured to win 
over the garrison of Maimana lo his cause. But 
the a t t e m p t  failed. Tllze troops which Ize sent ~ O I .  
the  p u r p o s e  seized tlieir leaclers ancl handecl tlzem 
over to the Herat autllorilies ; and Ishalc, the11 aL 
the  h e a d  of a small army of some 7,000 men, made 
a bold adva i l ce  southwards in order to gain pos- 
session of the pass at Bamjan. But tliere Ize was 
once more foiled by Gholam Eyder, the Arnir's 
Commander-in-Chief, wlio had already occupied 
the Pass, and who kheii, pushing rapidly forward, 
stormed the I<amarcl Pass, and routed a bocly of 
rebel cavalry at G1io1-i. Isliak Khan then fell back 
ancl coilcenl r;xt,ecl his rorces at Ghaznigak, near 
I<hnlru, 1v11e1-e he wa,s a1 t aclced 011 Sepleinber 4, 
1888. I)lu.ir\g the early portiolz of the day the 
l~attle was agaJnst tlie Ainir, for tlie left wing of 
llis ariiiy mas tlefeated and driven from tlie field. 
RLI~, tllinking the victory assured, tlle rebels stopped 
to 1dmlile.r the ca,ulp, ancl while they were so eii- 
gaged, Gliola,m Hyder retrieved tlie fortune of tlie 
day by lencli~~g a vigorous charge with his right 
wing upon a division comnlancled by Ishak in 
person. This attaclr mas coinl~letely successfnl, 
ancl the fire froin the breech-loading rifles supplied 
by tlze Inclia~z Governnzent soon forced the insur- 
genls to fall back wit11 severe loss, when Islial~ fled 
to Russian territory, and a few clays later his 
beaten arniy siu.reizclered at  discretion. 
After tlie suppression O F  this rebellion, tlie A~ni r  
went in person to Afg1za.n-T~~rkestaiz to restore 
order in that portion of his clominions. His 
presence in the neiglil~ourlzoocl of Mazar-i-Sherif 
for six rnoi-~tlzs in the spring and suinilier of 1889 
was supposed by the Russiaiis to be a inenace to 
the peace of their frontier possessions, and tlley 
therefore ~trengt~henecl their outposls on the border, 
mcl consiclerable reinforcements were sent to TLW 
kestan by the new Central Asian Railway, which 
hacl been coinpleted as far as Samarkand on the 
27th of the previous May.' Bnt matters gradually 
During tlie war scare w h i c h  followed the Russian occupation 
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cluicted down, aild with the exception of an &or- 
tive attempt at rebellion in Badakslznn, no I'urtlier 
d~squieting events occurred in the ilortheril pro- 
vinces ol' tlie A~nir's domininns. 
111 the meanwhile the rivalry hetween Eiigla~icl 
and 12nssia in Persia aga,il~ becaille very keen. 
Ill the 1)revious a9utuma (1888), tlie iiew British 
Minister at Teheran, Eir Reizry D~umino~ld Wollf, 
iliduccd tlie Sllall to o1Jeil tllle ICar~ni River to 
British merclia;llt vessels, and to refuse permissio~l 
for the establishment of a Russia11 Consul at Meshed. 
The 12ussims were f ~ ~ r i o u s  at these coilcessions ; 
they declared that Nortlierrl and Soutliern Persia 
ha(1 fallen coinpletely uilcler British influence, aild 
the press me11 welit so far as to all.ude t,o the 
episode as a nal;ional disaster coiiipnrable oi11y to 
Loinalcii~'~ defeat at Deilghil Tepd. The Russiaii 
Fo~eigii  Ofice, ho~vever, made vigorous represen-. 
tations on tlie subject, and as tlie Shall had loiig 
l3eeii tauglit tliat the secnrity of his kingdcliil and 
dynasty was depen.dent in a great ineasure 011 
the goodwill of Eussia, he soon receded froin t1.ie 
of Merv, and whila the Afghan boundary was still under dispute, tlle 
railway which had bee11 constrnctad from Michuelovsl~ to JCizil 
k v x t  during Sltobeleff's canll~aign against tho Teltltds was extended 
through Asltabud, Dushdc, Mo~v aild C h ~ i j u i  to Surno11'1tand. Tho 
bridges over the Tejcnd, Mnrghab, and Oxus Rivers are wooden 
structures, but steps are being t(lk811 to substitute iron girder briclges 
ovey the Tejend and Murghnb, as has already been done at the 
Zarafshan crossing at liara IC1.d. Carzon states that mnch trouble 
ha,a recently been caused by tho Oxns having shiftod ~ t s  channd 
ruore than half a mile to the eastwards, which has necessitated a 
corresponding oxtansion of tho Charjui Bridge. The western ter- 
rrlinus of the line is a t  prcsent at Uzun Ada, but the Ministry of 
War a ~11orL tiine ago ailtllorised an extoilsion from Mulla Iiari to 
ICrasnovodsl~, which will bc the future terminutr on the Caspian. 
positioi~ he had talcell up, yieldecl on tlie cluestion 
of t l ~ e  Rllssiail Consu1:~te a1 Meslierl, nut1 issued a 
decree before the close of the year (1668), by which 
tlle Icarun IZiver was ope11 to the mei.cnnt ilc, lllariile 
of tile mllole world, several vexatious col~ilitiol~s 
being at llle same lirne i m l ~ o s ~ d  ~vliic:li dei,snclt. 
greatly hoiii tlle valne of tlle c:ollcc~ssiol~. 
BUL tlle Russinlls wcsc iiot cholllcl~lt ~ v i l l ~  this 
partial success. They llatl oo lo119 1)or1 L :t.c~ctis- 
t,olned to liave their own way in llol.si:t.,  lid tll(!y 
resented any increase of 13sitisll iliiluc:llc:o c )vor :uly 
pol.tiou of the Sllali's dolniliiolls ; :t.iltl, [ l i : ~ l l i ~  1,o
the eil'iorts of their ellrToy, l'ri~ LC:(: I)( )lgol.onlii, :L 
secret c o ~ ~ v c l i l i o ~ ~  urns col1c:lurled ill t llc sl)riiig ol' 
1850, ill wl~icll t l ~ c  followilig coiicessiolis :we snid 
to have beell nlatlc :- 
I. Tll:~t, :dl fc~reigil or)~ltr:t.(~[ s for t,lie colisl,i~~l(!- 
ti011 of ~-:t.il~i?:tys ill l.'c:rsi:~ sllo~ll(2, for live! yci~rs, 1~ 
commu~~ic :~L(~t  to the 1tussi:ul C ~ O V ( T I L ~ I ~ ( ~ ~ I ~  1)c~fi)l'c 
t,lieir nv(~c31)1,:~~l(;i?, :L IN~  t 1i:~L litlssi:i~l ( ~ ) 1 1 t  om 
s11o11ld hi? given [lie liinsl ~'cf'usal for soc.11 work. 
11. T'1i:t.t I'ersi:~ slloultl l)(!rlliit, I ~ I I s s ~ : L ~ ~  V ~ S S I I ~ S  
ljrj l'reely ~i:~vig:t.[,(+ l l i r ~  l'Illrtl-:~l), or l : igoo~~ ol' b i -  
x l i ,  ; ~ i i c l  :t.llo~ir T V I I : L ~ ~ V ( ~ S  : L I I ( ~  t l ~ ~ ~ f i l s  to 1x1 oo11- 
xl1-uct (ltl t llrrc!. 
In. ' I ' I I~LL l'(>i*si:t. s I L ( ) L ~ ~ ( ~  t'11(*[ :I 1 1 i ~ l 1  ro:~(l 
fro111 I'ir-i-1jnz:lar lo 'I"ollc~*:ui ; :u ~ ( l  : L I S I )  ( + (  )1111)1(11(: 
~vil,li(~~iL (lel:~-y 1 ll(:ir )r[ i (  )il  ol' l J l i (~  ~,o:i( 1 l c d : ~ (  Ii11g 
fl~)l11 A~li:t.l~:~(l I I )  i l l s l l : ~ ~ ~ . ~  
-1893 SECRET RuSSO-PERSIAN CONVENTION 257 
Prince Dolgorouki is saicl to have tried very 
hard to induce the Shah to give up Kelat-i-Nadri 
to Russia, but the ' king of lrings ' would not hear 
of such a thing, allcl the great natural fortress still 
re~nains in Persian hai~cls, but is in such a neglected 
conditioil and is so iriaclecluately garrisoned that it 
nlust fall to Russia as soon as she clecicles on making 
a fresh move in the direction of Meshed. 
I-Iavii~g obtaiiled a fool;ing close to the Herat 
Ceiztral Asia where imperfectly deGilecl f~ontiers 
would enable them to advance closer to the out- 
posts of the Inclian Enlpire. I t  has already been' 
mentioned that, when the Agreement of 1873 was 
coacluded, tlle north-eastern and no~:tli-western 
limits of the Amir's clominions had been defined 
with an ainount of laxity which rendered future 
coinplications possible and even inevitable ; and it 
has been shown how Russia took advantage of this 
state of affairs to clrive a wedge into Afghanistan 
in the neighbourhood of Herat. But after she llad 
gained as ~nucli as she wanted in that direction for 
the time being, and as soon as the frontier froin 
the Heri-Rud to the Oxus had beell accurately 
i and Hernt. They nt this timo induced the Persiz~lls to unclertalre the portion to tlie sontll of the frontier ; but nlthough tho worlr was com- 
menced, it profiressed so slo~vly thnt the Russians in 1888 thought 
i t  time to ins i~ t  on its early completion. The Porsinns, on the 
conclusion of this secret convention, commenced work in real enr- 
nest, but fiom rocont accounts the W O Y ~ C  appears to hnve been very 
bndly done, and n very soconcl-class road has resulted. 
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I ' demarcated, slie hed to hold llcr hslld SO far as tlie 
north-l\~estern borders of Afghanistan were con- 
cerned, and she tllerl commencecl s similar move- 
ment fartller to~vards the e:tsl, \\~ll~:l.e tllc fiontiel. 
had been clefiuecl m~illl nil cvelr $rl-c:~t(~r :ln~ouilt of 
o ~ v i ~ l g  to the 11nfortall:~tc~ oirlissiorl of ;L 
line ill T,ortl arnnvillr's t1esp:~t of ( )clobcl. 17, 
1872. 
Ever siilcc Sliol)(~l(~lI"~ Al:ii c1sl)edilioll i l l  Itj'j'Ci, 
~ l l l e n  the ilol-tllcnl portion o l  tllc P:li~lir 1-egioi1 
al~uexecl to t , l l~  0z:n's tlonlillio~~s, Itn.c;si:11~ 
:~gellts have Lecil :~ctivcbly cl~~l)loyclcl ill cs l~ lor i l~g  
i 
tdle couiilry at, t11~ llc1:~il l\~stckrs ol' ill(, ( )XIIS. 'l'lic~ 
task Llli~s (~oi)l~rrt~ilc(ld 11:1s11~(111 c:~i'ri(vl ollt ill L ~ I C  
1 nlost thorough I L ~ ~ ~ L I ~ O I ' ,  f o l -  wllile ch.c.c6lvy rnoimt,aill 
tlle VOII 11 I ry l l : l~(*  l)o(~i I giv(ali glowi~ig : i ( 1 ( 8 0 ~ l ~ ~ ~  s l )f' 
tlie !)~~iwIits o S  l t l~ s s i :~~ i  I Y I I ~ A  : I I L ~  ( JI' t,11el l ) o ~ ~ ( ~ r  of 
t,11(~ C 1 l ~ : ~ t  Wllilo ( ' z :~r  : :111(l t l 1 ( 1 1 1 ,  H ~ ~ I C ~ I I  tI~(1 .I':LI~I~L' 
1 
l ~ l a t c n ~ ~  it.scllT lint1 I,cie~ i c b c  )n~l)l(htc~ly c~s~)lol.otl, lc~sc 
I 
1 
Illnsc:o~-i~o ~ ( J I I ~ S  1)1is11(1(1 H~1'111or :~lir*ltl, :ml a (J~Js- 
s:~cI< ( , : I  I ) I : L ~ I I  11~~1110(1 ir0111l )(~1\~1\.~Ii,j. ( h ~ ( 4 1 ~  ~ I I X I ~ O ~ I ( ~ ~  
:LC~*OSS t110 lli11(111 I ~ L I S I I  :111tl I N ~ ~ : L I I  1 0  i ~ ~ f ~ * i g ~ t t ~  jvi[11 
t,Ilc> l ~ ! t I y  l~l~i(:St:ii~~s 011 ~ 1 1 ( 4  i ~o l* t I~ t~ r r~  l )or t l (~~-s  ot' 
1 I<asl~i~~it . .  ' 1 p o 1 ~  fi J I I ~  j r ( l :~ lbs Illis ofIi(*(~r ( * o r ~ i , i ~ ~  I I ~ V  1 
, 
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1~osl)it;~l)ly c111[(~rt:1i11t~(I 011 q( lv (L~a: l  1 o(~(~:~siotis l)y tllc? 
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cllirlf 01' 11  I I I I Z : I ,  wllo Ii:itI c ~ ~ ~ [ ~ ~ ) l ~ l ( a l y  r~sl)ous(~(l t l ~ r *  I 
l i ~ ~ s s i n ~ l  ( : :L I I~{~ ;  111~1 it \\':IS I I O L  t l r ~ l i l  : L I I ~ I I I I I I ~  01'
l8!J 1 t11:it~ 1)11 l ) l i (@ : ~ t , t , ( b ~ ~ t i o t l  \\I:LS :LI tr :~v~tql to I I I ( ~  
1 r l ~ o v e ~ i u c ~ ~ ~ ~ s  ol' I i u w i : ~ ~ ~  ( I ( J ~ : I ( ' ~ I I I ~ ( ~ I I I S  it1 tllis 1ittlp.- 
known corner of the world by the receipt of news 
that Rritisl~ officers hacl been ruclely warned off 
the Pamirs by a Russian colo~lel of Cossaclrs who 
had been sent therc with a small expeditionary 
force. 
Captain Youngllusbancl, who was on special. 
duty in, the Intelligence Department of the. Go- 
verrlmeilt of Inilia, liad for some time past been 
enga,gecl in exploring tlle country to the north1 of 
the ~ i m a l a y a s ,  ancl had spelit the previous winter 
in Iiashgar. There he was joined by an aclven- 
t;urous young subaltern named Davison, and in 
July 1891 these two ofbcers started to return to 
India by way of the Palnirs and Gilgit. They 
fblloweil the most direct route vi8 the Gez de.lile, 
and on reaching the Bulun-Kul Lake they partecl 
company, Davisoil travelling towards the Alichur 
Painir, wliile Y ounghusband continnecl his march 
soutlzwarcls through Tash-Iiurgan and the Tagh- 
clum-Bash Palnir to the clesertecl village of Bozai- 
Clumbaz ---.- - in the Wakhsn Valley, which he found 
occupied 11y a small party of Russian soldiers, who 
were joined n f e v  days later by another cletach- 
ment of t ~ ~ ~ e n t y  rue11 uniler the comrnancl of Colonel 
Y s11off. 
The first meeting l~et~ireen the two oflicers was 
of a friendly nature, and after t h e  Eussiail colonel 
and his s t a r  hacl had tea ancl wine in the British 
oficer's tent,, Llley rotu~:necl t;hc 11ospitalit;y by invit- 
ing lliln to clin~ler. Rut these ple:r,sant relations 
dirl not last long, and Yoii~gl~usband was sllortly 
af~erwards informed t,hat the Governor-Gene~al of 
8 2 
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Turkestan lind issuecl orders fir him to be nr1.estecl 
and conducted t,o Mnrgel~n, ullless 11e gave n 
written promise to quiL tlie i ~ e i g i o o o  at o~lce 
ancl not to travel in wllnt tlie Russi:~n officer stylc(:l 
' newly nccluired Russisll territory.' IJllilcr tllc 
Cnptain Yom1gln1sl):~1icl \ir:ls ~?oiri- 
pelled to yield to snperior f iwc~?,  :lnd lic. :~ccol+tI- 
iilgly left Bozni-Gumbar: ailil ~-c?tni-nctl to t31ic Tnrrli- ,.I 
durn-bash Pnmir, wllere lie relu:~il~etl for s i s  ~~t!cBs 
ailcl was able to lenrii tll:~t tile Iii~ssinl~s, rlfter 1 their i~rrirnl at Bosni-G~~in~I)nz, 11:~d r:rosscrl tho 
/ IIindu Iiush by tlle I<ornl.)hat I1ass, :~ili[ :~i'l.c:!r 
' jonrneying for soirie clistancc tllrougl~ tl~tt '4':~ldlrnL 
Valley clistricl; of the C)liitr.:ll St,:lle, t l \ci~ ~-ccrossc!(I 
the Hincln Iinsll 11y tlie R:irogllil 1':~s~ ni~rl~jour- 
i neyed nortll.cvnrils Ihrough AI"g1l:~n t-,erritory to tlie 
Alicllur Pa~nir.  
I11 the ineanwliile Thvisol~ linil mc!t in tlie 
Alicllur P:~rnir a Clli~lese gc?~i~'r:~l who was cag:~gctl 
in builling n small fort for one of t11(! Cllit.icse 
Jctncllinc!l~t,s ~vliicl~ Ilacl for irlarly y(!:~rs LIC.C!II 
cst:~l.)li$herl in t11:~t 1):u.t (.)f tllc X'atnir rc~giui~ ; ns~tl 
wliile thcrc tllc: 1lussi:~ns :~rriilcil l i .oi~~ tl~cir rnicl 
:leross tllc 'I:.Iiliclu Ku'u.ii11. Ck:)l( )11c;l ?iT:t~lc)/T t,li(~ret~,l)o~i 
~:l:~,inlccl tlic: (listricl, 2s :RLISS~:~IL t(:rrit(:)i,y, ( ! 0 1 1 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 1 ~ ~ c l  
t1.x Clli~ic~sc! to itl~i~~c:(li:~~(:ly s i~; l~i I r :~~v,  i l ~ ( 1  ~ , l ; t ( , i ~ ~ g  
Ilii;utcii:~~lt J ) : L V ~ S ~ ~ L  1111ilc.~ :LZ'I,OS[:, (:ul~voyt*(l 11i1i1 
towardg Margr!l:tii, I ~ u t  cvt!t~tnally wt, I l i ln  f ~ ' ( l c ?  
belixc r~:~(;11ii1g t.11:~~ ~J~:L(IC! .  '.t'11(; J - U I I I I ~  :IihlgIisl~- 
rrlatl tl~c?n nl:ulc! liis w;ty tvnlnrcls K:~sll~:tl~in :111(Z 
rejc)inec1 Y ~ ~ I I I I ~ ~ I L I ~ ~ . I ~ I I ( ~  O I L  [.II(! ~ l ' : ~ g l ~ - c l , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - l ~ : ~ s ~ ~  
1':unir on ( )c!t.c)l~c!~. 4, wl~c?t~ ill(? t.tvo o n  t r:~gclc'l 
n- 
d- 
:11- 
lrs 
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officers lllade their way back to G-ilgit, arriving 
there in safety eleven days later. 
Now, although the north-eastern frolltier of 
Afghanistan was defined in the ilgreemeat of 1873 
in a inanner which permitted of considerable 
divergence of opiilioii as to the true inenning of 
the pllraseology therein adopted, it is nevertheless 
perfectly clear that liussia cannot, by ally possible 
interpretation of the clause in question, lay claiin 
to any portion of the country which lies to the 
soutll of .Llie branch of the Oxus which takes its 
rise i11 Lilre Victoria (Sir-i-kul). The deserted 
village of Bozai-Gumbaz is many miles tro the 
south of that branch of the Oxus, and the Russiails 
therefore have no shadow of a claim to that portion 
of the Pczillir region, and Colonel Yanofs action 
was nothing lllore 110s less tlzan a piece of effrontery 
which surl3nssed ally of the outrageou.~ actions of 
Iioillaroff a i d  Alilrhanoff; for it must be remem- 
bered that he not only made a prisoner of one 
British officer and ordered another OR ground 
11~11icli was uncluestioiiably within the recognised 
limits of British influence, but he moreover 
m.arclzecl across the Hindu 1C11sh with a consider- 
able detaclirrlent of Cossacks, alld th,en prornenaded 
tllrough the valleys on the borclers of the Kasbinir 
SLate, passing the whole time through territoxy 
wl~icll was recogriisetl as being I"ar 1.1eyond Bnssia's 
sphere of action in Central Asia. 
I t  t11 us I)ec:ame perfectly (:].ear that altlthouph 
'ILnswi,z l ~ d  rel~euteclly agreecl not to interfere in 
ally way y,~itll i;lie States to the soutll of the limi t:vy 
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line laid clown ill 1873, rlo i~elia11i:c ol~lcl be placecl 
on  the promises so given ; anti the Indit~n G o ~ ~ e r n -  
1nen.L was tller&re c;oinpcllocl to tnko ste11s to p:,ut 
;LI~ encl to ally furtlier t :~ i~ i l~ (?~ ' i~ lg  \ ~ r . i l , l ~  the petty 
chieftains to the soutli oT t'llc T3iniln Icusll. J\ s~u :~ l l  
forc,c wns ncco~~l i~ ig ly  seilt :~l,r:~illst the? c:o~.~l,um:~c:ioils 
chief of IIuiizu, ~ 1 1 o  1 ~ : ~ s  il(:)t ( ) 1 1 1 ~  lotul~iously 
frienclly Lotvards the IYSuscovites, l)llt-ill :~, l l ( l i t io~~ 
~:,o llis political ~rlisdcc:tls-g;~i~~(?cl :I I ' c ~ ) ~ I ~ : L ~ ~ o T I .  for 
cold-blootled crirue ' nncl l~lisgovenu~i(:~lt vllicll ~ ~ ~ 1 1 -  
dered his punishment ant1 ~c~I IoT ' :~ '~  IIC:CC!SS:LI'~ for 
the pence of the bode].. After :a 111.icf' but lrrillia,nt 
little c;~mpnign tllis uiirlcsi~.:~l,lc, neig11l:)our w:l,s 
drivel1 ont of his col11lt~i.y ; nntl :~ltll(.)~lgll f~u.tllcr 
operations in tlicse ~vilcl mounl;n.ii~ I ' C ~ ~ O I ~ S  \vr,re 
necessitate(l on :LCCC)II lit of serio~is I;I .OL~~.)~CS  id 
coinp1ic:~tions in Clii trtll, t,llc.! si tllntion 1 1 : ~  l)c?c:~r 
steicclily ii~lproviilg, :~ild IIOTV tli:~1; :C 131qil;is11 rcsicle1l t; 
lias becii :~ppo i~~ ted  n,t; C11it:i':~l it, is to 1x3 1~011~'il 
that not oilly 1~ :~s  t,llc: cloor l)cct~l sl:rn~nlc~d i l l tlic.! f:lc.c? 
of Xussin,V)nt. t,llnk it, u~ill l)c Ii~l>t, fir1111y closotl 
for t,he ~fl~tllrc, 
T3nt mliilc t l~o  1ntli:ln ;uitJio~.it,icvi weiv tllus 
taking mci:lsurcs to gu:rr(l 1110 Tli~l(lu lillsll ~):Lss(~s 
and to 11r~vc11t i~11-y f'~ii+t,l~rlr I ~ L I S S ~ : L I ~  iii c~rl'(lrc~il(:c~ 
Y o n n ~ $ l n ~ l ~ ~ ~ i ~ l  rolntcs t l ~ n t  this cliirf ~~l~lr;lorc~d ll iq li~thcv, 
poisoneil l l i ~  rrntlrnr, 111111 tlirow l l i ~  t w o  11rotI1(~1,n over l~r(!(%ij~i(*o~i, 
nntl tliril runuo~l~lc~c~d l ~ i ~  ~ ~ l i ~ ( l r o r l ~  to liis n~lx('rcii~i, tlltr RL~~linl*~~j& of 
I<ntlhrnir, i11 I,l~ofi)llowi~~ji L O ~ I I I N :  ' 1 1 ~  tllo G~-IZC($ or (iod ~ L I I { I  1111' ilc(319(>11 
of flit0 my ft~lllsr ant1 I foll nut. T h n k  t l i ~  initi~~tivo nticl~oCtlad Llro 
maltw, 1~1rr1 IIILVO ~~lrrcc~(l 111yfio1f on tlln t l~ t .n~~o ol  luy R ~ I P O H ~ O ~ H , '  1 Tlln I l~l~ni l in  T'rilaw ( i n l i l r i ~ ~ ,  rirlrilo imvvlli~,g in l~illin d l l rbg  
f '  tho cold wortltI~or nf 3H!)1 92, rr~~narlcc~rl r i t h  ~c.f(~ronco to 1110 rrcerrt 
'I expodition to 'I.ln~~sn.l\'n,nn~*: ' Ilt, oilt ft>r~rlc; IIL l~orlo nu nox.' 9 
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with (;he pebly States to tllc south of that range, 
the Muscovites redou.bled their efforts to gain 
possession of the whole of the Pnmi~  platean, and 
also took advanta,ge of (;he disturbed state of 
across t'he recently clemnrca,tecl boundary aild 
temporarily occupied ail Afghan torn.  
It was in the Pamirs, however, that the Russians 
displa,yed tlie greatesl; signs of activity. They saw 
clearly that the time was approacliing for set,tliilg 
the frontier cluestion, which had for so ilzxny years 
been in dispu.te, &d they evideiltly coilsidered t l~at  
the simplest manner of securing an advalltageous 
settlenient was by resortil~g to the same tactics 
which hail been einldoyed with suck signal success 
on tbe Heri-Rud and Murghab in 1884 alld 1885. 
The me~liocls adopted were simple a id  efficacious, 
and mere perfectly falniliar to those who had 
studied the history of Russia's conquests in Central 
Asia,. On Julie 14, 1892, Colonel Panoff again set 
out fro111 Margelan at the head of a force of some 
3,000 men of all arms,' ancl accompmiec~ by a 
Tl~e  accounts in the St. Pe t~~sb~ur g  and IVIoscow jomnala fix 
. +.,% I: .pi,* the nnmbers at about double the nurnber.of tPoop8 here mentioned.; 
bt: ,wj, :Ll.ld altl1011gh the n.ct~~sl st~sngth d the ~oluma c~~l~lnot bc ncc~~c~ttely 
9' 
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~luillber of volunteers, naturnlists, geologists, and 
otllers who were iiltei~t on scieritific rcscnrcl~.. TIie 
infantry formed the aclqniice gu.nl*rl of tlie forcc, 3n.d 
bile whole of t.lle trool~s were escell.c?nlly ecl~~il~l.)ecl, 
with t.11~ exception of the :ul;illery, mrhicli is dn- 
scribed as mediocre 11ot;li in qunri~il-jr n~iil c~il:l,lity. 
During 1;he ninrch xross  t11(! Al:ii L L I ~ ~  rl'r:~ils-l\.l;~i 
ranges the expeilit;ion 1i:iil to cncotzuter solllc viol.ent 
storms and heavy rain, wliidi 1n:~dc tllc ro:~tls 
almost impnssal~le 211d drcllcheil tllc 111~11 tliro11g11 
and through. I11 one of tliesc stonns 11111li'hers of 
telegraph l~osts, ilewly ererttcil ljy i;he 1;rooy)s :IS they 
advanced, were blowu do~irii, and n s'licll is said t,o 
liave been exploded l)y liglitiiiilg ill 011e of tllc 
camps. But although the meiri1,ers of the cspe- 
(lition hncl to put up  mrit'll the grcat;est har~lsliips, 
I 
the l.,nnlis of {.lie Mur~glinl) 1.1y tile 
, , 
micldle of July, ntiil t1icl.e Ynnoff' fc1~11lil 11i:it tlic? 
political sit~zn1;ion liail grctntly cl~nngc:(l since hi,.; 
foimer visit. 
Tl.ic liinits of the hfg1i:lri and C'!liiilcsc lmsses- 
sions i n  the centre of tlie P : ~ n ~ i r  1)l:~t c!:zn, l,c!twcc:il 
tlie M~:~rg l i :~ l~  arid Alj-i-S':zr.~j:ll~, 11:tvc ~ic;vc!r I.~cc:~i 
ilafined, foi* tlie sinll~lc sc:r.son i.li:~L; 1lc?i111(~ tl le 
Afglians nor Cllinesr! cvc!r trou1)lccl ~ . I ~ ( ? I I z ~ ( ! ~ v c R  
mnch :~I)ollt tliis region IIII t.il t.liey S:LW t,li:lt {:I l ( i  
nussi:xns ilitc?~~(le(l to t:ilrc! adv:tllh:lgt! of' 1.11(!ir 11ogl(?(:I; 
by ocr:nl)yiti,q t.11~ t:crril( ) ry  i,ii. t . l ~ ?  (Iz:u*'s 11:11nc!. 
r I L C  i i i i i i ~ i l  c 1 1  i t 1  I '  1 Vie:.. 
tOrin l'~:~lcc? (Sir-i-1;1~1) 113s 1 ~ ( ? 1 i  :L sort. 01 ( k l  ):L( :il )I(: 
nacclrtninnrl, thorc! in n n  iloubl; thne nt 1cn~L; i1,0110 ltion Look pnrl i11 
t h e  oxpoilitinn. 
:1c311 
111c 
ves 
tllc 
oot 
111C. 
Tic:.. 
.l ,lc 
land between China and A~ghanistan, although 
there appears to he little doubt that the true 
boundary between the two States is a line passi~ig 
close to Lake Sasik SCul in tlle Alicllur Pamir. 
A Clliilese outpost; had long been established at 
Burzila Jai, in the neigl~l~ourl~oocl f tllat lake, and 
when PwnofY visited the Pa~nirs in 1801 he found 
t l ~ e  Chinese in occupation. But after Yanoff ex- 
pelled the Chinese, tlle Afghans appeal: to have 
stepped in, and when the ~iussiail officer in 1892 
revisited the scene of his previous filibu~terill~ 
expedition, he fou~lcl that tlie Afghans had esta- 
blished a post as far eastwards as Alr Ta,sh, in the 
neigl~bourlloocl of tlle Neza Tnsh Pass, and had also 
placed a stray picquet at  Soma Tash, a little to the 
west of what appears to be the true bounclary 
between the Afghan and Chinese possessions. I-Ie 
accordingly at once inacle up his iniild to expel tlle 
Afgllaus fro111 the whole ~:egion between the Mur- 
ghab and Alj-i-Panjal~ ; and, starting off from his 
camp on the Murghab wi~ll  n large force, he reached 
Soma Tash at daybreak on the mori~iilg of July 26. 
I t  appears that the Afghans were, at the time, 
asleep in their camp, and before they had auy idea 
of the near approach of 3 hostile force, the Afghan 1 commandant's tent was surrounded by some eighty r 
t Cossaclrs, the ~:emainder of the FLussian detacllineilt , 
being concealed from view a sbort distance may .  I 
Shams-uil-Din Khan, the commander of the Afghan 
post, then advxncecl :~nd inquired what the IZussinns 
were doing on Afg1.1:~n soil ; but a:ker a sllort con.- 
versation he was illformed that his inen nlust lay 
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down their arms. T11is demand was haughtily 
rejected by I h e ' ~ f ~ h a n ,  who declared that he held 1 I 
the post for I~is master, the Amir, and would obey 
the orders of no one else. YanoF tlleil ordered 
him away aild appears to have used violeilce to- 
wards him, whereupon he drew his pistol :mrl fired, 
tlle ball piercing the Russiall ofice~'s belt ancl 
wo~znding a Cossack who was behinil hiin. A 
scuffle ens~~ed ,  in which Shanls-ucl-Din and six 
otller A-fghans mere at once l~illecl, while t'lle re- 
mainder of the pa,~ty Ae.il belliild tlleil* tents, n,nrl 
conti~zned to fire on the 12ussiai1s from behind the 
I 
cover thus obtaine(1. Tlie fight, however, mTas soon 
over, and in the end nine more Afgl~ans were killed, 
two wounded, and one drowiled in the Alichur 
River, wl~ile six men were tnlcei~ prisoners, aild the 
lviesseilgers who had beer1 de~~~atcl iecl  oil horseback 
with a letter to the Governor of Baclt~ltshaii were 
~ U ~ S L I C ~  a,~zd etained in the Iiussiarl camp for two 
or three clays. In this afhir blie riul;sisn losses 
were very trifling ; oiily t11.rt.c me11 being ~vo~utdetl, 
one of whom was the Cossacl< -ct-110 was strucli by 
the first ~1101; whicl~ was fired. 
While Yal-loff was tllus disposi~~g of the prin- 
ipal Afghan o~ztpost nt Sonla rl':~.~l~, anothel-' 
ussial~. dctachrnent m:~rched e:~stw:~rcls towards 
the Tngh-dunz-I3:~sh S'amir for tlic! pilrpose of ex- 
pelling tlic sirid1 AfCll:ul ilctaclnric!~~t; wllich ll.:~d 
established itself : ~ t  Alc-!Casl~, ()1.1 t11c left '11:~nlc o1.1 
the upper MT:L~;C:~S of the iN11~g11;~l) st~ea111--tll(?ri3 
called tllc Ak-an. 011,  :~rrivt~lg t l ~ i ~ ! ,  tlic I.~IISS~:LII 1 
comrtix~ztler l~ehnrreil ill l~rcciso'ly tlic same way is'.: . 1 
i 

clo~11jt have had to b e  withclrnmn Z~efore the wj.nter 1 
V 
set in, but  the disturbances in Russian territory 
hastened their departure, a i d  by the eilcl of Sep- 
tember 1892 the force ret'~.lrllc.il to Margelan, a 
cletachment of 165 illell 1111cler ;L ~a11~:~iil bei11.g 
left in a sn.lall fort on the Wurgllnl) to cniphasisc? 
Enssia's clnilrl to the suwou~lcling c o u ~ ~ l r y .  
Tllese serious ilemonstratioi~s ill llic I:':/iuil- 
region caused the Britisli Foreign OIlice to e n t e r  
iiito negotiations for L11.e l)ulapose of linviilg tlic 
Eusso-Afgllail frontiers in that park of tlie ~ ~ ~ o r l t l  
accurately definecl ; but as tile ~legatiatioils htivc: 
dragged on for inany ruout,lis ~vitliout any L):isis 
having Lee11 laid clown fc>r a Joiiit Coi~iillissioil for 
the deillnrcatiou of the bonnclnry, i t  appears only 
too p~.obnblc I;liat the 12nssi:tiis arc rc+pcating tllc 
tactics 1~~1iich they so s~~coessful.ly p~~rsnet l  in 
1884-87 ; 2nd it is very lilrcly tlint in the nexr 
Ellt~wc nwliwal-tl complicatioils will :wise olx a c c o ~ u ~ t  
of their aggressive clcsig~ls 011 the counttry to t;he 
11ort11 of tlie C1litr:~l State. 111 tllc luc!:~n~vliile t,lle 
: r i  lu~lces tan  autllorities : L ~ C  I-aliiilgsteps to strol~gl;llc!il i 
their position by the coilshnctio~i of n ucnr rc:)nil l o  
the M.ta.gl;ll:~b Pork, 311d ' by tlle estal,lisllmc?~lt of 
anokl~.er post in the Al:~i 1'l:itcau ; :~riil from tinzc to 
time sillis tier rumours ol~t'idi 1 (:ir(;:~il:~ti.oil :LS to t'lle 
rnoveruenL of Rassinl.l trool~s in tlic: I ' :LII~~~s. 
:l!'trl* the ~)rc!soi~t, lic~wevc!l+, tllc gc~rtc:rnl. fc!clil~g ()I' 
u~lcasilless :IS ko ~11:11: :Iiussi:l's llcst II~(>VI!  will hi; 
11:~s 1)ccli so~nc?wl~:lt L ~ ~ : L X C ~  b y  S~;:L[(~TLIC!IZ~S 11l:lilc 1.1~' r I 
Sir I<, Gr(,*y in t,llc! ~J'cII.Is(! (IS ~ ! C ) I ~ ~ I I ~ ~ . ) I I S  c n l  hi1:/-y 2 
and Snlgl 1.3, .I. 893, to t,licr efIi!c:~! 111:1(. 'ITc:r Jl;~jr.st.!''s 
l i ~ .  
ler 
he 
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Governinent ' have received a solemn promise froln 
Russia in the most exl~licit terms that during the 
present year, and wliile llegotiatioils are pentling, 
no expeditioiz vhatcver wou.ld be sent to tlze 
Panlirs.' I t  is sincerely to be hoped that tllis pro- 
mise will be Icept ; but from previous examples of 
t,hc value of 1Zussian pleilges, one is forced to con- 
fess that it -cvonlil not be a cause for much astouisll- 
nient if Ilussinn troops mere once more pu.shec1 for- 
ward into tlze ilebatalble territory, in spite of the 
assurances so given. Excuses ibr such inovements 
cou.ld readily be found, ; ~ n d  tlze iliplomntists on the 
Keva ~ ~ o u l i l  finc1 no dificulty in once again repeat- 
ting the cry that they had been compeller1 to ad- 
vance iliuclz against their vishes, and in spite of 
tlzeir intense desire to (lo nothing which might 
irritate or alarm their friends the English. 
Nor is this Palnir question tlze only one mhich 
miglit lenil to p a v e  complications between Ellgland 
and Russia, ; for, althougli the north-western fron- 
tier of Afglzaiiistan has only recently been defiiiecl, 
vexed questions have already arise11 regarding tlze 
llse by tlie Afglinns nnil Russians respectively of 
the watel. of the various streams which flow from 
Arglinn tervitory illto the Czar's iloininions. At 
tlze tinle of the Afghan S3onnilary Conlmission this 
irrigatioil qneslion was c:a~ef~~lly considered, and a 
settlcl~~ci.nt was tllen :~rrived at which was accepteil 
by both 1)sl.ties ; ljut, since l;llen, complaints have 
\,een fiyyluently nlaile by tlic liussians t1ia.t tlze 
iifg11ar1.s hail ~ ~ n i l u l y  tapped the strcains, and that 
c o n ~ e ~ ~ i c r ~ t l y  an ins~~lL(;ieizt sul)ply of water reached 
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the Turkoman settlements upon tlie nortliern side 
of the border. Tliese complaints linvc recently 
so serious $11 aspect, t h t  t h ~ :  Viceroy of 
India sent, Colonel Ynte t,o inquire into 1;lie luatt,er, 
in comm ~lnicati011 1vit1.l :Ln olfic.c.1' wllo 1 1 : ~ ~  been 
silnilarly appointed by tlie liussiali (ic-)~rcll.liurent ; 
but, no i~lbrll~ntiori  lins y(?t I)CCIL ~'t!(:c!iv(!(I :LR I o 1;1i(: 
~ n n ~ ~ n e r  i  wllicl-i the ilisputc! lins bccli scl tlccl. 
From tllis it will l ~ c  seeu tli:~t 1 . 1 1 ~  ~ I . I I S S ~ : L I ~ S  
sucr,eecl in keeping 112, n 1~rp"t":~l s~:L~;c 01' 1;6!iisioli 
:~11 along the Afglian l~oriler. 'I.'hey :L~I\~:L~s li: v(: 
two or three petty tlisl>utcsr~:~(ly nf; I~ :LI I (~ ,  ~\rli icl~ 
they can tun1 into serious clues Liniis wlic!llcvc?r l.1ic.y 
particularly desire to nniloy or cliscluiet tllc? 1 l~ t l i ;~n  
:tutlioritics. 'I'lley, nloreovei:, hnvc ~unliii-iil:rcl sc:opo 
for intrigues wit,l~ t,lic ~)cl;ty c:l-iic!f> :uiel tril )cs o11 
l;he fro11 tier ; nntl, altho~igli tllcy ]lave rclmif vil.ly 
promisecl t,o aljs1;niti fiolii int~i!rli!reiiccc: ill i\:fgIiail 
affairs, and linvc ilc~clarcil ~.]I:L.I: tlicy will 11ot 
commuilicate wit11 t,lle hmir  o f  'Ii'nl)nl, t11r:y wo~lltl 
find it dificullt t;o cletly 1;li:~b sc?c:rc.:t :rgtlilt.s l~nvc! 
reccnLly beell sc11l; to tlic ci.~pil.:al of' i~.rpl1:ti~1ist,;111. 
Thus, :LS e;xch yc:w IJ:LSR(:S it\v:l.y, 111~:. (1;~ri.gc:rs 
on tlie ~~orLl~-~\~c?st,c?rii fr(,)ilt (~rs or T~u'li:~ gr:~(ll,:~lly 
increase ; and i t  is tinzc l;liu,l; I,lic l)r?ol)lc r)t' Il:ngl:ni(l 
slioulil nw:rlre to Llic [:I,(::[; l;ll:~C I.lloy liarrc! :L l~1y!r:io11s 
iuherit,ancc left., to tllr!ir lic?c?l~il~g, t\rliic:li is ill tl:aig(,!r 
of \);L~".llfi ~ ' l l t  r)f ~;ll(!il' ~ J : ) O H S ( ! S S ~ O I ~ .  I I T I I ( ~ S S  f l l ( 1 ~  
~~naninloilsly, :~t - i ( l  n7it;ll ria lu~c!c!t.t::~i~l \.oiclcl, tl~!crl:~t! 
t,hnt ICussic~ Ilns rc!:~.c:lic!tl 1:11(! I , i~ l~ i [ : . r  0'1 l~(11. (, h ~ i ~  1 )is(! ' in 
(:et~.tr:ll Asia, :~iid nus st I)(? rOt+(*(il 1.0 c~l,st!l.vc! ] 1 ( ! ~  
c!n~f:i,gc~~~ncnl;s, a il osp~~:i :~lI j -  1 icti. pro11lisc.l~ 1.11;1, I slio 
I'E.IL'E u a  \V,ZIC 
- 
will not interfere in any way with the counlries to 
the soutli of the limitary line fixed by the Agree- 
ment of 1873. I f  peace is to be maintained, and 
if the Czar's Governincnt do nol desire to kindle a 
:11 disastrous anil cleploral~le war, wliich woulcl echo 
- .  , and re-echo for years tllroughout the wild coun- ' Y 
~e tries of Central Asia, a i d  117ould leave lraces which 
coulcl not be wipecl out by centuries of subsequeiil 
peace-if the Cz:tr lionestly c'lesires peace, tliese 
I~roinises mast, 1)c Iiepl. Englnnil never will, nor 
will she ever 1i:lvc niiy desire to, aclvnnce across the 
line of den~arcalion agreecl upon in 1873, nor will 
she, unless forcecl by lhe greatest political necessity, 
ever aclva~ice into any 130rtioil of Bfgllailistail. 
Let this 1)e clearly understood ; But let it also 
l,e, known thnl the British people have inacle up 
their ~ninds  that tlle complete inclepenclence of 
Afghanistan from anjT forin of Russian inlerference 
is essentially necessary for the peace and safety of 
t]leir 13astern Ellipire, ancl tlint they will, if neces- 
sary, take U P  ar111s to 1)revelit tlie slightest violation 
ol' the A~nir 's  ilonii~~ions. Znglancl has no inten- 
tion of interrerii~g 11~itl1, or :~clv:~ricing into, tlie 
count,ric.s 1)cyo11d the OXUS, anil mill use her 
is~[lneucc to induce the Amir to abstain from 
: ~ ~ ~ r e s s i o i ~  ; but, slie claims-nncl her claim has 
I~cen recogniscil l)y IZnssia-l11;~t she has the right 
to yrcservc order :mcl pence in Alghanistan. If 
1 Il(1 Amir, c:~rric>rl away by x sense of his own 
irn~)ori ,nu(~~,  or c:hcrjslling 1,hc hope of foreign as- 
sis(,nllchc~, tlispl:~ys 211 y liosLilit,y toura,rrls the Incliarl 
( ~ O T ~ C Y I ~ T ~ I C T ~ ~ , ,  or cornmils w r  ts wllic.11 :Ire inron- 
why such action shoulcl alarm or irritate Bussia, 
than that; tlie English should take oflence if the 
: a ~ ~ d  filibustering expeditions beyoizd their frontiers, 
273 RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS I N  THE Y A ~ ~ I R S  1887-1893 
---- .- -. 
sistent with his position as the ruler of a protected 
State, England has every right; to interfere, a i ~ d  if
necessary to replace liinl by a chief who mould 
ilrove rilore tractable ; slid there is no more reason 
C~ar's Gorernrilent shoulcl see fit to depose a 
13oliharan Arnir ~ l i o  srovecl himself lo be notori- 
- - 
lhen there will be peace; but if they wantonly E 1 J violate their promises, nncl interfere wit11 the 
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CONCLUSION 
IN the preceding pages an attempl; has beell made 
to place before khe reader a brief descriptioll of 
the manner in which Rnssia has gradually pushed 
forward tlirougli the wild countries in the I-Ieart of 
Asia uill;il she has at. last established herself wi t l~ i i~  
striking distance, of the outposts of the lizclian 
Einpire ; and it may now be well to consider to 
what extent British interests in Asia are endan- 
gered by this Muscovite advance, and to note how 
tliose interests can be safeguarded in the future. 
Tliirty years ago, when it first becaille hlown 
in England that the Czar's troops were engaged in 
serious military operations against the Khanates of 
Kholraild and Bol~liara, there were rriaily people 
who professed to believe that 1i;ussia was forced to 
advance in Asia in spite of herself, ancl mdlo loudly 
~roclaimed that such advaiices were to be looked 
upoil as a matter for congratulation, as ' the bless- 
ings of civilisation' would thereby be showerecl 
clowil upoii the barbarous inllabitants of those 
litble known regions. These persons scoffed at the 
fears and warnings of experts ; those who lleld 
contrary opii~ioils were set down as ' vision.,zries ; ' 
soldiers wlio hail ilevoteil their lives to the main- 
tel.la1.1ce of Rrit,isli supremacjr in the East, an.rI, who 
VUL.  I1. T 
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for the defence of India, yere credited with 
personal and ambitious motives ; and' tlie policy 
of ' masterly inactivity ' was in full swing. 
The control of Indian airairs was at that tiine 
entrusted to a, statesman wlio had rendered con- 
spicuous service to his country during the dark 
days of the Inclian Mutiny, ancl wliose position 
anlong Anglo-Indian administrators was of such 
an excep~io~lal nature that his opi~lions regitrdilig 
Central Asian xFdirs generc~llj7 passed uncll:~l- 
lenged. When this popular Viceroy st:ttecl that 
he was 'not at all certain Lhat Rnssia might not 
prove a sxfer ally, a better iieigllhour to Inili:~, 
tlisli~ the Mahornmeclan races of Cent,ral Asia,' ' 
and steadfastly set his face against ally iilterferclice 
with the States on the north-wesLern frontier crf  
India, the disciples of tlie ' do-not,llii~g ' school 
became confirineti in their beliefs, ancl few of t;henl 
paused to inquire whether it was iutleecl t n ~ e  t;liat 
the extension of Russian power to the borders of 
Inclia, would acltZ to the peace arid prospeyiLy of 
tlie native population of that comltry, or wlictliel. 
the near aap~roncli of a great Europea~l P u t ~ c l -  
would not, on the contrary uive rise to :L stat:(: of 
' P  
unrest ancl scnw of insecmlty wl~icll mroaltl ]I(:- 
cessarily ten.d to check the ilevelol)~lzc~lt of L ~ L C !  , 
. . 
country arld cause grent eli~b:~rrassmr!ll~; I.( 1 tl.lr! 
Goverrnncut of' L;1i:tt great ilepentlonc:y, 
Tlicse wo11.1d-l~c; pllilaiitl~rol~ists, .clrl,ilc .i\.c]pr)lu- 
Soo ' P I L ~ ~ O I R  ralntinfi to (lantrnl ~ H ~ I L  nlld Qnottrcr,' p n b l i ~ l ~ ~ ~ l  by 
ardor or tho XIon~c! oE C o ~ n m o ~ i ~ ,  V o b r ~ ~ ~ c ~ y  25, 1878, p. r i l ,  
! iilg tlie possible extension of civili~,ztion aillong 
L 
r 1 t'he scattered inhabitants of Central Asia, failed to realise tliat although the few in Turkestan might 
j receive some benefit, there was also n grave possi- 
bility that the niultitudes in India might lose all 
j I they hacl already g,zined, and that the Einpire Ir which for inore than a huilclrecl years had elljoyed 
n the blessillgs of the 'pax Britannic,zY migllt becoille 
11 j a fielc, for wide-spread intrigues and the theatre 
of a desolating war which woulcl destroy much of 
the good wl~ich had been brought about by years 
of careful administrat,ion. 
These followers of 'mnsterly inactivity,' while 
asserting that the Russians had been coinpelled to 
advance against their will, never seriously con- 
sidered whether there was ally paranlount necessity 
wl~icll obliged the Muscovites in the first instance 
to cross the hundreds of miles of barren steppes 
which separated tllern from Khiva and Xholrand, 
or wlzelher it was true t l~a t  the Russians were 
uilwilli~igly forced to seize the Kholrandian forts 
of Ak-Mechet, Aulie-ata, Elazret-i-Turlrestan, and 
Chi i~~kent .~  They failed to grasp the important 
fact that although these barren deserts afforded 
the Russiails an excelleilt barrier against serious 
'at~aclrs from the p0we~f~11 Central-Asian I<haiiates, 
and preveilted that contact with bm-barous States 
1 While considering this point, it will also be well to inquire 
whether Russia seized Ashurada end Ihasnovodslr ruerely from 
civilising and commercial motives, or whether she did not rather 
do so with a view to fiutl~er ~ggression, and with the full intention 
of extending her empire at the  expense of Persin end the vnl-ion~ 
petty tribes and States between the Caspinn Sen, and India. 
r J 
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which inevitably leads to continned conflicts and 
extension of territory, the Russians nevertheless de- 
liberately decided to cast aside that natural defence, 
i 
aud after moving across the Kirghiz Steppes, pro- 
voked collisioils with the independent races to the 
south, who-bitterly resenting the seizure of their 
strong places-naturally resisted until they had 
beell completely crushed by the superior power of 
the intruder. 
I t  is possible that these siinple-iniuded cle- 
fenders of the Russia11 advance would have been 
very much surprised if they had been told that 
they were unwittingly actiug tlie part of Russian 
agents, and were merely repeating excuses which i 
originated, not in their own mincls, but in  that of 
Prince Gal-tchakoff. If they, hom~ever, will care- 
fully study the clever circular despabch issued by 
Prince Gortchakoff on Novenlber 21, 1864, they 
will there find all the arguments which they have 
so frequently forced on the attention of the English 
people, and they will thus see that they have 
merely been acting as the mouth-pieces of the 
Russian Foreign Office, wllich has always found 
inany creclulous Englishmen ready to cllampion the 
i ! 
cause of Russia. 
These excuses for the Russian illovements in 
C!entral Asia, however, fulfilled their purpose for 
many years, by lullillg the  suspicioils of the 
English alld by tlius enabling Russia to nlove 
forward step by step towards the goal of her 
ambitions. But when these pretexts had dolle 
their dnty, and il M~LLS ffollild tliat L11ey aoulcl 110 
4 
longer obtain credence, a fi-esh theory was started 
-again in Russia-ancl was speedily seized upon 
by that section of the British public which knows 
but little about Eastern affairs, cares less, and is 
ready to accept any plausible excuse for ' putting 
off the evil day.' This last explanation of Russia's 
advance is to the effect tllnt llussia does not want 
India, but merely wishes to get as close to the 
borders of that country as possible, in order that 
she might paralyse the action of Great; Britain in 
the event of complications in Eastern Europe. In 
1 other words, Russia wants a free and uncontrolled 
passage into the Mediterranean, and mill nlake a 
clemonstration against India if England attempts 
to interfere; but if she be permitted to bold 
Constmtinople and the Dardanelles-and she won't 
be content with one without the other-she w d  
then cry ' Quits,' and trouble Inclia no more. 
Now this is at  first sight a very plausible 
theory ; but we take leave to doubt the accuracy of 
this view of Russian policy, and hope to be able to 
show that the surrender of the Straits wollld be of 
no avail in bringing about permanent peace be- 
tween England and Russia,, but, on the contrary, 
I wo~~lcl enable the latter Power to prosecute her 
I designs against India with a far greater prospect of ultimate success. I t  must be borne in mind that Russian trading 
vessels can at the present moment freely pass i between the Mediterranean and Blaclr Sea ports, and that so long as Russia abstains from war this 
can go on developiilg witllout let or hindrnace. 
But this is not sufficient for the Eussixiis. They 
desire to  be inclependenl of the goodwill of tllc 
Torte, and  objecl Lo be hainl~ered by irlrsoine re- 
strictions with regard to their war vessels ; :~nd 
they wish to gain coinl~lete com~nnild over the 
Strails so as to Le able lo close t2iem :~g:~inst 
possible eneilzies, and in orcler t1i:~t Lllcir Ifacli Sea 
fleet may be available for use i11 Llle bledi!,crrano:~~i. 
In other words, Xussia wisllcs Lo turri tlie Blnclr 
Sea into a IEi~ssian lake wliicll would form :L sec~ir(? 
base for further operatioils in the Meclitc 'I - 1 '~11e:~ll ; 
sizd if she were to achieve tliis ol?jccL, wlint woultl 
tlierl be her positiou with resl,cct to Iildi:~ ? Si11ll)ly 
this : Slie woulcl be estal~lished in a well-iiigll 
irr~pregnable positiori on tlle flank of' the sllortcsst 
route fro111 England lo tlle Xast, and woulil seri- 
ously lrleiiace Uritisll s1zpreiuar:y in tlic M edit ~1'1'3- 
]lean ; s l ~ e  would linve nz:~cle a striclc to~w,rils 
01)taining a footiiig on the Lr:~dc route by wl~icll 
the conlmerce of the East lias always fourid ils 
way to Xurol~ean n~nrlrets ; a~ii l  she woultl liavc 
rendered it almost iii-q~ossillc lor TC~~gla~id (in t,he 
event of war) to attaclt licr in l ~ c r  nlof;t, vulncrnLlc 
points, viz. in Llle C:~ucasus nilcl on tho I3l:~ck SC:L 
coasts. 
Such, then, would l)c tlic sit,uulWn if I,llc Str:~its 
were surrenrlcrc(1 to Bussi:~ ill rctnrn for 1wr 1)ro- 
lnise to a21st:~in fro111 filrtllcr tlirc:ill,r~~izlg :ulv:il~r:c?s 
townrcls olir Tll(li:~11 X':i~ll)ir(?, 111l(l rv1i:~t gu:\r:~nt,i!(: 
is there that :my suol~  prcmisa ~ f o u l d  I)(: kr.1~1~9 
I11 h11e 171-eccdinp p:lgrs it, h:ls brcn slio\vi~ hirw 
- 
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Russian pledges have been broken one after an- 
other for the past thirty years, and there is surely 
no one so credulous as to believe, in spite of these 
examples, that Russia would abstain from m & i q  
a Gnal attempt to secure the prize she has so long 
and so perseveringly sought afl;er, even if she were 
to make a hundred promises to that effect. 
And even if we allow that the Russian nation 
would honest1~- desire to abide by the terms of 
such .a covenant, it must be remelnbered that tlle 
very extent and colltinuons expansion of tile Rus- 
sian Empire is a factor which cannot be ignored. 
From the sl~ores of the Caspian Sea to far distant 
Corea tllere are scores of poiilts at  which 13ussian 
interests clash with those of Great Britain, to say 
notlling of t l ~ e  serious jealousies and complicatiolls 
which would inevitably arise if the Russians gained 
a footing in the Medit,erranean, and were thus in a 
position to effectively interfere in the afairs of 
Syria, EgjrPt, and Northern Africa. With so many 
loopholes for quarrelling we surely could not be 
certain that we should not, at some future period, 
find ourselves drawn into a war wit11 Russia in 
defence of vital interests ; and then .what would 
become of the promise ? Could we expect Russia 
still to adhere to her covenant, and refrain from 
nlakillg an attack on India, which is the only point 
where she could seriously injure us? No, cer- 
tainly not; ; mid it would be well, tb erefore, if we 
once ancl for all recognise the fact that we cannot 
purchase permanent pence for Inclia by any sucll 
surrencler. 
111 Russia11 eyes India slid Coiistantinople arc, 
i~~timately conilectecl wit11 each other. Tliey want 
possessioli of both ; and while they hope, by threat- 
ening India, i;o slialre tlze resolnt,ion of English- 
men, and thus pave tlie way for t11c occtzl)n.l;ion of 
the shores of the Bosphorus and D~nrclaiiclles, they 
also are keenly alive to t.l~e f:~ct tli:~t clnce they Ilc- 
coille masters of those Sl;rnits, t;heil. s~zl)scq~~eut 
erorts for the es~al~lislimeilt of nil enipire in 
Souther11 Asia wo~ilcl be greatly simp1ifir:il. 111 oiLe 
versioii of tlle so-called Will of Peter the G.ren[;l 
there are the following words : ' Approach :IS nc:,lr 
as possible to Constautinople :111cl IiiiZi:~. IIe who 
establislies lliinself iii tliose two p1:~ces will Ile tlic 
true sovereign of the wol.1~1 ; ' aiid ure Ilol(1 to tlle 
belief that whether tl~ese .cfrol*cls .cflere wril.tcii 'l)y 
tlie great Czar or lind their origiii ill tlie fertile 
brain of Nal~oleon Bo~laparte, tdlicy fcmn the ]icy- 
note of Russian policy in the East at tlic ~~rcseil~;  
moment. 
Believiilg tlieii, as we clo, that tlic tiillc is not 
far rlistant urlien tlle Russialis ~vill m:~lie a f~ i r~ l~c?r  
move towarcls tlle Inclns, eibllcl- for tlic l~nrl~osc! of 
contest,ing oul. suprc?iaxcy in tllc East, o r  in o1.ilrr 
that they might :~pproacl~ :ts closc as l)ossil,lu to 
our fi.ontie1.s before. tlwy niakr: theil* fin:~l s11ri1,lg ;
being confronteil, as we ~ulclc)ul)~;cxll~. :Llae,1,y tllc: 
possibility-n:~y, thc? l~rc.)l):~l)ility-c,E ~ 1 1 ~ 1 1  :L (1:ul- 
gerous clcvc!lol~lnc!~it of l;l.lc Ccntr:d A,,.;i:l,l, c~,lc?st,ioll, 
we niaint,:tin tlii~t i t  is 1iigJ~ ti~nc! t1l:lt t lw ~ ) ~ ~ , O ~ I I ( :  of 
Roo ' ItI~llnoiro~ dn C11r:vr~lic.r il'I!:on,' prLr Pr61ldric Gnillnril~t, 
Douxibmo CrdiLion. Pnrie, 1H50. 
- 
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Xngland should clecide whether they call permit; 
the Cossacks to come any closer to the Indian fron- 
tiers without endallgeriilg the safety of that great 
dependency, or whether they should not rather 
make up their miilds to resist any f ~ ~ r t h e r  ncroach- 
ments on the part of Russia by every possible 
nieans in their power. They must aslr themselves 
whether i;l~ey are resolved if needs be to enter into 
a bitter struggle with Russia in defence of the 
ulorious empire which their forefathers have built b 
up, or if they will'decline such a contest, ancl by so 
doing confess bcfore the world that they are u11- 
worthy of the great trust which Elas been conm1itted 
to their care. 
The Russian frontiers at present msrch side by 
side wit11 those of Afghanistan from the Heri-RLI~ on 
the west to Chinese Turlrestan on the east ; and. 
wlnat guarantee have we got that this frontier line 
will be respected by the Power which has so sya- 
tematically attaclred and subdued all the petty 
States and tribes to the north of the Amir's do- 
minions ? I t  is true that we have Russia's promise 
that she will respect the integrity of Afghanistaa, 
ancl will abstain from all interference in the affairs 
of that State ; but horn. can we place any reliance 
on such promises when we have before us so many 
iixtances of pledges ~ ~ l l i c l l  have been violated by 
Russia mhenever i t  suited her purpose to xalre a 
fresh move towards India? The Czar's Govern- 
ment declared in 1864 that they had reached a limit 
beyond which they would not advance ; and did 
they lreep within t l la~ limit? They promised to 
restore Samarlcand to the Amir of 3olrllar:i. Did 
'they do so ? They declared tllat they llail no in- 
tention of occupying JKhiva or Merv. Was not a 
large slice of I<llivan territory ~~?restcil from tlle 
helpless Khall, and is not n Russian gnrrison now 
located in the oasis on the Murg1:llal) ? A i d  did 
not tlle Russians also clcspatch a11 a1lll)nssaclor with 
a consiclerable escort to the Court of Slierc Ali in 
spite of their repeateil promise not to interfere in 
Afghan &-airs or even to send agents to the Amir's 
capital? These are a few ex:nny)les out of the 
lnany which could be q~zotecl, if necessary, to show 
that Russinil prolnises are al~solulely ~~rorLlilcss as 
a guarantee against fnrther :~ggression on their 
part. 
And, on the otlier llanil, mc! I C I ~ ~ I T  tllnt the 
Russi:tns have, for lrlatly years pi~st, yl~c~tiolieil 1:1lc 
Afghan Amir's soverciigil 1.igllts over hl'gll:~~i- 
Turkestan, and lime llillteil tl.lat tlic true fsoilticr 
between tlle I3rit;ish a~lcl 1tussi:ui spliercs o' artti011 
in Asia sho.ulrl be rlelineil by the Hiiiilu ICusll 
range. This co~ltentio~l, wliic11 was at, first 1)11(; 
forward in a haltirlg manlier, 11:is rccc~~f.ly assurilcii 
rnore definite sl1:~11e ; :ulrl tvllilc I,iussi:~1.1 wril;c:rs a t  
the present tirnc take ILO pains to C O I ~ C C : I ~  tllc f:icL 
that 1i11ssia ~i~c:ans, if possil~lc, t ( ,~ c;st~:~i(l  IICI- 
authority tl~rsughout Lllr: c!-ou~ltry lying l,c!t,r~t:c!~ 
tllc PIirlilu Iinsh :md Rivitr Oxus, t,lll?y c!vcrl go so 
Bsr :LS to i[isl)utc: T3ngl.tuitl's c!scl~isivc~ rig11,t to noll- 
1x01 Afgllan policy, :uiil rc:Li:r LO :I, ltnrrsi:u~ occ!upa- 
tion of 11cr:~t as an c;vc!~~C ~vllich ~rn~sl; iakc? plac:r. 
in. tluc coursc?. Wc thus see. tli:~I. ~vllilt! i,11r: (li~)lt)- 
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nlatists on the Neva are nominally bound by their 
pronlises to England, but in reality are merely 
waiting for a convenient opportunity for the next 
move, public opinion in Russia is gradually being 
accustolned to the idea that Afghan-Turkestan 
and Herat must inevitably become 12ussian posses- 
sions, and that England will be powerless to pre- 
vent it, but will have to bow before accomplisl~ed 
facts. 
Have Englishmen, then, made up their minds 
as to what should be done in the event of Russia 
~liaking such a move, either on Herat or against 
Ai'gl~an-Turkestan, or-as is Inore probable-on 
both provinces simultaneously ? Have they formed 
ally opinion as to tlie blest means of counteracting 
the great; blow wliicli would thus be struck against 
our vital interests in the East? The time for 
forming some decision regarding this nlatter can- 
not be much longer delayed ; and if the safety and 
welfare of tlie Indian Empire is not to be subordi- 
.nated and sacrificed to party interests at home, 
.it is not . only necessay that a definite line of 
policy should be adopted with regard to Central 
Asian affairs, but it is also imperative that tlie 
line of collduct so debermined should be stead- 
fastly adhered to, and should not be dependent 
on the passing fancies of each successive adminis- 
tration. 
Now, in order to more fully understand the 
situation, let us, for n moment, consider what 
,would be our position if we were to permit the 
.Russians LO move across the northern I'rontiera of 
Afghanistan and establish themselves in Herat or 
Afghan-Turkestan. . 
I n  the first place, i t  must be remembered that 
by such an invasion of the h i r ' s  dominions, 
Russia would not only have conclusively demon- 
strated-if such furl;her proof be necessary-that 
, her pleclges are of no avail in restrail~irig her 
, onward march towards India ; but if B~lglancl 
were then to take no steps to expel tlle intruders, 
her inaction woulcl be attributed to fear. Among 
the native populations of I i~dia  and Afgllnnistnn 
this fact alone would produce a conclition of alar111 
! and ~ n i s t ~ u s t  wliicll would seriously accentuate the 
clifficulties of our position ; in every bazaar ai1d 
hamlet in the East it W O L I ~ C ~  be allispered that the 
clays of the great British ' Raj ' were numbered ; 
and malcontents, and many waverers also, vllo 
:! might otllerwise liave throw11 in their lot wit11 us, 
,; would prepare to declare tllemselves in favour' of 
r our rivals. 
Alid while our position in India, woulcl. be sorely 
shaken by the acloption of such, half-hearted policy, 
would our positioii wit11 regarcl to Afgl~anistsn bc 
any better ? We should have to either occul~y 
the eastern and south-ensteriz l~ortions of tllat 
count.ry, or else try to erect a ' buffer State ' o11.t of 
the remaants wllicli Russia had le.ft. And what 
prospect woulcl there l ~ e  of raising up a new ai~t i  
stable Afghan kirlgdonl out of the wreclc of tlze o1.d 
one T The Britisli Govenu~~ent 113s repcatJc(lly 
sl;ated that they woulcl l~ermit no foreign inicr- 
fe~encc in Afghan aatirs, nlirl hnve cleclare~l t.,llnt 
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they would resist all encroach~nents on the A i l ~ i ~ ' ~  
dominions. This has been the avowed policy of 
Great Britain ever since the days of Dost Mdiom- 
med ; and although our policy towarcls the rulers . 
of the kingclom of Kabul has been subject to many 
variations, ancl has passed through all the changes 
from studied incl~fference to unpro.fitab1.e interfe- 
rence, still it has illvariably been affirmed that 
Afghanistan must be kept free froin Russia11 in- 
fluence. Were we, therefore, to countellance a 
Muscovite occupation of ally porl;ion of the Amir's 
dominions, we should not only appear before the 
Afghan people as a nation which abandoned a 
time-l~onoured policy rather than run the risk of a 
collision with Russia, but we sllould also stand 
conclemnecl for having betrayed and deserted them 
in their hour of need. 
Wit11 the Afghans in s~ich a frame of mind 
would there be any reasonable prospect of our 
being able to erect an efficient barrier out of the 
reinnants of the kingdom of Kabul ? And even 
if such a 'buffer State ' could be mailltailled for a 
few years, would it be 'the strong and friendly 
Power on our north-western frontiers,' which so 
many statesmen have declared it to be our true 
policy to establish ? IIaving by our actions con- 
fessed our inal~ility to upliold the integrity of tlie 
Anlir's doininions, how could we possibly expect 
to succeed in the construction of a inore lasting 
and more reliable obstacle to Russia's aclvance out 
of i;he fragments of Afghanistan which the White 
C z a ~  iilight be plcaseil to leave to ns ? 11; woulcl 
2 86 CONCLUSION, 
be a, fruitless-nay, a11 impossible-task. With a 
disquieted population i11 Indi:~, a i d  with a turbuleiit 
nud resentful people on our borders, no Govern- 
nlent in I i~dia could possibly hope to construct a 
new, lasting, and friendly Afghan kingdom out of. 
the wreck of the old one. 
And even if the existence of such a 'buffer 
State' were found to be possible, we could not 
expect to exercise the same degree of control over 
its external relatioils as we now exert over the 
foreign policy of the Amir Abdur Rahman. The 
co~uil;ry now l~noma by tlie name of Afghanistan 
i ~~ou lc l  liarre disappeared from OR the inap of Asia, 
f niicl 3 new State would have come into being, with, 
regard to wllicli the Russians woulcl no longer be 
fettered by ally proniises of non-intervention. The. 
new order of things would be followed by a corre- 
spoilding change in Russia's policy. She wonld 
no longer be hampered by any irksome pledges of 
lion-in~erference in the affairs of our trunipery 
' buffer State,' and would be carelul to a,bstain froin 
entering illto any inconvenient contracts ; and thus, 
insteacl of a united Afghanistan under Britisli 
control, m7e shonld have a puny principality on 
our borders, not  solely under the influence of the 
Indian Government, but under the dual coiltrol of 
England an.d Russia. I t  is surely unilecessary to 
com~neilt on the conditions of disorder and per- 
petual unrest which would be inherent in such an  
asrangenlent. 
Aiicl would our position be improvecl if we 
were to t,ake possession of the provinces of Iiabul 
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and Kandahar, and thus join with Russia in a 
partition of Afghanistan ? By the adoption of 
such a Line of action we should 110 cloubt make it 
clear to the people of India that we had at last 
determined to place a limit to Russia's advance, 
and were resolved to beat back the tide of invasion 
before i t  reached the plains of the Punjaub. They 
would thus gain confidence, and in proportion as 
their belief in our power increased so would the 
danger of trouhles in our rear diminish ; arid such 
a step mrould therefore tend to lninimise the dif- 
ficulties of tlie Irldian Government so far as the 
internal administration of the country is concerned. 
And, as compared with the eslablishment. of a nev 
'buKer State' in EasLerli and South-Eastern Afghani- 
stan, a British occupation of Kabul and Kandahar 
would possess the one other advantage that, instead 
of having a weak and unstable native Stateson our 
bordel-s, exposed to tlie machinations of Muscovile 
agents mrho have invariably proved themselves to 
be adepts in the cogcoction of cunningly devised 
political plots, we should, by our presence in the 
country, .be in a position to observe, and in a 
measure to counteract, any Russian attempts to 
intrigue with the local cl~iefs and tribesmen. 
But although our position in India might be 
somewllat imnl~roveil by snch a forward move, 
would we not raise np for ourselves fresh trials and 
hurcleils in Afghanistan ? Reference has already 
been inade to tlie dangerous effect which would 
be proiluced in tlie minds of the Afghan people 
if wc were lo coiullenance a Rnssian occul2ation 
- - 
of any portion of the Amir's doinii~ions, in spite 
of our repeated declarations that we shoplil per- 
mit no foreign interference in the affairsdof that 
State. But great as would be their resentineiit if 
me failed to adhere to our avowed policy, and 
deserted them in their time of trouble, it woulcl be 
illcreased a hundredfold if are were to join with 
Russia in the disinel-nbenneiit of their country. We 
should be considered to be not,llin,n better thnii a 
nation of tricksiters, whose prolnises were vrortliless, 
a id  who mere ready a11cld williug to sacri'lce our 
allies and our good ilaiile for tlie sake of territorisl 
aggr.anc1iseinent. Our first ancl seconcl Afglian wars 
would be brought fortvaril as evideilce against us. 
I t  woulcld be said that \Ire had inerely eiltereil upon 
those calnpaigns for the purpose of gaining posses- 
sion of the countl-y, that having 11een twice 
foiled by the stu'bbonl ~esistallce of the Afghan 
people, we bad at last cleciclecl to joi~i hnncls t~rit~ll 
the nation we llad so frec~ueiit,ly deno~ziiced ill 
order to achieve our object. Such, :~iirl similnr 
ideas-fostered, a s  ltliey proba1)ly would be, by the 
, 
secret teacliiiigs of llussialz crnissnries-tvoulil L;llie 
deep root in tlie minds of tlle peol)le, :~ii(l we 
shoulcl sooil begin to exl3erience :111 tllc! dilIicnltiex 
of OUT eit~zation. 11; inust lje rc.~a~ei~~bcrccld tll:~t\lr(.u 
slloulcld have to c1e:~l with the 1nol.e tn~I~nlc?nt :uld 
f'niiatical portion of the 11opul:~t;ion of AfK~ll:~ilis~;~,l, 
auil vrllile t811e Bnssia~ls ~ ~ c . r e  sct;tli~lg ~IOWIL wi(;li 
their iiew ITerati su1.1jcc:ts nut1 wit11 t;lw ' I J s l~c !~~  
A.l'gliali-'l'urkeshll, tvc sllor~lil lind it, a ~ L L *  Il l ,  ,I.(: 
: L ~ ~ L I O L I S  ~:LsI< to ~ O V ( ! Y ~ L  1,110 d(?.sc~(\ll(l:~, 1s 1lL1, 
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mountaineers who gave us so much trouble on 
former occasions. A large and permanent increase 
to our Indian army-especially in the British 
element-would be unavoidable, and our financial 
burdens and political responsibilities would be 
increased to an incalculable extent. 
And there is one other point to be considered. 
Whether we decided to establish a new 'buffer 
State ' or determined to assume direct control over 
Eastern and South-Eastern Afghanistan, we should 
be confronted by the great problem of the settle- 
ment of the frontiers of the newly acquired Russian 
possessions. And how is this problem to be 
solved? We know that three years were spent 
over the recent delimitation of the north-western 
frontiers of Afghanistan between the Hefi-Rud and 
River Oxus, and we also h o w  that although two 
years have been occupied in the interchange of 
 communication^ between the British and Russian 
Governments regarding the Pamir Question, no 
satisfactory understanding has yet been arrived at  ; 
and such being the case, what prospect would 
there be of the speedy deniarcation of a boundary 
extending from Beluchistan on the south to the 
Pamir plateau on the north, and passing for the 
most part tl~rough little-known and imperfectly 
explored regions ? Why, it would take years 
before even the general direction of the line was 
agreed upon, to say nothing of' the disputes and 
delays which would inevitably arise while the 
details were being worked out on the ground. 
The conduct of the Rtzssiens during the last 
YOL. 11. 
Boundary Commission d3ords a clear warning of 
what we should have to expect if we were ever so 
foolish as to attempt the joint delimitation of a 
new frontier such as that to which we now refer. 
Flushed with their success in ha.ving at last gained 
possession of Herat, they woulcl insist on the new 
.boundary being fixed in accordance wit11 their 
wishes, and unless we were prepared to make goocl 
our claims by force of arms, we s11.ould either have 
t,o abandon the task (zltogetlier and 1e:~ve the 
frontier undefined, or permit it to be laid clown in 
accordance with the dictates of Russia. 
It is possible that our position woulcl be 
rendered somewhat less di.ficult if we were to 
steer a micldle course, and were to occupy the 
Randallar 'province only, a native ruler being still 
maintained on the throne of Kabul. As cornpnre(1 
with the policy of remaining behinil onr existing 
frontiers and striving to preserve the rcrn~lntits of 
the Amir's dominions as a 'buffer St,zt,e,' or in 
comparison even with a Rritisli occnpni;ion of the 
whole of Eastern and South-Easten1 Afghzniskan, 
such a course would no doubt possess some 
advantages. By its adoption we sllo~~lcl still show 
that we intender1 to bar Russia's f~l'urtllr!r progress, 
and as tliis wonld clenote conficlel~ca irl our own 
strength there woulcl he less tlm~ger of tunlulcs in 
Indin ; we shoulcl still bc, in a bctl:cr posildoii to 
couni;cl.act E~~ss inn iiitriguea ilia11 if wo U'CLYC? I:O 
remain hehitlcl our present frontiers ; uro ulzould 
secure Hancla11:~r withoul, 1)urcloiiil~g ot,trscjlvc!s 
with tlie government of tht? more turhnl(!llt :ulil 
unprofitable portion of Eastern Afghanistan ; and 
me should, moreover, be able to gradually prepare 
the way for an eventual occupation of the Kabul 
province in case we found the continuailce of 
native rule to be detrimental to our interests. 
But although this last alternative would seem 
to be better than the others which have been 
referred to, we believe that no half measures will 
prove successful in wading off tlie blow which 
Russia intends, sooner or later, to strike against 
our Empire in the East. She has repeatedly pro- 
inised to respect the frontiers of Afghanistan, ancl 
vi7e have as frequentlyinade it known that we shall 
permit no violation of the Amir's dominions. I t  
is our true policy to see that tliese promises are 
lrept, ancl if we fail to do so we shall only have 
ourselves to blaine if the Afghan people turn to 
Bussia when they find tliat we are unable or un- 
willing to protect Lhem. If we permit the Cossacks 
to occupy Rerat or Afghan-Turkestan, we must 
not be surprised if the belief gains ground in India 
that we were powerless to prevent it, and it is 
aeedless to dwell on what the clii%cul~ies of our 
position. would be if such opiiiiotis unfortr~nately 
1)egan to tiice root in the nlinds of the people. 
In former years it vas frecluently said that the 
further Russia aclvailced into Central Asia th.e 
wealrer she wou1.d become, owing to extencleil 
communication.s and the hostility of tlie tribes she 
would encounter during her progress. But virllo 
can now say that Russia's power for threatening 
Inilia is less than it was a.t any former pe,riocl 
1r 3 
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The people who started this theory seemed to 
imagine that Russia vas  going to send her armies 
across unexplored deserts and mountai~i ranges 
with. a reckless. disregard of the most ordinary 
military and po1it;ical precautions; while, as a 
matter of fact, she has continued her advance with a 
remarkable clegree of caution and deliberation, and 
has not only secured her commuiiications with her 
base, but has also loolced to her lateral supports, 
and has been careful not, to make any fresh move 
until slie has first consolidated lier existing position. 
To quote the words of the late Sir I-Ienry, Raw; 
! linson : ' Anyone who traces the movements of 
Russia towards India on the map of Asia cannot 
fail to be struck with the resemblance which these 
movements bear t o  the operations of an army open- 
ing parallels ajirzilist a belengueretl fortl-ess.' Slie 
has advanced, and is still aclvt~ncing, tow:utls India, 
not after the manner in wliich an army assaults a 
position in the field, but with the care and de- 
liberation with wliich a skilled general collducts 
the siege of a strong fortress. One after another 
the pl~ysical obstacles which were supp~ficcI to 
form a11 allnost iinl~assable barrier to 11er :~ilvancc 
have all been passed ; tlle vast ileserts have 1)ec.n 
left miles behilid by the Coss:~cks ; the ' gig:nltic, 
snow-clacl mountains ' o,T the firopam.is us have, C ~ T L  
better acc~uaint;nllce, ilwinilleil into nil insig1ii~fic:ult; 
range of' sandstone hills, and ins~eail of' our l,c?iiig 
able to point to l;lle t h~~~a ik ( l f i  of miles of t~nc!s~~lort:t~ 
wastes vl.iicl~forinr!fly i~lt,ervenctll)c?t;wc?c:n t ; l l c  :I~lldi:ui 
and 'nussi:~n frontiers, we rlow Iaiolv that tllcrtl :u.cJ 
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but 500 miles remaining between our advanced 
posts in the Pishin Valley and those of the Russians 
in Badgllis. 
Are we, then, going to let Russia continue her 
march until this last remaining interval between her 
frontiers and India shall have entirely disappeared ? 
Are we going to cast aside all our advantages 
in the vain hope of securing permanent peace, 
or rather in order that we might ' put off the evil 
day ' ? Those 500 miles of country which still sepa- 
rate the Cossack from the Sepoy are of the greatest 
importance in that they secure us from surprise, 
and, by keeping Russian agents at a distance, pre- 
vent them from disturbing the peace of Inclia by 
their secret intrigues. But, above all, it must be re- 
membered that SO long as we prevent the Russians 
from perinaneritly establishing themselves in Herat 
or any other portion of Afghanistan, our India11 
troops will, in the event of war, possess the inestim- 
able advantage of being able to oppose, in selected 
positions, an army which has had to undergo long 
and toilsome marches, exposed throughout to the 
harassing attacks of local tribesmen. 
If we, however, permit Russia to absorb the 
northern and western provinces of Afghanistan, 
these aclvantages will disappear, and any short 
respite we might gain by such fatuous policy would 
be completely neutralised by the new dangers and 
dificulties we should have to face. Whctl~er we 
then rlloved forward into Eastern Afghanistan or 
remained behind our present frontiers, the result 
would be clisastrous. Our Indian arllly mvould have 
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to be greatly increased, large sums would liave to 
be spent on new~fortificatiol~s nncl other defensive 
measures, and to meet this additional expenditure 
on warlike prepaations, fresh burdens would have 
to be inlposed on tlie people. And to what pur- 
pose ? We slioulcl be discredited in the eyes of 
the Afghan nation ; the people of India would 
begin to doubt our power ; and Russia would be in 
a more favourable position, either to invade India, 
01- to shake our power by means of intrigue. She 
mould construct railwaj~s to the extreme limits of 
her possessions; lmge garrisons would be esta- 
blished at strategical points close to her frontiers ; 
2nd then, ~vllen it suitecl her to make a fresh move, 
our soldiers, insteacl of encoulltering an exhausted 
army, would find themselves confronted by troops 
who hacl been exposed to 110 greater l~ardships than 
they had tl~emselves experienced. 
There is one important factor in the case which 
has not yet been considered, viz. : the attitude of 
the Afghan people ; and it may be asked whether 
it would still be our best policy to oppose a 
Muscovite occupation of Northern and Western 
Afghanistan even i f  the Afghans were on Russia's 
side, or if it would not be wiser to wait until we 
could make sure of their co-operation or neutrality. 
Now, we may be perfectly certain of one thing, and 
that is that the Afghans will never be able to 
maintain an attitude of neutrality in the event of a 
conflict between England and Xussia in Central 
Asia. They will have to choose between the con- 
tencli~lg parties, ancl will either fight on our side 
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in defence of their kingdom, or join with Russia in 
tlie hope of obtaining some share in tlie plunder of 
India. If we then fail to observe our engagements 
towards them, and if we shrink from supporting 
ever likely to forget our desertion and range them- 
selves on our side? And if they were to turn 
against us when we offer to preserve their country 
from foreign invasion, could we possibly rely on 
their assistance after they had been exposed to 
Russian propagandisln and after they had become 
accustomed to Russian rule? We think not. Our 
besl; chance of gaining the assistance of the Afghan 
people is by displaying coiliidence in our own 
strength, and in steadfastly resolviiig to preserve 
their kingdom fro111 Russian occupation. If they, 
prove unwilling to assist us in repelling such an 
invasion of their country, they will never help us 
in  the defence of India, but under Russian 
influence will rather prove to be an additional 
danger, and it would therefore be madness for us 
to allow Russia to take up a position on our 
frontiers merely because the Afghans might prove 
to be lzostile, and in the vain hope of obtaining 
their aid at some later period. 
any further approximation of the Russian and 
Indian frontiers ; and such are the difficulties we 
should have to face if we were to permit Russia 
to violate the Amir's dominions. For  the reasons 
we have given above, we believe i t  to be England's 
true policy to make any Russian invasion of 
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1 Afghanistan a casus Belli, and, in the event of 
d ; her crossing the frontiers of that state, to wage 
( war against her in all parts of the world until she 
1 is forced to abandon her aggressive purpose. Such 
$ a war woulcl indeed be a deplorable catastrophe, 
which can only be contemplated with a repugnance 
al;lmost amounting to horror ; but however dreadful 
and far-reaching the consequences of sucll struggle 
might be, they could be no worse than those which 
would be attendant on tlie similar straggle wliicll 
must inevitably be forced oil us at a later period 
, 1 ion we if we abandon all the advantages of pos't' 
now possess. The conflict would tlieil be far more 
bitter, of longer duration, and inorc far-reaching, 
for, as our dangers and dificulties increased, we 
should be compelled to put forces into motion 
which we might otherwise shrililr from ~ztilising. 
If Russia violates Afghan territory and attempts 
to establish herself in Nortliern or Western 
Afghanistan, she will only do so for one of two 
reasons. She will do so either for Ihc purpose of 
directly contesting our supremacy ill Iridi:~, or in 
order that she might obtain a more favouraljle 
position for attaclring us at some later pc!riocl. If 
she wishes for peace, i f  she lioricstly clcsires to 
introduce order, civilisation, and coi~l~nercial 1)ro- 
sperity into Central Asia, she has su0ic:icnt sc:opc? 
and ample opportunities in her wiclo empiro f,)r so 
doing witlzout going farther alic!IcZ, anil wit lloul, 
making aggressive movements ~vlii(:li can ollly pro.. 
voke war, and must inevitably procluco a contiition 
of the wildest anarchy throughont nll tho coull- 
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tries in the Heart of Asia. If she abstains from 
interference in Afghan affairs we are not likely to 
meddle with the tribes and people within her 
sphere of action, but will rather welcome the in- 
creased prosperity and good order which are to be 
expected from the introduction into Central Asia 
of Western ideas and a more stable form of govern- 
ment ; but if she is not content with her position, 
and if she steps beyond the limit which she herself 
has agreed to respect, then we must be careful to 
preserve our great Eaatern dependency from her 
disturbing influence, and for this purpose it will 
be necessary to strike her in her most vulnerable 
points, and shake her power while her Asiatic 
armies are marching across the space which still 
intervenes between her frontiers and the positions 
we intend to defend. 
I t  is not the intention here to say where those 
positions should be, and it would be useless to 
attempt to lay down any hard and fast rule as to 
where our Indian armies should make their first 
stand against the invaders, for the nature and 
extent of our offensive and defensive measures 
must necessarily be dependent on numerous and 
complicated circumstances. But whether we meet 
them beyond the Passes, or strike them as they 
struggle through the difficult defiles on our fron- 
tiers, the defence of India will be greatly simpli- 
fied if the people of England will be true to them- 
selves, and resolutely make up their minds to 
actively oppose any further Russian advance to- 
wards our great Eastern Empire. 

APPENDICES 
I APPENDIX I 
1 The Will of Pete~ the Great, as given in ' Des P ~ o g ~ d s  e In Puissance Iiusso ' by bl. Lesu~ ; publisl~ed in Punis in 
1812. 
I. NEGLECT nothing which can introdl~ce European 
manners and customs into Rnssia, and with this object gain 
the co-operation of the various Courts, and especially the 
learned men of Europe, by means of interesting specula- 
tions, by philantl~ropic and philosophical principles, or by 
any other suitable means. 
11. Maintain the State in a condition of peiyetual war 
i in order that the troops may be inured to warfare and so that the whole nation may always be kept in training and ready to march at the first signal. 
111. Extend our dominions (by every possible means 
towards the north along the Baltic, as well as towards tlie 
south along the shores of the Black Sea; and for this 
purpose :- 
IV. Excite the jealousy of England, Denmark and 
Brandenburg against the Swedes, by means of which those 
powers will disregaid any encroachments whicli we may 
then make on that State, and which we will end by sub- 
jugating. 
V. Interest the TIouse of Austria in the expulgion of 
tlie Tnrks from Europe, and undor this pretext maintain 
n perinunellt ariny and establid L ~ O C ~ C ~ ~ L ~ L ~ S  on the shorefl 
- - - 
of the Black Sea, and thus by ever moving forwards we 
will eventually reach Constantinople. 
TI. ICeep up a state of anarchy in Poland ; influence 
its national assemblies, and above all regulate the elections 
of its kings; split it up on every occasion that presents 
itself ; and finally sul~jugate it. 
VII. Enter into a close alliance with England, and 
maintain direct relations wit11 her by means of a good 
commercial t,reaty ; allow her even to exercise a certain 
monopoly in the inte~ior of the Sbate, so that EL good uniler- 
standing may by degrees be established between the 
English merchants ancl sailors and ours, who on their part 
are in favour of everything which tends to perfect and 
increase the Russian Navy, by aid of which it is necessary 
to a t  once stiive for mastery over the Baltic and in the 
Black Sea-the keystone on which the speedy success ol 
the scheme depends. 
VIII. Bear in mind that tho commerce of India is the 
commerce of the World, and that 11e who can exclusively 
control i t  is the dictator of Europe; no occasion should 
therefore be lost to provoke war with Persia, to hasten its 
decay, to advance to the Persian Gulf, and then to en- 
deavour to re-establish the ancient trade of the Levant 
through Syria. 
IX. Always interfere, either by force of arms or by 
intrigue, in  the quarrels of the European I'owers, and 
especially in those of Germany ; and with this object :- 
X. Seek after and constnntly maintain an alliance with 
Austria; encourage her in her favourite idea of national 
predominance; profit by tlio slightest ascende~icy gained 
over her to entangle her in disastrous wars, so that she 
may gradually bo wealroned; oven help ller somotimos; 
but incessantly stir up agr~inst; her Ghe enmity of tho whole 
of Europe and pnrticularly that, of Germany, by rousing 
the jealousy and mistrust of the German princes. 
XI. Always seloot wives for Russian pi~inces from 
among the German Princesses ; RO that by thus rnultiply- 
ing c 
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ing alliances based on close relationship and mutual 
interest we will increase onr influence over that Empire. 
XI. Make use of the power of the Church over the 
disunited and schismatical Greeks who are scattered over 
Hungary, Turkey, and the southern parts of Poland ; gain 
them over by every possible means; pose as their pro- 
tectors ; and establish a claim to religious supremacy over 
them. Under this pretext, and with their help, Turkey 
will be conquered, and Poland, being unable any longer 
to stand alone, either by its own strength or by means of 
its political connections, will voluntarily place itself in 
subjection to us. 
XIII. From that time every moment will be precious. 
All our batteries must be secretly prepared to strike the 
great blow, and so that they can act with such order, pre- 
cision, and rapidity, as to give Europe no time for prepara- 
tion. The first step will be to propose very secretly, 
separately, and with the greatest circumspection, first to the 
Court of Vessailles and then to that of Vienna, to divide 
with one of them the Empire of the World; and by men- 
tioning that Russia is virtually ruler of the Eastern World 
and has nothing to gain but the title, this proposal will 
probably not rouse their suspicion. I t  is undoubted that 
this project cannot fail to please them ; and a war to the 
knife will be kindled between them which will soon become 
general, both on account of the connections and widespread 
relationships between these two rival Courts and natural 
enemies, and because of the interests which will compel the 
other powers of Europe to take part in the struggle. 
XIV. In  the midst of this general discord, Russia will 
be asked for help, first by one and then by anobher of the 
belligerent powers ; and after having hesitated long enough 
to give them time to exhaust themselves and to enable her 
to assemble her own armies, she will at last appear to 
decide in favour of the Etouse of Austria, and while she 
pushes her regulnr troops forward to the Rhine, she will 
at once follow them up mitli the hordes of Asia ; and as 
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they advance into Germany, two largo fleets filled with 
a portion of these same hordes must set sail, one from the 
Sea of Azoff and the other from the port of Archangel, 
under convoy of war vessels from the Black Sea and 
Baltic; they will suddenly appear in the Mediterranean 
and Northern Ocean and iilundate Italy, Spain, and France, 
with these fierce and rapacious nomads, who will plunder a 
portion of the inhabitants, carry off others into slavery to 
re-people the deserts of Siberia, and render the remainder 
incapable of escaping from our yoke. A11 these distrac- 
tions will afford such great opportunities to the regular 
troops that they will be able to act with a degree of energy 
and precision which will ensure the subjugation of the rest 
of Europe. 
APPENDIX I1 
Circzilar Desyatch addressed by Prince Gortc7~a7coff to Russian, 
Rejwesen,tativss abroad : dated 21st of Novernbw, 18G44. 
St. Petersburgh, November 21, 1864. 
The Russian newspapers have given a n  account of the 
last military operations execnted by a detachment of our 
troops in  the regions of Central Asia with remarkable suc- 
cess and important results. It was to be foreseen that 
,these events would the more attract the attention of the 
foreign public that their scene was laid in  scarcely known 
countries. 
Our august Master has commanded me  to state to you 
briefly, but with clearness and precision, the position ill 
which we find ourselves in  Central Asia, the interests 
which inspire us in those countries, arid the end which we 
have in  view. 
The position of Russia i n  Central Asia is that of all 
civilised States which ai'e brought into contact with 
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half-savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed social 
organisation. 
I n  such cases it always happens that the more civilised 
State is forced, in the interest of the security of its frontier 
and its coinmercial relations, to exercise a certain ascen- 
dency over those whom their turbulent and unsettled 
character make most undesirable neighbours. 
First, there are raids and acts of pillage to be put 
down. To put a stop to them, the tribes on the frontier 
have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect sub- 
mission. This result once attained, these tribes take to 
more peaceful habits, but are in thoir turn exposed to the 
attacks of the more distant tribes. 
The State is bound to defend them against these 
depredations, and to punish thoso who commit them. 
Hence the necessity of distant, costly, and periodically 
recurring expeditions against an enemy whom his social 
organisation makes it impossible to seize. If, the robbers 
once punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the lesson is 
soon forgotten ; its withdrawal is put down to weakness. 
I t  is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible 
and palpable force ; the morn1 force of reason and of the 
interests of civilisation has as yet no hold upon them. 
The work has then always to be clone over again from the 
beginning. 
In  order to put a stop to this state of permanent dis- 
order, fortified posts are established in the midst of these 
hostile tribes, and an influence is brought to bear upon 
them which reduces them by degrees to a state of more or 
less forced submission. But soon beyond this second line 
other still more distant tribes come in their turn to threaten 
the same dangers and necessitate the same measures of 
repression. The State thus finds itself forced to choose 
one of two alternatives, either to give up this endless 
labour and to abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance, 
rendering all prosperity, all security, all civilisation an 
impossibility, or, on the other hand, to plunge deeper and 
i 
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deeper into barbarous countries, where the difficulties aild 411l!i1 
expenses increase with every fitep in advance. i ~ ~ t l t h ~  
Such has been the fate of every country which has :LI ~ ' 1  
found itself in  a similar position. The 'United States in . 1 1 c : i 1 0 ~  
America, France i n  Algeria, Bolland i n  her Colonies, b A 
England in India-a11 have been irresistibly forced, less wit11 
by ambition than by imperious necessity, into this onward 
march, where the greatest dificulty is to know when to 
on one side on the Syr-Darin, on the other on tlie Lalce ( 
Issilr-Kul, and to strengthen these two Iines by advanced t ~ )  i 1 
foi,ts, which, little by little, have crept on into the heart I 
of those distant regions, without however succeeding in 
estnblishing on the other ~ i d e  of our frontiers that tran- 
quillity which is indispensable for their security. t ~ v r ~  
The explanation of tliis unsettled state of things is to 
be found, first, in the fact that, betmeen tbe extreme 
points of this double line, there is an immense unoccupied HC) t 
space, where all attempts a t  colonisation or caravan trade 
are paraIysed by the inroads of the robber tribes ; and, in 
the second place, in the perpetnnl fluctuations of tho 
political conditioli of tliou~ countries, where Turlce~tnn al~d 
Rhokand, sometin~es united, sometimes at variance, always 
at  war, either with one a~iotller or rnithBolrliart~, presented 
no chance of settledrelations or of any regular trrmsactiona 
whatever. 
'.l1he Imlsorinl Goverr~rne~it tlms found itself, ill spitn of 
all its afforLs, in the dilommn wo llavo r~bovct; nllutlrd to, 
t'ht~t is to say, cornpolled c!it;hr?r to parrnit; tl~e: continuunco 
of n, utntc: nf permanent disorilar, ~r~rnlys ing  to id1 ~c:?cu~ii;y 
and progrew, or to  corldotr~r~ itsolf to costly nnil rlififnnt 
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subjugation by armed force, one after another, of the small 
independent states whose habits of pillage and turbulence 
aild whose perpetnal revolts leave their neighboum neither 
peace nor repose. 
Neither of these alternative courses was in accordance 
with the object of our august Master's policy, which con- 
sists, not in  extending beyoiid all reasonable bounds the 
regious nncler his sceptre, but in giving a solid basis to 
liis rule, in guaranteeing their secnrit,y, ancl in developing 
their social organisation, their commerce, their well-being, 
ancl their civilisation. 
Our task was, therefore, to discover a system adaptecl 
to the attainlnent of this threefold object. 
The foilowing principles have, in consequence, been 
laid down :- 
1. It has been judged to be indispensable that our 
two fortified frontier lines-one extending from China to 
the lake Issik-Knl, the other from the Sea of Aral aloilg 
the Syr-Daria, should be united by fortified points, 
so that all our posts shonld be in a position of rnulual 
support, leaving no gap through which the nomad tribes 
might make with impunity tlieir inroads and deprcda- 
tions. 
2. It was essential that the line of oar advanced forts 
thus completed shonld be sitnatecl in  a conntry fertile 
enough, not only to insure their supplies, but also to 
facilitate the  regular colonisation, which alone can prepare 
a future of stability and prosperity for tho occupied 
country, Isy gaining over the neighbouring populations to 
civilizcil life. 
3, and lastly. It was urgent to lay down this line 
definitely, so as to escape the danger of being carried 
away, as is almost inevitalsle, by a series of repressive 
measures ancl reprisals, into an uillimited extension of 
territory. 
To attain this end a system had to be established which 
shonld depend not only on reason, wliich may be elasiic, 
VOJ,, 11. X 
~ -- 
b l ~ t  on geographical and political conclitions, which are 
fixed and permanent. 
This system was suggested to us by n very simplo fact, 
tlie result of long experience, namely, that t he  nomad 
tribes, which tau neither be mized nor puliished, nor efyectu- 
ally kept in order, are our most inconvenient; neigl~bonrs ; 
while, on the other hand, ngricultural aud commorcinl 
populations attached to the soil, alld possessing a lnoro 
advanced social organisation, offer us every chance of 
gaining neigl~bours wit11 wliom there is  a possibility of 
entering into re1 a t' ions. 
Consequent;ly, our frontier line ought to s~vdlow up 
tho former, and stop short a t  tho limit of the latter. 
T h e ~ ~ e  three principles supp1.y a cloar, iintnml, nnil 
logical explanation of our last militlnry operntions in Central 
Asia. I11 fact, our original ft.oi~tior line, estsncl ing along 
the  Syr-Dnrio to Fort I.'erovslii oil onc side, mid on tllo othel, 
to tlie Lake Issilr-Kul, bncl tlio cll.~wb:~cli of bnir~g nllno.ut 
on the verge of the desert. I t  was I~wlion by n, wiile gal, 
Letjweeli tlie two extrernc? poinCs ; it did not olli.;~- sufliciellt, 
revonrces to our troops, and left n11sett;leil tril~cs over tho 
bordor with wliich any settlocl ni~ai-lgegomcnt bccn111o 
itnpossible. 
I n  spite of our ~~nwillingness to oxtend 0111. fro~~t;iclr, 
those mot;ives h:~d beon ~o~ve~ ' f i l I  cl ~~ioligli t o  it~ll~lc(! I ; ~ I C )  
Imperial Govenl~nenl; f:o estnl~lish this lillr) 1~i:trvc?r~11 '1',:$(! 
I,suil;-Ral and the Rys-T')arin l ~ y  frrtifyii~g t11c~ t;o\~.n of 
Chiml:ontJ, l:~t;c!ly occnl)ir?d l)y ns. Iiy Llic! :dopt4ion ol' t;his 
litlo wo obtnhl n ilo-ulllo ~usulti. 'In t l ~ !  lirst pl:~ct+, tho 
count~~y i t  h l l i ~ ~  it1 i~ .fc;rI;ilo, wall ~v0011(~il, :~lld ~11t;ertvI I)y 
n i i~~~e~oi is r  m:~t;c:r-coi~rfic!~ ; ili is 11artly i~lll:d~il;clil I J ~  v:~rirl~~s 
I<irgl~i.w tril~cs, wl~ic.:h Ilavo :~lrc:~hy :~c:copi;~lil'our 1-ult:; i(; 
(:oilscquonl~dy olE:l% fi~vonr:d,lc! cosiili.tions fi,i* colo~lia:b(;iol~ 
and tlie s u ~ ~ p l y  of provisions Lo our g i~ r r i so l~~ .  III t110 H L ~ C O ~ I ~ ~  
pl:hce, it p ~ i t ~ ~  118 ill Iii1(9 itr~~ri(!(li:~i;(! r ~ ~ ! i ~ l ~ l ~ o ~ ~ t ~ l ~ ( , ~ o ~ ~  of' t ,Il,j  
r.~gricultiil*d and r:omrr~r!rc:ial po11111:d;io1l,li l i l o l .  Nr(+ 
liliil oursc~lvc?~ in ptli!st!nct: 01' :L I ~ I O I ~ O  $(,lid :111d c(.,J~~I~:Lc~:, 
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ullsettled, and better organised social state ; fixing for us 
with geogra~hical precision tho limit up to which me are 
bound t o  advance, alld at which we must h d t ;  because, 
while, on the one hand, any further extension of our rule, 
meeting, as  it wonld, no longer with nilstable comm~ulities, 
such as  the nomad tribes, but  with more regularly cousti- 
t u t ed  States, wonld entail considerable exertions, anti would 
draw us  on from annexatioil to annexatiou with unfsreseen 
colaplications. On the other, with such States for our 
future  neighbours, their backward civilisation and the 
instability of their political condition do not shut us out 
f140rn the  hope &at the day lnny come when regular rolntions 
may, to the  advantago of both parties, take the place of tllo 
permanent troubles whiol~ have up to the present rnoineut 
~ a r a l y s e d  all progress in those countries. 
Such, Sir, are the intereats which inspire the policy of 
our august master i n  Central Asia ; such is the object, by 
E i s  I~nper ia l  Mqjesty's orders, of thc action of his Cabinet. 
You are requesied to tako these argnments as your 
guido in any explanations you may give to the Goveriiinent 
t o  which yon are accredited, in case questioils aye asked or 
yon may see credence give11 to erroneons ideas as to our 
action in  these distant parts. 
It, is ileedless for me to lay stress upon tlie interest, 
which Russia evidently has not to increase her terl-itory, 
and, above all, to avoid raising complications on her frontiers 
which can but delay and pamlyse her domestic develop- 
meni;. 
The programme which I have just traced is in accordailce 
wi th  theso views. 
Very frecluenlly of late yen1.s the civilisation of these 
countries, which are her neighbours on tlie continent of 
Asia, has been assigned to Russia as her special ~nission. 
N o  agent has been t'ound more apt for the propess of 
c iv i l i sa t i~ l~  than commercial relations. Their developmcllt 
everywhere o r d ~ r  and stability ; but ill Asia it 
iJcmancls a comy~lcte tmnsforn~tttion of the habits nf t1he 
x 2 
people. Tlle G r ~ t  thing to be tauglit to  tho populnlions of 
Asia i s  that  they will gain more in fjvouring nncl prot(>ctiiig 
t,he caravan trade than in robbing it. These e1emcnt:~~y 
idces can oidy be accepted by tlio ~mblic  whore one existh ; 
that  is to  say, where t l~ere is Bolnc, orgfinisocl. fbrrn of sociely 
and a Governmel~t o direct and rapresent it. 
W e  are accomplivl~ing the first pnrl of our tndi in 
c~ r~ y ing  our frontier to tho limit wllore the iudixpensi~blo 
conditions we to bo founcl. 
Tlle second we shall nccoinplisli in  making ovory offo~bt; 
henceforward to  prove to  our 11eighl)onring Htntus, by rL 
system of Grmllesa in the reprousion of their rnis~lei.tlx, 
co~nbinecl with mocleration mil just,ico in  tlie usu of our 
sbrangth, ancl respect for tlleir i~~depcncloncr, that llussia 
i a  not their onotny, tllnt s l i ~  orlt(*rt:~iils towaril~ them no 
idens of conquast, and that pe:~ceful and cominel~ci:~l rcla- 
tious with Iler are rno1.e l~rolital~lu t11:rn clit3or~lar, pi l l~~ge,  
re~risals ,  allcl a l~orrnnnont ~ t t ~ t o  of W:W. 
'I'lie Imperitd Cnbilict, in nssllllliug this tnsl;, talre,s :IS 
its guiclo the  into rest,^ of Itussin. I 3 u t  it holiaves t,h;~f;, : ~ t  
tlie flame timo, it is promoting tlie interests of hu~n:mit,y 
and civilisation. It lins a right to aspect, t l ~ r ~ t  tllu line c ~ f  
conduct it pursues anil l.lle principles ~vldcll gnidu i t  will 
meut with cl just and ~unclid nppreciution. 
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